Vl^lUQ 


Section 


• V\33 
V.  \n 


\ 


I 


1 


THE  HARVARD  ORIENTAL  SERIES 


VOLUME  SEVENTEEN 


HARVARD  ORIENTAL  SERIES 

/f 

EDITED 

WITH  THE  COOPERATION  OF  VARIOUS  SCHOLARS 

BY 

CHARLES  ROCKWELL  LANMAN 

PROFESSOR  IN  HARVARD  UNIVERSITY,  HONORARY  MEMBER  OF  THE  ASIATIC 
SOCIETY  OF  BENGAL,  THE  ROYAL  ASIATIC  SOCIETY  (lONDON),  AND  THE 
DEUTSCHE  MORGENLANDISCHE  GESELLSCHAFT,  ETC.,  CORRESPONDING 
MEMBER  OF  THE  IMPERIAL  RUSSIAN  ACADEMY  OF  SCIENCES  AND 
OF  THE  INSTITUTE  OF  FRANCE  (aCAD^MIE  DES  INSCRIPTIONS 
ET  belles-lettres) 

IDolume  Seventeen 


CAMBRIDGE,  MASSACHUSETTS 

Zbc  Ibarvarb  ipress 

1914 


THE 


YOGA-SYSTEM  OF  "PATAN JALI 

®r  tbe  ancient  Ibinbu  Doctrine  of  Concentration  of  fiDinO 

EMBRACING 

THE  MNEMONIC  RULES,  CALLED  YOGA-SUTRAS,  OF  PATANJALI 

AND 

THE  COMMENT,  CALLED  YOGA-BHASHYA,  ATTRIBUTED  TO  VEDA- VY ASA 

AND 

THE  EXPLANATION,  CALLED  TATTVA-VAigARADI,  OF  VACHASPATI-MigRA 
TRANSLATED  FROM  THE  ORIGINAL  SANSKRIT 
BY 

JAMES  HAUGHTON  WOODS 

PROFESSOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY  IN  HARVARD  UNIVERSITY 


CAMBRIDGE,  MASSACHUSETTS 

Cbe  Ibarvarb  lllnivereiti?  press 

1914 


The  volumes  of  this  Series  may  be  had,  in  America,  by  addressing  Messrs.  Ginn 
AND  Company,  at  New  York  or  Chicago  or  San  Francisco,  or  at  the  home-office, 
29  Beacon  Street,  Boston,  Mass. ; in  England,  by  addressing  Messrs.  Ginn  & Co., 
9 St.  Martin’s  Street,  Leicester  Square,  London,  W.C.  ; and  in  Continental  Europe, 
by  addressing  Mr.  Otto  Harrassowitz,  Leipzig. — For  the  titles  and  descriptions  and 
prices,  see  the  List  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 


PRINTED  FROM  TYPE  AT  THE 

UNIVERSITY  PRESS,  OXFORD,  ENGLAND 
BY  HORACE  HART,  M.A. 

PRINTER  TO  THE  UNIVERSITY 


First  Edition,  750  Copies,  October,  1914 


HVNC  • LIBRVM 


IN  • MVLTIS  • ET  ■ LONGINQVIS  • TERRIS 
ELABORATVM  • ATQVE  • NVNC  • DENIQVE  ■ CONFECTVM 
SOCIIS  ■ FIDELIBVS 

QVORVM  • MEMORIA-  LABOR  - ILLE-  FELICITER-COMPENSATVR 
ALMS  • MAGISTRIS  • OMNIBVS  • SEMPER  - AMICIS 


y 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2016 


https://archive.org/details/yogasystemofpataOOpata 


CONTENTS 


Preface  page 

1.  Eeasons  for  taking  up  the  work ix 

2.  Difficulties  of  comprehending  the  work  ......  ix 

3.  Difficulties  of  style  . .........  ix 

4.  Translation  of  technical  terms  ........  x 

5.  Punctuation  ...........  x 

6.  Texts  and  manuscripts  .........  xi 

7.  Acknowledgements xi 

Introduction 


1.  Authorship  of  the  Yoga-sutras  : The  two  Patahjalis  ....  xiii 

2.  Tradition  of  their  identity  not  earlier  than  tenth  century  . . . xiii 

3.  Comparison  of  philosophical  concepts  does  not  confirm  the  tradition  . xv 

4.  Date  of  the  Sutras  (between  a.  d.  300  and  500)  .....  xvii 

5.  Date  of  the  Bhasya  (between  a.  d.  650  and  850)  .....  xx 

6.  Date  of  Vacaspatimi9ra’s  Tattva-vaifaradi  (about  a.  d.  800  to  850)  . xxi 

Analytical  Summary  of  the  Yoga-sutras 

1.  Book  1,  Concentration  (samadhi)  .......  xxiv 

2.  Book  2,  Means  of  attainment  (sadhana)  ......  xxv 

3.  Book  3,  Supernormal  powers  (vibhuti)  ......  xxvii 

4.  Book  4,  Isolation  (kaivalya)  . .......  xxviii 

The  Yoga-sutras  translated  without  the  Comment  or  the  Explanation 
Being  the  Sutras  translated  in  groups,  with  group-headings  by  translator  xxx 

Translation  of  Patanjali’s  Yoga-sutras  or  Mnemonic  Eules 
Together  with  the  Comment  or  Yoga-bhasya,  attributed  to  Veda-vyasa 
And  Vacaspatimifra’s  Explanation  or  Tattva-vai^aradl 

1.  Book  1,  Concentration  (samadhi)  .......  1 

2.  Book  2,  Means  of  attainment  (sadhana)  ......  101 

3.  Book  3,  Supernormal  powers  (vibhuti)  ......  201 

4.  Book  4,  Isolation  (kaivalya)  ........  297 

Appendixes 

1.  Bibliography  of  works  referred  to  in  this  volume  ....  351 

2.  Index  of  quotations  in  the  Comment,  in  the  order  of  citation  . . 359 

3.  Index  of  the  same  grouped  according  to  their  sources  ....  361 

4.  Index  of  quotations  in  the  Tattva-vai^aradl,  in  the  order  of  citation  . 362 

5.  Index  of  the  same  grouped  according  to  their  sources  ....  364 

6.  Quotations  not  yet  traced  to  their  sources  ......  365 

7.  Index  of  words  in  the  Yoga-sutras 366 


niMtu> 


I 


PREFACE 

1.  Eeasons  for  taking  np  the  work. — It  is  not  without  misgiving  that  one 
ventures  to  render  into  English  the  texts  of  an  intricate  system  which 
have  never,  with  the  exception  of  the  sutras,  been  translated  in  Europe 
or  America.  But  the  historical  importance  of  those  texts,  as  forming 
a bridge  between  the  philosophy  of  ancient  India  and  the  fully  developed 
Indian  Buddhism  and  the  religious  thought  of  to-day  in  Eastern  Asia, 
emboldens  one  to  the  attempt.  For  this  system,  together  with  the  Nyaya 
and  Vai^esika  systems,  when  grafted  upon  the  simple  practical  exhortations 
of  primitive  Buddhism,  serves  as  an  introduction  to  the  logical  and  meta- 
physical masterpieces  of  the  Mahay  ana. 

2.  Difficnlties  of  comprehending  the  work. — Even  after  a dozen  readings 
the  import  of  some  paragraphs  is  not  quite  clear,  such  for  example  as  the 
first  half  of  the  Bhasya  on  iii.  14.  Still  more  intractable  are  the  single 
technical  terms,  even  if  the  general  significance  of  the  word,  superficially 
analysed,  is  clear.  This  irreducible  residuum  is  unavoidable  so  long  as 
one  cannot  feel  at  home  in  that  type  of  emotional  thinking  which  culmi- 
nates in  a supersensuous  object  of  aesthetic  contemplation. 

3.  Difficulties  of  style. — The  Bhasya  and,  still  more,  the  Tattva-vai§aradi 
are  masterpieces  of  the  philosophical  style.  They  are  far  from  being  a loosely 
collected  body  of  glosses.  Their  excessively  abbreviated  and  disconnected 
order  of  words  is  intentional.  The  Mimahsa  discussed  first  the  meaning  of 
words  (jpadartha) ; then  in  a distinct  section  the  meaning  of  the  sentences 
(vdkydrtha) ; and  finally  and  most  fully  the  implication  (bhdvdrtka)  of  the 
sentences  as  a whole.  Wherever  the  sentence-form  is  lacking,  I have  intro- 
duced in  brackets  the  words  needed  to  make  a declarative  clause.  Much 
more  obscurity  remains  in  the  bhdvdrtka  section  of  the  Bhasya.  For  here 
many  extraneous  technical  terms  are  surreptitiously  introduced  under  the 
guise  of  exegesis.  Thus  polemic  with  an  opponent  whose  name  is  suppressed 

b [h.o.s.  17] 


I 


Preface  [x 

creeps  into  the  argument.  The  allusions  are  suggestive,  but  obviously 
elusive.  The  passage  at  iii.  14  might  be  quite  simple  if  we  had  before 
us  the  text  which  it  criticizes. 

4.  Translation  of  technical  terms. — A system  whose  subtleties  are  not 
those  of  Western  philosophers  suffers  disastrously  when  its  characteristic 
concepts  are  compelled  to  masquerade  under  assumed  names,  fit  enough  for 
our  linguistic  habits,  but  threadbare  even  for  us  by  reason  of  frequent 
transpositions.  Each  time  that  Purusa  is  rendered  by  the  word  “ soul  ”, 
every  psychologist  and  metaphysician  is  betrayed.  No  equivalent  is  found 
in  our  vocabulary.  The  rendering  “ Self  ” is  less  likely  to  cause  misunder- 
standing. Similarly,  and  in  accordance  with  the  painstaking  distinctions 
made  at  the  end  of  ii.  5,  it  is  most  important  to  remember  that  the  term 
a-vidyd,  although  negative  in  form,  stands  for  an  idea  which  is  not  nega- 
tive, but  positive.  Bearing  in  mind  the  express  instructions  of  the  text, 
I have  adopted  “ undifierentiated-consciousness  ” as  the  translation  of  avidyd. 
Another  word,  which  Professor  Garbe  discussed  more  than  twenty  years 
ago  (in  his  translation  of  the  Samkhya-pravacana-bhasya,  S.  70,  Anm.  1),  is 
guna.  I prefer  to  translate  this  term  by  “ aspect  ” rather  than  by  “ con- 
stituent ”,  because,  in  addition  to  the  meanings  “ quality  ” and  “ substance  ”, 
it  often  seems  to  have  the  semantic  value  of  “ subordinate  ” as  correlated  to 
pradhdna.  Three  other  words  sattva  and  rajas  and  tamas  seem  untrans- 
latable, unless  one  is  content  with  half-meaningless  etymological  parallels. 
In  another  case  I have  weakly  consented  to  use  “ Elevation  ” as  equivalent 
to  prasamkhydna ; the  original  word  denotes  the  culmination  of  a series 
of  concentrations;  the  result  is  the  merging  of  the  Self  in  the  object  of 
contemplation. 

5.  Punctuation. — 1.  Quotations  from  the  Sutras  are  enclosed  in  single 

angular  quotation-marks  (<  >).  2.  Quotations  from  the  Bhasya  are  enclosed 

in  double  angular  quotation-marks  («  »).  3.  Quotations  from  authorita- 
tive texts  are  enclosed  in  ordinary  double  quotation-marks  (“  ”).  4.  Objec- 

tions and  questions  by  opponents,  and  quotations  from  unauthoritative  texts, 
are  enclosed  in  ordinary  single  quotation-marks  (‘  ’).  Hyphens  have  been 
used  to  indicate  the  resolution  of  compound  words.  A half-parenthesis  on 
its  side  is  used  to  show  that  two  vowels  are  printed  in  violation  of  the  rules 
of  euphonic  combination  (Lanman’s  Sanskrit  Reader,  p.  289). 


xi]  Preface 

6.  Texts  and  Manuscripts. — The  text  of  the  sutras  of  the  Yoga  system, 
like  that  of  the  sutras  of  all  the  other  five  systems,  except  perhaps  the 
Vai^esika,  is  well  preserved;  and  there  is  an  abundance  of  excellent 
printed  editions.  The  most  accessible  and  the  most  carefully  elaborated 
of  these  books  is  the  one  published  in  the  Ananda9rama  Series  and  edited 
by  Kafinatha  Shastri  Aga9e.  Variants  from  twelve  manuscripts,  mostly 
southern,  are  printed  at  the  foot  of  each  page;  and  Bhojadeva’s  Vrtti  is 
appended ; also  the  text  of  the  sutras  by  itself  and  an  index  thereto.  Another 
edition,  in  the  Bombay  Sanskrit  Series,  by  Rajaram  Shastri  Bodas,  is  also  an 
excellent  piece  of  work.  I have,  however,  made  use  of  the  edition  by  Svami 
Balarama  (Calcutta,  Sarhvat  1947,  a.d.  1890;  reprinted^  in  Benares  a.d. 
1908)  because  it  is  based  on  northern  manuscripts  and  because  of  the  valuable 
notes  in  the  editor’s  tippana.  Of  manuscripts,  I have  collated,  with  the  kind 
permission  of  the  Maharaja,  during  a charming  week’s  visit  at  Jammu  just 
below  the  glistening  snows  above  the  Pir  Panjal,  two  of  the  oldest  manu- 
scripts in  the  library  of  the  Eaghunath  Temple.  In  Stein’s  Catalogue  these 
are  numbered  4375  and  4388  and  the  former  is  dated  Sarhvat  1666.  Two 
other  manuscripts  were  lent  me,  one  by  the  courtesy  of  the  most  learned 
Gangadhara  Shastri,  the  other  the  very  carefully  written  Bikaner  manuscript, 
sent  to  me  by  the  generosity  of  the  Bikaner  government,  which  proved  to 
be  extremely  valuable  for  disputed  readings  in  the  Tattva-vai^aradi.  This 
latter  manuscript  seemed  to  be  about  a hundred  and  fifty  years  old  and  is 
described  in  Rajendralala  Mitra’s  Catalogue  of  Sanskrit  Manuscripts  in  the 
Library  of  His  Highness  the  Maharaja  of  Bikaner  (Calcutta,  1880)  under 
the  number  569.  An  old  Sharada  manuscript,  which,  by  the  kind  mediation 
of  Mukundaram  Shastri  of  Shrinagar,  was  put  into  my  hands,  proved, 
upon  critical  examination,  to  have  been  so  badly  corrupted  as,  on  the  whole, 
not  to  be  worth  recording. 

7.  Acknowledgements. — At  the  end  of  one’s  task  comes  the  compensation 
of  looking  back  to  old  scenes,  and  to  the  friends  and  helpers  who  have 
watched  the  progress  of  the  book.  First  of  all  I remember  the  delightful 

In  the  reprint,  the  pagination  is  unchanged,  but  the  lines  vary  a little.  Hence  there 
are  some  small  apparent  inaccuracies  in  the  references.  The  reprint  may  be  had 
from  Harrassowitz  in  Leipzig ; it  is  catalogued  there  as  Pdtanjala-dar^anasya 
yoga-tattva. 


Preface 


[xii 


visit  on  the  island  of  Fohr,  where,  besides  the  long  friendly  walks  upon 
the  sands,  I enjoyed  the  inestimable  opportunity  of  reciting  and  reading  the 
Yoga-sutras  with  Professor  Deussen.  The  next  winter,  at  Benares,  Mr.  Arthur 
Venis  opened  the  doors  of  the  Sanskrit  College  to  me  and  with  the  utmost 
generosity  smoothed  my  way  through  my  first  winter  in  India  and  initiated 
me  into  the  methods  of  many  controversial  sutras.  Since  my  return  he  has 
always  been  ready  to  assist,  and  I thank  him  for  illuminating  for  me  the 
perplexing  debate  on  the  sphota  in  iii,  17.  Besides  all  this  I am  most 
grateful  to  him  for  an  introduction  to  the  lamented  Shriman  Mukunda 
Shastri  Adkar,  a scholar  who  has  put  the  wealth  of  the  ancient  tradition 
and  his  own  ripe  scholarship  at  my  disposal  for  many  years. 

To  many  other  scholars  in  Benares  and  in  Kashmir  and  in  Poona  I wish 
to  express  my  thanks,  especially  to  Dr.  Shripad  Krishna  Belvalkar  and  to 
Mr.  V.  V.  Sovani.  To  Professor  Arthur  W.  Ryder,  of  the  University  of 
California,  I am  also  much  indebted.  Furthermore,  my  thanks  are  due  to 
Colonel  George  A.  Jacob  of  the  Bombay  Staff  Corps  for  his  courtesy  in 
searching  after  quotations,  and  to  Dr.  Frederick  W.  Thomas  of  the  India 
Office  Library  for  similar  favours  too  many  to  enumerate  or  to  repay. 

My  deepest  insight  into  this  system  and  into  what  little  I know  of  the 
philosophy  of  India  I owe  to  Professor  Hermann  Jacobi  of  Bonn.  Each 
visit  to  the  little  city  on  the  Rhine  adds  to  my  debt  of  gratitude  to  him 
and  reveals  to  me  the  beauty  of  the  scholar’s  life. 

On  my  return  from  each  visit  to  India  I laid  the  work  in  its  several  stages 
before  Professor  Lanman,  my  teacher  in  my  student  days  and  now  my 
colleague.  To  him  I owe  the  revision  of  the  manuscript  for  the  press 
and  a comparison  of  most  of  the  translation,  either  in  manuscript  or  in 
proof,  with  the  original.  His  rigorous  criticism  has  detected  many  over- 
sights which  strike  a fresh  pair  of  eyes  more  quickly  than  those  of  the 
author.  For  his  ready  and  ungrudging  help  through  many  years  of 
intimate  friendship  my  hearty  thanks. 


Harvard  University, 
July,  1914. 


James  Haughton  Woods. 


INTRODUCTION 


1.  Authorship  of  the  Yoga-sutras. — Identity  of  Patahjali,  author  of 
the  sutras,  and  of  Fataujali,  author  of  the  Mahabhasya,  not  yet  proved. 

The  opinion  in  India  and  in  the  West  that  the  author  of  the  Yoga-sutras 
is  also  the  author  of  the  great  grammatical  comment  upon  Panini  has  not 
been  traced  definitely  any  farther  back  than  to  the  tenth  century.  The 
Yoga-bhasya  (about  a.d.  650  to  850)  makes  no  statement  as  to  the 
authorship  of  the  Yoga-sutras,  unless  the  benedictory  verse  at  the  be- 
ginning be  regarded  as  valid  proof  that  Patanjali  wrote  the  sutras.  Still 
less  is  there  any  statement  in  the  Yoga-sutras  about  the  author  of  the 
Mahabhasya.  And  conversely  there  is  no  reference  in  the  Mahabhasya 
to  the  author  of  the  Yoga-sutras.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  ground 
for  believing  that  the  author  of  the  Comment  on  Yoga-sutra  iii.  44  may 
have  had  the  author  of  the  Mahabhasya  in  mind  when  he  quotes  a certain 
formula  and  ascribes  it  to  Patanjali.  This  is  the  only  mention  of  Patanjali 
in  the  whole  Comment.  The  formula  is  Ayutasiddha^avayava-bheda^anu- 
gatah  samuho  dravyam-,  and  although  it  is  ascribed  to  Patanjali  (iti 
Patanjalih),  it  has  not  been  found  in  the  Mahabhasya.  Nevertheless  the 
Yoga-bhasya  does  here  seem  to  contain  an  allusion,  more  or  less  direct, 
to  the  theory  of  the  unity  of  the  parts  of  concrete  substances  as  set  forth 
in  the  Mahabhasya.  But  the  allusion  is  not  direct  enough  to  serve  by 
itself  as  basis  for  the  assertion  that  the  Yoga-bhasya  assumes  the  identity 
of  the  two  Patanjalis.  In  other  words,  it  does  not  justify  us  in  assigning 
to  the  tradition  of  their  identity  a date  as  ancient  as  that  of  the  Yoga- 
bhasya  (eighth  century).  The  allusion  is,  however,  significant  enough  not 
to  be  lost  out  of  mind,  pending  the  .search  for  other  items  of  cumulative 
evidence  looking  in  the  same  direction. 

2.  Tradition  of  identity  of  two  Patanjalis  not  earlier  than  tenth 
century. — So  far  as  I know,  the  oldest  text  implying  that  the  Patanjali 
who  wrote  the  sutras  is  the  same  as  the  Patanjali  who  wrote  the  Maha- 
bhasya, is  stanza  5 of  the  introduction  to  Bhojadeva’s  comment  on  the 
Yoga-sutras,  his  Rajamartanda.  This  I would  render  as  follows : 

Victory  be  to  the  luminous  words  of  that  illustrious  sovereign,  [Bhoja] 
Rana-rahgamalla,  who  by  creating  his  Grammar,  by  writing  his  comment 
on  the  Patanjalan  [treatise,  the  Yoga-sutras],  and  by  producing  [a  work] 
on  medicine  called  Rajamrganka,  has — like  Patanjali — removed  defilement 
from  our  speech  and  minds  and  bodies. 


Introduction 


[xiv 

Bhoja’s  Grammar,  his  comment  called  Rajamartanda,  and  his  medical 
treatise  are  all  extant.  The  stanza  must  mean  that  Patanjali  and  Bhoja 
both  maintained  a standard  of  correct  speech,  Patanjali  by  his  Mahabhasya 
and  Bhoja  by  his  Grammar ; and  that  both  made  our  minds  clear  of  error, 
Patanjali  by  his  Yoga-sutras  and  Bhoja  by  his  comment  upon  them ; 
and  that  both  made  our  bodies  clear  of  impurities,  Patanjali  by  his  medical 
treatise  and  Bhoja  by  his  Rajamrganka. 

This  certainly  implies  that  the  writer  of  this  stanza  identified  Patanjali 
of  the  Yoga-sutras  with  Patanjali  of  the  Mahabhasya.  If  the  writer  of 
the  stanza  of  the  introduction  is  the  same  as  the  Bhojadeva  who  wrote 
the  Rajamartanda,  we  may  note  that  he  is  called  Ranarangamalla  here, 
Maharajadhiraja  in  the  colophon  in  Mitra’s  edition,  and  Lord  of  Dhara 
or  Dhare^vara  in  the  colophon  in  the  edition  of  Aga9e.  There  were  a 
number  of  Bhojadevas ; but  whichever  of  them  the  author  of  the  Raja- 
martanda may  be,  no  one  of  them  is  earlier  than  the  tenth  century  of 
our  era. 

The  tradition  of  the  triple  activity  of  Patanjali  as  a writer  on  Yoga  and 
grammar  and  medicine  is  reinforced  as  follows  : 

Yogena  cittcib-ya,  padena  vdcdm 
'tnalam,  carlrasya  tu  vdidyakena 
yo  ’pdkarot,  tam  pravaram  munlndm, 

Patanjalim  prdnjalir  dnato  ’smi. 

This  is  cited  in  Qivarama’s  commentary  on  the  Vasavadatta  (ed.  Bibl.  Ind., 
p.  239),  which  Aufrecht  assigns  to  the  eighteenth  century.  The  stanza 
occurs  also  in  some  MSS.  just  before  the  opening  words  of  the  Mahabhasya 
(Kielhorn’s  ed.,  vol.  I,  p.  503) — that  is,  not  under  circumstances  giving 
any  clue  to  its  date.  We  may  add  that  an  eighteenth-century  work, 
the  Patanjalicarita  (v.  25,  ed.  of  Kavyamala,  vol.  51),  vouches  for  Patanjali’s 
authorship  in  the  fields  of  Yoga  and  medicine  in  the  following  gUi 
stanza : 

Sutrdni  yogacdstre 

vdidyakacdstre  ca  vdrttikdni  tatah 
krtvd  Patanjalimunih 

pracdraydm  dsa  jagad  idam  trdtum. 

As  to  the  precise  medical  work  of  which  Patanjali  was  the  author  or 
with  which  he  had  to  do,  all  three  stanzas  leave  us  uninformed.  Not 
so  the  following  stanza  from  the  introduction  to  the  commentary  on 
Caraka,  composed  by  Cakrapani,  who  (according  to  Jolly’s  book  on 
Medicine  in  Blihler’s  Grundriss,  p.  25)  wrote  about  1060 : 

Pdtanjala-Mahdhhdsya-GarakapratisamskrtdiJi 
mano-vdk-kdyadosdndm  hantre  ’hipataye  namah. 


Introduction 


xv] 

This  agrees  in  sense  with  the  other  stanzas,  and  in  addition  informs  us 
that  Patanjali’s  medical  work  consisted  in  a revision  (pratisarhskrta)  of 
the  great  compendium  of  Caraka. 

Accordingly,  the  Bhoja-stanza  appears  to  be  the  oldest  external  evidence 
thus  far  at  hand  for  the  tradition  as  to  the  identity  of  the  two  Patanjalis, 
and  this  tradition  is  not  older  than  the  tenth  century,  a thousand  years 
and  more  after  Patanjali  the  author  of  the  Mahabhasya. 

3.  The  identification  of  the  two  Patanjalis  not  confirmed  by  a comparison 
of  philosophical  concepts. — Inconsistent  use  of  terminology  and  con- 
flicting deflnitions  of  concepts  in  the  case  of  a single  writer  of  two  books 
are  frequently  explained  by  the  fact  that  quite  distinct  subjects  are  dis- 
cussed in  the  different  works.  In  other  cases  the  subject  under  discussion 
is  the  same  and  such  an  explanation  of  the  inconsistency  does  not  hold. 
An  instance  of  the  latter  is  the  discussion  of  the  nature  of  substance 
{dravya)  in  the  Yoga-system  and  in  the  Mahabhasya.  In  the  commentary 
on  Yoga-sutra  iii.  44  we  have  the  following  definition,  “A  substance  is  a 
collection  of  which  the  difierent  component  parts  do  not  exist  separately 
{ayutasiddha^avayava-hheda^anugatah  samuho  dravyam  iti  Patan- 
jalih)”  and  the  definition  is  attributed  to  Patanjali  as  being  consistent  with 
his  sutras.  This  quotation  is  of  the  most  technical  kind  and  is  in  the 
same  style  as  the  Nyaya-sutras.  A similar  use  of  language,  for  instance, 
is  found  in  Nyaya-sutra  ii.  1.  32  (Vizianagaram  edition,  p.  798).  On  the 
other  hand  this  phrase  is  not  to  be  found  in  the  Mahabhasya,  which 
however  does  repeatedly  analyse  the  concept  of  substance.  And,  what 
is  more  important,  nothing  so  precise  as  the  formula  attributed  (iii.  44) 
to  Patanjali  is  found  in  the  Yoga-sutras  themselves.  Yet  substance  is 
partially  defined  in  Yoga-sutra  iii.  14,  “ A substance  (dharmin)  conforms 
itself  to  quiescent  and  uprisen  and  indeterminable  external-aspects 
{dharma).”  In  this  terminology  dharmin  and  dharma  of  the  Yoga-sutra 
are  substitutions  for  dravya  and  guna  of  the  Mahabhasya.  In  neither 
case  is  the  description  of  substance  discriminating.  Yet  such  as  it  is, 
the  difference  is  very  slight.  In  the  Mahabhasya  it  is  substance,  we 
are  told,  which  makes  the  difference  in  weight  between  iron  and  cotton 
of  the  same  bulk  and  dimension  (Mahabhasya,  Kielhorn’s  edition,  vol.  II, 
p.  366^®) ; and  it  is  that  which  causes  the  difference  between  penetrability 
and  impenetrability.  Or  again  it  is  that  which  does  not  cease  to  be,  even 
when  a succession  of  properties  appears  within  it  (vol.  II,  p.  366^^).  Of 
what  kind  then  is  this  form  of  being  {tattva)  ? The  answer  is  that  when 
the  various  reds  and  other  properties  of  a myrobalan  fruit,  for  instance, 
successively  appear  within  it,  we  have  the  right  to  call  it  a substance. 
In  short  a substance  is  a concretion  of  properties  {guna-sanidravo  dravyam 


Introduction 


[xvi 

iti,  Kielhorn,  vol.  II,  p.  366^®) ; or,  as  it  is  put  elsewhere,  it  is  a collection 
of  properties  {gxma-samuddya)  such  that  the  various  states  (bhdva)  depend 
upon  it  (II.  200^^).  This  collection  is  loosely  paraphrased  as  being  a group 
(samgha)  or  mass  {samuha,  II.  356®). 

In  order,  however,  to  make  the  comparison  of  the  dharmin  of  the  Yoga- 
sutras  with  the  dravya  of  the  Mahabhasya,  we  must  assume  that  the 
interpretation  of  the  Yoga-sutras,  as  given  in  the  Comment,  correctly 
represents  the  concept  in  the  mind  of  the  author  of  the  sutras.  There 
might  well  have  been  a series  of  redactions  of  the  works  of  Patanjali, 
as  of  those  of  Caraka.  The  later  interpretation,  such  as  the  formula  in 
the  Comment  on  iii.  44,  might  give  us  the  original  thought  in  more  tech- 
nical form.  If  this  be  so,  we  find  a great  similarity  in  the  discussion 
of  the  relation  of  whole  and  parts  in  the  two  works.  In  the  Comment 
on  the  Yoga-sutra  iii.  44  a collection  (samuha)  is  of  two  kinds:  1.  that  in 
which  the  parts  have  lost  their  distinctness,  for  example,  ‘a  tree’,  ‘a  herd’, 
‘ a grove  ’ ; 2.  that  in  which  the  parts  are  distinctly  described,  for  example, 
‘ gods  and  human  beings.’  The  second  class  has  two  subdivisions  : 2®.  one 
in  which  the  distinctness  of  parts  is  emphasized,  for  example,  ‘ a grove  of 
mangoes  ’ ; 2’’.  one  in  which  the  distinctness  is  not  emphasized,  for 
example,  ‘ a mango-grove.’  From  another  point  of  view  a group  is  two- 
fold : 1.  a group  whereof  the  parts  can  exist  separately,  for  example^ 
‘ a grove  ’,  wherein  the  trees  exist  separately  from  the  aggregate  whole ; 
2.  a group  whereof  the  parts  cannot  exist  separately,  for  example,  ‘ a tree  ’ 
or  ‘an  atom’.  The  question  now  arises.  To  which  of  these  kinds  of  groups 
does  a substance  belong?  A substance  (dravya)  is  an  aggregate  of  generic 
and  particular  qualities  (sdmanya-vicesa-samudaya).  This  is  the  definition 
of  substance  from  the  point  of  view  of  its  relation  to  its  qualities. 
Furthermore,  the  substance  is  a group  of  the  second  subdivision  of  the 
second  kind ; it  is  ‘ a collection  of  which  the  different  parts  do  not  exist 
separately  ’.  This  then  is  the  resultant  definition  of  substance  according 
to  the  traditional  interpretation  of  the  Sutras. 

What  now  is  the  relation  of  whole  and  parts  in  the  Mahabhasya,  with 
especial  reference  to  the  substance  and  its  qualities  ? A collection  (samu- 
daya)  is  loosely  paraphrased  as  being  a group  (samgha)  or  mass  (samuha, 
Kielhorn,  vol.  II,  p.  356®).  It  is,  etymologically  at  least,  a concretion  of 
properties  (guna-samdrava  II.  366^®).  It  is  a collection  of  parts ; the 
characteristics  of  the  parts  determine  the  characteristics  of  the  whole 
(III.  3^^ ; avayavair  arthavadbhih  samudaya  apy  arthavanto  bhavanti 
1. 217^® ; I.  30^®“''^'^ ; avayave  krtam  liHgam  samuddyasya  vicesakam  bhavati 
I.  2892  f;  and  I.  377”).  All  these  cases  would  belong  to  the  first  subdivi- 
sion of  the  second  kind  of  group,  whereof  the  parts  can  exist  separately. 


Introduction 


xvii] 

Yet  a collection  (samuddya)  is  not  merely  an  assemblage  of  parts,  but  is 
a unity  performing  functions  which  the  parts  by  themselves  cannot 
perform,  for  example,  the  blanket,  the  rope,  the  chariot,  as  compared  with 
the  threads,  the  fibres,  the  chariot-parts,  I.  220^®“^®.  All  these  cases  would 
belong  to  the  second  subdivision  of  the  second  kind  of  group,  wherein 
the  parts  cannot  exist  separately  {ayutasiddhdvayava).  Such  then  are 
the  different  groups  [samuddya). 

With  regard  to  the  substance  (dravya),  its  relation  to  its  qualities  (guna) 
is  analogous  to  the  relation  of  the  parts  to  the  group,  I.  220,  vart.  11. 

Just  as  a collection  [samuddya)  is  characterized  by  its  parts  [avayavdt- 
maJca)  III.  3^^,  so  the  substance  [dravya)  is  characterized  by  its  qualities 
[guTidtmaJca)  or  is  a collection  of  qualities  [gunasamuddya)  II.  200^®. 
This  last  formula  is  given  tentatively  as  a not  quite  final  conclusion ; yet 
the  definition  is  not  rejected.  And  elsewhere,  I.  411^®,  II.  356^^,  II.  415^®, 
and  especially  II.  366^'^"^®,  it  is  accepted  as  a working  definition.  Some 
qualities  like  sound,  touch,  colour,  and  taste  belong  to  all  substances ; they 
at  least  are  present  I.  246*^^  II.  198®^*^.  Nothing,  however,  is  said  about 
a generic-form  being  required  to  constitute  a substance  [dravya).  At  the 
most  it  is  true  that  when  one  asserts  the  reality  of  a species  [dkrti)  one 
does  not  deny  the  reality  of  the  substance  [dravya);  and  conversely. 
For  each  person  who  makes  the  assertion,  the  reality  of  both  is  asserted. 
Either  the  species  or  the  substance  may  be  dominant  in  anything,  and 
the  other  subordinate.  It  is  only  a matter  of  the  relative  emphasis  in 
the  use  of  words.  But  the  word  substance  is  used  for  mass  of  particular 
qualities ; it  is  not  a concretion  of  species  and  qualities,  but  is  contrasted 
with  species.  Accordingly  even  if  we  admit  that  the  formula  ascribed 
to  Patanjali  in  the  Comment  on  iii.  13  is  the  correct  rendering  of  the 
thought  in  the  mind  of  Patanjali,  the  author  of  the  Yoga-sutra,  it  is  not 
true  that  Patanjali,  the  author  of  the  Mahabhasya,  when  speaking  of 
a substance  [dravya)  means  what  is  contained  in  this  formula.  And 
there  is  nothing  here  to  indicate  that  the  tradition  which  identifies  the 
two  Patanjalis  must  be  correct. 

4.  Date  of  the  Yoga-sutras  between  A.D.  300  and  A.D.  500. — If  Patanjali, 
the  author  of  the  Mahabhasya,  is  not  the  author  of  the  Yoga-sutras,  when 
were  they  written?  The  polemic  in  the  Yoga-sutras  themselves  against 
the  nirdlambana  school  of  Buddhists  gives  the  answer.  Very  probably 
in  the  two  Yoga-sutras  iii.  14  and  15  and  certainly  in  iv.  14  to  21  this 
school  is  attacked.  The  idealism  of  the  Vijndna-vdda  is  attacked  in  iv.  15, 
16,  and  17.  We  cannot,  it  is  true,  maintain  that  the  Vijiidna-vdda  here 
attacked  by  the  Sutra  must  be  the  idealism  of  Vasubandhu.  But  the 

C [h.o.s.  it] 


Introduction 


[xviii 


probability  that  the  idealism  is  Vasubandhu’s  is  great.  And  the  earlier 
limit  would  then  be  the  fourth  century.  There  surely  were  idealists 
before  him,  just  as  there  were  pre-Patanjalan  philosophers  of  yoga.  Yet 
we  have  the  great  authority  of  Vacaspatimi9ra  to  support  the  obvious 
probability  that  the  school  of  Vijiianavadins  is  here  combated  by 
Pataiijali.  He  accepts  the  interpretation  of  the  Comment  which  intro- 
duces a Vijndnavddinani  Vdindcikam  (p.  292*^,  Calc,  ed.)  as  being 
intended  by  the  author  of  the  Sutra.  It  is  true  that  the  Sutra  itself 
obviously  does  not  make  explicit  references  to  this  or  any  other  school. 
Still  the  fact  remains  that  the  Sutra  is  attacking  some  idealist ; that  the 
Comment  explicitly  states  the  idealist’s  position  ; and  that  Vacaspatimi^ra 
identifies  the  idealist  as  being  a Vijndnavddin.  Elsewhere  Vacaspatimi^ra 
contrasts  this  school  with  other  Buddhist  schools.  And  the  possibility 
that  he  is  referring  to  some  Vijndna-vdda  other  than  Vasubandhu’s  is 
remote.  If  this  be  so,  it  becomes  clearer  why  Nagarjuna  (a  little  before 
A.D.  200),  the  great  expounder  of  the  Qunya-vdda,  does  not,  so  far  as 
we  have  discovered  in  the  portion  of  the  Mulamadhyamika-karikas  thus 
far  published  (fasc.  I-V),  mention  Patahjali.  Yet  from  the  Chinese  transla- 
tions of  Nagarjuna  it  is  clear  that  he  was  familiar  with  the  philosophical  yoga. 
For  example  in  the  Chinese  translation,^  made  in  a.  d.  472,  of  Nagarjuna’s 
Upjiyakau^alyahrdaya-^astra  (Nanjio,  No.  1257),  eight  schools  of  philo- 
sophers and  logicians  are  enumerated;  1.  Fire-worshippers,  2.  Mimahsakas, 
3.  Vai^esikas,  4.  Sathkhya,  5.  Yoga,  6.  Nirgranthas,  7.  Monists,  8.  Pluralists. 
There  was  then  a philosophical  school  of  Yoga  about  A.D.  200.^  Pataiijali 
was  not  unknown  to  Buddhist  writers.  But  there  is  nothing  to  indicate 
that  Nagarjuna  is  referring  to  Pataiijali,  the  philosopher,  who  would  then 
have  preceded  both  nirdlartibana  schools.  More  probably,  we  may  suppose, 
he  refers  to  some  one  of  the  authorities  on  Yoga,  such  as  Jaigisavya  or 
Pafica^ikha  who  are  quoted  in  the  Yoga-bhasya. 

With  regard  to  the  later  limit,  a reference,  if  historically  sound,  would 
make  it  certain  that  Pataiijali  lived  before  a.d.  400.  In  the  Mahavansa, 
chap.  37,  vs.  167  (Tumour,  p.  250 ; compare  Dines  Andersen,  Pali  Reader, 
I,  p.  113,  st.  3),  we  have  the  words 

Vihdram  ekam  dgamma  rattlm  Pdtanjali-matam 
parivatteti. 

The  verse  refers  to  Buddhagho.sa,  who  lived  in  the  first  half  of  the  fifth 


’ I am  indebted  to  the  Rev.  Kentoku  Hori 
of  Tokyo  for  this  reference. 

Professor  Jacobi  has  proved  the  existence 
of  a philosophical  Yoga  system,  resting 


upon  logical  inferences  and  not  upon 
intuitive  processes,  as  early  as  300  b.c. 
(SB.  der  konigl.  preuss.  Ak.  der  Wiss., 
13.  Juli  1911). 


xix] 


Introduction 


century.  But  unfortunately  the  Mahavahsa  proper,  the  work  of  Maha- 
nama,  ends,  according  to  the  judgement  of  Professor  Geiger,  at  chapter  37, 
verse  50,  at  which  point  also  the  tlka  stops.  The  quotation  therefore  belongs 
to  the  Culavahsa.  And  if,  as  Professor  Geiger  concludes,  the  work  of 
Mahanama  is  to  be  placed  in  the  first  quarter  of  the  sixth  century,  the 
verse  in  question  comes  later,  and  probably  later  to  such  a degree  that  its 
value  as  evidence  is  almost  nothing.  If  this  be  so,  one  can  easily  explain 
how  it  is  that  Buddhaghosa  in  the  whole  Visuddhimagga  and  in  the 
Atthasalini  makes  no  allusion  to  Patafijali. 

Much  more  conclusive  is  the  fact  that  Umasvati  in  his  Tattvarthadhigama- 
sutra  ii,  52  refers  to  Yoga-sutra  iii.  22.  There  can  be  little  doubt  of  the 
reference  since  Umasvatys  Bhasya  repeats  (Bib.  Ind.  ed.  p.  53^^  and  65^) 
two  of  the  illustrations  given  in  the  Yoga-bhasya,  of  the  fire  set  in  the  dry 
grass  and  of  the  cloth  rolled  up  into  a ball.  Other  references  (Tattvartha- 
dhigama-sutra  xii.  5 and  6 and  ix.  44—46)  are  quite  as  likely  allusions  to 
ancient  Jain  formulae  as  to  Patanjali.  By  how  much  Umasvati’s  date 
precedes  that  of  his  commentator,  Siddhasena,  cannot  be  said  until  the 
complete  text  of  Siddhasena  is  published.  The  date  for  Siddhasena  is  set 
by  Professor  Jacobi  (ZDMG.  60. 289,  Leipzig,  1906,  reprint  p.  3,  Eine  Jaina- 
Dogmatik)  at  the  middle  or  end  of  the  sixth  century.  Umasvati  precedes 
him;  and  Patanjali  the  philosopher  would  not  be  later  than  a.d.  500  and 
might  be  much  earlier. 

On  the  other  hand  I should  guess  that  he  is  not  much  earlier.  Because,  for 
one  reason,  as  Professor  Stcherbatskoi  reports,  Dignaga  (about  A.D.  550 
or  earlier)  seems  to  know  nothing  of  him.  And  secondly  because  it  is 
improbable  that  the  Yoga-bhasya  was  composed  very  much  later. 

Other  confirmatory  evidence,  somewhat  later  but  more  certain,  would 
be  the  reference  to  Yoga-sutra  i.  33  in  Magha’s  Qi^upalavadha  iv.  55. 
Professor  Hultzsch  has  kindly  pointed  out  another  reference  at  xiv.  62  of 
Magha’s  poem.  In  respect  of  the  date  of  Magha,  Professor  Jacobi  concluded 
(WZKM.  vol.  Ill,  p.  121  ff.)  that  Magha  lived  about  the  middle  of  the  sixth 
century.  But  Mr.  Gaurishankar  Ojha’s  discovery  of  the  Vasantgadh  inscrip- 
tion dated  Vikrama  682  adds  new  and  most  convincing  evidence.  Professor 
Kielhorn  (Gottinger  Nachrichten,  philol.-histor.  Klasse,  1906,  Heft  2,  p.  146) 
is  of  the  opinion  that  Magha,  the  grandson  of  a minister  of  the  King  Varma- 
lata,  must  be  placed  at  about  the  second  half  of  the  seventh  century. 

Still  later,  Gaudapada  (about  a.d.  700),  in  his  comment  on  the  Samkhya- 
Karika  23,  quotes  Yoga-sutra  ii.  30  and  32  and  names  Patanjali  as  the 
author. 

The  conclusion  would  be  then  that  Patanjali’s  sutras  were  wi'itten  at  some 
time  in  the  fourth  or  fifth  century  of  our  era. 


Introduction 


[xx 


5.  Date  of  the  Yoga-bhasya  between  A.D.  650  and  A.D.  850. — Of  this 
tlie  limits  are  easier  to  fix.  Three  pieces  of  evidence  help  us  to  determine 
the  earliest  limit. 

A.  The  Comment  could  not  in  any  case  be  much  earlier  than  a.d.  350. 
For  (at  the  end  of  iii.  53  or  52)  it  quotes  Varsaganya  in  the  words 

murti-vyavadki-jdti-hhecldbhdvdn  ndsti  mulapfihaktvam  iti  Vd,rsaganyah. 

And  again  (iv.  13)  the  Comment  quotes  from  a cdstrdrhucdsanam  as  follows  : 

Gnndnobfn  paramam  rupani  na  drstipatfiam  rcchati 
yat  tu  d^tipatham  prdptam  tan  mdyeva  sutucchakam. 

Fortunately  Vacaspatimi^ra  offers  us  the  information  that  this  is  an  exposi- 
tion of  the  teaching  of  the  Shasti-tantra.  And  furthermore,  in  the  Bhamati 
on  Vedanta-sutra  ii.  1.  2.  3 (Nirnayasagara  edition,  1904,  p.  352,  line  7 of 
the  Bhamati),  we  are  told  that  it  is  Varsaganya,  the  founder  of  the  Yoga 
system,  who  said  these  words  (ata  eva  yoga-cdsfram  vyutpddayitd,  dha  sma 
Bhagavdn  Vdrsaganyah  gundiidrii  paramam  . . .”). 

Thus  the  Comment  contains  two  quotations  from  Varsaganya.  There  is 
little  reason  to  doubt  that  Varsaganya  was  an  older  contemporary  of 
Vasubandhu.  Professor  Takakusu^  by  a combination  of  dates  centering 
about  the  Chinese  translation  of  Paramartha’s  Life  of  Vasubandhu  estimated 
that  Vasubandhu  lived  from  about  a.d.  420  till  500.  Professor  Sylvain 
L^vi  (Asahga,  vol.  II,  pp.  1 and  2)  accepted  the  result  of  these  discussions. 
But  Professor  Wogihara’'^  had  conjectured  that  the  date  of  Vasubandhu 
must  be  set  back.  An  elaborate  confirmation  of  his  suggestion  is  now 
offered  by  Monsieur  Noel  Peri,^  who  places  the  death  of  Vasubandhu 
at  A.D.  350;  and  by  Mr.  B.  Shiiwo,^  who  estimates  that  Vasubandhu’s 
life  was  from  a.d.  270  to  350.  This  is  a return  to  the  fourth  century, 
the  date  for  Vasubandhu  which  Biihler  ® favoured.  Accordingly  the  Bhasya 
must  in  any  case  be  later  than  A.D.  350. 

B.  Another  kind  of  evidence  which  helps  us  to  determine  yet  more  closely 
the  earliest  limit  is  the  fact  that  the  decimal  system  is  used  by  way  of 


’ Bulletin  de  I’lilcole  Fran9aise  d’Extrcme- 
Orient,  1904,  tome  IV,  pp.  48  and  56 ; 
and  JRAS.  Jan.  1905,  pp.  16-18  of  the 
reprint. 

® Asahga’s  Bodhisattvabhumi,  Leipzig, 
1908,  p.  14. 

® “ A propos  de  la  date  de  Vasubandhu  ” 
(Bulletin  de  I’Bcole  Fran9aise  d’Ex- 
treme  Orient,  tome  XI,  1911,  p.  339). 


* “ Doctor  Takakusu  and  Monsieur  Peri 
on  the  date  of  Vasubandhu  ” in  the 
Tetsugaku  Zasshi,  vol.  27,  Nov.-Dee., 
1912.  I am  indebted  to  Mr.  K.  Yabuki 
for  this. 

® “ Die  indischen  Inschriften  und  das 
Alter  der  indischen  Kunst-Poesie,”  in 
Sitzungsberichte  der  Kaiserl.  Akad. 
der  Wiss.,  Wien,  1890,  p.  79  f. 


Introduction 


xxi] 

illustration  in  the  Comment  on  iii.  13.  The  oldest  epigraphic  ^ instance 
of  the  use  of  the  decimal  system  is  in  the  Gurjara  inscription  of  a.d.  595. 
With  one  obscure  and  doubtful  exception,  there  is  no  literary  evidence 
of  the  use  of  the  decimal  system  before  Varahamihira,  who  lived  in  the 
sixth  century.  If  we  consider  this  kind  of  evidence  alone,  it  is  improbable 
that  the  Comment  precedes  the  year  A.  D.  500 ; it  is  probably  later. 

C.  There  is  evidence  which  determines  that  the  earliest  limit  of  the 
Comment  is  still  later,  as  late  as  the  seventh  century.  In  the  stanza 
iv.  55  of  the  ^igupalavadha  by  Magha  (circa  a.d.  650),  not  only  Yoga- 
sutra  i.  33  is  referred  to,  but  also  the  words  of  the  avatarana  in  the 
Comment.  In  the  Comment  the  parikarma  of  the  citta  is  enjoined.  This 
is  an  uncommon  term.  Even  if  citta-parikamma  might  be  found  in 
Buddhist  books,  the  fact  that  it  here  immediately  precedes  the  quotation 
from  sutra  i.  33,  makes  it  almost  certain  that  such  a mixture  of  termino- 
logy is  impossible.  In  fact  the  stanza  is  full  of  specific  yoga-terms  in 
each  line  to  such  an  extent  that  reference  to  any  other  system,  much 
less  to  some  heretical  book,  is  quite  excluded.  The  point  is  then  that 
the  words  citta-parikarona  together  with  the  first  word  of  the  sutra 
have  been  wrought  into  the  metre  of  the  poem  as  one  word.  The  poet, 
as  we  saw,  probably  lived  in  the  second  half  of  the  seventh  century.  If 
this  is  trustworthy  evidence,  the  Comment  cannot  be  earlier  than  A.D.  650. 

D.  The  later  limit  is  set  by  the  date  of  Vacaspatimi5ra’s  Nyaya  Index, 
A.D.  841 — see  below,  page  xxiii. 

Accordingly  the  date  of  the  Bhasya  would  be  somewhere  between  about 
A.D.  650  and  about  a.d.  850. 


6.  Date  of  Vacaspatimigra’s  Tattva-vai9aradi  about  A.D.  850. — In  the 

verse  at  the  close  of  his  Bhamati-nibandha,  Vacaspatimi9ra  gives  the  names 
of  his  works,  seven  in  number : 

Yan  Nydyakanikd-Tattvasamiksd-Tattvabindubhih  I 
Yan  Nydya-Sdmkhya-Yogdndm,  Veddntdndni  nibandhandili  ii 
Samacdisam  mahat  punyam,  tat  phalani  puskalam  mayd  i 
Samarpltam ; athditena  prlyatdm  Paramecvarah  ll. 

The  Nydya-vdrttiJca-tdtparya-tikd  is  on  the  Nyaya  system ; the  Tattva- 


^ See  p.  78,  of  Buhler’s  Palaeographie,  in 
his  Grundriss.  In  his  Notes  on  Indian 
Mathematics  (Journal  of  the  Asiatic 
Society  of  Bengal,  July  1907,  vol.  Ill, 
number  7,  p.  482,  note  5),  Mr.  G.  R. 
Kaye  gives  a list  of  epigraphical  in- 
stances of  the  notation  in  which 


“ place-value  ” is  utilized.  Most  of 
these  he  thinks  are  worthless  as  evi- 
dence for  the  introduction  of  the 
decimal  system.  The  same  conclusion 
is  reached  in  a later  article  (JR AS. 
July  1910,  p.  749). 


Introduction 


[xxii 

haumudl  is  on  the  Samkhya  system;  the  Tattva-vdicdmdl  is  on  the  Yoga; 
the  Nydya-kanikd,  a gloss  on  the  Vidhi-viveka,  is  on  the  Mimahsa;  the 
Tattva-bindu  is  on  Bhatta's  exposition  of  the  Mimahsa ; the  Tattva-samiksd 
and  the  Bhdmatl  are  both  on  the  Vedanta. 

In  the  same  verse  at  the  end  of  the  Bhamati  he  speaks  of  himself  as  living 
under  King  Nrga: 

tasmin  mahipe  mahanlyakirtdu  Qriinan-Nrge  ’kdri  mayd  nibandhah. 
Unfortunately  there  is  (as  Professor  Liiders  informs  me)  no  epigraphical 
record  of  this  king  and  we  cannot  say  when  or  where  he  lived.  Vacas- 
patimi^ra  was  a native  of  Mithila/  the  northern  part  of  Tirhut,  and  the 
latter  part  of  his  name  would  indicate,  as  Fitz- Edward  Hall  has  pointed 
out,  that  he  was  a native  of  Gangetic  Hindustan. 

In  the  introduction  to  his  edition  of  the  Kusumanjali  (Calcutta,  1864,  p.  x). 
Professor  Cowell  thinks  that  Vacaspatimi9ra  lived  in  the  tenth  century. 
Barth  (Bull,  des  Bel.  de  I’lnde,  1893,  p.  271)  would  set  him  at  the  end  of 
the  eleventh  or  beginning  of  the  twelfth  century.  Professor  Macdonell 
(Hist,  of  Sansk.  Lit.,  p.  393)  places  him  soon  after  a.d.  1100. 

These  judgements  rest,  more  or  less,  upon  the  opinion  that  the  Raja-varttika, 
quoted  by  Vacaspatimi9ra  in  his  Saihkhya-tattva-kaumudi  on  Karika  72, 
was  composed  by,  or  for,  Bhoja  Raja,  called  Ranarahga  Malla,  King  of  Dhara 
(1018-1060).  This  opinion  accords  with  the  assertion  of  Pandit  Ka9inatha 
(^astrl  Astaputra  of  Benares  College,  who  assured  Dr.  Fitz-Edward  Hall  that 
a manuscript  of  the  Raja-varttika  had  been  in  his  possession  several  years 
(Hall’s  edition  of  the  Samkhya-pravacana-bhasya,  1856,  p.  33).  But  the 
visible  basis  for  this  assertion  that  the  Raja  in  question  is  Bhoja  is  not 
now  at  hand. 

Similarly,  Professor  Pathak  in  his  article  on  Dharmakirti  and  Shankara- 
carya  (see  Journal  of  the  Bombay  Branch  RAS.,  vol.  XXVIII,  no.  48,  1891, 
p.  89,  and  also  the  table  in  the  same  Journal,  p.  235,  no.  49,  note  74)  is 
content  to  rest  his  conclusions  as  to  the  date  of  Vacaspatimi9ra  upon  the 
fact  that  Qribharatl,  the  pupil  of  Bodharanya,  in  his  edition  of  the  Sathkhya- 
tattva-kaumudi  (Benares,  Jainaprabhakara  Press,  1889,  p.  182),  prints,  in  a 
note  at  the  end,  the  word  Bhoja  before  the  word  Raja-varttika.  Thus  it 
would  appear  that  this  varttika  is  by  Bhojaraja  and  that  Vacaspatimi9ra, 
who  quotes  it,  must  be  later  than  Bhojaraja,  that  is,  later  than  the  tenth 
century.  But  we  are  not  at  all  sure  from  other  manuscript  evidence 
that  the  word  Bhoja  should  be  read  before  the  word  Raja-varttika,  and 
the  date  of  this  Raja-varttika  is  therefore  undetermined. 

' See  the  beginning  of  the  Nyayasutro-  prasad^astrl.  Notices  of  Sanskrit  MSS., 

(Idharah  by  Vacaspatimifra  Qrlvaca-  Second  Series,  vol.  II,  p.  98). 

sj)at/mi(rena  Mithile(^varasurind  (Kara- 


i 


xxiii]  Introduction 

By  way  of  contrast  we  now  have  the  direct  statement  of  Vacaspatimi^ra 
that  he  finished  his  Nyayasucinibandha  in  the  year  898.  For  on  the  first 
page  of  this  appendix  to  the  Nyaya-varttika,  as  given  in  the  edition  of  the 
Nyaya-varttika  in  the  Bibliotheca  Indica,  1907,  he  says  that  he  is  about  to 
compose  an  index  for  the  Nyaya-sutras 

Cru'dcaspatimicrena  mmyd  sucl  vidhdsyate. 

And  in  the  colophon  he  says  that  he  made  the  work  for  the  delight  of 
the  intelligent  in  the  year  898. 

Nydyasuclnihandho  ’sdv  akdri  sudliiydih  mude 

Crivdcaspatimicrena  vasv-anka-vam-vatsare. 

It  remains  to  determine  whether  this  year  belongs  to  the  era  of  Vikrama- 
ditya  or  of  Qalivahana.  In  the  introduction  to  his  edition  of  Six  Buddhist 
Nyaya  Tracts  (Bibl.  Ind.,  1910),  Mahamahopadhyaya  Haraprasad  Shastri 
gives  the  date  as  belonging  to  the  second  era,  to  Qaka  898.  He  says  (p.  iii) 
that  the  author  of  the  Apohasiddhi  “ takes  a good  deal  of  pains  in  elaborately 
refuting  the  theory  of  Vacaspatimi9ra”,  and  that  he  does  “ not  quote  or  refute 
Udayana,  whose  date  is  Qaka  905  = a.d.  983”.  In  his  Notices  of  Sanskrit 
Manuscripts,  second  series,  vol.  II,  p.  xix,  this  distinguished  scholar  had 
come  to  the  same  conclusion  with  regard  to  the  era  to  which  this  date  of 
VacaspatimiQra  should  be  assigned.  This  conclusion  seemed  doubtful  to 
Mr.  Nilmani  Chakravarti,  M.A.,  in  his  valuable  Chronology  of  Indian 
Authors,  a supplement  to  Miss  Duff’s  Chronology  of  India  (Journal  of  the 
Asiatic  Society  of  Bengal,  vol.  3,  1907,  p.  205).  And  one  cannot  refrain 
from  thinking  that  the  other  era  is  presumably  more  likely  for  a Northern 
writer ; and  that  more  especially  a great  difficulty  is  created  if  only  seven 
years  are  supposed  to  separate  Vacaspatimi5ra  and  Udayana.  The  difference 
between  the  two  philosophers  is  of  such  a kind  that  one  must  assume  a much 
longer  interval  between  their  writings.  And  furthermore,  would  it  not  be 
an  extraordinary  coincidence  that  the  author  of  the  Apohasiddhi  should 
be  so  minutely  familiar  with  the  work  of  Vacaspatimi9ra,  and  yet  not 
have  the  dimmest  sense  of  the  existence  of  Udayana,  the  light  of  a new 
dawn  in  the  world  of  Nyaya?  Accordingly,  the  date  of  Yaeaspati’s 
Nyaya-index  would  appear  to  be  Samvat  898  = A.D.  841 ; and  the  dates 
of  his  six  other  works,  including  the  Tattva-vai9aradi,  may  be  presumed 
to  be  not  many  years  earlier  or  later.  We  are  therefore  safe  in  making 
the  statement  that  the  date  of  the  Tattva-vai9aradi  is  not  far  from  the 
middle  of  the  ninth  century,  or  approximately  A.D.  850. 


I 


ANALYTICAL  SUMMAEY  OF  THE  YOGA-SUTKAS 

BOOK  FIRST— CONCENTRATION 

PAGE 

1.  Reasons  for  beginning  the  book  .......  3 

2.  Characteristic  mark  of  yoga  is  the  restriction  of  fluctuations  . . 8 

3.  Intelligence  in  the  state  of  restriction  ......  13 

4.  Intelligence  in  the  state  of  emergence  ......  14 

5.  There  are  five  fluctuations  . . . . . . . . 17 

6.  List  of  the  five  fluctuations  ........  19 

7.  The  first  fluctuation  is  the  source  of  valid  ideas  ....  20 

8.  The  second  fluctuation  is  misconception  ......  24 

9.  The  third  fluctuation  is  predicate  relation  .....  26 

10.  The  fourth  fluctuation  is  sleep  ........  29 

11.  The  fifth  fluctuation  is  memory  .......  31 

12.  Two  methods  of  restriction  of  the  fluctuations  .....  34 

13.  The  first  method  is  practice  ........  34 

14.  The  confirmation  of  practice  ........  35 

15.  The  second  method  is  passionlessness  ......  36 

16.  Characteristic  mark  of  the  highest  passionlessness  ....  37 

17.  Result  of  these  methods  is  conscious  concentration  of  four  kinds  . 40 

18.  Characteristic  mark  of  unconscious  concentration  . . . . 41 

19.  A first  way  of  approach  to  unconscious  concentration  ...  43 

20.  A second  way  of  approach  to  the  same  as  used  by  yogins ...  45 

21.  Gradations  of  methods  and  intensities  ......  47 

22.  Yet  another  way  of  approach  ........  48 

23.  Devotion  to  the  l9vara  is  this  way  of  approach  ....  48 

24.  Characteristic  mark  of  the  devotion  to  the  l9vara  ....  49 

25.  The  l9vara  is  unexcelled  in  his  power  of  knowing  ....  55 

26.  The  l9vara  has  no  limit  in  time  .......  59 

27.  The  symbolic  expression  of  the  l9vara  ......  60 

28.  Description  of  the  devotion  . . . . . . . • 61 

29.  Two  results  of  this  concentration  .......  62 

30.  List  of  nine  ohstacles  removed  ........  63 

31.  Five  accompaniments  of  the  obstacles  ......  65 

32.  Prevention  of  these  bj’  calming  the  mind-stuff  .....  66 


xxv]  Analytical  Summary  of  the  Yogci-sutras 

PAGE 


33.  Four  ways  of  calming  the  mind-stuff  ......  71 

34.  Breathings  calm  the  mind-stuff . .......  72 

35.  Fixed  attention  steadies  the  mind  .......  72 

36.  Fixed  attention  to  processes  of  thought  steadies  the  mind ...  74 

37.  Attention  to  the  mind-stuff  of  great  yogins  .....  76 

38.  Fixed  attention  to  objects  seen  in  sleep  . . . . . . 76 

39.  Contemplations  of  the  most  desired  object  .....  77 

40.  Mastery  of  the  mind-stuff  the  result  of  attentions  ....  77 

41.  Balanced  state  of  the  steady  mind  .......  77 

42.  Balanced  state  with  regard  to  a coarse  object  .....  80 

43.  Balanced  state  with  regard  to  a super-coarse  object  ....  82 

44.  Balanced  states  with  regard  to  subtile  and  super-subtile  objects  . 88 

45.  Extent  of  the  existence  of  subtile  objects . . . . . . 91 

46.  These  balanced  states  are  seeded  concentrations  ....  92 

47.  Eesult  of  the  super-subtile  balanced  state  ......  93 

48.  Truth-bearing  insight  .........  94 

49.  Object  of  the  truth-bearing  insight  .......  94 

50.  Latent  impressions  from  this  insight  inhibit  others  ....  96 

51.  Seedless  concentration  is  the  restriction  of  even  these  impressions  . 98 


BOOK  SECOND— MEANS  OF  ATTAINMENT 


1.  Yoga  of  action  ...........  103 

2.  Eesult  of  yoga  of  action  .........  105 

3.  The  five  hindrances  ..........  106 

4.  The  root  of  the  other  hindrances  is  undifferentiated-consciousness  . 106 

5.  Undifferentiated-consciousness  is  the  first  hindrance  . . . .110 

6.  Feeling-of-personality  is  the  second  hindrance  . . . . .115 

7.  Passion  is  the  third  hindrance  . . . . . . . .116 

8.  Hatred  is  the  fourth  hindrance  . . . . . . .117 

9.  Will-to-live  is  the  fifth  hindrance  . . . . . . .117 

10.  Eemedy  for  hindrances  when  subtile  ......  119 

11.  Eemedy  for  fluctuations  which  result  from  hindrances  . . .120 

12.  Latent-deposit  of  karma  the  cause  of  hindrances  ....  121 

13.  Three  kinds  of  fruition  of  karma  . . . . . . .122 

14.  Eesults  of  fruition  ..........  131 

15.  Pleasure  to  be  rejected,  inasmuch  as  it  is  intermingled  with  pain  , 132 

16.  A.  Future  pain  avoidable . ........  139 

cl  [h.o.s.  it] 


Analytical  Summary  of  the  Yoga-sutras  [xxvi 

PAGE 

17.  B.  Cause  of  future  pain.  Correlation  of  seer  and  seen  . . . 140 

18.  Nature  of  an  object  for  sight  ........  144 

19.  Subdivision  of  objects  for  sight  . . . . . . .148 

20.  Nature  of  seer  ...........  154 

21.  Object  for  sight  subordinate  to  seer  .......  157 

22.  Plurality  of  objects  for  sight  ........  159 

23.  Nature  of  the  correlation  . . . . . . . . .160 

24.  Undifferentiated-consciousness  the  cause  of  the  correlation  . . 166 

25.  C.  The  escape  from  pain  is  the  isolation  of  the  seer  ....  168 

26.  D.  The  method  of  escape  is  discriminative  insight  ....  169 

27.  Seven  forms  of  discriminative  insight  ......  170 

28.  Means  of  attaining  discrimination  . . . . . . .172 

29.  The  eight  aids  to  yoga  . . . . . . . . .177 

30.  i.  The  five  abstentions  . . . . . . . . .178 

31.  Qualified  abstentions  .........  180 

32.  ii.  The  five  observances  .........  181 

33.  Inhibition  of  obstacles  to  abstentions  and  observances  . . . 183 

34.  Nature  of  perverse-considerations  .......  183 

35.  Consequences  of  abstention  from  injury  ......  186 

36.  Consequences  of  abstention  from  lying  ......  186 

37.  Consequences  of  abstention  from  stealing  ......  186 

38.  Consequences  of  abstention  from  incontinence  .....  187 

39.  Consequences  of  abstention  from  property  .....  187 

40.  Consequences  of  observance  of  cleanliness ......  188 

41.  Further  consequences  of  cleanliness  . . . . . . .188 

42.  Consequences  of  observance  of  contentment  .....  189 

43.  Consequences  of  observance  of  self-castigation  .....  189 

44.  Consequences  of  observance  of  study  ......  190 

45.  Consequences  of  observance  of  devotion  to  the  l9vara  . . . 190 

46.  hi.  Nature  of  postures  .........  191 

47.  Ways  to  success  in  postures  . . . . . . . .192 

48.  Consequences  of  postiu’es  .........  192 

49.  iv.  Nature  of  restraint  of  the  breath  .......  193 

50.  Three  kinds  of  restraint  of  the  breath  ......  193 

51.  A fourth  kind  of  restraint  of  the  breath  ......  195 

52.  Consequences  of  restraint  of  the  breath  ......  196 

53.  A further  consequence  is  fixed  attention  ......  197 

54.  V.  Nature  of  fixed  attention  ........  197 

55.  Consequences  of  fixed  attention  .......  198 


xxvii] 


Analytical  Summary  of  the  Yoga-siltras 


BOOK  THIRD— SUPERNORMAL  POWERS 

PAGE 

1.  vi.  Characteristic  mark  of  fixed-attention  ......  203 

2.  vii.  Characteristic  mark  of  contemplation  ......  204 

3.  viii.  Characteristic  mark  of  concentration ......  204 

4.  The  three  last  together  are  called  constraint  .....  205 

5.  Consequences  of  mastery  of  constraint  ......  206 

6.  Three  stages  of  constraint  ........  206 

7.  Last  three  aids  more  direct  than  first  five  ......  207 

8.  Even  last  three  less  direct  than  seedless  concentration  . . . 208 

9.  Characteristic  mark  of  restricted  mutations  .....  208 

10.  Peaceful  flow  of  mind-stuff  due  to  subliminal  impressions  . . 210 

11.  Nature  of  mutations  in  concentration  ......  211 

12.  Characteristic  mark  of  focused  mutations  . . . . . .211 

13.  Mutations  of  external-aspect  and  time-form  and  intensity  . . .212 

14.  Characteristic  mark  of  a substance  .......  224 

15.  Reason  for  the  order  of  mutations  .......  229 

16.  Consequences  of  constraint  upon  the  mutations  ....  232 

17.  Consequences  of  discriminating  things  from  words  and  ideas  . . 233 

18.  Consequences  of  direct  perception  of  subliminal  impressions  . . 247 

19.  Consequences  of  direct  perception  of  presented-ideas  of  another  . 249 

20.  Object  of  such  a presented -idea  not  perceived  .....  249 

21.  Consequences  of  constraint  upon  the  form  of  the  body  . . . 250 

22.  Consequences  of  constraint  upon  karma  . . . . . .251 

23.  Consequences  of  constraint  upon  acts  of  sympathy  ....  252 

24.  Consequences  of  constraint  upon  powers  ......  253 

25.  Consequences  of  constraint  upon  luminous  processes  ....  253 

26.  Consequences  of  constraint  upon  the  sun  ......  254 

27.  Consequences  of  constraint  upon  the  moon  .....  260 

28.  Consequences  of  constraint  upon  the  zenith  .....  260 

29.  Consequences  of  constraint  upon  the  navel  .....  260 

30.  Consequences  of  constraint  upon  the  throat  .....  260 

31.  Consequences  of  constraint  upon  the  tortoise-tube  ....  261 

32.  Consequences  of  constraint  upon  the  radiance  in  the  head  . . 261 

33.  Consequences  of  constraint  upon  the  vividness  .....  261 

34.  Consequences  of  constraint  upon  the  heart  .....  262 

35.  Consequences  of  constraint  upon  knowledge  of  the  Self  . . . 262 

36.  Consequences  of  direct  perception  of  the  Self  .....  265 

37.  Supernormal  powers  obstructive  to  concentration  ....  265 

38.  Mind -stuff  penetrates  into  the  body  of  another 266 

39.  Consequences  of  constraint  upon  Udana 267 


Analytical  Summary  of  the  Yoga-sutras  [xxviii 

PAGE 

40.  Consequences  of  constraint  upon  Samdna  ......  268 

41.  Consequences  of  constraint  upon  relation  between  the  ear  and  air  . 268 

42.  Consequences  of  constraint  upon  relation  between  body  and  air  . 271 

43.  Dwindling  of  the  obscuration  of  light  ......  272 

44.  Atomization  and  other  supernormal  powers  .....  273 

45.  Perfection  of  body  ..........  278 

46.  Method  of  mastering  the  organs  .......  280 

47.  Consequences  of  mastering  the  organs  ......  280 

48.  Mastery  over  all  matter  .........  282 

49.  Means  of  attaining  Isolation  ........  283 

50.  Means  of  reducing  opposition  to  Isolation  .....  284 

51.  Consequences  of  constraint  upon  moments  and  their  sequence  . . 285 

52.  Object  of  discriminative  perception  .......  287 

53.  Characteristic  mark  of  discriminative  perception  ....  290 

54.  Consequences  of  the  discrimination  .......  294 

55.  Isolation  is  purity  of  the  sattva  and  of  the  Self .....  295 


BOOK  FOURTH— ISOLATION 


1.  Different  causes  of  supernormal  powers  ......  299 

2.  Reasons  for  mutations  into  another  birth  ......  300 

3.  No  impulse  given  by  karma  ........  301 

4.  Created  mind-stuffs  ..........  303 

5.  Mind-stuff  which  gives  the  impulse  .......  303 

6.  No  latent-impressions  in  created  mind-stuffs  .....  304 

7.  Varieties  of  karma  ..........  305 

8.  Latent  impressions  conform  to  karma  ......  306 

9.  Continuity  of  impressions  .........  307 

10.  Latent  impressions  from  time  without  beginning  ....  309 

11.  Termination  of  impressions  ........  314 

12.  External-aspects  in  aU  three  time-forms  ......  315 

13.  External-aspects  phenomenalized  or  subtile  .....  317 

14.  Activity  of  a thing  due  to  a single  mutation  .....  318 

15.  Things  and  mind-stuff  on  different  levels  ......  323 

16.  Things  not  dependent  upon  a single  mind-stuff . ....  325 

17.  Rejection  of  idealism  .........  327 

18.  The  Self  undergoes  no  mutations  .......  328 

19.  Mind-stuff  does  not  illumine  itself  .......  328 

20.  Fallacy  in  confusing  thinking-substance  and  thing  ....  330 

21.  One  mind-stuff  not  illumined  by  another 331 


xxix]  Analytical  Summary  of  the  Yoga-sutras 

PAGE 

22.  Intelligence  aware  of  its  own  mind-stufif  ......  332 

23.  Mind-stufF,  when  affected,  capable  of  perceiving  all  objects  . . 334 

24.  Intelligence  distinct  from  mind-stuff  ......  336 

25.  Change  in  the  habits  of  the  mind-stuff  ......  337 

26.  Change  in  the  nature  of  the  mind-stuff  ......  339 

27.  Disturbances  in  the  discriminating  mind  ......  339 

28.  Escape  even  from  subliminal-impressions  .....  340 

29.  Means  of  attaining  the  Eain-cloud  .......  340 

30.  Consequences  of  the  Eain-cloud  .......  341 

31.  Condition  of  mind-stuff  in  the  Eain-cloud  .....  342 

32.  End  of  the  sequences  of  mutations  .......  343 

33.  Characteristic  of  a sequence  ........  343 

34.  Nature  of  Isolation  347 


TRANSLATION  OF  THE  YOGA-SUTRAS  WITHOUT 
THE  COMMENT  OR  THE  EXPLANATION 


Being  the  Sutras  translated  in  groups,  together  with 

GROUP-HEADINGS  ADDED  BY  THE  TRANSLATOR 

BOOK  FIRST— CONCENTRATION 

Goal  of  Concentration 

i.  1-4.  Yoga  is  the  concentration  which  restricts  the  fluctuations.  Freed 
from  them,  the  Self  attains  to  self-expression. 

i.  1 Now  the  exposition  of  yoga  [is  to  be  made],  i.  2 Yoga  is  the 
restriction  of  the  fluctuations  of  mind-stuff,  i.  3 Then  the  Seer  [that  is, 
the  Self]  abides  in  himself,  i.  4 At  other  times  it  [the  Self]  takes  the 
same  form  as  the  fluctuations  [of  mind-stuff]. 

Forms  of  the  mind-stuff 

i.  5-11.  The  fluctuations  are  all  exposed  to  attack  from  the  hindrances 
and  are  five  in  number:  1.  sources-of-valid- ideas ; 2.  misconceptions; 
3.  predicate-relations;  4.  sleep;  5.  memory. 

i.  6 The  fluctuations  are  of  five  kinds  and  are  hindered  or  unhindered, 
i.  6 Sources-of-valid-ideas  and  misconceptions  and  predicate-relations  and 
sleep  and  memory,  i.  7 Sources-of-valid-ideas  are  perception  and  inference 
and  verbal-communication,  i.  8 Misconception  is  an  erroneous  idea 
not  based  on  that  form  [in  respect  of  which  the  misconception  is 
entertained],  i.  9 The  predicate-relation  {vikalpa)  is  without  any  [corre- 
sponding perceptible]  object  and  follows  as  a result  of  perception  or 
of  words,  i.  10  Sleep  is  a fluctuation  of  [mind-stuff]  supi^orted  by 
the  cause  of  the  [transient]  negation  [of  the  waking  and  the  dreaming 
fluctuations],  i.  11  Memoiy  is  not-adding-surreptitiously  to  a once 
experienced  object. 

Methods  of  restricting  fluctuations 

i.  12-16.  An  orientation  of  the  whole  life  with  reference  to  one  idea;  an 
emotional  transformation  corresponding  to  this  focused  state. 

i.  12  The  restriction  of  them  is  by  [means]  of  practice  and  passionless- 
ness. i.  13  Practice  is  [repeated]  exertion  to  the  end  that  [the  mind- 


xxxi] 


Translation  of  the  Yoga-siitras 

stuff]  shall  have  permanence  in  this  [restricted  state],  i.  14  But  this 
[practice]  becomes  confirmed  when  it  has  been  cultivated  for  a long  time 
and  uninterruptedly  and  with  earnest  attention,  i.  15  Passionlessness 
is  the  consciousness  of  being  master  on  the  part  of  one  who  has  rid 
himself  of  thirst  for  either  seen  or  revealed  objects,  i.  16  This  [passion- 
lessness] is  highest  when  discernment  of  the  Self  results  in  thirstlessness 
for  qualities  [and  not  merely  for  objects]. 

Kinds  of  concentration 

i.  17-18.  Four  kinds  of  conscious  concentration,  and  the  concentration  of 
subliminal-impressions  alone. 

i.  17  [Concentration  becomes]  conscious  [of  its  object]  by  assuming 
forms  either  of  deliberation  [upon  coarse  objects]  or  of  reflection  upon 
subtile  objects  or  of  joy  or  of  the  feeling-of-personality.  i.  18  The  other 
[concentration  which  is  not  conscious  of  objects]  consists  of  subliminal- 
impressions  only  [after  objects  have  merged],  and  follows  upon  that 
practice  which  effects  the  cessation  [of  fluctuations]. 

Degrees  of  approach  to  concentration 

i.  19-23.  The  worldly  approach ; the  spiritual  approach ; the  combina- 
tions of  methods  and  intensities ; and  the  devotion  to  the  highest  Self. 

i.  19  [Concentration  not  conscious  of  objects]  caused  by  worldly  [means] 
is  the  one  to  which  the  discarnate  attain  and  to  which  those  [whose 
bodies]  are  resolved  into  primary-matter  attain,  i.  20  [Concentration 
not  conscious  of  objects,]  which  follows  upon  belief  [and]  energy  [and] 
mindfulness  [and]  concentration  [and]  insight,  is  that  to  which  the 
others  [the  yogins]  attain,  i.  21  For  the  keenly  intense,  [concentration] 
is  near.  i.  22  Because  [this  keenness]  is  gentle  or  moderate  or  keen, 
there  is  a [concentration]  supexdor  even  to  this  [near  kind],  i.  23  Or 
[concentration]  is  attained  by  devotion  to  the  l9vara. 

Analysis  of  the  highest  Self 

i.  24-28.  Unique  quality  of  the  highest  Self ; proof  of  His  existence ; His 
temporal  priority  ; His  symbolical  realization, 

i.  24  Untouched  by  hindrances  or  karmas  or  fruition  or  by  latent-deposits, 
the  l9vara  is  a special  kind  of  Self.  i.  25  In  this  [l9vara]  the  germ  of 
the  omniscient  is  at  its  utmost  excellence,  i.  26  Teacher  of  the  Primal 
[Sages]  also,  forasmuch  as  [with  Him]  there  is  no  limitation  by  time, 
i.  27  The  word-expressing  Him  is  the  Mystic-syllable,  i.  28  Kepetition 
of  it  and  reflection  upon  its  meaning  [should  be  made]. 


i 

j 


I 


[xxxii 


Translation  of  the  Yoga-siitras 

Obstacles  to  the  calming  of  the  mind-stuff 

i.  29-34.  The  inner  sense  is  exposed  to  distractions  which  may  be  over- 
come by  focusing  the  mind ; by  the  cultivation  of  sentiments ; one  may 
also  practise  breathings. 

i.  29  Thereafter  comes  the  right-knowledge  of  him  who  thinks  in  an 
inverse  way,  and  the  removal  of  obstacles,  i.  30  Sickness  and  languor 
and  doubt  and  heedlessness  and  worldliness  and  erroneous  perception  and 
failure  to  attain  any  stage  [of  concentration]  and  instability  in  the  state 
[when  attained] — these  distractions  of  the  mind-stuff  are  the  obstacles, 
i.  31  Pain  and  despondency  and  unsteadiness  of  the  body  and  inspiration 
and  expiration  are  the  accompaniments  of  the  distractions,  i.  32  To 
check  them  [let  there  be]  practice  upon  a single  entity,  i.  33  By  the 
cultivation  of  friendliness  towai’ds  happiness,  and  compassion  towards 
pain,  and  joy  towards  merit,  and  indifference  towards  demerit,  i.  34  Or 
[the  yogin  attains  the  undisturbed  calm  of  the  mind-stuff]  by  expulsion 
and  retention  of  breath. 

Attainment  of  Stability 

i.  35-39.  Suitable  objects  for  fixed-attention  and  contemplation. 

i.  35  Or  [he  gains  stability  when]  a sense-activity  arises  connected  with 
an  object  [and]  bringing  the  central-oi’gan  into  a relation  of  stability, 
i.  36  Or  an  undistressed  [and]  luminous  [sense-activity  when  arisen 
brings  the  central-organ  into  a relation  of  stability],  i.  37  Or  the  mind- 
stuff  [reaches  the  stable  state]  by  having  as  its  object  [a  mind-stuff]  freed 
from  passion,  i.  38  Or  [the  mind-stuff  reaches  the  stable  state]  by 
having  as  the  supporting-object  a perception  in  dream  or  in  sleep,  i.  39  Or 
[the  mind-stuff  reaches  the  stable  state]  by  contemplation  upon  any  such 
an  object  as  is  desired. 

Mastery  and  concentration 

i.  40-47.  Classification  of  concentration  with  reference  to  different  single 
objects  or  absence  of  objects,  or  to  the  mental  act,  or  to  a fusion  of  object 
and  knower. 

i.  40  His  mastery  extends  from  the  smallest  atom  to  the  greatest 
magnitude,  i.  41  [The  mind-stuff]  from  which,  as  from  a precious  gem, 
fluctuations  have  dwindled  away,  reaches  the  balanced-state,  which,  in 
the  case  of  the  knower  or  of  the  process-of-knowing  or  of  the  object- 
to-be-known,  is  in  the  state  of  resting  upon  [one]  of  these  [three]  and  in 
the  state  of  being  tinged  by  [one]  of  these  [three],  i.  42  Of  [these 
balanced-states]  the  state-balanced  with  deliberation  is  confused  by 
reason  of  predicate-relations  between  words  and  intended-objects  and 


{xxxiii  without  the  Comment  or  the  Explanation 

ideas,  i.  43  When  the  memory  is  quite  purified,  [that  balanced-state] — 
which  is,  as  it  were,  empty  of  itself  and  which  brightens  [into  conscious 
knowledge]  as  the  intended-object  and  nothing  more — is  super-delibera- 
tive. i.  44  By  this  same  [balanced-state]  the  reflective  and  the  super- 
reflective  [balanced-states]  are  also  explained,  i.  45  The  subtile  object 
also  terminates  in  unresoluble-primary-matter  (alihga).  i.  46  These 
same  [balanced-states]  are  the  seeded  concentration,  i.  47  When  there 
is  the  clearness  of  the  super-reflective  [balanced-state,  the  yogin  gains] 
internal  undisturbed  calm. 

Normative  insight 

i.  48-51.  After-effects  of  concentrated  insight  efface  after-effects  of  con- 
centration upon  objects. 

i.  48  In  this  [concentrated  mind-stuff]  the  insight  is  truth-bearing, 
i.  49  Has  another  object  than  the  insight  resulting  from  things  heard 
or  from  inferences,  inasmuch  as  its  intended-object  is  a particular, 
i.  50  The  subliminal-impression  produced  by  this  [super-reflective 
balanced-state]  is  hostile  to  other  subliminal-impressions,  i.  51  When 
this  [subliminal-impression]  also  is  restricted,  since  all  is  restricted,  [the 
yogin  gains]  seedless  concentration. 


BOOK  SECOND— MEANS  OF  ATTAINMENT 
Devices  for  weakening  hindrances 

ii.  1-11.  Aids  serviceable  to  the  beginner  who  is  on  the  path  to  con- 
centration. 

ii.  1 Self-castigation  and  study  and  devotion  to  the  Ifvara  are  the  Yoga 
of  action,  ii.  2 For  the  cultivation  of  concentration  and  for  the 
attenuation  of  the  hindrances.  ii.  3 Undifferentiated-consciousness 
{avidya)  and  the  feeling-of-personality  and  passion  and  aversion  and  the 
will-to-live  are  the  five  hindrances,  ii.  4 Undifferentiated-consciousness 
is  the  field  for  the  others  whether  they  be  dormant  or  attenuated  or 
intercepted  or  sustained,  ii.  5 The  recognition  of  the  permanent,  of 
the  pure,  of  pleasure,  and  of  a self  in  what  is  impermanent,  impure, 
pain,  and  not-self  is  undifferentiated-consciousness  [avidya).  ii.  6 When 
the  power  of  seeing  and  the  power  by  which  one  sees  have  the 
appearance  of  being  a single  self,  [this  is]  the  feeling-of-personality. 
ii.  7 Passion  is  that  which  dwells  upon  pleasure,  ii.  8 Aversion  is  that 
which  dwells  upon  pain.  ii.  9 The  will-to-live  sweeping  on  [by  the 
force  of]  its  own  nature  exists  in  this  form  even  in  the  wise.  ii.  10 
6 [h.o.s.  17] 


[xxxiv 


Translation  of  the  Yoga-siitras 

These  [hindrances  when  they  have  become  subtile]  are  to  be  escaped 
by  the  inverse-propagation,  ii.  11  The  fluctuations  of  these  should  be 
escaped  by  means  of  contemplation. 

Karma 

ii.  12-14.  Origin  of  karma  in  hindrances;  result  of  karma  in  state-of- 
existence,  length  of  life,  and  pleasure  or  pain. 

ii.  12  The  latent-deposit  of  karma  has  its  root  in  the  hindrances  and  may 
be  felt  in  a birth  seen  or  in  a birth  unseen,  ii.  13  So  long  as  the  root 
exists,  there  will  be  fruition  from  it  [that  is]  birth  [and]  length-of-life 
[and]  kind-of-experience.  ii.  14  These  [fruitions]  have  joy  or  extreme 
anguish  as  results  in  accordance  with  the  quality  of  their  causes  whether 
merit  or  demerit. 

All  is  pain 

ii.  15.  Present  and  future  and  past  correlations  with  objects  result  un- 
avoidably in  pain. 

ii.  15  As  being  the  pains  which  are  mutations  and  anxieties  and 
subliminal-impressions,  and  by  reason  of  the  opposition  of  the  fluctuations 
of  the  aspects  (gum), — to  the  discriminating  all  is  nothing  but  pain. 

There  is  an  escape 

ii.  16.  Only  yogins  are  sensitive  to  future  pain.  This  may  he  avoided  in 
that  it  has  not  expressed  itself  in  actual  suffering. 

ii.  16  That  which  is  to  be  escaped  is  pain  yet  to  come. 

Cause  of  pain 

ii.  17-24.  The  Seer-sight  relation  implies  1.  complexes  of  potential 
stresses  between  aspects  (guna)  and  between  sense-organs  and  elements, 
2.  the  power  of  the  Seer  who  is  undefiled  by  aspects,  3.  the  actual  correla- 
tion until  the  purpose  of  the  Seer,  which  is  to  differentiate  consciousness,  is 
completed. 

ii.  17  The  correlation  of  the  Seer  and  the  object-of-sight  is  the  cause 
of  that  which  is  to  be  escaped,  ii.  18  With  a disposition  to  brightness 
and  to  activity  and  to  inertia,  and  with  the  elements  and  the  organs 
as  its  essence,  and  with  its  purpose  the  experience  and  the  liberation 
[of  the  Self], — this  is  the  object-of-sight.  ii.  19  The  particularized  and 
the  unparticularized  [forms]  and  the  resoluble  only  [into  primary  matter] 
and  irresoluble-primary-matter — are  the  divisions  of  the  aspects  (guna). 
ii.  20  The  Seer  who  is  nothing  but  [the  power  of  seeing],  although 
undefiled  (^uddha),  looks  upon  the  presented  idea.  ii.  21  The  object- 
of-sight  is  only  for  the  sake  of  it  [the  Self].  ii.  22  Though  it  has 


xxxv]  without  the  Comment  or  the  Explanation 

ceased  [to  be  seen]  in  the  case  of  one  whose  purpose  is  accomplished, 
it  has  not  ceased  to  be,  since  it  is  common  to  others  [besides  himself], 
ii.  23  The  reason  for  the  apperception  of  what  the  power  of  the 
property  and  of  what  the  power  of  the  proprietor  are,  is  correlation, 
ii.  24  The  reason  for  this  [correlation]  is  unditferentiated-consciousness 
{avidya). 

The  escape 

ii.  25.  Positive  state  of  Isolation  follows  the  ending  of  the  correlation. 

ii.  25  Since  this  [non-sight]  does  not  exist,  there  is  no  correlation.  This 
is  the  escape,  the  Isolation  of  the  Seer. 

Means  of  escape 

ii.  26-27.  The  act  of  discrimination  leading  up  to  the  act  of  insight. 

ii.  26  The  means  of  attaining  escape  is  unwavering  discriminative 
discernment,  ii.  27  For  him  [there  is]  insight  sevenfold  and  advancing 
in  stages  to  the  highest. 

Eight  aids  to  yoga 

ii.  28-29.  To  purify  the  aspects  and  to  intensify  intuitive  thinking  there 
are  five  indirect  aids  and  three  direct  aids. 

ii.  28  After  the  aids  to  yoga  have  been  followed  up,  when  the  impurity 
has  dwindled,  there  is  an  enlightenment  of  perception  reaching  up  to  the 
discriminative  discernment,  ii.  29  Abstentions  and  observances  and 
postures  and  regulations-of-the-breath  and  withdrawal-of-the-senses  and 
fixed-attention  and  contemplation  and  concentration. 

First  indirect  aid : i.  Five  abstentions 

ii.  30-31.  The  elements  and  degrees  of  morality  in  the  form  of  prohibi- 
tions. 

ii.  30  Abstinence  from  injury  and  from  falsehood  and  from  theft  and  from 
incontinence  and  from  acceptance  of  gifts  are  the  abstentions,  ii.  31  When 
they  are  unqualified  by  species  or  place  or  time  or  exigency  and  when 
[covering]  all  [these]  classes — there  is  the  Great  Course-of-conduct. 

Second  indirect  aid : ii.  Five  observances 

ii.  32.  Advances  in  morality  in  the  form  of  voluntary  action. 

ii.  32  Cleanliness  and  contentment  and  self-castigation  and  study  and 
devotion  to  the  l9vara  are  the  observances. 

Results  of  tbe  abstentions  and  observances 

ii.  33-45.  Persistent  inhibitions  of  certain  kinds  reorganize  an  increase  of 
activity  of  the  opposite  kind. 

ii.  33  If  there  be  inhibition  by  perverse-considerations,  there  should  be 


[xxxvi 


Translation  of  the  Yoga-sfitras 

cultivation  of  the  opposites,  ii.  34  Since  perverse-considerations  such, 
as  injuries,  whether  done  or  caused  to  be  done  or  approved,  whether 
ensuing  upon  greed  or  anger  or  infatuation,  whether  mild  or  moderate 
or  vehement,  find  their  unending  consequences  in  pain  and  lack  of 
thinking,  there  should  be  the  cultivation  of  their  opposites,  ii.  35  As 
soon  as  he  is  grounded  in  abstinence  from  injury,  his  presence  begets 
a suspension  of  enmity,  ii.  36  As  soon  as  he  is  grounded  in  abstinence 
from  falsehood,  actions  and  consequences  depend  upon  him.  ii.  37  As 
soon  as  he  is  grounded  in  abstinence  from  theft,  all  jewels  approach  him. 
ii.  38  As  soon  as  he  is  grounded  in  abstinence  from  incontinence,  he 
acquires  energy,  ii.  39  As  soon  as  he  is  established  in  abstinence  from 
acceptance  of  gifts,  a thorough  illumination  upon  the  conditions  of  birth, 
ii.  40  As  a result  of  cleanliness  there  is  disgust  at  one’s  own  body  and 
no  intercourse  with  others,  ii.  41  Purity  of  sattva  and  gentleness  and 
singleness-of-intent  and  subjugation  of  the  senses  and  fitness  for  the 
sight  of  the  self.  ii.  42  As  a result  of  contentment  there  is  an  acquisition 
of  superlative  pleasure,  ii.  43  Perfection  in  the  body  and  in  the  oi’gans 
after  impurity  has  dwindled  as  a result  of  self-castigation,  ii.  44  As 
a result  of  study  there  is  communion  with  the  chosen  deity,  ii.  45 
Perfection  of  concentration  as  a result  of  devotion  to  the  Ifvara. 

Third  indirect  aid : iii.  Postures 

ii,  46-48.  Bodily  conditions  favourable  to  concentration. 

ii.  46  Stable-and-easy  posture,  ii.  47  By  relaxation  of  effort  or  by  a 
[mental]  state-of-balance  with  reference  to  Ananta.  ii.  48  Thereafter 
he  is  unassailed  by  extremes. 

Fourth  indirect  aid : iv.  Restraint  of  the  breath 
ii.  49-52.  Calming  of  affective  states  is  favourable  to  concentration. 

ii.  49  When  there  is  [stability  of  posture],  the  restraint  of  breath,  a 
cutting  off  of  the  flow  of  inspiration  and  expiration,  follows,  ii.  50  [This 
is]  external  or  internal  or  suppressed  in  fluctuation  and  is  regulated  by 
place  and  time  and  number  and  is  protracted  and  subtile,  ii.  51  The 
fourth  [restraint  of  the  breath]  transcends  the  external  and  the  internal 
object,  ii.  52  As  a result  of  this  the  covering  of  the  light  dwindles  away. 

Fifth  indirect  aid : v.  Withdrawal  of  the  sense-organs 
ii.  53-55.  The  span  of  attention  is  confined  to  an  inner  object. 

ii.  53  For  fixed-attentions  also  the  central  organ  becomes  fit,  ii.  54  The 
withdrawal  of  the  senses  is  as  it  were  the  imitation  of  the  mind-stuff 
as  it  is  in  itself  on  the  part  of  the  organs  by  disjoining  themselves  fi’om 
their  object,  ii.  55  As  a result  of  this  [withdrawal]  there  is  a complete- 
mastery  of  the  organs. 


xxxvii]  without  the  Comment  or  the  Explanation 

BOOK  THIRD- SUPERNORMAL  POWERS 

First  direct  aid;  vi.  Fixed-attention 
iii.  1.  The  knower  focuses  the  process  of  knowing  upon  the  object  to  be 
known. 

iii.  1 Binding  the  mind-stuff  to  a place  is  fixed-attention. 

Second  direct  aid : vii.  Contemplation 
iii.  2.  A two-term  relation  between  the  process  of  knowing  and  the  object 
to  be  known. 

iii.  2 Focusedness  of  the  presented  idea  upon  that  [place]  is  con- 
templation. 

Third  direct  aid : viii.  Concentration 

iii.  3.  A fusion  of  the  knower  and  the  process  of  knowing  with  the  object 
to  be  known. 

iii.  3 This  same  [contemplation],  shining  forth  [in  consciousness]  as  the 
intended  object  and  nothing  more,  and,  as  it  were,  emptied  of  itself,  is 
concentration. 

Transition  to  seedless  concentration 

iii,  4-10.  The  direct  aids  in  combination  result  in  insight  and  restricted 
subliminal-impressions  and  the  calm  flow  of  the  mind-stuff. 

iii.  4 The  three  in  one  are  constraint,  iii.  5 As  a result  of  mastering 
this  constraint,  there  follows  the  shining  forth  of  insight,  iii.  6 Its 
application  is  by  stages,  iii.  7 The  three  are  direct  aids  in  comparison 
with  the  previous  [five],  iii.  8 Even  these  [three]  are  indirect  aids 
to  seedless  [concentration],  iii.  9 When  there  is  a becoming  invisible 
of  the  subliminal-impression  of  emergence  and  a becoming  visible 
of  the  subliminal-impression  of  restriction,  the  mutation  of  restriction 
is  inseparably  connected  with  mind-stuff  in  its  period  of  restriction, 
iii.  10  This  [mind-stuff]  flows  peacefully  by  reason  of  the  subliminal- 
impression. 

Mutations  of  substances 

iii.  11-15.  In  the  focused  state  the  concentration  holds  two  time-forms 
within  the  span  of  attention.  Mutations  are  in  fixed  orders  of  subliminal- 
impressions  in  the  restricted  state. 

iii.  11  The  mutation  of  concentration  is  the  dwindling  of  dispersiveness 
and  the  uprisal  of  singleness-of-intent  belonging  to  the  mind-stuff, 
iii.  12  Then  again  when  the  quiescent  and  the  uprisen  presen ted-ideas 
are  similar  [in  respect  of  having  a single  object],  the  mind-stuff  has 
a mutation  single-in-intent,  iii.  13  Thus  with  regard  to  elements  and 
to  organs,  mutations  of  external-aspect  and  of  time-variation  and  of 
intensity  have  been  enumerated,  iii.  14  A substance  conforms  itself  to 
quiescent  and  uprisen  and  indeterminable  external-aspects,  iii.  15  The 
order  of  the  sequence  is  the  reason  for  the  order  of  the  mutations. 


Translation  of  the  Yoga-sutras  [xxxviii 

Application  of  constraints  to  different  orders  of  mutations 

iii.  16-52.  Given  a single  mutation  of  external-aspect  or  time-form  or  in- 
tensity, the  vphole  sequence  comes  under  control  of  the  concentrated  insight, 
iii.  16  As  a result  of  constraint  upon  the  three  mutations  [there  follows] 
the  knowledge  of  the  past  and  the  future,  iii.  17  Word  and  intended- 
object  and  presented-idea  are  confused  because  they  are  erroneously 
identified  with  each  other.  By  constraint  upon  the  distinctions  between 
them  [there  arises  the  intuitive]  knowledge  of  the  cries  of  all  living 
beings,  iii.  18  As  a result  of  direct  perception  of  subliminal-impressions 
there  is  [intuitive]  knowledge  of  previous  births,  iii.  19  [As  a result  of 
constraint]  upon  a presented-idea  [there  arises  intuitive]  knowledge  of 
the  mind-stuff  of  another,  iii.  20  But  [the  intuitive  knowledge  of  the 
mind-stuff  of  another]  does  not  have  that  [idea]  together  with  that  upon 
which  it  depends  [as  its  object],  since  that  [upon  which  it  depends] 
is  not-in-the-field  [of  consciousness],  iii.  21  As  a result  of  constraint 
upon  the  [outer]  form  of  the  body,  when  its  power  to  be  known  is 
stopped,  then  as  a consequence  of  the  disjunction  of  the  light  and  of  the 
eye  there  follows  indiscernibility  [of  the  yogin’s  body],  iii.  22  Advancing 
and  not-advancing  is  karma ; as  a result  of  constraint  upon  this  [two- 
fold karma]  or  from  the  signs  of  death  [there  arises  an  intuitive] 
knowledge  of  the  latter  end.  iii.  23  [As  a result  of  constraint]  upon 
friendliness  and  other  [sentiments  there  arise]  powers  [of  friendliness], 
iii.  24  [As  a result  of  constraint]  upon  powers  [there  arise]  powers  like 
those  of  an  elephant,  iii.  25  As  a result  of  casting  the  light  of 
a sense-activity  [there  arises  the  intuitive]  knowledge  of  the  subtile 
and  the  concealed  and  the  obscure,  iii.  26  As  a result  of  constraint 
upon  the  sun  [there  arises  the  intuitive]  knowledge  of  the  cosmic-spaces, 
iii.  27  [As  a result  of  constraint]  upon  the  moon  [there  arises  the 
intuitive]  knowledge  of  the  arrangement  of  the  stars,  iii.  28  [Asa  result 
of  constraint]  upon  the  pole-star  [there  arises  the  intuitive]  knowledge 
of  their  movements,  iii.  29  [As  a result  of  constraint]  upon  the  wheel 
of  the  navel  [there  arises  the  intuitive]  knowledge  of  the  arrangement 
of  the  body.  iii.  30  [As  a result  of  constraint]  upon  the  well  of  the 
throat  [there  follows]  the  cessation  of  hunger  and  thirst,  iii.  31  [As 
a result  of  constraint]  upon  the  tortoise-tube  [there  follows]  motionless- 
ness of  the  mind-stuff,  iii.  32  [As  a result  of  constraint]  upon  the 
radiance  in  the  head  [there  follows]  the  sight  of  the  Siddhas.  iii.  33  Or 
as  a result  of  vividness  the  yogin  discerns  all.  iii.  34  [As  a result  of 
constraint]  upon  the  heart  [there  arises]  a consciousness  of  the  mind-stuff, 
iii.  35  Experience  is  a presented-idea  which  fails  to  distinguish  the  sattva 
and  the  Self,  which  are  absolutely  uncommingled  [in  the  presented-idea]. 
Since  the  sattva  exists  as  object  for  another,  the  [intuitive]  knowledge 
of  the  Self  arises  as  the  result  of  constraint  upon  that  which  exists  for 


xxxix]  ivithout  the  Comment  or  the  Explanation 

its  own  sake.  iii.  36  As  a result  of  this  [constraint  upon  that  which 
exists  for  its  own  sake],  there  arise  vividness  and  the  organ-of-[supernal]- 
hearing  and  the  organ-of-[supernal]-touch  and  the  organ-of-[supernal]- 
sight  and  the  organ-of-[supernal]-taste  and  the  organ-of-[supernalJ-smell. 
iii.  37  In  concentration  these  [supernal  activities]  are  obstacles ; in  the 
emergent  state  they  are  perfections  {siddJii).  iii.  38  As  a result  of  slacken- 
ing the  causes  of  bondage  and  as  a result  of  the  knowledge  of  the  procedure 
[of  the  mind-stuff],  the  mind-stuff  penetrates  into  the  body  of  another, 
iii.  39  As  a result  of  mastering  the  Udana  there  is  no  adhesion  to  water 
or  mud  or  thorns  or  similar  objects,  and  [at  death]  the  upward  flight, 
iii.  40  As  a result  of  mastering  the  Samana  [there  arises]  a radiance, 
iii.  41  As  a result  of  constraint  upon  the  relation  between  the  organ-of- 
hearing  and  the  air,  [there  arises]  the  supernal-organ-of-hearing.  iii.  42 
Either  as  a result  of  constraint  upon  the  relation  between  the  body  and 
the  air,  or  as  a result  of  the  balanced-state  of  lightness,  such  as  that  of 
cotton-fibre,  there  follows  the  passing  through  air.  iii.  43  An  outwardly 
unadjusted  fluctuation  is  the  Great  Discarnate  ; as  a result  of  this  the 
dwindling  of  the  covering  to  the  brightness,  iii.  44  As  a result  of  con- 
straint upon  the  coarse  and  the  essential-attribute  and  the  subtile  and 
the  inherence  and  purposiveness,  there  is  a mastery  of  the  elements, 
iii.  45  As  a result  of  this,  atomization  and  the  other  [perfections]  come 
about,  [there  is]  perfection  of  body  ; and  there  is  no  obstruction  by  the 
properties  of  these  [elements],  iii.  46  Beauty  and  grace  and  power  and 
compactness  of  the  thunderbolt, — [this  is]  perfection  of  body.  iii.  47  As 
a result  of  constraint  upon  the  process-of-knowing  and  the  essential- 
attribute  and  the  feeling-of-personality  and  the  inherence  and  the 
purposiveness,  [there  follows]  the  subjugation  of  the  organs,  iii.  48  As 
a result  of  this  [there  follows]  speed  [great  as  that]  of  the  central- organ, 
action  of  the  instruments  [of  knowledge]  disjunct  [from  the  body],  and 
the  subjugation  of  the  primary-cause,  iii.  49  He  who  has  only  the  full 
discernment  into  the  difference  between  the  sattva  and  the  Self  is  one 
who  has  authority  over  all  states- of-existence  and  is  one  who  knows 
all.  iii.  50  As  a result  of  passionlessness  even  with  regard  to  these 
[perfections]  there  follows,  after  the  dwindling  of  the  seeds  of  the 
defects.  Isolation,  iii.  51  In  case  of  invitations  from  those-in-high- 
places,  these  should  arouse  no  attachment  or  pride,  for  undesired 
consequences  recur,  iii.  52  As  a result  of  constraint  upon  moments 
and  their  sequence  [there  arises  the  intuitive]  knowledge  proceeding  from 
discrimination. 


Culmination  of  concentration 

iii.  53-55.  The  particular  which  is  indiscernible  in  respect  of  class  or 
term  or  point-in-space  is  intuitively  discerned ; the  widest  span  of  objec- 
tivity is  also  discerned.  This  is  the  attainment  of  Isolation. 


Translation  of  the  Yoga-sfitras 


[xl 


iii.  53  As  a result  of  this  there  arises  the  deeper-knowledge  of  two 
equivalent  things  which  cannot  be  distinctly  qualified  in  species  or 
characteristic-mark  or  point-of-space.  iii.  54  The  [intuitive]  knowledge 
proceeding  from  discrimination  is  a deliverer,  has  all  things  as  its  object, 
and  has  all  times  for  its  object,  and  is  an  [inclusive  whole]  without 
sequence,  iii.  55  When  the  purity  of  the  sattva  and  of  the  Self  are  equal 
there  is  Isolation. 

BOOK  FOURTH— ISOLATION 
Substances  and  subconsciousness 

iv.  1-13.  Correspondence  between  imperceptible  forms  of  substance  and 
latent-impressions  of  concentrated  states. 

iv.  1 Perfections  proceed  from  birth  or  from  drugs  or  from  spells 
or  from  self-castigation  or  from  concentration,  iv.  2 The  mutation  into 
another  birth  is  the  result  of  the  filling  in  of  the  evol\dng-cause. 
iv.  3 The  efficient  cause  gives  no  impulse  to  the  evolving-causes  but 
[the  mutation]  follows  when  the  barrier  [to  the  evolving-cause]  is  cut, 
as  happens  with  the  peasant,  iv.  4 Created  mind-stuffs  may  result  from 
the  sense-of-personality  and  from  this  alone,  iv.  5 While  there  is  a 
variety  of  actions,  the  mind-stuff  which  impels  the  many  is  one.  iv.  6 Of 
these  [five  perfections]  that  which  ju’oceeds  from  contemplation  leaves 
no  latent-deposit,  iv.  7 The  yogin’s  karma  is  neither-white-nor-black  ; 
[the  karma]  of  others  is  of  three  kinds,  iv.  8 As  a result  of  this 
there  follows  the  manifestation  of  those  subconscious-impressions  only 
which  correspond  to  the  fruition  of  their  [karma],  iv.  9 There  is 
an  uninterrupted-causal-relation  [of  subconscious-impressions],  although 
remote  in  species  and  point-of-space  and  moment-of-time,  by  reason  of 
tlie  coiTespondence  between  memory  and  subliminal-impressions,  iv.  10 
Furthermore  the  [subconscious-impressions]  have  no  beginning  [that 
we  can  set  in  time],  since  desire  is  permanent,  iv.  11  Since  [sub- 
conscious-impressions] are  associated  with  cau.se  and  motive  and  mental- 
substrate  and  stimulus,  if  these  cease  to  be,  then  those  [subconscious- 
impressions]  cea.se  to  be.  iv.  12  Past  and  future  as  such  exist ; [therefore 
subconsciou.s-imj)ressions  do  not  cease  to  be].  For  the  different  time- 
forms  belong  to  tlie  external-aspects.  iv.  13  These  [external-aspects 
with  the  three  time-forms]  are  phenomenalized  [individuals]  or  subtile 
[generic-forms]  and  their  essence  is  the  aspects  (giina). 

Polemic  against  Idealism 

iv.  14-23.  Knowledge  of  the  stream  of  consciousness  is  impossible  unless 
it  be  a permanent  order  as  contrasted  with  a succession  of  transient 
appearances 

iv.  14  The  that-ness  of  a thing  is  due  to  a singleness  of  mutation. 


xli]  without  the  Comment  or  the  Ex])lanation 

iv.  15.  Because,  while  the  [physical]  thing  remains  the  same,  the  mind- 
stulfs  are  different,  [therefore  the  two  are  upon]  distinct  levels-of-existence. 
iv.  16  And  a thing  is  not  dependent  upon  a single  mind-stuff,  [for  then 
in  certain  cases]  it  could  not  be  proved  [by  that  mind-stuff ],  [and]  then 
what  would  it  be?  iv.  17  A thing  is  known  or  not  known  by 
virtue  of  its  affecting  [or  not  affecting]  the  mind-stuff,  iv.  18  Uninter- 
mittently  the  Master  of  that  [mind-stuff]  knows  the  fluctuations  of 
mind-stuff  [and  thus]  the  Self  undergoes-no-mutations.  iv.  19  It  does 
not  illumine  itself,  since  it  is  an  object-for-sight.  iv.  20  And  there 
cannot  be  a cognition  of  both  [thinking-substance  and  thing]  at  the 
same  time.  iv.  21  If  [one  mind-stuff]  were  the  object-for-sight  for 
another,  there  would  be  an  infinite  regress  from  one  thinking-substance 
to  another  thinking-substance  as  well  as  confusion  of  memory,  iv.  22 
The  Intellect  {citi)  which  unites  not  [with  objects]  is  conscious  of  its  own 
thinking-substance  when  [the  mind-stuff]  takes  the  form  of  that  [thinking- 
substance  by  reflecting  it],  iv.  23  Mind-stuff  affected  by  the  Seer  and  by 
the  object-for-sight  [leads  to  the  perception  of]  all  intended-objects. 

Complete  Self-realization  of  the  Self 

iv.  24-34.  All  hindrances  subside ; all  acts  of  the  Self  are  spontaneous 
and  free ; absence  of  limitations  which  thwart  one  who  wishes  to  attain 
the  ultimate  ideal  of  his  own  nature. 

iv.  24  This  [mind-stuff],  although  diversified  by  countless  subconscious- 
impressions,  exists  for  the  sake  of  another,  because  its  nature  is  to  produce 
[things  as]  combinations,  iv.  25  For  him  who  sees  the  distinction, 
pondering  upon  his  own  states-of-being  ceases,  iv.  26  Then  the  mind- 
stuff  is  borne  down  to  discrimination,  onward  towards  Isolation,  iv.  27 
In  the  intervals  of  this  [mind-stuff]  there  are  other  presented-ideas  [coming] 
from  subliminal-impressions,  iv.  28  The  escape  from  these  [subliminal- 
impressions]  is  described  as  being  like  [the  escape  from]  the  hindrances, 
iv.  29  For  one  who  is  not  usurious  even  in  respect  of  Elevation,  there 
follows  in  every  case  as  a result  of  discriminative  discernment  the 
concentration  [called]  Kain-cloud  of  [knoAvable]  things,  iv.  30  Then 
follows  the  cessation  of  the  hindrances  and  of  karma,  iv.  31  Then, 
because  of  the  endlessness  of  knowledge  from  which  all  obscuring 
defilements  have  passed  away,  what  is  yet  to  be  known  amounts  to  little, 
iv.  32  When  as  a result  of  this  the  aspects  {guna)  have  fulfilled  their 
purpose,  they  attain  to  the  limit  of  the  sequence  of  mutations,  iv.  33 
The  positive  correlate  to  the  moment,  recognized  as  such  at  the  final  limit 
of  the  mutation,  is  a sequence,  iv.  34  Isolation  is  the  inverse  generation 
of  the  aspects,  no  longer  provided  with  a purpose  by  the  Self,  or  it  is 
the  Energy  of  Intellect  grounded  in  itself. 

f [h.o.s.  17] 


BOOK  FIRST 

CONCENTRATION 


1 [h.o.s.  17] 


NOTICE  TO  THE  READER 


Patanjali’s  Mnemonic  Rules  or  Yoga-sutras  are  divided  into  four  books  as  follows  : 


Book  1.  Concentration  or  Samadhi,  with  51  rules  or  sutras, — 
Book  2.  Means  of  attainment  or  SMhana,  with  55  sutras, — 
Book  3.  Supernormal  powers  or  Vibhuti,  with  55  sutras, — 
Book  4.  Isolation  or  Kaivalya,  with  34  sutras, — 


pages  1 to  100 ; 
pages  101  to  200 ; 
pages  201  to  296  ; 
Images  297  to  348. 


In  all,  there  are  195  rules.  Their  extreme  brevity  is  apparent  when  they  are  printed 
continuously,  as  at  the  end  of  the  Ananda>-'a9raraa  edition,  where  the  entire  text  of 
the  rules  occupies  only  between  four  and  five  pages. 


The  Comment  or  Bhasya,  usually  after  a brief  introductory  paragraph  or  phrase  (called 
avatarana),  takes  up  the  rules,  one  by  one,  and  gives  first  the  text  and  then  the 
meaning  thereof. 

Vacaspatimi9ra’s  Explanation  is  of  course  in  the  first  instance  an  explanation  of  the 
Comment ; but  since  the  Comment  comprehends  also  the  Rules,  it  is  in  fact  an 
explanation  of  both  Rules  and  Comment.  In  the  body  of  this  volume,  the  Explana- 
tion is  not  put  all  together  by  itself,  but  is  made  to  keep  pace  with  the  Comment, 
rule  by  rule. 


Meaning  of  the  Diflferenees  of  Type 

The  translation  of  the  Rules  is  set  in  pica  type  of  full-faced  Clarendon  style ; 

The  translation  of  the  Comment  is  set  in  pica  type  of  Roman  style  ; 

The  translation  of  the  Explanation  is  set  in  long  primer  type  of  Roman  style. 

Single  angles  (like  these  < >)  indicate  that  the  words  which  they  enclose  are  taken  from 
the  particular  Rule  or  Yoga-sutra  under  discussion. 

Double  angles  (like  these  »)  indicate  that  the  words  which  they  enclose  are  taken 
from  the  Comment  or  Yoga-bhasya. 

Double  quotation  marks  (“  ”)  indicate  that  the  words  which  they  enclose  are  taken  from 
some  authoritative  text. 

Single  quotation  marks  (‘  ’)  indicate  that  the  words  which  they  enclose  are  the  objections 
or  questions  of  an  opponent,  or  are  a quotation  from  some  unauthoritative  text. 

A half-parenthesis  on  its  side  {'■>)  is  used  between  two  vowels  to  show  that  they  are 
printed  in  violation  of  the  rules  of  euphonic  combination. 


BOOK  FIRST 


CONCENTRATION 


May  he,  who,  having  abandoned  his  primal  form,  exercises  his 
power  to  show  kindness  to  the  world  in  many  ways — he  with  the 
beautiful  hood  and  many  mouths,  possessed  of  deadly  poison  and 
yet  abolishing  the  mass  of  hindrances — he  the  source  of  all  know- 
ledge, and  whose  girdle  of  attendant  snakes  produces  continual 
pleasure, — may  he,  the  divine  Lord  ^ of  Serpents,  protect  you,  with 
his  white  stainless  body — he,  the  giver  of  concentration  {yoga),  and 
himself  concentrated  in  concentration. 

1.  Now  the  exposition  of  yoga  [is  to  be  made]. 

The  expression  <now>  indicates  that  a distinct  topic  ^ commences 
here.  The  authoritative  book  which  expounds  yoga  is  to  be 
understood  as  commenced.  [To  give  a provisional  definition :] 
yoga  is  concentration  ; but  this  is  a quality  of  the  mind-stuff  (citta) 
which  belongs  to  all  the  stages.  The  stages  of  the  mind-stuff  are 
these  : the  restless  {hsipta),  the  infatuated  {mudha),  the  distracted 
{viksipta),  the  single-in-intent  and  the  restricted  {niruddha). 

Of  these  [stages  the  first  two  have  nothing  to  do  with  yoga  and 
even]  in  the  distracted  state  of  the  mind  [its]  concentration  is  [at 
times]  overpowered  by  [opposite]  distractions  and  [consequently] 
it  cannot  properly  be  called  yoga.  But  that  [state]  which,  when 
the  mind  is  single-in-intent,  fully  illumines  a distinct  and  real 
object  and  causes  the  hindrances  (klega)  to  dwindle,  slackens  the 
bonds  of  karma,  and  sets  before  it  as  a goal  the  restriction  [of  all 


^ See  Linga  Purana,  I.,  Ixiii.  22-37. 

* There  are  six  kinds  of  sutras  according  to 
the  Mimahsa : the  definition  (sarhjnd), 
the  key  to  interpretation  (paribhasd), 
the  statement  of  a general  rule  (vidhi), 
the  restrictive  rule  (niyawa),  an  original 
statement  (adhikdra),  an  analogical 


application  {atideca).  The  word  atha 
may  introduce  a toi^ic  {adhikarci'^ariJia), 
or  give  the  purport  {prastdva'^a?iha),  or 
state  the  subject-matter  of  the  dis- 
cussion (drambha'^ariha).  This  is  dis- 
cussed in  ^loka-varttika  i.  1.  22-24. 


i.  1-] 


Book  I.  Coyicentration  or  Samadhi 


[4 


fluctuations],  is  called  the  yoga  in  which  there  is  consciousness  of 
an  object  {samprajndta).  This  [conscious  yoga],  however,  is 
accompanied  by  deliberation  [upon  coarse  objects],  by  reflection 
[upon  subtile  objects],  by  joy,  by  the  feeling-of-personality  {asmitd). 
This  we  shall  set  forth  later.  But  when  there  is  restriction  of 
all  the  fluctuations  {vrtti)  [of  the  mind-stuff],  there  is  the  con- 
centration in  which  there  is  no  consciousness  [of  an  object]. 

I prostrate  myself  before  him  who  is  the  cause  of  the  world’s  origination,  before 
Vrsaketu,  who — although  for  him  fruition  and  other  results  of  karma  proceeding 
from  the  hindrances  have  ceased — is  yet  kindly  [to  the  world  he  has  made]. 
Prostrating  myself  before  Patanjali  the  sage,  I proceed  to  set  forth  a brief,  clear, 
and  significant  explanation  of  the  Comment  by  Vedavyasa. 

For  here  the  Exalted  Patanjali — wishing  to  announce  in  brief  the  import  of  the 
book  which  he  is  about  to  begin  that  he  may  thus  assist  the  procedure  of  men 
of  understanding  and  that  he  may,  more  especially,  make  the  hearer  easily 
comprehend — composed  this  sutra : 1.  Now  the  exposition  of  yoga  [is  to  be 
made].  Of  this  [sutra]  the  first  portion,  the  word  <now>,  he  [the  author  of 
the  Comment]  discusses  in  the  phrase  «The  expression  <now>  indicates  that 
a distinct  topic  commences  here.^  [The  word  <now>  is  used]  as  in  [the  sutra] 
“ Now  ^ this  is  the  Jyotis  ”.  It  does  not  imply  that  it  is  to  be  preceded  [by  condi- 
tions as  in  the  first  Brahma-sutra].  Now  by  the  word  <exposition>  he  means 
the  authoritative  book  in  the  sense  that  it  is  that  whereby  a thing  is  expounded. 
Moreover  the  book  may  enter  upon  its  activity  when  preceded  not  only  by 
calm“  and  the  other  [five  conditions  required  by  the  Brahma-sutra];  but  it 
must  be  preceded  also  by  [Patanjali’s]  desire  to  announce  [his]  truth.  [Calm], 
on  the  contrary,  would  follow  when  once  there  had  been  a desire  to  know  and 
when  the  knowledge  [had  entered  into  action].  As  it  is  written  [BAU.  iv.  4. 
23  or  28],  “ After  that,  calm  and  subdued  and  retired  and  resigned  and  concen- 
trated let  him  behold  himself  in  the  Self  only.”  Although  it  would  be  possible 
[for  the  book  to  enter  into  action]  immediately  after  advantage  had  been  taken 
of  such  things  as  students’  questions  or  performances  of  austerities  or  elixirs  of 
life,  [still  these  are]  not  mentioned.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  these  things 
would  be  of  no  use  either  to  the  student’s  knowledge  or  to  [his]  feeling  inclined 
{pravrtti)  [for  it].  [What  then  would  be  advantageous?  The  book’s  authori- 
tativeness.] If  the  book  be  authoritative,  then,  even  if  there  are  no  [questions 
or  austerities  or  elixirs],  the  exposition  of  yoga  is  to  be  accepted  ; but  if  not 
authoritative,  then,  even  if  [there  be  questions  and  all  the  other  conditions,  still] 

‘ These  words  are  from  the  Tandy a-Mahabr.  soma.  See  Caland  and  Henry : L’Agni- 

xix.  11.  1 (Biblioth.  Ind.).  The  jyotis  stoma,  I,  p.  166.  And  compare  (,!astra 

is  a chant  by  the  iidgatar  in  the  Agni-  Dipika  (Benares  edition),  p.  230-®. 

stoma  directly  after  the  filtering  of  the  See  Vedanta  Sara  4 and  14  and  17. 


5]  Conditions  required  for  a beginning  [ — i.  l 

the  book  is  to  be  rejected.  Thus  it  is  [by  insisting  upon  the  authorita- 
tiveness of  the  book]  that  [Patanjali]  refuses  to  say  that  [the  book  may  begin] 
immediately  after  his  understanding  the  truth  and  his  desire  to  announce.  But 
if  it  be  agreed  that  [the  word  <now>  indicates]  that  a distinct  topic  commences, 
then  when  once  yoga  has  been  mentioned  as  the  topic  of  the  book  the  student 
easily  understands  the  announcement  of  the  import  of  the  book  as  a whole  and 
is  started  into  action. — Now  every  one  knows  from  Qruti  and  Smrti  and  the 
Epics  and  the  Puranas  that  concentration  is  the  cause  of  final-bliss  [and  that 
yoga  is  authoritative].  Some  one  might  ask,  ‘ If  the  word  <now>  indicates  that 
a distinct  topic  commences  in  all  those  works  to  which  it  is  attached,  then,  if 
this  is  so,  would  not  such  an  announcement^  as,  “Now  therefore  the  inquiry 
into  Brahma  [is  to  be  made]  ” also  be  included  ? ’ To  prevent  this  mistake  [the 
commentator]  uses  the  word  «here.»  [Again],  some  one  cites  the  Yogiyajna- 
valkyasmrti,  “ Hiranyagarbha  and  no  other  of  ancient  days  is  he  who  gave 
utterance  {vaMa)  to  yoga”  and  asks  how  it  can  be  said  that  Patanjali  gives 
utterance  to  the  authoritative  book  on  yoga.  In  reply  the  author  of  the 
sutra  says  <the  exposition):  exposition  in  the  sense  of  expounding  something 
previously  expounded.  When  then  the  word  <now>  signifies  that  here  a dis- 
tinct topic  commences,  then  the  point  of  the  statement  is  quite  consistent. — 
Accordingly  he  says,  ^The  authoritative  work  which  expounds  yoga  ...  as  com- 
menced».  Here  an  objector  interrupts,  ‘ The  topic  which  is  commenced  here  is 
not  the  authoritative  work,  but  yoga  in  so  far  as  it  is  taught.’  In  reply  to 
which,  he  says  «is  to  be  understood. 2>  True,  we  are  beginning  yoga  in  so  far 
as  it  is  taught.  But  the  instrument  which  is  to  teach  this  [yoga]  is  the  authori- 
tative work  which  deals  with  the  same.  Moreover  the  teacher’s  activity  has  to 
do  more  immediately  with  the  instrument  than  with  the  thing  he  works  upon. 
Accordingly,  with  emphasis  upon  the  activity  of  the  author  {kartf),  we  are  to 
understand  that  the  authoritative  work  which  deals  with  yoga  is  commenced. 
But  the  topic  commenced  is  that  yoga  only  which  is  limited  in  its  activity  by 
an  authoritative  work.  This  is  the  real  point. — And  one  must  suppose  that 
the  hearing  of  the  word  <now>,  which  means  that  a distinct  topic  has  com- 
menced, suggests — like  the  sight  of  a water-jar^  carried  [on  a girl’s  shoulder 
at  early  morning] — another  meaning,  [namely,]  it  serves  as  an  auspicious 
beginning. — Doubt  as  to  the  actual  thing  [yoga]  is  occasioned  by  doubt  as  to 
the  meaning  of  the  word  [yoga].  This  [doubt]  he  removes  by  stating  that 
[^yoga:^  in  the  phrase]  «yoga  is  concentration))  is  etymologically  derived 
from  the  stem  yuj-a  [Dhatupatha  iv.  68]  in  the  sense  of  concentration  and  not 
from  the  stem  yuj-i  [vii.  7]  in  the  sense  of  conjunction. 

Another  objection  is  raised,  ‘ The  yoga  which  is  to  be  described  is  a whole,  and 
concentration  is  a part  of  it ; and  a mere  part  is  not  the  whole.’  The  reply  is 


^ Brahma-sutra  i.  1.  1. 

^ This  is  in  the  list  of  auspicious  objects  to 


which  one  makes  a circumambulation 
{pradaksina),  Visnu-smrti  Ixiii.  29. 


i.  1-] 


Book  I.  Concentration  or  Samcidhi 


[6 


in  the  words  ^But  this.»  The  word  ca  has  the  sense  of  «but»  and  distin- 
guishes the  whole  from  the  part. — «Which  belongs  to  all  the  stages^  refers 
to  the  stages  or  states  which  are  to  be  described : Madhumatl  [iii.  54],  Madhu- 
pratika  [iii.  48],  Vi9oka  [i.  36],  Samskarafesa  [iii.  9].  These  belong  to  the 
mind-stuff.  In  all  these  [stages]  is  found  that  yoga  the  [more]  special  mark 
of  which  is  the  restriction  of  the  mind-stuff.  But  concentration  is  a part 
[of  this]  and  has  not  this  as  its  special  mark.  And  the  words  «yoga  is  concen- 
tration»  are  a statement  for  etymological  purposes  only,  in  so  far  as  one  is  not 
dwelling  upon  the  difference  between  the  whole  and  the  part.  But  [when  he  is 
referring  to]  the  practical  purpose  of  what  he  calls  «yoga,»  [he  says]  it  is  the 
restriction  of  the  fluctuations  of  mind-stuff : this  is  the  stricter  sense  of  the 
term.  To  those  [Vai9esikas]  who  hold  the  view  that  fluctuations  are  sensations 
inherent  in  the  soul  and  that  therefore  the  restriction  of  them  would  also  involve 
the  soul  (dtman)  in  which  they  inhere, — to  these  in  rebuttal  he  says,  «a  quality 
of  the  mind-stuff.» — The  term  <mind-stuff>  (citta)  he  uses  as  a partial  expression 
for  the  inner-organ  ’ {antakJiarana),  the  thinking-substance  {huddhi).  The  point  is 
that  the  Absolutely-eternal  Energy  of  Intellect  [cUi-gakti),  [since  it  is]  immutable, 
cannot  have  sensations  as  its  properties ; but  the  thinking-substance  may  have 
them. — An  objector  says,  ‘ This  may  be  so.  But  if  yoga  belongs  to  all  its 
stage.s, — why  then  ! Sir,  [since  you  concede  that]  the  restless  and  the  infatuated 
and  the  distracted  states  also  are  stages  of  mind-stuff,  and  [since]  there  would 
be  among  these  states,  reciprocally  at  least,  also  a restriction  of  fluctuations, — 
then  <yoga>  would  have  to  include  these  states  also  (tatrapi).’  In  replying  to 
this  difficulty  he  makes  clear  which  stages  are  to  be  included  and  which  not 
included  [in  yoga]  by  the  words  beginning  with  <the  restless.>  i.  The  restless 
incessantly  thrown  by  force  of  rajas  upon  this  or  that  object  is  excessively 
unstable  ; ii.  the  infatuated  because  of  a preponderance  of  tanias  is  filled  with 
the  fluctuation  of  sleep  ; iii.  the  distracted  differs  from  the  restless  in  that, 
although  prevailingly  unstable,  it  is  occasionally  stable,  this  prevailing  instability 
being  either  natural  or  generated  by  diseases  and  languor  and  other  obstacles 
later  [i.  30]  to  be  described  ; iv.  the  single-in-intent  is  the  focused  ; v.  the 
restricted  mind-stuff  is  that  in  which  all  the  fluctuations  are  restricted  and  in 
which  nothing  remains  but  subliminal-impressions  [samskdra).  In  spite  of  the 
fact  that  certain  fluctuations  of  the  restless  and  the  infatuated,  [the  first  two]  of 
these  [five  stages],  are  restricted  each  by  the  others,  still,  since  these  two  are 
not  even  indirectly  causes  of  final  bliss  and  since  they  contend  against  it,  they 
are  so  far  removed  from  [the  possibility  of]  being  called  yoga  that  he  has  not 
expressly  denied  that  these  two  are  yoga.  But  in  the  case  of  the  distracted 
[state],  since  occasionally  it  has  stability  when  directed  towards  a real  object,  he 
denies  that  it  can  be  yoga  in  the  words  «Of  these  stages.»  When  the  mind  is 
distracted,  the  concentration  which  is  the  occasional  stability  of  the  mind-stuff 


Compare  Qaiiikara  Bhasya  on  ii.  1.  6 (Niiijayasagara  edition,  p.  711"). 


7] 


[-i.  1 


States  of  mind-stuff ft  for  Yoga 

when  directed  to  a real  object,  cannot  properly  be  called  yoga.  Why  [cannot 
this  be  called  yoga]?  Because  it  has  come  under  the  adverse  influence  of 
distraction,  which  is  the  opposite  of  this  [yoga].  When  fallen  into  the  hands 
{antargata)  of  a troop  of  opponents,  it  is  hard  for  a thing  to  be  even  what  it  is 
and  it  is  still  harder  for  it  to  produce  effects.  Just  as  any  one  can  see  that 
a seed  which  has  fallen  into  the  fire  and  stayed  there  three  or  four  moments 
has  not  power,  even  if  sown,  of  sprouting : this  is  the  real  meaning.  If  then 
concentration  which  has  come  under  the  adverse  influence  of  distraction  be  not 
yoga,  what  then  is  yoga  ? To  this  he  makes  answer,  <JCBut  that  [state]  which, 
when  the  mind  is  single-in-intent.2>  By  the  word  «real^  {bhuta)  he  excludes 
[any]  imaginary  [object].  Since  sleep,  a fluctuation  of  mind-stuff,  is  also  single- 
in-intent with  regard  to  tamas, — a real  {bhuta)  object,  the  peculiar  (wa)  [aspect  of 
a substance']  upon  which  it  [sleep]  depends  {dlambana), — so  he  says  «distinct^ 
(sad) ; which  means  is  clear  {gobhana),  in  which  the  sattva  [aspect]  becomes  evident 
in  a very  high  degree.  But  that  thing  is  not  clear  in  which  the  tamas  is  in 
preponderance,  inasmuch  as  it,  [the  tamas{\  is  the  cause  of  hindrances.  Now 
the  perception  of  a thing  either  by  verbal  communication  [agamai]  or  by  inference 
may,  we  grant,  be  luminous  [dyotanam,  bhavad  api) ; still,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
mediately  known,  it  does  not  destroy  undifferentiated-consciousness  {avidya) 
which  we  directly  experience.  For  in  such  [illusions  as  the  sight  of]  two 
moons  or  a defective  sense  of  orientation,  [verbal  communications  or  inferences] 
do  not  destroy  undifferentiated-consciousness.  Accordingly  he  uses  the  word 
«fullyS>  {pra),  because  it  means  luminous  to  the  full  extent  [pra-lcarsam)  and 
because  it  alludes  to  immediate  perception  [in  the  case  of  yoga].  The  feeling- 
of-personality  (asmita)  and  the  other  hindrances  have  their  root  in  undifferen- 
tiated-consciousness {avidya).  Furthermore,  since  knowledge  [vidya)  destroys 
undifferentiated-consciousness  [avidya) ; and  since,  when  knowledge  emerges, 
the  hindrances  [arising]  from  undifferentiated-consciousness  and  so  on  are 
destroyed,  inasmuch  as  they  are  contrary  the  one  to  the  other,  and  inasmuch 
as  [then]  the  cause  [of  the  hindrances]  would  be  destroyed ; therefore  he  says 
«and  causes  [the  hindrances]  to  dwindle. This,  then,  is  the  reason  why 
[yoga]  slackens  the  bonds  which  consist  of  karma. — And  in  this  passage  by 
a figurative  use  of  the  cause  for  the  effect  he  employs  the  word  <S;karma2>, 
whereas  subtile-influences  [apurva)  are  intended. — The  word  ^slackens»  means 
brings  [them]  down  from  their  operation.  For  later  [ii.  13]  he  says,  “ So  long 
as  the  root  exists,  [there  will  be]  fruition  from  it.”  And  finally  it  ^sets  before 
it  as  a goal  the  restriction  [of  all  fluctuations].» — Moreover  since  this  [yoga] 
conscious  of  objects  is  four-fold,  he  employs  the  words  [beginning]  <gThis 
[conscious  yoga].2>  He  describes  [the  yoga]  not  conscious  of  objects  with  the 
words  ^aU  the  fluctuations.^  [In  other  words,]  we  know  (Mia)  that  sources-of- 
valid-ideas  and  other  fluctuations  (pramanddivrtti)  made  of  rajas  and  tamas  are 


' ‘Aspect  of  a substance’  is  dharma  (see  iii.  13)  or  parindma. 


i.  1-] 


Book  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[8 


restricted  in  [yoga]  conscious  [of  objects]  while  fluctuations  of  sattva  are  retained  ; 
but  that  in  [yoga]  not  conscious  [of  an  object]  all  fluctuations  whatsoever  are 
restricted.  Therefore  [the  final  result]  is  established  (siddham)  that  ^belonging 
to  all  stages^  means  occurring  in  all  these  [four]  stages,  Madhumatl  and  so 
on,  which  [four]  are  [all]  included  in  these  two  stages  [of  the  conscious  and 
the  unconscious  yoga]. 


The  intent  of  the  following  sutra  is  to  state  the  distinguishing 
characteristic  of  this  [yoga]. 

2.  Yoga  is  the  restriction  of  the  fluctuations  of  mind-stuflf. 

By  the  non-use  of  the  word  ‘ all  ’ [before  <the  fluctuations)],  [the 
yoga  which  is]  conscious  [of  objects]  is  also  included  under  the 
denomination  of  yoga.  Now  mind-stuff  has  three  aspects  [guna), 
as  appears  from  the  fact  that  it  has  a disposition  to  vividness 
(prakliyd),  to  activity  {j)ravrtti),  and  to  inertia  (sthiti).  For  the 
mind-stuff’s  [aspect]  sattva,  which  is  vividness,  when  commingled 
with  rajas  and  tamas,  acquires  a fondness  for  supremacy  and  for 
objects-of-sense  ; while  the  very  same  [constituent-aspect,  sattva,~\ 
when  pervaded  with  tamas,  tends  towards  demerit  and  non- 
perception and  passionateness  and  towards  a failure  of  [its  own 
rightful]  supremacy ; [and]  the  very  same  [sattva\ — when  the 
covering  of  error  has  dwindled  away, — illumined  now  in  its 
totality  {sarvatas),  but  faintly  pervaded  by  rajas,  tends  towards 
merit  and  knowledge  and  passionlessness  and  [its  own  rightful] 
supremacy  ; [and]  the  very  same  [sattva\ — the  stains  of  the  last 
vestige  of  rajas  once  removed, — grounded  in  itself  and  being 
nothing  but  the  discernment  {khydti)  of  the  difference  between  the 
sattva  and  the  Self  (purusa),  tends  towards  the  Contemplation  of 
the  Rain-cloud  of  [knowable]  Things.  The  designation  given  by 
contemplators  {dhydyin)  to  this  [kind  of  mind-stuff]  is  the  highest 
Elevation  (prasamkhydna).  For  the  Energy  of  Intellect  (citi-fakti) 
is  immutable  and  does  not  unite  [with  objects] ; it  has  objects 
shown  to  it  and  is  undefiled  [by  constituent-aspects]  and  is  unending. 
Whereas  this  discriminate  discernment  [viveka-khydti),  whose 
essence  is  sattva,  is  [therefore]  contrary  to  this  [Energy  of  Intellect 


9] 


[— i.2 


Provisional  definition  of  Yoga 

and  is  therefore  to  be  rejected].  Hence  the  mind-stuff  being 
disgusted  with  this  [discriminative  discernment]  restricts  even  this 
Insight.  When  it  has  reached  this  state,  [the  mind-stuff],  [after 
the  restriction  of  the  fluctuations,]  passes  over  to  subliminal 
impressions  {sarhskdra).  This  is  the  [so-called]  seedless  concentra- 
tion. In  this  state  nothing  becomes  an  object  of  consciousness  : 
such  is  concentration  not  conscious  [of  objects].  Accordingly  the 
yoga  [which  we  have  defined  as]  the  restriction  of  the  fluctuations 
of  the  mind-stuff  is  two-fold. 

He  introduces  the  second  sutra  with  the  words  <5Cthe  distinguishing  charac- 
teristic of  this.»  The  words  ^of  this»  refer  to  the  two  kinds  of  yoga  mentioned 
in  the  previous  sutra.  2.  Yoga  is  the  restriction  of  the  fluctuations  of  mind- 
stuflf.  Yoga  is  that  particular  state  of  mind-stuff  in  which  sources-of-valid- 
ideas  and  the  other  fluctuations  are  restricted.  The  objection  is  made  that 
this  cannot  be  the  distinguishing  characteristic  [of  yoga]  since  yoga  conscious 
[of  objects]  would  be  excluded.  For  in  this  [conscious  yoga],  [those]  fluctua- 
tions of  mind-stuff  which  have  the  sai^ya-aspect  are  not  restricted.  The  reply  is 
«by  the  non-use  of  the  word  ‘ all  ’.»  If  yoga  had  been  said  to  be  the  restric- 
tion of  all  the  fluctuations  of  mind-stuff,  [yoga]  conscious  [of  objects]  would 
not  have  been  included.  But  [if  the  objection  be  made  that  this  includes  too 
much  since  there  is  restriction  of  sattva  in  the  first  three  states,  the  reply  is,] 
the  restriction  of  the  fluctuations  of  mind-stuff  which  are  hostile  to  the  latent- 
deposit  {aqaya-jparipanthin)  of  karma  from  the  hindrances  [i.  e.  the  restriction,  as 
thus  qualified]  includes  this  [yoga]  also.  [And  this  is  so]  because  there  is  a 
restriction  of  those  mind-stuff’s  fluctuations  which  have  the  rajas  and  tamas 
aspect  in  this  [conscious  yoga]  also,  and  because  this  (tad)  [hostility  to  the 
hindrances]  is  (bhdvdt)  a part  of  that  (tasya)  [restriction].  But  why  is  this 
mind-stuff,  which  is  a single  thing,  in  connexion  with  [its  own]  restless  and 
other  stages  ? And  since  some  one  might  be  in  doubt  why  the  fluctuations 
of  mind-stuff  which  is  in  such  [a  three-fold]  state  should  be  restricted,  he  now 
makes  clear  first  of  all  the  reason  for  [the  mind-stuff’s]  connexion  with  [these] 
states.  «Now  mind-stuff)^  [is  in  this  threefold  state]  since  the  aspect  sattva  has  a 
disposition  to  vividness  [and]  since  the  aspect  rajas  has  a disposition  to  activity 
[and]  since  the  aspect  tamas  has  a disposition  to  inertia.  The  use  of  the  word 
«vividness)^  is  the  use  of  a part  for  the  whole  (u;palaksana).  It  alludes  also  to 
other  kinds  of  sattva,  to  serenity  and  lightness  and  joy  (prlti) ; and  «activity» 
alludes  to  [the  other]  kinds  of  rajas,  to  pain  and  grief.  Inertia  is  a property 
of  the  tamas-fluctuation  and  is  opposed  to  activity.  The  use  of  the  word 
^inertia)^  is  a partial  expression  for  heaviness  and  covering  and  dejection  and 
similar  states.  What  he  means  to  say  is  this : the  mind-stuff,  although  a single 

2 [h  o.s.  n] 


i.  2-] 


Booh  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[XO 


thing,  has,  inasmuch  as  it  is  made  up  of  three  aspects  and  inasmuch  as  the 
aspects  are  not  in  equilibrium,  a multitude  of  mutations  (parindma)  arising  from 
a multitude  of  reciprocal  antagonisms  ; and  thus  may  consistently  have  many 
states.  He  shows  that  the  restless  and  other  stages  of  the  mind-stulf  have 
according  to  circumstances  a variety  of  subordinate  states.  «For  . . . which  is 
vividness.»  Mind-stuffs  sattva  is  sattva  in  its  form  as  a mutation  of  mind- 
stuff  ; [and]  this  [mind-stuff s sattva]  in  its  form  as  vividness  is  thus  shown 
to  be  a preponderance  of  sattva  in  the  mind-stuff.  In  this  mind-stuff  when 
rajas  and  tamas  are  somewhat  less  than  the  sattva,  and  when  they  two  are  equal 
each  to  the  other,  then  [tadd]  [that  mind-stuff]  is  that  thing  thus  described 
[in  the  Comment]  which  acquires  a fondness  for  supremacy  and  for  objects- 
of-sense,  sound  and  so  on.  Although  the  mind-stuff  under  the  predominance  of 
sattva  desires  to  meditate  upon  reality  [tattva),  still,  when  the  reality  is  concealed 
by  tamas,  it  thinks  that  such  supremacies  as  atomization  [animan]  are  the  reality 
and  desires  to  meditate  upon  them  [tad).  It  meditates  a moment,  and  then, 
caught  by  rajas,  although  obtaining  no  permanence  [in  its  meditation]  on  them, 
it  gains  nothing  except  a fondness  for  these  things.  But  its  natural  inclination 
towards  sound  and  so  on  [the  objects  of  sense]  is  quite  well  known.  Accord- 
ingly in  this  way  the  mind -stuff  is  said  to  be  distracted. — While  describing  the 
restless  mind-stuff,  he  alludes  also  to  the  infatuated  : ^the  very  same  . . . with 
famas.»  Now  when  tamas  suppresses  rajas  and  extends  itself,  then,  since  rajas 
has  become  incapable  of  removing  the  famas  which  covers  the  mind-stuff’s  sattva, 
the  mind-stuff  covered  with  tamas  tends  towards  demerit  and  other  [forms  of 
ignorance].  «Non-perception^  is  declared  to  be  misconceived  perception  [i.  8], 
and  also  to  be  sleep-perception  [i.  10]  which  is  supported  [dlamhana]  by  a cause 
(pratyaya)  of  a [transient]  negation.  And  from  this  [word]  comes  the  sug- 
gestion [sucitd)  of  the  infatuated  state  also.  A ^failure  of  its  [own  rightful] 
supremacy»  is  an  obstruction  to  one’s  will  in  every  direction.  Thus  it  is  that 
mind-stuff  becomes  pervaded  with  demerit  and  the  other  [forms  of  ignorance]. 
But  when  this  same  substance  (sattva)  of  the  mind-stuff  comes  to  have  its 
saff ra[-quality]  manifest  [and]  its  cover  of  tamas  removed  [and]  is  accompanied 
by  rajas,  then  it  tends,  as  he  says,  towards  merit  and  perception  and  passionless 
and  [rightful]  supremacy,  as  he  says  in  the  phrase  ^dwindled  away.»  That 
[substance  of  the  mind-stuff]  is  referred  to,  the  covering,  that  is,  the  tamas 
[-quality],  that  is,  the  infatuation  of  which  has  almost  entirely  (praltarsena) 
dwindled.  For  the  same  reason  <Kit  is  illumined  in  its  totality S>:  in  substances- 
as-effects  (vi(;esa)  and  substances-as-causes  (avi(}esa)  and  in  the  Unga  and  the 
lihgin  [see  ii.  19]  and  the  Self.  Still  it  has  not  the  capacity  for  merit  and 
[rightful]  supremacy  since  it  lacks  activity.  With  regard  to  this  he  says  ^pervaded 
by  rajas  only.)^  In  other  words  when  rajas  is  the  active  agent,  merit  and  the 
rest  do  persist.  Accordingly  for  the  two  middle  classes  of  yogins,‘  the 


' See  below,  hi.  51,  and  cf.  Kern’s  ‘ Lotus  ’,  SEE.  xxi.  387. 


11] 


Functions  of  the  mind- stuff  [ — i.  2 

MadhubhOmika  and  the  Prajhajyotis  who  have  attained  to  concentration  con- 
scious [of  an  object],  the  substance  {sattva)  of  the  mind-stuff  is  included. — He 
now  describes  the  state  of  the  mind-stuff  of  the  fourth  class  of  contemplators, 
the  AtikrantabhavanTya,  with  the  words  «the  same.»  Since  the  stain  of  the 
last  vestige  of  rajas  is  removed,  the  mind-stuff  is  grounded  in  itself.  Now  the 
gold  of  the  substance  {sattva)  of  the  thinking-substance  (jbuddhi), — when  once  the 
stain  of  the  rajas  and  tamas  is  purified  by  the  joining  [of  the  upper  and  lower 
parts]  of  the  crucible  {puta-pdJca),  which  are  practice  and  passionlessness,  and 
when  it  has  withdrawn  [see  ii.  54]  the  organs  which  are  concerned  with  objects- 
of-sense,  and  is  grounded  in  itself, — has  still  a further  function  to  perform 
{para  karya),  namely,  the  discriminative  discernment  [referring  to  the  sattva 
and  the  Self],  which  performs  its  function  in  so  far  as  its  task  {adhikara)  is  un- 
finished. With  this  in  mind  he  says  ^the  mind-stufif.»  The  mind-stuff  which 
is  nothing  else  than  the  discriminative  discernment  referring  to  the  sattva  and 
the  Self  tends  towards  the  Contemplation  [called]  the  Rain-cloud  of  [knowable] 
Things.  The  Rain-cloud  of  [knowable]  Things  will  also  be  described  [iv.  29]. 
He  tells  what  is  perfectly  clear  to  yogins  with  regard  to  this  [state]  in  the 
words,  <5Cthis  ...  is  the  highest.^  The  mind-stuff  which  is  nothing  else  than 
the  discernment  of  the  difference  between  the  sattva  and  the  Self  and  which 
lasts  until  the  Rain-cloud  of  [knowable]  Things,  is  designated  by  contemplators 
as  the  highest  Elevation.  And  if  one  does  not  wish  to  make  the  distinction 
between  the  substance  and  its  property,  [this  Elevation]  may  be  regarded  as 
having  the  same  office  as  the  mind-stuff  [:the  mind-stuff  itself  is  the  Eleva- 
tion.]— In  order  to  introduce  the  Concentration  of  Restriction  as  the  ground  for 
rejecting  the  discernment  of  the  difference  and  as  the  ground  for  accepting  the 
Energy  of  Intellect,  he  shows  the  excellence  of  the  Energy  of  Intellect  and  the 
inferior  value  of  the  discriminative  insight  by  the  phrase  «the  Energy  of 
Intellect»  and  the  following  words. — Impurity  has  as  its  essence  pleasure  and 
pain  and  infatuation.  For  even  pleasure  and  infatuation  give  pain  to  the  man 
of  discrimination  [ii.  15]  ; therefore,  like  pain,  they  too  are  to  be  escaped. 
Moreover  exceptional  beauty  also  comes  to  an  end  and  so  gives  pain.  Accord- 
ingly, that  too  the  man  of  discrimination  can  only  reject.  Since  this  same 
impurity  and  this  coming  to  an  end  do  not  occur  in  the  Energy  of  Intellect 
[which  is]  the  Self,  it  is  said  to  be  ^undefiled  and  unending.3>  An  objection  is 
made,  ‘ How  can  this  {iyam)  [Energy  of  Intellect]  be  free  from  defilement,  if,  in 
being  aware  of  things  which  have  as  their  essence  pleasure  and  pain  and  infatua- 
tion, it  assumes  their  form  ? and  how  can  it  be  unending  if  it  accepts  and  rejects 
their  forms  ?’  In  reply  it  is  said  «it  has  objects  shown  to  it.^  It  [the  Energy 
of  Intellect]  is  that  to  which  the  various  objects  are  shown.  That  [objection] 
would  be  sound,  if,  like  the  thinking-substance  {buddhi),  the  Energy  of  Intellect 
assumed  the  form  of  objects ; but  it  is  the  thinking-substance  only  which,  because 
it  undergoes  mutations  {parinatd  sail)  in  the  form  of  the  objects,  shows  the 
object  to  the  Energy  of  Intellect,  which  [latter  however]  does  not  take  their 


Book  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[12 


1.  2— 


form.  And  when  this  happens,  the  Self  is  then  said  to  become  aware  [of 
the  objects].  The  objector  asks,  ‘How  can  the  Energy  of  Intellect  unless 
it  strike  upon  the  thinking-substance  which  has  taken  the  form  of  some  object, 
know  [that]  object  ? or,  if  it  do  strike  upon  [that]  object,  how  is  it  that  it  does 
not  undergo  a change  into  the  form  of  that  [object]  ? ’ To  this  he  replies  ^does 
not  unite  [with  objects].S>  Union  is  contagion  ; not  any  of  this  is  in  Intellect : 
this  is  his  meaning.  If  any  one  asks  why  there  is  no  [union]  of  this  [Intellect 
with  objects],  the  reply  is,  it  <Kis  immutable.»  Mutation,  which  has  the  three- 
fold character  [see  iii.  13]  of  external  aspect  {dharma)  and  time- variation 
{laksana)  and  intensity  (avastha),  does  not  appertain  to  the  [Energy  of]  Intellect 
also  (api)  [as  it  does  to  the  mind-stuff]  in  any  such  way  that  {yena),  by  passing 
into  a mutation  in  the  form  of  an  action,  the  Energy  of  Intellect  should  mutate 
in  correspondence  with  the  thinking-substance.  That  it,  [this  Energy,]  even 
if  it  does  not  unite  [with  objects],  can  [nevertheless]  be  conscious  of  objects, 
he  will  now  show  to  be  possible.  This  [much]  is  established,  that  the  Energy 
of  Thought  is  unsullied  by  [the  aspects  {guna)\.  But  it  has  been  said  that  the 
discriminative  discernment,  since  it  has  as  its  essence  the  substance  of  the 
thinking-substance  is  not  unsullied.  It  is  <K[therefore]  contrary  to  this» 
Energy  of  Intellect.  And  since  even  the  discriminative  discernment  is  to  be 
rejected,  then  how  can  you  make  mention  of  the  other  fluctuations  which 
abound  in  defects  ; this  is  the  real  meaning.  Thence,  [that  is,]  for  this  reason, 
the  introduction  of  the  Concentration  of  Eestriction  is  fitting.  And  so  he  says, 
«Hence  . . . with  this.^  The  meaning  is  that  he  restricts  even  the  discrimina- 
tive discernment  by  the  higher  passionlessness  which,  surely,  is  nothing  more 
than  the  complete  calming  of  the  perceptions. — Now,  what  kind  of  a mind- 
stuff  would  that  be  that  has  all  its  fluctuations  restricted  ? In  reply  he  says 
«[When  it  has  reached]  this  state.^  He  speaks  of  that  [mind-stuff]  the  state 
of  which  has  restriction. — He  tells  what  restriction  itself  is  : <SThis  is  the 
[so-called]  seedless.^  The  latent-deposit  [a(;aya)  of  karma,  which  corresponds 
with  the  hindrances — birth  and  length-of-life  and  kind-of-enjoyment  [ii.  13], — 
is  the  seed.  That  which  is  exempt  from  this  is  «:seedless.)S>  For  this  same 
[seedless  concentration],  he  indicates  the  proper  technical  term  which  is  current 
among  yogins  when  he  says  «In  this  state  nothing.2>  He  sums  up  with  the 
words  «the  yoga  [which  we  have  defined  as]  the  restriction  of  the  fluctuations  of 
the  mind-stuff  is  two-fold.^ 

The  mind  being  in  this  [unconscious]  state,  what  will  then  be 
the  condition  of  the  Self?  For  it  is  the  essence  {dtmari)  [of  the 
Self  to  receive]  knowledge  {bodlia)  [reflected  upon  it]  by  the 
thinking-substance  (huddhi),  [as  this  in  its  turn  receives  the 
impression  of  external  objects,  and  in  this  case]  there  is  a [total] 
absence  of  objects  [in  the  thinking-substance]. 


13] 


[— i.  3 


Consummation  of  Yoga 

3.  Then  the  Seer  [that  is,  the  Self,]  abides  in  himself. 

At  that  time  the  Energy  of  Intellect  is  grounded  in  its  own  self, 
as  [it  is]  when  in  the  state  of  Isolation.  But  when  the  mind-stuff 
is  in  its  emergent  state,  [the  Energy  of  Intellect],  although  really 
the  same,  [does]  not  [seem]  so. 

To  introduce  now  the  next  sutra,  he  raises  the  question  beginning  «The 
mind  being  in  this  [unconscious]  state  . . .»  The  question  has  the  force  of 
an  objection;  ‘ Now  this  Self,  whose  essence  is  [that  it  receives]  the  knowledge 
{bodlia)  [reflected  upon  it]  by  the  thinking-substance  which  is  mutated  into 
the  form  of  one  [object]  after  another,  is  always  undergoing  an  experience, 
[but  there  is]  no  [experience]  when  [the  Self]  is  deprived  of  the  knowledge 
from  the  thinking-substance.  For  the  very  nature  of  this  Self  is  the  know- 
ledge (bodha)  thrown  upon  the  thinking-substance  precisely  as  shining  is  [the 
nature]  of  the  sun.  Moreover  this  [knowledge  of  the  thinking-substance] 
does  not  occur  in  that  kind  of  mind  which  consists  of  subliminal-impressions 
(samsMra)  only.  And  further  a thing  cannot  exist  without  its  own  nature. 
If  this  is  so,  then  why  does  not  the  Self  know  that  thinking-substance  also 
which  consists  of  subliminal-impressions  only?’  To  this  he  replies  «there 
is  a [total]  absence  of  objects.)5>  The  thinking-substance  as  such  {buddlii^atra) 
is  not  the  object  of  the  Self,  but  (api  tu)  only  in  so  far  as  it  fulfils  the  purposes 
of  the  Self  [iv.  32].  Now  the  two  purposes  of  the  Self  are  discriminative 
insight  and  the  enjoyment  of  objects  ; and  these  do  not  exist  in  the  restricted 
state  [of  the  mind-stuff].  Thus  the  [total]  absence  of  objects  is  established. 
The  rebuttal  is  [also]  given  in  the  sutra : 3.  Then  the  Seer  [that  is,  the  Self  ] 
abides  in  himself.  The  words  <in  himself>  mean  that  the  peaceful  and  the 
cruel  and  the  infatuated  nature  falsely  attributed  [to  the  Self]  has  ceased.  For 
the  Self’s  Intelligence  {caitanya)  is  himself  [svarupa],  [and  is]  not  conditioned  ; 
while  the  knowledge  of  the  thinking-substance  has  the  various  forms  peaceful 
and  other.  And  so  it  is  subject  to  conditions  just  as  the  crystal  which  is  in  its 
own  nature  absolutely  transparently  white  [is  subject  to  conditions] : the 
redness  of  the  [crystal]  is  its  condition  of  being  near  the  China-rose.  And 
when  a condition  ceases,  there  is  no  cessation  of  the  thing  conditioned  ; since 
this  would  prove  too  much.  This  is  the  real  point.  And  although  [the  Seer] 
in  himself  [svarupatah)  cannot  [actually]  be  divided,*  still  when-he  [the  author 
of  the  Comment]  -supposes-a-predicate-relation  {vikdlpya)  [between  the  drastr 
and  his  svarupa],  the  words  <in  himself>  {svarupe)  are  put  in  the  locative  case. 
This  same  meaning  is  made  clear  by  the  author  of  the  Comment  when  he  says 
«grounded  in  its  own  self.»  <^CAt  that  time»  means  in  the  state  of  restriction 
[and]  not  in  the  state  of  emergence.  [The  objection  is  made,]  ‘ This  may  be 
true.  But  if  while  in  the  state  of  emergence  the  Energy  of  Intellect  is  not 

* Literally,  although  the  essential-attribute  (sraritpa)  cannot  be  divided  [from  the  Self]. 


i.  3 — ] Book  I.  Concentration  or  Samcldhi  [14 

grounded  in  itself  and  while  in  the  state  of  restriction  is  grounded  [in  itself], 
then  it  would  enter  into  mutation;  or  else  if  in  [the  state  of]  emergence  it 
[remains]  grounded  in  itself,  [then  there  would  be]  no  difference  between 
emergence  and  restriction.’  In  reply  to  this  he  says  «But  when  the  mind-stuff 
is  in  its  emergent  state.S>  Never  does  the  Energy  of  Intellect,  [in  that  it  is] 
absolutely  eternal,  deviate  from  itself.  Accordingly,  as  [it  is]  in  restriction, 
just  so  [is  it]  in  emergence  also.  Assuredly,  mother-of-pearl  as  such  [svampa) 
does  not  suffer  increase  or  decrease  of  being,  no  matter  whether  the  perception 
(jhana)  which  refers  to  it  [gocara)  be  the  source  of  a valid  idea  {pramana)  or 
[the  source  of]  a misconception.  The  observer  however,  although  the  thing 
is  really  the  same,  is  under  the  illusion  that  it  is  not  so  {atathatvena). 
Compared  with  the  concentration  of  restriction,  even  [the  concentration  that 
is]  conscious  [of  an  object]  is  nothing  more  than  emergence. 


How  in  that  case  [is  it  that  the  Energy  of  Intellect  does  not  seem 
the  same  in  the  emergent  state]  ? [The  answer  is,]  Since  objects' 
are  shown  to  it. 

4.  At  other  times  it  [the  Self]  takes  the  same  form  as  the 
fluctuations  [of  mind-stufi*]. 

In  the  emergent  state  [of  the  subliminal-impressions],  the  Self  has 
fluctuations  which  are  not  distinguished  from  fluctuations  of  the 
mind-stuff ; and  so  we  have  a sutra  [of  Pancacikha^],  “ There  is  only 
one  appearance  [for  both], — that  appearance  is  knowledge.”  The 
mind-stuff  is  like  a magnet ; and,  as  an  object  suitable  to  be  seen  [by 
the  Self  as  Witness],  it  gives  its  aid  [to  the  Self]  by  the  mere  fact 
of  being  near  it,  and  thus  the  relation  between  it  and  the  Self  is 
that  between  property  (svam)  and  proprietor  [svdmiri).  Hence  the 
reason  why  the  Self  experiences  (bodha)  the  fluctuations  of  the 
mind-stuff  is  its  beginning-less  correlation  [with  the  thinking-sub- 
stance]. 

To  introduce  the  next  sutra,  he  inquires  «IIow  in  that  case  ?»  If  [the  Energy 
of  Intellect],  though  really  the  same,  [does]  not  [seem  to  be]  so,  in  what  kind 
of  a way  in  that  case  does  it  assume  an  appearance  ? such  is  the  meaning. 
He  supplies  the  words  «Since  objects  are  shown  to  it»  which  give  the  reason, 
and  [then]  rehearses  the  sutra.  4.  At  other  times  it  takes  the  same  form  as 
the  fluctuations  [of  mind-stufif].  <At  other  times)  means  «in  the  emergent 


> Compare  Vi.mu  Pur.  i.  14.  35. 

’ See  Garbe : Paiicafikha  und  seine  Frag- 


mente  in  Feslgruss  an  Roth,  Stuttgart, 
1893,  p.  75. 


15]  The  Self  correlated  ivith  its  thinking-substance  [ — i.  4 

state ;»  <the  fluctuations  [of  mind-stuff  ]>  are  the  tranquil  and  the  cruel 
and  the  infatuated  ; «not  distinguished»  means  not  different.  These  [three] 
ai-e  those  [fluctuations]  which  the  Self  has. — <The  same  form  :>  in  these 
words  the  word  ‘ same  ’ is  synonymous  with  ‘ one  What  he  means  to  say 
is  this : when,  by  reason  of  nearness  to  each  other,  the  difference  between 
[the  colour]  of  the  China-rose  and  of  the  crystal  [vase],  or  analogously,  between 
the  thinking-substance  and  the  Self,  does  not  come  to  consciousness  {a-hheda- 
graJie),  then  the  individual  by  wrongly  attributing  the  fluctuations  of  the 
thinking-substance  to  the  Self,  recognizes  [wrongly]  that  he  is  tranquil  or 
pained  or  infatuated.  Likewise,  wrongly  supposing  that  his  face  when  reflected 
upon  the  dirty  surface  of  a mirror  is  itself  dirty,  [the  individual]  bemoans 
himself  at  the  thought  that  he  is  dirty.  Although^  the  fluctuation  of  the 
thinking-substance,  like  the  perception  of  sounds  or  other  [perceptible]  things, 
is  also  wrongly  attributed  to  the  Self,  and  although  in  so  far  as  it  is  primary- 
substance  it  should  be  experienced  as  being  unintelligent,  nevertheless  by 
transferring  the  quality  of  the  Self  to  the  thinking-substance,  [the  fluctuation 
of  the  thinking-substance]  appears  as  if  it  were  a fluctuation  of  the  Self,  as 
if  it  were  an  experience  [of  the  Self].  And  so  although  the  Soul  [atman)  has 
no  misconceptions,  it  seems  to  have  misconceptions ; although  not  an  ex- 
periencer,  it  seems  to  be  an  experiencer ; although  it  lacks  the  discriminative 
discernment,  it  seems  to  be  provided  with  it,  [and]  it  shines  forth  by  the 
discriminative  discernment.^  And  this  will  be  set  forth  in  detail  in  this  [sutra] 
[iv.  22],  “The  intellect  (citi)  which  unites  not  [with  objects]  is  conscious  of 
its  own  thinking-substance  when  [the  mind-stutf]  takes  its  form  [by  reflecting 
it] ; ” and  in  this  [iii.  35],  “ Experience  is  undistinguished  from  a presented- 
idea  on  the  part  of  the  sa^tea-aspect  and  of  the  Self,  each  absolutely  uncom- 
mingled [in  the  presented  idea].”  And  this  has  been  established  in  another 
system  also  [the  Saihkhya].  Accordingly  with  the  words  4Cand  so»  he  intro- 
duces {aM)  the  sutra  of  Pancafikha  the  acarya,  “ There  is  only  one  appearance 
[for  both], — that  appearance  is  knowledge.”  The  question  is  raised,  ‘ How 
is  there  one  appearance  ? considering  that  you  say  that  the  fluctuation  of  the 
thinking-substance — occupied  on  the  one  hand  with  the  different  kinds  of 
things,  and  occupied  on  the  other  hand  with  insight,  and  perceptible  as 
being  unintelligent  in  so  far  as  it  is  primary-substance — is  appearance ; and 
[considering  that  you  at  the  same  time  say  that]  the  Self’s  intelligence  [caitanya), 
which  is  different  from  this  and  which  is  the  perception,  is  [also]  appearance.’ 


* Literally : Although  yet  another  Self- 
wrong-attribution  possesses  a fluctua- 
tion of  the  thinking-substance  like  the 
perception  of  sounds  and  so  on,  and 
although  . . . 

“ Reading  iva  vivekakhyatyd.  Or  : it  seems 
to  be  provided  with  it  up  to  discrimi- 


native discernment  \that  is,  so  long  as 
there  is  no  discriminative  discernment : 
reading  iva  a vivekakhyatyah].  Or : it 
seems  to  be  provided  with  it  during 
the  time  of  non-discriminative  discern- 
ment [reading  iva  a-vivekakhydtydm]. 


i.4-] 


Book  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[16 


To  this  he  reiDlies  [in  the  words  of  Panca^ikha]  «that  appearance  is  know- 
ledge.)^  When  he  says  «only  oneS>,  he  says  it  with  reference  to  ordinary 
(IduJcika)  knowledge,  [which  is]  a fluctuation  subject  to  origination  and  dissolu- 
tion.' But  knowledge  (kliydti)  is  not  intelligence  {cditanya),  [which  latter  is] 
the  very  nature  of  the  Self.  On  the  contrary  that  [i.e.  intelligence]  is  concerned 
not  with  an  ordinary  perception  {tohapratyaksa),  but  rather  with  verbal-com- 
munication and  inference.  Consequently  after  [the  author  of  the  Comment] 
has  shown  that  undifferentiated-consciousness  {avidyd)  is  the  original  cause 
[of  making  wrong  attributions]  in  the  emergent  state,  he  suggests  that  this 
[consciousness]  is  the  cause  of  the  contact  [of  the  Self  with  the  thinking- 
substance],  and  also  that  the  relation  between  property  and  proprietor  is  the 
cause  of  experience.  He  makes  this  [series  of  assertions]  consistent  by  saying 
«the  mind-stuff’.»  Mind-stuff  is  the  property  of  its  proprietor,  the  Self:  this 
is  the  connexion  [of  the  statements].  The  objection  is  made  that  that-by- 
which-one-is-intelligent  (cetana),  [namel}’^,]  the  agent  that  is  Master  of  the 
mind-stuff,  accepts  aid  {upakdra)  afforded  by  the  mind-stuff,  whereas  it  is 
impossible  that  he  [the  Master  of  the  mind-stuff  should  accept]  aid  afforded 
by  this  [mind-stuff].  The  reason  for  this  is  that  there  is  no  correlation  [of 
the  Self]  with  this  [mind-stuff],  since  [the  Self]  cannot  be  aided  [by  it]. 
But  on  the  other  hand  [ca)  if  it  be  the  case  {-tve)  that  there  is  a connexion 
with  this  [mind-stuff]  or  that  aid  is  accepted  from  it,  one  would  have 
to  admit  that  [the  Self]  enters  into  mutation.  In  reply  to  this  objection  he 
says  «like  a magnet ; and,  as  an  object  suitable  to  be  seen  [by  the  Self  as 
Witness],  it  gives  its  aid  [to  the  Self]  by  the  mere  fact  of  being  near  it.»  The 
mind-stuff  is  not  in  connexion  with  the  Self,  but  is  near  it.  [This]  nearness, 
moreover,  does  not  result  from  a correlation  either  spatially  or  temporally  of 
the  Self  with  it  [the  mind-stuff].  But  the  distinguishing  characteristic  [of  this 
nearness]  is  [that  the  Self  stands  to  the  mind-stuff  in  a relation  of]  pre- 
established  harmony  {yoyyatd).  Moreover  the  Self  has  the  capacity  for  being 
the  experiencer  [while]  the  mind-stuff  has  the  capacity  for  being  experienced. 
Accordingly  [mind-stuff]  is  described  «as  an  object  suitable  to  be  seen.»  In 
other  words  it  is  described  as  an  object-for-experience  when  it  enters  into 
mutations  which  have  the  forms  of  various  kinds  of  things  ((;abdddi).  Although 
experience  is  a fluctuation  in  the  form  of  sounds  and  of  other  [perceptible] 
things  and  is  an  external  aspect  (dharma  : see  iii.  13)  of  the  mind-stuff,  still 
it  [experience]  belongs  to  the  Self,  because  the  Self  <takes  the  same  form  as 
the  fluctuations  :>  [that  is,  because  they  result  fi’om  the  false  supposition  of 
an  identity  between  mind-stuff  and  intelligence  (cditanya) : this  is  what  is 


' The  original,  udaya-vyaya-dharmini,  may 
be  a reminiscence  of  one  of  the  most 
famous  of  all  Buddhist  gathas, 
anicca  vata  sankhdrd 
uppdda-vaya-dhammino, 


Digha-nikaya,  ii.  157,  ed.  PTS.  But 
Vacaspati  seems  to  understand  it  more 
pregnantly  here  as  ‘subject  to  rising 
into  and  passing  out  of  conscious- 
ness ’. 


17] 


[— i.  5 


Five  hinds  of  fluctuations 

meant.  Therefore  although  there  is  no  correlation  with  the  mind-stuff,  still 
it  is  established  that  the  Self  accepts  aid  afforded  by  it,  and  that  it  does  not 
enter  into  mutation.  A question  is  raised,  ‘The  relation  of  property  and 
proprietor  is  [we  grant]  the  reason  for  experience  and  is  subject  to  the  condi- 
tions of  undifferentiated-consciousness.  But  subject  to  what  conditions  is 
undifferentiated-consciousness  ? Not  subject  to  conditions  (as  everybody  admits) 
no  effect  is  produced.  As  they  say,  “ Is  there  any  commencement  of  un- 
diflferentiated-consciousness  for  him  [that  is,  man]  as  in  the  case  of  sleep  and 
so  on?”’  While  apparently  summing  up,  he  [in  fact]  removes  this  doubt 
with  the  words  <SCHence  the  reason  why  . . . experiences  the  fluctuations  of 
the  mind-stuff.^  The  reason  for  the  [Selfs]  awareness  of  the  mind-stuffs 
fluctuations  in  the  form  of  tranquil  and  cruel  and  infatuated  forms  is  the 
[above-mentioned]  correlation,  which  is  without  beginning  since  it  is  under 
the  conditions  of  undifferentiated-consciousness  which  is  without  beginning. 
And  the  serial-order  [santana]  of  undifferentiated-consciousness  and  of  the 
subconscious-impressions  [vasana)  is,  like  the  serial-order  of  seed  and  sprout, 
without  beginning. 

Moreover  these — for  there  are  many  such  found  in  the  mind-stuff — 
must  be  restricted. 

5.  The  fluctuations  are  of  flve  kinds  and  are  hindered  or 
unhindered. 

The  hindered  (klista)  are  those  which  are  caused  by  the  hindrances 
{kief a)  [undifferentiated-consciousness,  &c. ; see  ii.  3]  and  are  the  field 
for  growth  of  the  accumulation  of  the  latent-deposits  of  karma ; 
the  unhindered  have  discriminative  discernment  as  their  object  and 
thus  obstruct  the  task  {adhikara)  of  the  aspects  {guna).  These  are 
still  unhindered  even  when  they  occur  in  the  stream  of  the  hindered. 
For  even  in  the  midst  of  the  hindered  [fluctuations]  they  are  un- 
hindered ; while  in  the  midst  of  the  unhindered  [they  are]  hindered. 
Corresponding  subliminal-impressions  are  produced  by  nought  else 
than  [these]  fluctuations,  and  fluctuations  [are  made]  by  subliminal- 
impressions.  In  this  wise,  the  wheel  of  fluctuations  and  subliminal- 
impressions  ceaselessly  rolls ^ on  [until  the  highest  concentration  is 
attained].  Operating  in  this  wise,  this  mind-stuff,  having  finished 
its  task,  abides  in  its  own  likeness,  or  [rather]  becomes  resolved 
[into  primary  substance]. — These,  either  hindered  or  unhindered, 
are  the  five-fold  fluctuations. 

' Compare  iv.  11,  p.  288*  (Calc.  ed.). 

3 [h.o.s.  17] 


i.  5 — ] Booh  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi  [18 

Let  this  be  granted.  Still  a man  is  qualified  for  that  in  which  he  has  capacity. 
Furthermore  the  restriction  of  fluctuations  is  impossible  unless  one  has  an  idea 
of  the  fluctuations.  And  yet  no  one  even  in  a thousand  years  could  count  them. 
Numberless  as  they  are,  how  [then]  can  they  be  restricted  ? In  reply  to  this 
difficulty  he  introduces  the  sutra  whose  purpose  is  to  teach  us  their  number  and 
their  nature  with  the  words  ^Moreover  these — for  there  are  many  such  found 
in  the  mind-stuff — must  be  restricted  5.  The  fluctuations  are  of  flve  kinds 
and  are  hindered  or  unhindered.  The  fluctuations  form  a single  whole. 
Of  this  [whole]  there  are  five  parts,  and  of  them  the  first  is  the  source- of-a- valid- 
idea.  Accordingly,  there  is  a fluctuation  which  has  the  parts  of  this  [whole], 
[namely]  five-fold,  [that  is]  of  five  parts.  And  since  these  fluctuations  are  many, 
inasmuch  as  there  are  different  mind-stuffs  belonging  to  Chaitra  and  to  Maitra 
and  to  other  people,  the  use  of  the  plural  is  consistent.  What  he  wishes  to  say  is 
this  : Whether  Chaitra  or  Maitra  or  any  one  else — of  all  these  without  exception, 
the  fluctuations  are  of  exactly  flve  kinds  [and  there  are]  no  more  [fluctuations]. 
And  the  word  «mind-stuff,)»  which  has  a collective  sense  (jatyahhipraya),  is 
a singular,  but  is  to  be  taken  as  [a  plural,]  mind-stuffs.  He  shows  that  there 
are  differences  of  a subordinate  kind  which  are  serviceable  in  the  pursuit  [of 
yoga]  in  the  words  <hindered  or  unhindered.)  By  the  help  of  the  unhindered 
[fluctuations],  the  hindered  should  be  restricted ; and  the  former,  [should  be 
restricted]  by  the  higher  passionlessness.  He  gives  the  explanation  of  this  in 
the  words  «caused  by  the  hindrances  ;»  in  other  words  the  fluctuations  have 
the  feeling-of-personality  and  the  other  hindrances  as  their  cause  of  action. 
Another  interpretation  would  be  that,  for  a person  whose  chief  end  is  to  fulfil 
the  purposes  of  the  Self,  those  fluctuations  which  consist  of  rajas  and  tamas  act 
as  hindrances  in  so  far  they  cause  hindrance.  «Hindrance»  is  in  the  sense 
[Pan.  V.  2. 127]  of  having  something  hindered  [as  its  effect].  This  [hindrance] 
belongs  to  those  [fluctuations]  and  therefore  they  are  called  hindered. — Since 
the  action  of  those  [hindered]  fluctuations  tends  towards  an  increase  of  hindrance, 
it  is  they  which  are  the  field  for  growth  of  the  accumulation  of  the  latent- 
deposits  of  karma.  For  this  observer  [namely,  the  thinking-substance  whose 
chief  end  is  to  fulfil  the  purposes  of  the  Self]  decides  definitely  {ava-saya)  by 
sources-of-valid-ideas  and  in  other  ways  what  the  [intended]  object  is  and  becomes 
attached  to  it  or  averse  to  it  and  [then]  accumulates  latent-deposits  of  karma. 
Thus,  hindered  fluctuations  become  the  soil  for  the  propagation  of  the  accumu- 
lated merit  and  demerit.  He  explains  the  unhindered  [fluctuations]  by  saying 
that  they  «have  discriminative  discernment  as  their  object. » When  the  sattva 
of  the  thinking-substance  is  cleansed  of  rajas  and  tamas  and  flows  calmly 
onwards,  the  clearing  of  the  insight  {prajhd)  is  the  [discriminative]  discernment. 
By  [thus  speaking  of]  that  which  has  [discernment  as  its]  object  he  partially 
describes  that  discrimination  {viveka),  between  sattva  and  the  Self,  which  is  the 
object  of  this  [insight].  Accordingly,  since  [the  unhindered]  have  as  their 
object  the  discrimination  of  [the  difference  between]  the  sattva  and  the  Self,  for 


19]  Mingling  of  fluctuations  [ — i.  6 

this  very  reason  they  obstruct  the  task  of  the  aspects  {gum).  Now  the  aspects 
have  the  task  to  develop  products.  Since  moreover  this  [development]  lasts 
until  the  end  of  discriminative  discernment,  and  since  when  the  aspects  have 
accomplished  their  task  {adkiMra)  [these  unhindered  fluctuations]  restrict  their 
authority  {adhiMra),  for  this  reason  sources-of-valid-ideas  and  the  other  fluctua- 
tions are  these  unhindered  ones.  [The  objection  is  made  :]  ‘ This  may  be  true. 
But  all  living  creatures  have  hindered  fluctuations  only,  since  there  is  nothing 
born  that  is  free  from  desire.  Furthermore,  unhindered  fluctuations  cannot 
exist  in  the  stream  of  hindered  fluctuations.  And  even  if  those  [unhindered 
fluctuations]  could  exist,  they  could  not  produce  effects  since  they  have  fallen 
into  the  midst  of  obstructors.  For  this  reason  restriction  of  the  hindered  by 
the  unhindered  and  of  these  latter  by  the  higher  passionlessness  is  nothing  more 
than  a wish.’  In  reply  to  that  objection  he  says  ^in  the  stream  of  the  hindered. » 
Practice  and  passionlessness  are  produced  by  devoting  oneself  steadily  to  verbal 
communications  and  to  inferences  and  to  the  instruction  of  teachers.  «In  the 
midst  of  the  hindered)?>  [means]  among  [them].  That  they  occur  there  means 
that  they  are  in  themselves  quite  unhindered  although  they  occur  in  the  stream 
of  the  hindered.  Surely  a Brahman,  although  he  reside  at  ([Jalagrama  which  is 
crowded  with  hundreds  of  Kiratas,  is  not  [on  that  account]  a Kirata.  This  is  an 
example  of  what  is  meant  by  [occurring]  in  the  midst  of  the  xmhindered.  And 
in  so  far  as  they  are  found  among  the  hindered,  the  unhindered,  without  being 
suppressed  by  the  hindered,  do  after  all,  as  gradually  their  own  subliminal- 
impressions  come  to  fruition,  suppress  the  hindered.  •^Corresponding»  means 
that  unhindered  subliminal-impressions  [are  produced]  by  unhindered  fluctua- 
tions. This  is  that  wheel  of  fluctuations  and  subliminal-impressions  which 
ceaselessly  rolls  on  until  the  concentration  of  restriction  [is  attained].  Operating 
in  this  wise,  the  mind-stuflf  reaches  the  state  of  restriction  and,  coming  [then] 
to  consist  of  nothing  but  subliminal-impressions,  abides  in  its  own  likeness 
{dtmakalpena) : this  is  the  superficial  view.  Or  else — and  this  is  the  stricter 
view — it  becomes  resolved  into  primary  substance. — He  joins  together  the 
meaning  of  sutras  [5  and  6]  by  the  word  «These.^ — The  word  «five-fold» 
[literally,  five  times]  is  an  expression  of  the  sense  merely  ; but  it  is  not  a literal 
rendering  of  the  force  {vrtti)  of  the  termination  (fa&da),  because  it  is  not  taught 
[by  Panini,  at  v.  2.  42]  that  the  termination  taya  {tayap)  has  the  meaning  of 
‘ kinds  ’. 


6.  Sources-of-valid-ideas  and  misconceptions  and  predicate- 
relations  and  sleep  and  memory. 

These  [five]  he  announces  by  their  technical  names.  6.  Sources-of-valid-ideas 
and  misconceptions  and  predicate-relations  and  sleep  and  memory.  [The 
compound]  is  analysed  according  to  the  order  of  words  in  the  enumeration  [of 
the  sutra].  The  compound  is  a copulative  {cdrthe  dvamdvah,  Panini  ii.  2.  29)  in 


i.  6 — ] Book  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi  [20 

the  sense  of  mutual  conjunction. — Just  as  once  more  in  the  statement  [ii.  5], 
“ The  recognition  of  the  permanent,  of  the  pure,  of  pleasure,  and  of  a self  in 
what  is  impermanent,  impure,  pain,  and  non-self, — is  undifferentiated-conscious- 
ness,”  such  illusions  as  the  loss  of  the  sense  of  orientation  or  as  the  fire-brand 
[whirled  about  so  as  to  be  seen  as  a]  circle,  are  not  expressly  excluded, — so  here 
also,  even  in  the  mentioning  of  the  sources-of-valid-ideas  and  the  rest,  since  doubt 
as  to  the  real  existence  of  other  fluctuations  would  not  [otherwise]  be  excluded, 
in  order  to  exclude  them  [these  others],  the  words  ‘ of  five  kinds  ’ should  be 
added.  Thus  it  becomes  clear  that  fluctuations  are  just  so  many  and  no  more. 


7.  Sources-of-valid-ideas  are  perception  and  inference  and 
verbal-communication,  i.  Perception  is  that  source-of- valid- 
ideas  [which  arises  as  a modification  of  the  inner-organ]  when  the 
mind-stuff  has  been  affected  by  some  external  thing  through  the 
channel  of  the  sense-organs.  This  fluctuation  is  directly  related  to 
that  [object],  but,  whereas  the  intended-object  (artha)  consists  of  a 
genus  ^ and  of  a particular,  it  [the  fluctuation]  is  chiefly  concerned 
with  the  ascertainment  of  the  particular  [the  genus  being  subordi- 
nate in  perception  to  the  particular].  The  result  [of  perception]  is 
an  illumination  by  the  Self  {'pduruseya)  of  a fluctuation  which 
belongs  to  the  mind-stuff,  [an  illumination  which  is]  undistinguished 
{a-viyista),  [that  is,  one  in  which  the  Self  does  not  distinguish  itself 
from  the  thinking-substance],  [as]  we  shall  explain  in  detail  hereafter 
[ii,  17]  in  the  passage  ^ beginning  “ Self  is  conscious-by- reflection  of 
the  thinking-substance.”  ii.  Inference  is  [that]  fluctuation  [of  the 
mind-stuff]  which  refers  {-visayd)  to  that  (tat-)  relation  {samhandha) 
which  is  present  in  things  belonging  to  the  same  class  as  the  subject- 
of-the-illation  {anumeya)  and  absent  from  things  belonging  to 
classes  different  [from  that  of  the  subject-of-the-illation] ; and  it  is 
chiefly  concerned  with  the  ascertainment  of  the  genus.  Thus,  for 
instance,  the  moon  and  stars  possess  motion,  because,  like  [any  man, 
for  instance,]  Chaitra,  they  get  from  one  place  to  another ; and 
because  [negatively]  the  Vindhya  [mountain-range]  does  not  get 
[from  one  place  to  another,  it]  does  not  possess  motion,  iii.  A thing 
which  has  been  seen  or  inferred  by  a trustworthy  person  is  men- 

' Compare  ii.  14,  p.  214^ ; iii.  44,  p.  257^  (Calc.  ed.). 

^ Compare  also  i.  29;  ii.  20;  iv.  19. 


21] 


[— i.  7 


Sources  of  valid  ideas 

tioned  by  word  in  order  that  his  knowledge  [thereof]  may  pass  over 
to  some  other  person.  The  fluctuation  [in  the  mind-stuff]  of  the 
hearer  which  arises  from  that  word  and  which  relates  to  the  ohject- 
intended  by  that  [word]  (tad-artha-visaya)  is  a verbal-communica- 
tion. That  verbal-communication  is  said  to  waver,  the  utterer  of 
which  declares  an  incredible  thing,  not  a thing  which  he  himself  has 
seen  or  inferred  ; but  if  the  original  utterer  has  himself  seen  or 
inferred  the  thing,  [then  the  verbal-communication]  would  be  un- 
wavering. 

Among  these  [five],  [of  one,  that  is,]  the  fluctuation  which  is  the  source-of-valid- 
ideas,  he  gives  {aha)  [what  may  pass  as  the  naturally  expected]  general  dis- 
tinguishing characteristic  {tahsana),  by  analysing  [that  one  into  three  and 
saying]  : 7.  The  sources-of-valid-ideas  are  perception  and  inference  and 
verbal-communication.  A valid-idea  (prama)  is  an  illumination  of  a thing  ^ not 
already  presented  and  is  caused  by  the  operation  of  the  Self.  The  instrument  for 
this  is  the  source-of-the-valid-idea  {pramana).  And  the  mention  [of  the  sources-of- 
valid-ideas]  analytically  [is]  for  the  purpose  of  definitely  excluding  either  a less 
or  a greater  number. 

i.  Of  these  [three]  he  gives  first  the  distinguishing-characteristic  of  percep- 
tion, since  it  is  the  root  of  all  the  [other]  sources-of-valid-ideas,  in  the  words 
beginning  ^of  the  sense-organs. » By  using  the  words  <Kintended-object» 
he  rejects  [the  doctrine  of  maya  according  to  which  the  object  is]  a false 
attribution.  With  the  words  <5Cdirectly  related  to  that,»  in  so  far  as  [the 
fluctuation]  has  an  external  field-of-action,  he  renounces  [the  Buddhist  doctrine 
which  conceives]  the  field-of-action  as  having  the  form  of  mental-objects 
[literally,  form  of  knowledge].  With  the  words  «affected  by  some  external 
thing»  he  shows  what  the  relation  is  between  something  to  be  externally 
known  and  [the  object]  in  the  form  of  a sensation  which  is  found  in  the  mind- 
stuif.  With  the  words  ^through  the  channel  of  the  sense-organs»  he  tells  the 
reason  for  the  affect  of  this  [external  thing]  upon  the  [mind-stuff  which  is] 
separated  ^ [from  it  by  the  sense-organ  in  question]. — The  object  is  the  genus  and 
nothing  more  : thus  some  maintain.  Particulars  only  : thus  others.  Members 
of  yet  other  schools  [say  that  the  object  is  something  that  has]  the  genus  and 
the  particular  as  its  properties.  To  reject  these  [points  of  view]  he  says  that 
[the  object]  «consists  of  a genus  and  of  a particular.»  The  object  does 
not  have  these  two  as  its  properties  ; but  it  consists  of  these  two  [by  a relation 
of  identity].  This  will  again  be  the  topic  of  discussion  in  that  passage  [iii.  13] 
where  it  is  said  “ since  we  do  not  maintain  an  absolute  unity.”  With  the  words 

1 Literally,  Of  a that-ness  not  yet  presented  recognized  as  existent  but  of  unknown 

to  consciousness.  That  is,  something  quality. 

^ Vyavahita  : compare  Saihkhya  Karika  7. 


i.7— ] 


Book  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[22 


«chiefly  concerned  with  the  ascertainment  of  the  particular^  he  distinguishes 
that  which  relates  to  perception  from  that  which  relates  to  inference  and  to 
verbal-communication.  In  other  words,  although  the  genus  itself  does  shine  forth 
[into  consciousness]  in  perception,  still  it  is  subordinated  to  the  particular.  This 
would  also  be  a partial  characterization  of  direct  experience  {saksatMra).  And  so 
even  the  discriminative-discernment  receives  its  characteristic  mark. — With  the 
words  <KThe  result  [of  perception]  is  an  illumination  by  the  Self  of  a fluctuation 
which  belongs  to  the  mind-stuffy  he  denies  that  there  is  any  contradiction  in 
the  result.  An  objector  asks  how  an  illumination  which  is  found  in  the  Self 
can  be  the  result  of  a fluctuation  situated  in  the  mind-stuff  ? For  surely  when 
an  axe  ’ is  busy  with  a khadira-ti’ee,  it  is  not  chopping  on  a pala^a-tree.  In  reply 
[Vyasa]  says  «undistinguished.y  For  the  illumination  whose  seat  is  in  the 
Self  is  not  produced,  but  is  the  result  when  the  intelligence  (caitanya)  is  reflected 
in  the  mirror  of  the  thinking-substance  and  assumes  the  form  of  that  [thinking- 
substance]  in  so  far  as  the  fluctuation  of  the  thinking-substance  has  the  form  of 
the  object.  And  this  [intelligence]  in  this  [assumed]  condition  is  undistinguished 
from  the  thinking-substance  and  has  its  being  in  the  thinking-substance.  More- 
over since  the  fluctuation  has  its  being  in  the  thinking-substance  there  is  ground 
for  the  relation  of  the  source-of-the-valid-idea  to  the  result  in  the  fact  that  [both] 
have  the  same  locus  [namely,  in  the  thinking-substance].  And  this  he  says 
^we  shall  explain»  in  the  passage  “ Self  is  conscious-by-reflection.” 
ii.  After  perception  [and  before  verbal-communication],  because  [in  the  first 
place]  verbal-communication  depends  upon  inference,  in  so  far  as  it  obtains  its 
validity  ^ from  a knowledge  of  the  connective-power-of- words  (sambandha)  result- 
ing from  an  inference  with  regard  to  a cognition  (buddhi)  on  the  part  of  the 
hearer  which  [inference]  is  based  on  actions  and  so  on,  and  [in  the  second  place] 
because  [in  this  sutra]  the  inferred  is  folio  wed-in-enumeration  by  verbal-commu- 
nication,— [therefore]  he  gives  the  characteristic  marks  of  inference,  before  [he 
gives  those  of]  verbal-communication,  in  the  words  «subject-of-the-illation.» 
A subject-of-illation  is  a subject  (dJiarmin)  distinguished  by  attributes  [dliarma) 
which  we  wish  to  know.  Things  belonging  to  the  same  class  with  it  [the 
subject-of-illation],  [are]  objects  similar  to  the  genus  which  is  an  attribute  of  the 
major-term  {sadliya),  [that  is,  objects  that  are]  similar  instances  {sapaksa). 
«Which  is  pi’esent»  in  these  [things  belonging  to  the  same  class], — with  these 
words  he  excludes  [both]  contrariety  * and  lack  of  community  as  between  an 
attribute  of  the  middle-term  {sudhana-dharma)  [and  the  attributes  of  the  major].’ 
Things  belonging  to  different  classes  are  dissimilar  instances,  and  they  are  other 
than  the  similar  instances,  [that  is,]  contrary  to  them  and  containing  the  nega- 
tion of  them.  ^Absent»  from  these  [things  belonging  to  a different  class]. 

* See  G.  A.  Jacob  : A Handful  of  Popular  ’ Samntthatayd : sdmarthyam  grhndti,  Bala- 

Maxims,  part  1,  2nd  edition,  1907,  rama. 

p.  32.  ’ See  Athalye  and  Bodas,  Tarka-saihgraha, 

§ 54,  p.  306,  and  § 53,  p.  302. 


23]  Perception  and  inference  and  verbal-communication  [ — i.  7 

Accordingly  (tad)  by  this  he  rules  out  over-inclusive  {sadharana)  non-coextensive- 
ness {anaikantikatva).  Things-are-brought-into-relation — such  is  the  use  of  the 
word  <5Crelation^,  a syllogistic-mark  {linga).  Thus  describing  the  minor  premiss 
{paksa-dharmata)  he  avoids  the  fallacious-reasoning  (asiddhata)  [of  the  svarupa 
type^]. — '^Eefers  to  that)^  [means]  having  [necessary]  con-nection  with  that, 
because  of  the  etymology’^  of  the  word  «refers)^  [vi-saya]  based  on  this  [statement 
of  Dhatu-patha,  v.  2,  that]  “the  root  si  means  -nect.” — With  the  words  <Kthe 
ascertainment  of  the  genus^  he  distinguishes  [the  object  of  an  inference]  from 
the  object  of  a perception.  Inference  arises  on  condition  that  there  be  an  aware- 
ness of  a relation  [between  two  terms].  In  so  far  as,  in  the  case  of  particulars, 
one  does  not  apprehend  relations,  it  is  only  the  genus  which,  as  affording  an  easy 
apprehension  of  relations,  comes  into  the  discussion.  For  this  he  gives  an 
example  in  the  passage  beginning  ^Thus,  for  instance.2>  The  word  ca  [after  the 
word  Vindhya]  carries  with  it  a reason. — Because  the  Vindhya  [range]  has  no 
motion,  therefore  it  does  not  get  [from  one  place  to  another].  Hence,  as  there  is  an 
absence  of  motion  ® {gati-nivrttau),  there  is  an  absence  of  getting  [from  one  place  to 
another].  [And  conversely,]  because  they  do  get  from  one  place  to  another,  the 
moon  and  stars,  like  Chaitra,  do  have  motion.  Thus  [the  point]  is  established, 
iii.  Of  the  fluctuation  which  is  a verbal-communication  he  gives  the  distinguish- 
ing characteristic  in  the  words  <Sa  trustworthy  person»  [and  so  on].  Insight 
and  compassionateness  and  dexterity-of-the-sense-organs  combine  into  trust- 
worthiness. A man  whose  ways  are  governed  by  that  is  a trustworthy  one. 
He  is  the  one  by  whom  the  object  is  seen  or  inferred.  Unless  there  be  a heard 
word,  there  is  no  receiving  [of  the  seen  or  inferred  object  on  the  part  of  another 
person],  because,  in  so  far  as  this  [word]  is  rooted  in  something  seen  or  inferred, 
it  is  only  by  these  two  that  its  meaning  becomes  complete.  <KHis  knowledge 
[thereof]  passing  overS>  [to  some  other  person]  means  that  in  the  mind-stuff  of 
the  hearer  there  arises  [into  consciousness]  knowledge  similar  to  knowledge 
found  in  the  mind-stuff  of  the  trustworthy  person.  To  effect  this  [passing], 
^a  thing  is  mentioned»  [that  is,]  is  made  known,  as  a means  to  obtain  what  is 
good  for  the  hearer  and  to  avoid  what  is  bad  [for  him].  The  rest  is  easy.  The 
verbal-communication  <Kthe  utterer  of  which  declares  an  incredible  things — for 
example,  ‘These  identical  ten  pomegranates  are  going  to  be  six  cakes — «not  a 
thing  which  he  himself  has  seen  or  inferred» — for  example,  ‘ A shrine  let  him 
worship  who  desireth  heaven,’ — that  verbal-communication  <Kwavers.» 

An  objector  says,  ‘ If  that  be  so,  then  the  verbal-communication  even  of  such 
persons  as  Manu  would  waver,  [and  thus  they  would  not  be  supreme  authorities,] 
for  even  they  [declared]  things  which  they  themselves  had  not  seen  or  inferred.  ’ 

^ See  Atbalye,  p.  310.  ‘ to  stand  still  means  not  to  move  ’. 

“ According  to  this,  visaija  ought  to  mean  * This  is  an  allusion  to  Patanjali’s  Maha- 
‘ dis-nection ’.  In  fact  it  means  ‘ sphere  bhasya  on  i.  2.  45  (Kielhorn  i.  217^“). 

of  action  ’ from  root  vis  ‘ act  ’.  Cakes  (aptipa)  are  made  with  ghee : see 

® See  Dhatu-patha,  i.  975,  sthd  gati-nivrttdu,  Sayana  on  RV,  x.  45.  9. 


i.  7-] 


Booh  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[24 


In  reply  he  says  «but  if  the  original  utterer.»  For  in  case  of  such  persons  {tatra), 
the  original  utterer  was  the  Ifvara,  who  had  himself  seen  or  inferred  the  things. 
For  instance,  it  is  said  [at  Mann  ii.  7],  “Whatever  law  has  been  ordained  for  any 
person  by  Manu,  every  such  [law  had  been  already]  laid  down  in  the  Veda. 
That,  surely,  contains  within  itself  all  knowledge.”  This  is  the  meaning. 


8.  Misconception  is  an  erroneous  idea  [jndna)  not  based  on 
that  form  [in  respect  of  which  the  misconception  is  enter- 
tained]. 

Why  is  it  not  a source-of-a- valid-idea  ? Because  it  is  inhibited  by 
the  source-of-a-valid-idea,  for  the  reason  that  the  source-of-a-valid- 
idea  has  as  its  object  a positive  fact.  In  such  cases  there  is  evidently 
an  inhibition  of  the  source-of-the-invalid-idea  by  the  source-of-the- 
valid-idea,  as  for  instance  the  [erroneous]  visual-perception  of  two 
moons  is  inhibited  by  the  actual  {sad-visaya)  visual-perception  of 
one  moon.  This  [fluctuation,  namely,  misconception]  proves  to  be 
that  [well-known]  flve-jointed  undiflerentiated-consciousness  [the 
joints  of  which  are  enumerated  at  ii.  3 in  the  words]  ; “ Undifleren- 
tiated-consciousness and  the  feeling-of-personality  and  passion  and 
hatred  and  the  will-to-live  are  the  hindrances.”  These  same  [are 
known]  by  peculiar  technical  ^ designations  : Obscurity  and  Infatua- 
tion and  Extreme  Infatuation  and  Darkness  and  Blind-Darkness. 
These  will  be  discussed  in  connexion  with  the  subject  of  the  defile- 
ments of  the  mind-stuff. 

8.  Misconception  is  an  erroneous  idea  not  based  on  that  form  [in  respect 
of  which  the  misconception  is  entertained].  The  word  <Misconception> 
indicates  the  thing  to  be  characterized ; the  words  <erroneous  idea>  and  so  on 
[give]  the  distinguishing  characteristic.  A form  which  appears  [in  conscious- 
ness] as  an  idea  {jndna)  is  un-based  on  that  form,  [or,  to  put  it  as  does  the  sUtra,] 
<not  based  on  that  form>.  As,  [to  give  another  example  in  which  the  negation 
applies  to  the  action*  and  not  to  the  object,]  ‘ One  who  eats  not  the  funeral-feast.’ 
Accordingly  doubt  also  would  be  included  [in  the  definition  of  misconception]. 
But  there  is  a distinction  to  this  extent : in  this  case  [the  case  of  doubt]  the  failure 
to  be  based  [on  the  true  form]  is  overridden  by  a [clear]  perception  {jndna) ; but 
[in  the  other  case],  such  as  [the  vision]  of  two  moons,  [the  misconception  is  over- 

* Compare  Visnu  Pur.  i.  5.  5.  7-upa.  Compare  PataSjali : Maha- 

* A case  of  prasajya-pratisedha.  The  nega-  bhasya,  Kielhorn’s  edition,  i,  p.  215, 

tion  applies  to  pratisthd  and  not  to  last  line;  221“;  319*-;  34P. 


25] 


[-i.8 


Nature  of  misconception 

ridden]  by  the  perception  of  the  inhibition  [of  the  one  idea  by  the  other  idea]. 
An  objector  says,  ‘ If  this  be  granted,  the  predicate-relation  [vikalpa),  in  that  it 
is  not  based  on  the  true  form,  would  also  upon  consideration  prove  to  be  a mis- 
conception.’ In  reply  to  this  he  says  «an  erroneous  perception.»  For  these 
words  describe  an  inhibition  familiar  in  common  experience  to  everybody.^  Now 
this  [inhibition]  occurs  in  misconception  ; but  not  in  the  predicate-relation,  for- 
asmuch as  the  business-of-life  [is  done]  by  this  [predicate-relation],  and  because, 
on  the  other  hand,  only  the  learned  kind  of  persons  when  they  might  be  engaged 
in  reflection  would  have  in  this  matter  any  idea  of  an  inhibition. — [The  author 
of  the  Comment]  puts  forward  the  objection  ^Why  is  it  not  a source-of-a-valid- 
idea  ? » The  point  is  that  a previous  [perception]  should  not  be  inhibited  by  a 
later  [perception]  which  has  incurred  contradiction  ; on  the  contrary’'  the  later 
[perception  should  be  inhibited]  by  just  that  previous  [perception]  which  occurred 
first  and  has  not  incurred  contradiction.  He  gives  the  rebuttal  in  the  words 
<KBecause ...  by  the  source-of-a-valid-idea.2>  For  this  rule  [of  the  Mimahsa]  applies 
(evam)  when  a later  [perception]  arises  in  dependence  upon  a previous.  But  in 
this  present  case  two  perceptions,  each  from  its  particular  cause,  in  entire  inde- 
pendence of  each  other,  spring  up.  Accordingly  the  later  [perception]  does  not 
attain  to  a rise  [into  consciousness]  unless  it  has  destroyed  the  earlier  [perception]  ; 
and  in  fact  its  rise  [into  consciousness]  has  its  being  in  the  removal  of  that 
[previous  perception]  by  inhibition.  But  it  is  not  true  that  the  rise  [into  con- 
sciousness] of  a previous  [perception]  has  its  being  in  an  inhibition  of  the  later,  for 
the  reason  that,  at  that  time  [the  time  of  the  earlier  perception],  this  [later  per- 
ception] does  not  yet  exist.  Hence  the  fact  that  [one  perception]  has  not  incurred 
contradiction  is  the  reason  why  [another  perception]  is  to  be  inhibited  ; and  [hence 
also]  the  fact  that  [a  pei’ception]  has  incurred  contradiction  [is  the  reason]  why  it 
should  act  as  inhibitor.  Consequently  it  is  established  that  the  source-of-a- valid- 
idea,  because  its  object  is  a positive  fact,  can  inhibit  the  source-of-an-invalid-idea. 

An  example  is  given  in  the  words  <Kln  such  cases by  the  source-of-the- 

valid-idea.»  In  order  that  it  may  be  rejected,  he  shows  the  worthlessness  of 
this  [source-of-invalid-ideas,  i.  e.,  of  undifferentiated-consciousness]  in  the  words 
«This  . . . that  . . five.^  So,  undifferentiated-consciousness  as  a genus  [exists] 
in  five  special-forms  [literally,  in  five  joints],  namely,  undifferentiated-conscious- 
ness, sense-of-personality,  and  so  on.  The  mental-process  (fcMdd/n)  which  [recog- 
nizes : compare  ii.  5]  the  self  in  eight  forms  which  are  not  the  self,  that  is,  in 
the  undeveloped  [primary  substance]  and  in  the  Great  [thinking-substance]  and 
in  the  substance  of  personality  and  in  the  five  subtile-elements  [tanmatra), — is 
undifferentiated-consciousness,  the  [so-called]  Obscurity.  Similarly  the  mental- 
process  which  [recognizes]  welfare  (freya.s)  in  forms  where  no  welfare  is,  in 
atomization  [animan : technical,  see  iii.  45)  and  the  rest  of  the  eight  supremacies 
of  yogins,  is  eight-fold,  the  [so-called]  Infatuation.  [This  is]  worse  than  the  pre- 

* On  the  form  sarvajanina  see  Pan.  iv.  4.  99,  Siddhanta  KaumudI,  § 1651,  or  Whitney’s 
Grammar,  1223  d. 

j_H.O  S.  17] 


4 


i.8— ] 


Booh  I.  Concentration  or  Sanitidhi 


[26 


ceding.  And  this  is  called  the  sense-of-personality  (asmitd).  In  this  way,  after 
one  has  obtained  eight-fold  supremacy  by  yoga  and  after  becoming  perfected 
(siddha),  the  resolution  (dtmikd  pratipattik)  to  enjoy  the  ten  objects  which  are  seen 
[in  the  world]  {drsta-)  and  taught  [in  the  (;astra\  [anu<}ravika  : see  i.  15)  is  [called] 
Extreme  Infatuation ; this  is  desire.  In  case  atomization  and  the  other  supre- 
macies do  not  come-into-play  {an-utpattdu),  because  while  working  on  in  this  way 
with  this  same  intention  he  is  impeded  by  something  or  other,  [then,  ] while  he  is 
bound  down  by  this  [impediment,]  there  arises,  from  the  failure  to  enjoy  the 
objects  seen  [in  the  world]  and  taught  [in  the  (^astra\,  anger  towards  the  im- 
pediment. This  is  the  so-called  Darkness  ; this  is  hatred.  In  like  manner,  if 
he  have  success  with  the  [supernatural]  qualities,  atomization  and  so  on,  and  if 
he  dwell  in  thought  close  to  the  objects  seen  [in  the  world]  and  taught  [in  the 
<^dstra\  [then]  the  fear  that  all  this  will  perish  at  the  end  of  the  mundane  period 
is  the  will-to-live,  the  [so-called]  Blind-Darkness.  It  hath  been  said  [Samkhya- 
karika*  xlviii]  “There  are  eight  different  kinds  of  Obscurity  and  of  Infatua- 
tion. Extreme  Infatuation  is  of  ten  kinds.  Darkness  is  eighteen-fold  ; likewise 
Blind-Darkness.” 


9.  The  predicate-relation  {vikalpa)  is  without  any  [corre- 
sponding perceptible]  object  and  follows  as  a result  of 
perceptions  or  of  words. 

This  [predicate-relation]  does  not  amount  to  a source-of-valid-ideas, 
nor  does  it  amount  to  a misconception.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that 
there  is  no  [corresponding  perceptible]  object,  [nevertheless,]  because 
there  is  dependence  upon  the  authority  of  perceptions  or  of  words, 
something  is  evidently  said  [literally,  there  appears  something- 
said  {yyavahdra)  which  possesses  a dependence].  Thus  for  instance, 
when  it  is  said  [by  some  philosophers]  that  ‘ The  true  nature  of  the 
Self  is  intelligence  [cditanya)  ’,  then  in  this  case  [of  absence  of  per- 
ceptible object]  we  may  well  ask — since  the  Self  is  itself  nothing 
but  intelligence — what  thing  is  in  the  attributive  relation  to  what 
[other]  thing?  For  (ca)^  the  expressive-force  {vrtti)  [of  language] 
lies  in  the  attributive-relation,  as  for  instance  ‘ Chaitra’s  cow  ’. 
[The  eow  is  distinguished  as  being  Chaitra’s,  who  is  something 
different  from  her.]  Likewise  [there  is  expressive-force  when  the 
subject  and  the  predicate  are  identical,  when  for  instance]  the  Self 
is  said  to  be  the  unchanging  [Absolute  and  thus  is  characterized] 
by  the  negation  of  some  quality  which  is  found  in  some  [percep- 
1 Compare  (the  unedited)  Qiva-sutras  ii.  13.  ^ For  ca  meaning  ‘ for’,  see  p.  23^®,  above. 


27] 


Nature  of  predicate-relation  [ — i.  9 

tible]  thing.^  [Or  when  there  is  a connexion  between  a positive 
and  a negative,  when  for  instance]  it  is  said,  The  arrow  comes  to  a 
standstill  [or]  will  come  to  a standstill  [or]  has  come  to  a stand- 
still. The  bare  meaning  of  the  verbal-root  \sthd,  ‘ stand  still  ’ ; com- 
pare page  23]  is  understood  to  be  ‘ not  to  move  [In  this  case  also 
there  is  expressive-force  in  the  attributive  relation  even  in  the 
absence  of  any  factor  or  kdrali.a.']  So  too  [there  is  expressive- 
force]  in  the  sentence  ‘ The  Self  is  something  which  has  the  property 
that  it  does  not  come  into  existence.’  All  that  is  meant  is  that  there 
is  an  absence  of  the  property  of  coming  into  existence ; not  [any 
negative]  property  inherent  in  the  Self.  Therefore  this  property 
[which  is  a negation  so  far  as  perceptible  objects  are  concerned]  is 
predicated  and  as  such  it  is  something-that-is-thought  [vyavahdra). 

9.  The  predicate -relation  (vikalpa)  is  without  any  [corresponding  per- 
ceptible] object  and  follows  as  a result  of  perceptions  or  of  words. 

The  objection  is  made  that,  if  the  predicate-relation  follows  as  a result  of  percep- 
tions or  of  words,  then  one  would  have  to  admit  that  it  is  included  under  [that] 
source-of-valid-ideas  [which  is  termed]  verbal-communication,  or  [on  the  other 
hand],  if  the  predicate-relation  has  no  [corresponding  perceptible]  object,  it  ought 
to  be  a misconception.  In  reply  to  this  he  says  <JCThis  [predicate-relation]  does 
not.^  This  is  not  included  among  sources-of-valid-ideas  nor  among  misconcep- 
tions. Why  not  ? Because  he  says  «object.»  With  the  words  ^In  spite  of  the 
fact  that  there  is  no  [corresponding  perceptible]  object, » he  denies  that  [the 
predicate-relation]  is  included  among  sources-of-valid-ideas.  And  with  the  words 
«because  there  is  dependence  upon  the  authority  of  perceptions  or  of  words, » 
[he  denies]  that  it  is  included  among  misconceptions.  What  he  means  to  say 
is  that  a man  in  some  cases  falsely  attributes  diversity  to  things  that  are 
identical,  and  again  in  other  cases  identity  to  things  that  are  diverse.  There- 
fore since  identity  and  diversity  are  non-existent  as  perceptible  objects,  the 
portrayal  (abhasa)  of  these  two  is  a predicate-relation  [and]  not  the  source-of- 
a-valid-idea.  Nor  yet  would  it  be  a misconception,  because  it  is  not  in  contradic- 
tion with  the  fact  that  something  is  said.  He  gives  an  illustration  which  is  well 
established  in  the  systems  {gastra)  in  the  words  ^Thus  for  instance.2>  What 
subject  {vi^esya)  is  in  the  attributive-relation  (vyapadi^yate),  that  is,  is  defined 
(vigesyate)  by  what  [other]  thing  ? For  when  there  is  identity,  there  is  no  rela- 
tion of  subject  and  predicate.  Because  [for  instance]  a cow  cannot  be  defined 
as  a cow  ; but  by  something  different  [from  herself],  by  Chaitra.  To  this  he 
replies  by  the  phrase  <SFor  the  expressive-force  [of  language]  lies  in  the 
attributive-relation.)^  The  relation  between  that  to  which  the  attribute  is 
* Literally  ‘ possessing  negated  perceptible-object-qualities  ’. 


i.9— ] 


Book  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[28 


to  be  applied  and  that  which  furnishes  the  attribute  is  the  attributive- 
relation,  that  is  to  say,  the  relation-of-predicate-and-subject.  In  this  [lies]  the 
expressive-force  (rrtti)  of  the  sentence  «as  for  instance  Chaitra’s  cow.^  He 
adds  another  example  found  nowhere  but  in  the  books  of  the  systems  {^astrlya), 
«Likewise  [there  is  expressive-force]. » [A  negated  quality  found  in  some  per- 
ceptible thing  would  be,  for  instance,]  motion,  a quality  belonging  to  some  such 
[perceptible]  thing  as  earth  [and  this  quality  as  belonging  to  the  Self]  is  negated. 
Who  would  that  one  [thus  characterized]  be  ? «The  Self  is  said  to  be  the 
unchanging  [Absolute].S>  Surely  it  cannot  be  urged  in  a Samkhya  system  that 
there  is  a certain  quality  in  perceptible-objects  called  non-existence  and  that  the 
Self  could  be  defined  by  this. — Sometimes  there  is  found  a reading  ‘ Qualities  of 
a perceptible  thing  are  negated  ’.  The  meaning  of  this  would  be  that  negated 
[qualities]  are  those  concomitant  with  negation  ; qualities  of  [perceptible]  objects 
cannot  be  concomitant  with  this  [negation],  because  [in  them]  there  cannot  be 
a connexion  between  an  existent  and  a non-existent.  While  on  the  other  hand 
in  this  way  [by  the  predicate-relation]  there  is  distinct-knowledge. — In  the  words 
«The  arrow  is  coming  to  a standstill)^  he  gives  an  example  from  everyday  life. 
Now  just  as  when  we  say  ‘ he  cooks  ’ or  ‘ he  chops  ’,  we  mean  that  the  accumu- 
lated moments  of  an  action  in  serial  order  and  characterized  by  a unity  in  the 
result  are  distinctly  known,  so  it  is  also  quite  as  truly  a serial  order  to  which  he 
refers  when  he  says  «comes  to  a standstill.»  When  he  says  ^wili  come  to 
a standstill,  has  come  to  a standstill,2> — then  some  objector  may  say,  ‘If  we 
grant  [that  the  action  of  coming  to  a standstill  is]  like  that  of  cooking,  then 
the  arrow  could  have  as  its  attribute  an  action,  namely,  stopping  still, ^ which 
is  in  a serial  order  and  is  over-and-above  {hhinna)  the  arrow  itself.’  To  this 
he  replies,  [that  stopping  still  is  not  a series  of  actions,  but  that]  «The  bare 
meaning’*  of  the  verbal-root  is  understood  to  be  ‘not  to  move’.»  To  begin 
with  {tavat),  not-to-move  is  a mental-structure  {Jcalpita) ; then  too  (api)  the  exis- 
tence-in-positive-form [hliavanipatva]  of  this  [non-moving  (reading  tasya  api)~\  [is 
a mental-structure]  ; [and]  then  too  a serial  order  in  this  [existence-in-positive- 
form]  [is  again  a mental-structure] — if  that’s  what  you  mean  {iti),  whew!  what 
a string  of  mental-structures  ! — such  is  the  intention  [of  the  Comment.] — [On 
the  other  hand,]  a non-existent  is  conceived  [gamyate)  as  in  relation  with  all  the 
Selves,  [although  not  with  perceptible-objects,]  not  only  (ca)  as  if  it  were  an 
existent,  but  also  {ca)  as  if  it  were  inherent  (anugafa) — [provided  it  be]  a mental- 
structure.®  But  a [non-existent  is]  not  any  kind  of  a property  [existentially] 
distinct  from  the  Self.  By  way  of  another  illustration,  he  says,  «So  too  .... 


* The  words  sthasgafi,  sthita  and  so  forth 
explain  the  succession  inqfiied  in  the 
word  tisthati. 

® Compare  Patafijali ; Mahabhasya  on  Pa- 
nini  i.  .8.  2,  vart.  11  (Kielhorn  i.  258'*^). 

® The  Self  (pnrusa)  can  he  defined  in  terms 


of  assertion,  but  no  less  also  in  terms 
of  negation,  and  both  may  be  equally 
inherent  in  the  concept  of  the  Self,  as 
when  we  say  ‘Not  coming  into  exis- 
tence is  a property  of  the  Self’,  or 
‘ The  Self  is  un-changing  ’. 


29] 


Nature  of  sleep 


— l.  10 


the  property  that  it  does  not  come  into  existence.S> — Many  thinkers  [of  the 
Mimahsa  and  Nyaya  schools]  have  advanced  the  assertion  that  there  is  no 
fluctuation  [called]  predicate-relation  other  than  the  source-of-valid-ideas  or  the 
misconception.  To  enlighten  them,  is,  as  we  may  suppose,  the  purpose  of  this 
abundance  of  illustration. 


10.  Sleep  is  a fluctuation  [of  mind-stuff]  supported  by  the 
cause  {pratyaya,  that  is  tamas)  of  the  [transient]  negation 
[of  the  waking  and  the  dreaming  fluctuations].^ 

And  this  [fluctuation]  by  [the  operation  of]  connecting-memory 
becomes,  upon  awakening,  a special  kind  of  presented-idea 
{pratyaya).  How  is  it  that  one  can  reflect : ‘ I have  slept  well,  my 
mind  is  calm,  it  makes  my  understanding  clear  ; I have  slept  poorly, 
my  mind  is  dull,  it  wanders  unsteadfast ; I have  slept  in  deep 
stupor,  my  limbs  are  heavy,  my  mind  remains  unrefreshed  [Manta) 
and  languid  and  as  it  were  stolen  [from  my  grasp]  ? ’ [The  answer 
is : ] the  man  [just  after]  awakening  would  of  course  not  have  this 
connecting-memory,  had  there  not  been  [during  sleep,  some]  experi- 
ence of  [this  form]  of  a cause  [pratyaya,  that  is  tamas)  ; nor  would 
he  have  the  memories  based  upon  it  and  corresponding  with  it  [at 
the  time  of  waking].  Therefore  sleep  is  a particular  kind  of  pre- 
sented-idea [pratyaya)  ; and  in  concentration  it  also,  like  any  other 
presented-idea,  must  be  restricted. 

10.  Sleep  is  a fluctuation  [of  mind-stufi]  supported  by  the  cause  of  the 
[transient]  negation  [of  the  waking  and  the  dreaming  fluctuations].^ 

For,  the  word  ‘ fluctuation  ’ given-in-the-topical  [sutra  i.  5]  is  made-the-subject-of- 
an-assertion  [here].  Because,  with  regard  to  sources-of- valid -ideas  and  misconcep- 
tions and  predicate-relations  and  memories  being  fluctuations,  there  is  no  disagree- 
ment among  investigators, — therefore  this  word  is-made-the-subject-of-an-assertion 
[anudyate]  [namely,  that  one  of  the  fluctuations  is  sleep,]  in  order  that  this 
particular  [fluctuation]  may  be  mentioned.  But  as  to  whether  sleep  is  a fluctua- 
tion or  not,  there  is  disagreement  among  investigators.  Accordingly  it  must  be 
expressly  said  that  it  is  a fluctuation.  And  the  fact  that  the  matter-in-hand 
[namely,  that  one  of  the  fluctuations  is  sleep]  is  made-the-subject^-of-an-assertion 
cannot  serve  as  an  express  statement  [to  the  effect  that  sleep  is  a fluctuation]. 


^ The  point  here  is  that  sleep  is  a positive 
experience  and  not,  as  some  Vedantins, 
Udayana,  for  instance,  would  teach,  the 
absence  of  a fluctuation.  It  is  there- 


fore of  sufficient  importance  to  require 
an  explicit  assertion. 

^ Compare  Jacobi : Anandavardhana’s 

Dhvanyaloka,  p.  23,  note  1. 


i.  10—] 


Book  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[30 


Consequently  the  word  fluctuation  is  used  [here]  again.  That  fluctuation  is 
called  sleep  the  object  or  support  of  which  is  a cause  [praiyaya),  that  is,  a cause 
{karana), — the  tamas  which  covers  over  the  substance  {sativa)  of  the  thinking- 
substance, — of  the  [transient]  negation  of  the  fluctuations  of  waking  or  of 
dreams.  For  the  substance  of  the  thinking-substance  has  three  aspects ; and 
when  tamas,  the  coverer  of  all  the  organs,  preponderates  over  sattva  and  rajas 
and  becomes  manifest  (ai'is),  then,  because  there  is  no  mutation  of  the  thinking- 
substance  into  the  form  of  an  object,  the  Self,  aware  of  a thinking-substance 
which  consists  of  intensified  tamas,  is  in  deep  sleep  and  inwardly  conscious. 
Thus  it  is  explained. 

[An  objection  :]  whj^  not  consider  sleep  to  be  merely  an  absence  of  fluctuations, 
as  in  the  case  of  restricted  isolation  {Mivalya)?  He  answers  «This.»  And 
this  [fluctuation]  by  [the  operation  of]  connecting-memory,  that  is,  a remem- 
brance which  can  be  made  the  basis  of  an  argument  [sopapattika),  is  a special 
kind  of  presented-idea.  How  [is  the  argument  ? He  replies]  : When  <a»nas  is 
manifest  in  company  with  sattva,  then  the  connecting-memory  of  a man  just 
arisen  from  sleep  is  of  such  a kind  that  he  reflects  «I  have  slept  well,  my 
mind  is  calm,  it  makes  my  understanding  clear  ;)5>  clarifies  it,  in  other  words. 
But  when  tamas  is  manifest  in  company  with  rajas,  then  the  connecting- 
memory  is  of  such  a kind  that  he  reflects  (aha)  «I  have  slept  poorly,3>  in  other 
words,  my  mind  is  dull  and  unfit  for  work.  Why?  Since  it  wanders  unstead- 
fast.  [The  author  of  the  Comment]  describes  the  connecting-memory,  of  a man 
[just]  awakened,  with  reference  to  a sleep  in  which  tamas,  preponderating 
altogether  over  rajas  and  sattva,  comes-quite-to-the-fore  (samullase),  in  the  words 
«I  have  slept  in  deep  stupor,  my  limbs  are  heavy,  my  mind  remains  unrefreshed 
and  languid  and  as  it  were  stolen  [from  my  grasp].  ^ — In  the  words  ^ ...  of 
course  not  have  this  . . he  gives  a negative  instance  of  the  middle- term 
(hetu),  [that  is,  experience,]  in  order  to  show  that  the  major-term  (sadhya)  [that  is, 
memories]  does  not  exist.  «Awakening»  means  just  after  awakening.  «[Had 
there  not  been  during  sleep,  some]  experience  of  [this  form]  of  a caused  means 
[had  there  not  been]  an  experience  of  the  cause  of  the  [transient]  negation  of  the 
fluctuation.  «Based  upon  it»  is  said  with  reference  to  the  time  of  waking.  An 
objection  is  made  that  sources-of-valid-ideas  and  other  fluctuations  have  their 
locus  in  the  emergent  mind-stuff  and  must  be  restricted  because  they  are  enemies 
to  concentration  ; but  that  sleep,  since  it  amounts  to  a fluctuation  single-in- 
intent, is  in  no  wise  a foe  to  concentration.  To  this  he  replies  with  the  words 
«And  in  concentration.»  Sleep,  to  be  sure,  does  amount  to  [a  fluctuation]  single- 
in-intent ; but,  because  of  its  quality  of  tamas,  it  is  a foe  to  concentration-with- 
seed  and  to  seedless-[concentration],  [that  is,  concentration  without  subliminal- 
impressions].  And  therefore  it  also  must  be  restricted  : this  is  the  meaning. 


31]  Nature  of  Memory  [ — i.  n 

11.  Memory  {smrti)  is  not-adding-surreptitiously  [asampra- 
mosa)  to  a once  experienced  object. 

Does  the  mind-stuff  remember  the  presented-idea  or  does  it 
[remember]  the  object  ? The  presented-idea,  if  affected  by  the 
object-known  [grahya),  shines-forth-in-consciousness  {nirhhasa)  in  a 
form  ^ of  both  kinds,  both  of  the  object-known  and  of  the  process- 
of-knowing  [grahana),  and  gives  a start  to  the  corresponding 
subliminal-impression.  This  subliminal-impression  [of  these  two 
kinds  changes  into]  its  phenomenal  [form  ^]  by  the  operation  of 
the  conditions-which-phenomenalize  {vyanjaha)  it  {sva)  [that  is  to 
say,  the  subliminal-impression],  and  brings  forth  [in  its  turn] 
a memory  which  [also]  consists  of  the  object  known  and  of  the 
process-of-knowing.  With  regard  to  these  two  {tatra), — in  the  case 
of  the  idea  (buddhi),  the  form  of  the  process-of-knowing  is  predomi- 
nant ; and  in  the  case  of  memory,  the  form  of  the  object-known 
is  predominant.  The  latter  [that  is,  memory]  is  of  two  kinds,  in 
that  the-things-to-be-remembered  are  imagined  (bhdvita)  or  not 
imagined.  In  a dream  the-things-to-be-remembered  are  imagined, 
whereas  in  waking  the-things-to-be-remembered  are  not  imagined. 
AU  memories  arise  out  of  an  experience  either  of  sources-of-valid- 


* The  object  as  such  is  not  directly  per- 
ceived, but  only  its  form  (dkcira)  as 
reproduced  in  the  thinking-substance 
(buddhi-sattva),  which  in  its  turn  reflects 
the  image  cast  upon  it  by  the  Self. 

^ Literally,  “ possessing  a manifestation  of 
the  manifester  of  itself.”  (1)  The  word 
sva  denotes  some  mutation  or  time- 
form  or  intensity  [iii.  13]  yet  to  he 
phenomenalized.  Anger  or  fear  would 
serve  as  an  example.  (2)  The  word 
vyanjaka  denotes  the  conditions  which 
transform  the  unphenomenalized-form 
into  a phenomenon.  The  approach  of 
the  tiger  would  be  a concrete  example. 
(3)  The  word  anjana,  that  is  praka^ana 
or  dvirbhdvaka,  is  the  presented-idea  of 
the  tiger.  The  discussion  is  not  with 
regard  to  things  in  themselves,  but  to 
their  phenomenal  forms.  A phenome- 
nalized-form  (vyakti)  is  in  Vacaspati- 


mi9iu’s  terminology  equivalent  to  a 
fluctuation  (vrtti).  And  this  pheno- 
menalized-form  is  further  conceived 
to  be  any  change  in  a substance 
(dharmin)  which  realizes  some  purpose 
(arthakriydkdntva).  When  we  so  regard 
a substance  that  we  see  it  doing  any- 
thing which  interests  us,  we  call  it 
a thing,  in  other  words,  a mutation 
{yarindma)  or  a phenomenalized-form 
{vyakti).  Consequently  things  do  not 
arise  and  pass  out  of  existence,  as 
Buddhists  would  contend ; hut  our 
conscious  experience  temporarily  iso- 
lates successive  phenomenal  aspects  of 
permanent  substances.  In  fine,  all 
phenomena  are  latent  or  implicit  in 
the  substance  and  become  fluctuating 
or  explicit  under  certain  determined 
conditions. 


i.  11 — ] Booh  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi  [32 

ideas  or  of  misconceptions  or  of  predicate-relations  or  of  sleep  or  of 
memory.  And  all  these  fluctuations  have  as  their  being  pleasure 
and  pain  and  infatuation  ; and  pleasure  and  pain  and  infatuation 
are  to  be  explained  among  the  hindrances  [ii.  3-9]  ; “ Desire  is  that 
which  dwells  upon  pleasure  ” [ii.  7]  ; “ Aversion  is  that  which  dwells 
upon  pain  ” [ii.  8]  ; while  undifferentiated-consciousness  is  the  same 
as  infatuation.  All  these  fluctuations  must  be  restricted.  Because 
it  is  [only]  upon  their  restriction  that  there  ensues  concentration 
whether  conscious  or  not  conscious  [of  objects].^ 

11.  Memory  {smrti)  is  not-adding-surreptitiously  {asampramosa)  to  a once 
experienced  object. 

This  not-adding-surreptitiously-to,  which  is  the  same  as  not  stealing  for,  an 
object  once  experienced  by  means  of  sources-of-valid-ideas  and  other  fluctuations  is 
memory.  For  in  the  case  of  knowledge  produced  by  nothing  but  a subliminal- 
impression,  the  object  which  appeared  in  that  experience  which  was  the  cause 
of  the  subliminal-impression,  is  the  own  peculiar  [object  of  that  knowledge]. 
But  the  appropriation  of  any  object  in  addition  to  that  [own  peculiar  object]  is 
a surreptitious  addition,  that  is,  a stealing  [from  other  experiences].  Why  [is 
there  any  stealing  at  all]  ? Because  there  is  similarity  [betw'een  the  subliminal- 
impression  and  other  experiences]. — Since  this  word  ^surreptitious  adding»  {sam- 
pra-mom)  is  etymologically  derived  ^ from  the  root  mus  ‘ to  steal  ’.  What  he 
means  to  say  is  this : all  sources-of-valid-ideas  and  other  fluctuations  give  access 
(aclhi-gam),  either  by  the  generic  or  the  special  form,  to  a hitherto  inaccessible 
object.  But  memory  does  not  go  beyond  the  limits  of  a previous  experience. 
It  corresponds  wuth  that  [previous  experience]  or  corresponds  w'ith  less  than  that, 
but  it  does  not  correspond  to  [any  experience]  in  addition  to  that.  This  fact 
distinguishes  memoi’y  from  other  fluctuations.— He  puts  forth  for  discussion  the 
problem  «Does  [the  mind-stuff  remember]  the  presented  idea  ?»  Because 
experience  {anuhhava)  directs  itself  towards  the  object-known,  [therefore]  the 
subliminal-impression  resulting  from  it  (taj-ja),  [that  is,  from  experience,]  since 
it  has  no  [present]  experience  of  its  own,  makes  us  remember  only  the  object- 
knowm : this  is  one  view  of  the  case.  [Another  view  is  that  the  subliminal- 
impression  makes  us  remember]  only  the  experience  [of  knowing],  for  the  reason 
that  [subliminal-impressions]  are  derived  solely  from  experience.  After  putting 
forth  this  problem,  [the  author  of  the  Comment,]  byway  of  bringing  the  two  view’s 
into  consistency,  decides  that  remembrance  must  be  of  both  kinds.  In  so 
far  as  it  directs  itself  towards  the  object-knowm,  [the  subliminal-impression] 
is  affected  by  the  object-known.  But,  strictly  speaking,  it  makes-to-shine- 
forth-in-consciousness,  [that  is,]  it  illumines,  not  only  the  object-known  but  also 

^ Compare  the  definition  of  memory  as  a tion  ’,  at  Philebus  34  a o-ooTrjpia  alndq- 

‘ keeping  or  maintenance  of  a sensa-  treais.  ^ Dhatu  patha  i.  707. 


33]  Contrast  between  perception  and  memory  [ — i,  ii 

the  process-of-knowing,  that  is,  the  form  of  both  kinds,  the  nature  of  the  two. 
This  [subliminal-impression]  is  thus  described  as  one  which  has  the  manifesta- 
tion {anjana)  or  form  [aMra)  of  the  manifester  (vyaujaJca)  or  cause  {karana)  of  itself, 
in  other  words,  which  has  the  foi-m  of  the  cause  of  itself.  [The  subliminal- 
impression  produces  a memory  corresponding  to  the  cause  of  that  impression, 
that  is,  to  the  experience  (anubhava).]  Another  interpretation  would  be  that 
[this  subliminal-impression  is  one]  which  has  the  manifestation  {anjana)  or  the 
bx’inging-to-the-point-of-fruition  (phalabhimukhikarana)  of  the  manifester  {vyafijaka) 
or  suggestive-stimulus  {udbodhaka).  An  objection  is  made  : ‘ If,  in  so  far  as  both 
refer  to  the  cause  [that  is,  to  experience],  there  is  a similarity  between  the  idea 
{buddhi)  and  the  remembrance,  then  what  difference  is  there  between  them  ? ’ 
In  reply  to  this  he  says  ^With  regard  to  these  two  . . . the  process-of-knowing. » 
i.  [Perception  ;]  the  process-of-knowing  (graJiana)  is  an  apprehending  (upadana). 
And  there  cannot  be  an  apprehending  of  that  which  is  [already]  known. 
Accordingly  an  idea  (buddhi)  is  said  to  be  an  illumination  (bodhana)  of  that  which 
has  not  been  already  got  at  (adhigata)  by  this  [process-of-knowing].  This  [idea] 
is  that  in  which  the  configuration  (akara)  or  form  (rupa)  of  the  process-of-knowing 
is  the  predominant  or  principal  [element].  Though  the  relation  between  the 
idea  and  the  process-of-knowing  is  one  of  identity,  [still]  ^ by  predicating  [the  one 
of  the  other]  the  relation  may  be  treated  here  as  if  it  were  that  of  principal  and 
subordinate,  ii.  [Memory  :]  that  whose  predominant  or  primary  [element]  is  the 
configuration  of  the  object-known.  This  same  predominance  of  the  object-known 
in  the  configuration  of  the  object-known  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  object-intended 
(artha)  has  already  been  made  the  object  of  one  of  the  other  [four]  fluctuations. 
Accordingly  memory  is  declared  to  be  concerned  with  objects  which  have 
already  been  made  the  object  of  one  of  the  other  fluctuations  : this  is  precisely 
what  is  meant  by  not  adding  surreptitiously  [to  the  once  experienced  object]. 
It  might  be  urged  that  there  is  even  in  memory  a surreptitious  addition.  For 
in  a dream  one’s  parents  and  others  deceased  who  have  been  experienced  in  one 
time  and  place  are  brought  [by  memory]  into  relation  with  another  time  and 
place  not  previously  experienced.  The  reply  is  «The  latter  [that  is,  memoiy] 
is  of  two  kinds that  [memory]  by  which  imagined  or  mentally-constructed 
things  are  to  be  remembered  ; [that  memory  by  which]  not  imagined,  that  is, 
not  mentally-constructed  [or]  real  things  [are  to  be  remembered].  This  [memory 
of  imagined  things]  is  not  [really]  memory,  but  is  misconception ; because  it 
agrees  with  the  characteristic-mark  [i.  8]  of  this  [misconception].  But  it  is 
called  memory  in  so  far  as  it  resembles  memory,  just  as  that  which  resembles 
a source-of-valid-ideas  is  called  a source-of-valid-ideas.  This  is  his  point. — But 
why  is  memory  placed  at  the  end  [of  i.  6]  ? To  this  he  replies  ^All  memories. » 
Experience  (anubhava)  means  getting  to  [an  object].  Memory  is  a fluctuation 
preceded  by  a getting  to  [an  object].  [Not  until]  after  this  [getting  to  an  object] 

* Literally,  ‘ a relation  of  principal  and  subordinate  is  here  (ayani)  predicated.’ 

5 [h.o.s.  it] 


i.  11—] 


Booh  I.  Concentration  or  SarnCtdhi 


[34 


do  memories  associate  themselves  [with  the  subliminal-impression  and  with  the 
experience].  The  objection  is  made  that  a reasonable  person  should  restrict 
those  objects  only  which  hinder  * a man.  Moreover  the  hindrances  [affect  him] 
thus ; but  fluctuations  do  not.  Why  then  should  these  [fluctuations]  be 
restricted?  In  reply  he  says  « And  all  these. ^ [The  rest  is]  easy. 


N ow  what  means  are  there  for  the  restriction  of  these  [fluctuations]  ? 

12.  The  restriction  of  them  is  by  [means  of]  practice  and 
passionlessness. 

The  so-called  river  of  mind-stutf,  whose  flow  is  in  both  directions, 
flows  towards  good  and  flows  towards  evil.  Now  when  it  is  borne 
onward  to  Isolation  \hcdvalya\  downward  towards  discrimination, 
then  it  is  flowing  unto  good ; when  it  is  borne  onward  to  the 
whirlpool-of-existence,  downward  towards  non-discrimination,  then 
it  is  flowing  unto  evil.  In  these  cases  the  stream  towards  objects 
is  dammed  by  passionlessness,  and  the  stream  towards  discrimina- 
tion has  its  flood-gate  opened  by  practice  in  discriminatory  know- 
ledge. Thus  it  appears  that  the  restriction  of  the  mind-stuff  is 
dependent  [for  its  accomplishment  upon  means]  of  both  kinds, 
[practice  and  passionlessness]. 

With  the  word  «now^  he  asks  what  is  the  means  for  restriction.  He  gives 
the  answer  in  the  [following]  sutra : 12.  The  restriction  of  them  is  by  [means 
of]  practice  and  passionlessness.  If  the  restriction  is  to  be  effected,  then  both 
[these]  distinct  activities,  practice  and  passionlessness,  must  operate  together, 
but  not  either  one  or  the  other  separately.  “ Accordingly  he  says  «The  river  of 
mind-stuff.»  The  words  ^borne  onward  to^  [connote]  a continuous  connexion  ; 
«downward  towards^  [suggest]  depth  or  bottomlessness. 


13.  Practice  {abliydsa)  is  [repeated]  exertion  to  the  end  that 
[the  mind-stuflf]  shall  have  permanence  in  this  [restricted 
state]. 

Permanence  is  the  condition  of  the  unfluctuating  mind-stuff  when 
it  flows  on  in  undisturbed  calm.  Practice  is  an  effort  {prayatna) 
with  this  end  in  view, — a [consequent]  energy,  a persevering 

' Read  klignanti.  with  the  distinction  that  there  be  [two] 

^ Literally,There  is  [=  must  be]  a piling-up-  subordinate  activities,  but  not  analter- 

together  (samuccaya)  [=  simultaneous  native  [action], 

action]  of  practice  and  passionlessness. 


35]  Restriction  of  fluctuations  hy  'practice  [ — i.  14 

struggle, — the  pursuit  {anustlidnd)  of  the  course-of-action-requisite 
thereto  with  a desire  of  effectuating  this  [permanence]. 

Of  these  [two],  he  characterizes  practice  by  telling  what  it  is  [svarupa)  and 
what  its  purpose  is,  [and  does  so  in  the  words]  13.  Practice  is  [repeated] 
exertion  to  the  end  that  [the  mind-stuff  ] shall  have  permanence  in  this  [re- 
stricted state].  This  he  discusses  in  the  words  <5Cof  the . . mind-stuff. » The  word 
«unfluctuating)^  means  without  fluctuations  of  rajas  and  tamas.  Its  flowing  on 
in  undisturbed  calm  is  stainlessness,  is  the  flowing  on  of  the  fluctuations  of  sattva ; 
it  is  singleness-of-intent ; it  is  permanence.  It  is  with  this  end  in  view  [that 
there  is  practice].  In  the  words  <shall  have  permanence)  there  is  [a  pregnant 
use  of]  the  locative  case  expressive  of  the  reason  [for  the  action]  as  in  the  phrase 
“He  kills  the  leopard  for  the  sake  of  the  skin.”  He  makes  the  word  «effort» 
clear  by  a pair  of  synonyms  ^a  [consequent]  energy,  a persevering  struggle.)) 
That  this  [effort]  starts  from  a specific  volition  [icclia]  he  declares  in  the  words 
^with  a desire  of  effectuating  this.^  The  word  ^this!^  refers  to  permanence. 
In  the  words  <5Cthe  course-of-action-requisite  thereto)^  he  describes  the  goal  of  the 
effort.  The  [eight]  means-of-attaining  [this]  permanence  are  the  [three]  inner 
means  {anga)  and  the  [five]  outer  means,  of  which  [eight]  the  first  [two]  are  the 
abstentions  and  the  observances  [ii.  30  and  32].  The  sense  is  that  the  functional- 
activity  of  the  agent  is  occupied  with  the  means  [of  the  action],  and  not  with 
the  result. 


14.  But  this  [practice]  becomes  confirmed  when  it  has  been 
cultivated  for  a long  time  and  uninterruptedly  and  with 
earnest  attention. 

[Practice,]  when  it  has  been  cultivated  for  a long  time,  cultivated 
without  interruption,  and  carried  out  with  self-castigation  and 
with  continence  and  with  knowledge  and  with  faith, — in  a word, 
with  earnest  attention, — becomes  confirmed.  In  other  wmrds  it  is 
not  likely  to  have  its  object  suddenly  overpowered  by  an  emergent 
subliminal-impression. 

An  objection  is  made  that  practice  is  obstructed  by  emergent  subliminal- 
impressions,  which  are  the  foes  of  practice  [from  time]  without  beginning. 
How  does  [practice]  conduce  to  permanence?  In  reply  he  says,  14.  But  this 
[practice]  becomes  confirmed,  when  it  has  been  cultivated  for  a long  time 
and  uninterruptedly  and  with  earnest  attention.  This  same  practice 
becomes  a confirmed  state  only  when  {san)  provided  with  [these]  three  qualifica- 
tions. And  its  goal,  namely  permanence,  is  not  suddenly  overrun  by  emergent 
subliminal-impressions.  But  if,  even  after  having  done  practice  of  this  kind, 
a man  should  fail  to  persevere,  then  in  the  course  of  time  he  might  be  overrun 
[reading  abluhlmyeta\  Therefore  one  must  not  fail  to  persevere. 


i.  15 — ] 


Book  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[36 


15.  Passionlessness  is  the  consciousness  of  being  master  on 
the  part  of  one  who  has  rid  himself  of  thirst  for  either  seen 
or  revealed  objects. 

The  mind-stuff  (citta), — if  it  be  rid  of  thirst  for  objects  that  are 
seen,  such  as  women,  or  food  and  drink,  or  power, — if  it  be  rid  of 
thirst  for  the  objects  revealed  [in  the  Vedas],  such  as  the  attain- 
ment of  heaven  or  of  the  discarnate  state  or  of  resolution  into 
primary  matter, — if,  even  when  in  contact  with  objects  either  super- 
normal or  not,  it  be,  by  virtue  of  Elevation  {prasamkhyd7ia),  aware 
of  the  inadequateness  of  objects, — [then  the  mind-stuff]  will  have 
a consciousness  of  being  master,  [a  consciousness]  which  is  essen- 
tially the  absence  of  immediate-experience^  (ahhoga)  [and]  has 
nothing  to  be  rejected  or  received,  [and  that  consciousness  is] 
passionlessness. 

He  describes  passionlessness.  15.  Passionlessness  is  the  consciousness  of 
being  master  on  the  part  of  one  who  has  rid  himself  of  thirst  for  either 
seen  or  revealed  objects.  He  describes  this  riddance  from  thirst  for  seen 
objects  whether  animate  or  inanimate  in  the  words  beginning  with  ^women.)^ 
«Power^  is  sovereignty.  Kevelation  is  Veda  ; ^revealed»  is  that  which  is 
known  from  this  [revelation],  heaven  for  instance.  Thirstlessness  even  for  these 
things  is  specified  in  the  words  beginning  «heaven.»  ^Discarnate^  means 
without  carnate  body.  «The  discarnate  stated  is  the  state  of  those  who  are 
resolved  into  their  organs.  But  there  are  others  deeming  themselves  to  be 
nothing  but  primary-matter,  persons  who  worship  primary-matter,  who  are 
resolved  into  primary-matter,  which  of  course  has  its  task  [still  unfulfilled  in 
so  far  as  primary-matter  is  for  them  an  object  of  desire] : the  state  of  these 
is  «resolution  into  primary -matter.^  A man  rids  himself  of  a thirst  which 
is  directed  to  the  attainment  of  this.  Now  one  who  is  rid  of  thirst  for  a revealed 
object  is  said  to  be  rid  of  a thirst  which  is  directed  to  the  attainment  of 
heaven  or  the  like.  It  might  be  objected  : ‘ If  passionlessness  is  riddance  from 
thirst  and  nothing  more,— why  ! then  this  [riddance  from  thirst]  exists  even  if 
you  don’t  get  to  your  objects.  And  for  that  reason  {iti)  [that  riddance  from 
thirst]  would  [also]  be  passionlessness.’  The  reply  to  this  is  in  the  words  «super- 
normal  or  not.»  Passionlessness  is  not  merely  riddance  from  thirst.  But  it 
is  [the  consciousness  of  being  master]  on  the  part  of  the  mind-stuff,  and  is 


^ This  word  anabhoga  occurs  in  Asanga’s 
Mahayana-Sutralamkara  (1907),  p.  3'®. 
In  his  translation  (1911)  on  page  8, 
note  7,  Sylvain  Levi  discusses  this  word 
and  states  that  it  apparently  is  lacking 


in  classical  Sanskrit.  The  fact  that  it 
occurs  here  is  another  indication  of  the 
intimate  relation  between  Patanjali  and 
the  Mahayana.  Haribhadra  Suri  uses 
it  at  Yoga-bindu,  vs.  91  and  elsewhere. 


37]  Restriction  of  fluctuations  hy  passionlessness  [ — i.  16 

essentially  the  absence  of  immediate-experience  of  objects  whether  supernal  or 
not,  even  when  in  contact  with  them.  This  same  [consciousness]  he  makes 
more  clear  by  saying  ^[has  nothing]  to  be  rejected.)^  The  words  ^has  nothing 
to  be  rejected  or  received^  mean  free  from  flaw  of  attachment.  This  idea, 
[a  state  of]  indifference,  is  the  <Kconsciousness  of  being  master.^  But  whence 
comes  this  idea?  In  reply  he  says  <Sby  virtue  of  Elevation.»  Objects  are 
encompassed  by  the  three  kinds  of  pain.  That  is  their  inadequateness.  By 
meditation  upon  that,  [results]  a direct  perception  of  it,  [and  that  is]  Elevation. 
By  virtue  of  that.  1.  The  Consciousness  of  Endeavour  {yatamana-samjha)  ; 
2.  The  Consciousness  of  Discrimination  ; 3.  The  Consciousness  of  a Single  Sense ; 
4.  The  Consciousness  of  Being  Master  : these  are  the  four  consciousnesses, 
according  to  those  who  know  the  ti’adition.  1.  Such  things  as  desires  are  of 
course  taints  found  in  the  mind-stuff.  By  these  the  senses  (indriya)  are  turned 
each  toward  its  particular  object.  So,  in  order  that  the  senses  may  not  turn 
toward  this  or  that  particular  object,  there  is  a beginning,  an  effort  [made] 
to  bring  these  taints  to  maturity  [and  thus  to  cast  them  off] : this  is  the  Con- 
sciousness of  Endeavour.  2.  When  this  beginning  is  made,  some  taints  have 
matured  and  others  are  maturing  or  are  about  to  mature.  In  this  [situation,]  the 
ascertainment  of  the  matured  by  [a  process  of]  discriminating  [them]  from  those 
about  to  mature  is  the  Consciousness  of  Discrimination.  3.  Inasmuch  as  the 
senses  are  [now]  incapable  of  turning  [toward  objects],  the  matured  [taints]  per- 
sist in  the  central-organ  ‘ as  a faint  [barren]  desire : the  Consciousness  of  a Single 
Sense.  4.  The  faint  [barren]  desire  also  is  destroyed  and  there  is  indifference 
to  objects,  whether  supernal  or  not,  even  when  they  are  close  at  hand : this  idea 
{buddhi),  higher  than  the  other  three  [forms  of  consciousness],  is  the  Conscious- 
ness of  Being  Master.  And  inasmuch  as  the  [three]  preceding  ones  have  their 
purpose  fulfilled  by  this  same  [fourth  form  of  consciousness],  therefore  these  are 
not  separately  mentioned.  Thus  all  is  quite  cleared  up. 


16.  This  [passionlessness]  is  highest  when  discernment  of 
the  Self  results  in  thirstlessness  for  qualities  [and  not 
merely  for  objects]. 

[One  yogin  becomes]  passionless  on  knowing  the  inadequateness  of 
[all]  objects,  seen  or  revealed.  Through  practice  in  the  vision  of 
the  Self,  [another  yogin,]  because  his  thinking-substance  is  satiated 
with  a perfect  discrimination,  resulting  from  the  purity  of  this 
[vision],  [between  the  qualities  {guna)  and  the  Self],  [becomes] 

* The  central-organ  (manas)  is  counted  as  the  eleventh  sense-organ  and  is  the  Single 
Sense  here  referred  to. 


i.  16—] 


Booh  I.  Concentration  or  Samdclhi 


[38 


passionless  with  regard  to  [all]  qualities  whether  perceptible  or  not- 
perceptible.  Thus  passionlessness  is  of  two  kinds.  Of  these  [two], 
the  latter  is  nothing  but  an  undisturbed  calm  of  perception 
[untouched  by  any  objects  whatsoever].  And  at  the  rising  of  this 
[state,  the  yogin]  on  whom  this  insight  has  dawned,  thus  reflects 
within  himself,  ‘ That  which  was  to  be  attained  [prdpanlya)  has 
been  attained  ; the  hindrances  which  should  have  dwindled  have 
dwindled  ; the  close-interlocked  succession  of  existences-in-the- 
world,  which — so  long  as  it  is  not  cut  asunder — involves  death 
after  life  and  life  after  death,  has  been  cut.’  It  is  just  this  utter- 
most limit  of  knowledge  that  is  passionlessness.  For  it  is  with 
this  that  Isolation,  as  they  term  it,  is  inseparably  connected. 

After  describing  the  lower  passionlessness  he  tells  of  the  higher : 16.  This 
[passionlessnessj  is  highest  when  discernment  of  the  Self  results  in  thirst- 
lessness  for  qualities  [and  not  merely  for  objects].  Lower  passionlessness 
serves  as  a cause  of  higher  passionlessness.  He  points  out  the  means  to  this 
[higher  passionlessnessj  in  the  words  ^passionless  on  seeing  the  inadequateness 
of  [all]  objects,  whether  seen  or  revealed.»  By  this  [statement]  the  lower 
passionlessness  has  been  set  forth.  ^Practice  in  the  vision  of  the  Self:S>  is  the 
practice  in  that  vision  of  the  Self  who  has  become  accessible  through  verbal- 
communications  and  inference  and  the  instruction  of  teachers.  [This  practice] 
is  a constantly  reiterated  performance — through  this.  Purity  of  this  vision 
is  a focusedness  upon  sattva  in  so  far  as  rajas  and  tamas  have  been  rejected. 
Resulting  from  this  [purity]  is  that  perfect  discrimination  between  the  qualities 
and  the  Self — to  the  effect  that  the  Self  is  pure  and  exists  from  time-without- 
beginning,  whereas  the  qualities  [in  respect  of  which  it  is  not  contaminated] 
are  the  opposite  of  this — by  which  [discrimination]  the  thinking-substance  of 
the  yogin  is  satiated  {a-pyayita).  It  is  to  such  a yogin  that  reference  is  made.  Now 
these  same  words  [anena)  describe  the  concentration  called  the  Rain-cloud  of 
[knowable]  Things  [iv.  29].  A yogin  of  such  a kind  as  this  is  altogether  passion- 
less with  regard  to  qualities  {gum),  whether  their  properties  be  developed  or 
undeveloped, — that  is  to  say,  even  to  the  extent  that  he  is  passionless  with  regard 
to  the  discernment  of  the  difference  between  sattva  and  the  Self,  [for  to  this 
discernment]  qualities  are  essential. — ^Thus»  that  is,  therefore,  passionlessness 
is  of  two  kinds.  The  first  is  when  the  substance  {sattva)  of  the  mind-stuff  has 
[all]  its  tamas  washed  aw’ay  by  the  excess  of  its  sattva,  and  when  the  mind-stuff’s 
sattva^  is  in  contagion  with  a tiny  stain  of  rajas.  This  [passionlessness,] 

* This  use  of  sattva  is  an  intentional  am-  sartm  (as  a which  in  the  higher 

biguity.  Sattva  is  not  only  the  ‘ sub-  stages  of  attainment  preponderates  in 

stance  ’ (of  the  mind-stuff),  but  is  also  the  citta  (Saihkhya-sara,  iii,  near  beg.). 


39]  Undisturbed  calm  of  the  Self  [ — i.  ig 

moreover,  is  common  to  those  also  whose  wishes  have  been  fulfilled  {taudiJca).^ 
For  they  also  have  by  virtue  of  the  same  [discrimination]  been  merged  in 
primary  matter.  In  this  same  sense  it  has  been  said  [Sarhkhya-karika  45] 
From  discrimination  results  resolution  into  primary-matter.”  Among  these, 
that  is,  of  these  two  [kinds  of  passionlessness]  the  latter  is  nothing  but  an 
undisturbed  calm  of  perception.  The  use  of  the  words  ^nothing  but2>  indi- 
cates that  this  [passionlessness]  is  without  any  object.  For  it  is  the  mind- 
stuff’s  substance  (sattva)  of  precisely  such  a kind  as  this  that  is  untouched  by 
the  stain  of  even  a particle  of  rajas.  This  is  the  substrate  for  that  [kind  of 
passionlessness].  For  this  very  reason  it  is  called  the  undisturbed  calm  of 
perception.  Because  the  substance  (sattva)  of  the  mind-stuff,  although  by  nature 
undisturbed,  [sometimes]  experiences  defilement  from  contact  with  rajas  and 
tamas.  But  when  all  defilement  by  rajas  and  tamas  is  washed  away  by  a 
stream  of  the  undefiled  water  of  passionlessness  and  practice,  it  [the  substance 
of  the  mind-stuff]  becomes  absolutely  undisturbedly  calm  and  becomes  so  that 
nothing  more  is  left  of  it  than  an  undisturbed  calm  of  perception.  He  shows  its 
qualities  so  that  we  may  be  inclined  to  receive  it.  He  says  «at  the  rising  of 
this.^  The  meaning  is  : When  this  [state]  arises,  then  the  yogin — on  whom  this 
insight  has  dawned ; in  other  words,  when  there  is  this  particular  insight 
[that  is,  the  undisturbed  calm,] — has  present  insight  [that  is,  the  Eain-cloud 
of  knowable  Things].  «That  which  was  to  be  found»  that  is.  Isolation,  has 
been  found.  In  this  sense  he  will  say  [iv.  30]  “ Even  while  living  the  -wise  man 
becomes  hberated.”  The  reason  would  be  that  what  is  nothing  but  subliminal- 
impression  has  its  root  [in  undifferentiated-consciousness]  cut : this  is  the  point. 
How  is  it  that  [Isolation]  has  been  found  ? Since  all  the  hindrances  which 
should  have  dwindled, — undifferentiated-consciousness  and  the  [four]  others 
together  with  subconscious-impressions  (vasana), — have  dwindled.  It  is  urged  as 
an  objection  that  there  is  a mass  of  merit  and  of  demerit  ; there  is  the  succession 
of  existences-in-the-world,  the  unbroken  sequence  of  birth  and  death  for  [all] 
living  creatures.  How  then  can  there  be  Isolation  ? In  reply  to  this  he  says  <Khas 
been  cut.» — That  [succession]  the  joints  of  which  show  no  connexion  is  close- 
interlocked.  These  sections  of  the  whole  (samuMn)  multitude  (samulia)  of  merits 
and  demerits,  which  are  the  parts,  are  close-interlocked.  For  nothing  alive  is  ever 
free  from  connexion  with  bondage  to  birth  and  death.  This  is  that  same  suc- 
cession of  existences-in-the-world.  When  hindrances  dwindle,  it  is  cut.  To 
this  same  effect  he  will  say  [Li.  12]  “The  latent-deposit  of  karma  has  its  root 
in  the  hindrances,”  [and  ii.  13]  “ So  long  as  the  root  exists  there  will  be  fruition 
from  it.”  Some  one  might  ask  ‘Without  the  full  maturity  of  the  Elevation 
(prasamlihyana)  and  the  restriction  of  the  Eain-cloud  of  [knowable  Things],  what 
is  this  undisturbed  calm  of  perception  ? ’ To  this  he  replies  ^uttermost  limit  of 
knowledge.^  Higher  passionlessness  is  only  one  kind  of  the  Eain-cloud  of 


^ Cp.  Samkhj’a-karika  50. 


i.  16—] 


Booh  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[40 


[knowable]  Things  ; nothing  but  that.  To  this  same  effect  he  will  say  [iv.  29] 
“ For  one  who  takes  no  interest  even  in  Elevation  there  always  follows,  as  a 
result  of  discriminative  discernment,  the  concentration  [called]  the  Kain-cloud 
of  [knowable]  Things,”  and  [iv.  31]  “ Then,  because  of  the  endlessness  of  per- 
ception from  which  all  defilements  and  coverings  have  passed  away,  the  know- 
able  amounts  to  little.”  For  this  reason  Isolation  is  inseparably  connected  with 
it  [and]  is  an  essential  characteristic  {avindhhdvin)  of  it. 


Now  when  the  fluctuations  of  mind-stuff*  have  been  restricted  by 
these  two  means,  how  are  we  to  describe  the  [ensuing]  concentra- 
tion conscious  [of  an  object]  ? 

17.  [Concentration  becomes]  conscious  [of  its  object]  by- 
assuming  forms  either  of  deliberation  [upon  coarse  objects] 
or  of  reflection  [upon  subtile  objects]  or  of  joy  or  of  the 
sense-of-personality. 

Deliberation  [vitarTca)  is  the  mind-stuff’s  coarse  direct-experience 
{ahlioga)  when  directed  to  its  supporting  [object].  Reflection 
(vicdra)  is  the  subtile  [direct-experience].  Joy  is  happiness.  The 
sense-of-personality  is  a feeling  {samvid)  which  pertains  to  one  self 
[wherein  the  Self  and  the  personality  are  one].  Of  these  [four]  the 
first,  [that  is,  deliberation]  which  has  [all]  the  four  associated 
together  is  concentration  deliberating  [upon  coarse  objects].  The 
second,  [that  is,  reflection,]  which  has  deliberation  subtracted  [from 
it]  is  [concentration]  reflecting  [upon  subtile  objects].  The  third, 
[that  is,  joy,]  which  has  reflection  subtracted  from  it,  is  [concentra- 
tion] with  [the  feeling]  of  joy.  The  fourth,  [that  is,  the  sense-of- 
personality,]  which  has  this  [joy]  subtracted  from  it,  is  [concentra- 
tion] which  is  the  sense-of-personality  and  nothing  more.  All 
these  kinds  of  concentrations  have  an  object  upon  which  they  rest. 
After  having  mentioned  the  means  [updya),  in  order  that  he  may  state  what- 
may-be-obtained-by-these-means  [upeya)  in  all  its  variations,  he  asks  «Now  . . . 
by  these  two  means  ?»  17.  [Concentration  becomes]  conscious  [of  its  object] 
by  assuming  forms  either  of  deliberation  [upon  coarse  objects]  or  of 
reflection  [upon  subtile  objects]  or  of  joy  or  of  the  sense-of-personality. 
Since  [concentration]  not  conscious  [of  an  object]  is  preceded  by  [concentration] 
conscious  [of  an  object],  he  describes  first  concentration  [conscious]  of  an  object. 
The  generic-nature  of  [concentration]  conscious  [of  an  object]  is  to  be  learned 
from  its  association  with  the  forms  of  deliberation  and  of  reflection  and  of 


41] 


Concentration  conscious  of  an  object  [ — i.  is 

joy  and  of  the  sense-of-personality  as  they  are  in  themselves.  He  explains 
deliberation  by  the  words  <Kthe  mind-stuff’s. » The  direct-experience  (dbhoga)  [of 
an  object]  is  an  insight  {prajnd)  with  a direct-perception  {saksdtkara)  of  the  thing 
itself.  And  this  is  coarse  because  the  object  is  coarse.  For  just  as  an  archer, 
when  he  is  a beginner,  pierces  first  only  a coarse,  and  afterwards  a subtile 
target,  so  the  yogin,  when  a beginnei-,  has  direct  experience  merely  of  some 
coarse  object  of  contemplation  made  of  the  five  [material]  elements,  [for 
example]  four-armed  [Vishnu],  and  afterwards  a subtile  [object].  Likewise  the 
subtile  direct-experience,  when  directed  to  its  supporting  [object],  is  a reflection 
upon  an  object  which  is  either  the  unresoluble-primary-matter  (alinga)  or  the 
resoluble-matter  {lihga)  or  the  five  tanmdtra  which  are  the  subtile  elements, 
the  causes  of  the  coarse  [elements]. — Having  thus  described  the  object  to  be 
known,  he  describes  the  object  which  is  the  process-of-knowing  with  the  word 
«joy,;^  Happiness  is  the  mind-stuff’s  direct-experience  when  directed  towards 
a sense-organ  as  a coarse  ^ supporting  object.  Sense-organs,  as  every  one  knows, 
arise  from  the  personality-substance  (ahanikdra),  in  so  far  as  they  have  a dispo- 
sition to  illumine  because  of  the  predominance  of  the  sattva  [quality].  And 
because  the  sattva  [gives]  pleasure,  these  sense-organs  also  [give]  pleasure. 
Thus  direct-experience  when  directed  to  them  is  happiness. — With  the  words 
«a  feeling  which  pertains  to  one  self  he  tells  of  the  concentration  which  has 
the  knower  as  its  object  (graliltrvisaya).  Organs-of-sense  are  produced  out  of  the 
sense-of-personality.  Consequently  the  sense-of-personality  is  their  subtile  form. 
Moreover  this  [sense-of-personality]  together  with  the  [Self  as]  known  becomes 
the  idea  (buddhi),  that  is,  the  feeling  which  pertains  to  one  self.  And  because 
the  knower  becomes  included  in  this  [feeling],  one  may  say  that  there  is  a 
[concentration]  conscious  of  the  knower  as  its  object. — He  gives  another  subor- 
dinate difference  between  [these]  four  in  the  words  <5Cof  these  [four]  the  first. » 
The  effect  adjusts  itself  to  the  cause,  not  the  cause  to  the  effect.  Hence  this 
coarse  direct-experience  becomes  associated  [by  inherence]  with  coarse  [objects] 
and  with  subtile  [objects],  with  sense-organs  and  with  the  feeling-of-personality, 
which  are  four  kinds  of  causes.  Furthermore,  the  other  [first  three  direct- 
experiences,  inasmuch]  as  they  have  three  or  two  or  one  cause,  assume  a triple 
or  double  or  single  form.  The  words  «A11  theseS>  distinguish  [concentration 
conscious  of  an  object]  from  [concentration]  not  conscious  [of  an  object]. 


Now  by  what  means  is  that  concentration  produced  which  is  not 
conscious  of  any  object or  what  is  its  nature  ? 

18.  The  other  [concentration  which  is  not  conscious  of 
objects]  consists  of  subliminal  - impressions  only  [after 

^ The  word  sthula  is  used  here  in  the  sense  of  product  as  contrasted  with  siiksma  in  the 
sense  of  cause  : cp.  iii.  44. 

6 [h.o.s.  it] 


i.  18 — ] Booh  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi  [42 

objects  have  merged],  and  follows  upon  that  practice  which 
effects  the  cessation  [of  fluctuations]. 

The  concentration  which  is  not  conscious  [of  objects]  is  that 
restriction  of  the  mind-stuff  in  which  only  subliminal-impressions 
are  left  and  in  which  all  fluctuations  have  come  to  rest.  The 
higher  passionlessness  is  a means  for  effecting  this.  For  practice 
when  directed  towards  any  supporting-object  is  not  capable  of 
serving  as  an  instrument  to  this  [concentration  not  conscious  of  an 
object].  So  the  supporting-object  [for  this  concentration]  is  [the 
Fain-cloud  of  knowable  things]  ^ which  effects  this  cessation  [of 
fluctuations]  and  has  no  [perceptible]  object.  For  (ca)  [in  this 
concentration]  there  is  no  object-intended.  Mind-stuff,  when 
engaged  in  the  practice  of  this  [imperceptible  object],  seems  as  if 
it  were  itself  non-existent  and  without  any  supporting-object. 
Thus  [arises]  that  concentration  [called]  seedless,  [without  sensa- 
tional stimulus],  which  is  not  conscious  of  objects. 

To  introduce  [the  topic  of]  [concentration]  not  conscious  [of  objects]  which  comes 
next  in  order,  he  asks  «Now?»  18.  The  other  [concentration  which  is  not 
conscious  of  objects]  consists  of  subliminal-impressions  only  [after  objects 
have  merged],  and  follows  upon  that  practice  which  effects  the  cessation 
[of  fluctuations].  The  fii-st  ^ clause  [<follows  upon)  to  <fluctuations>]  relates 
to  the  means ; and  the  last  two  ^ words  [from  <the  other)  to  <merged)]  relate 
to  the  thing  itself.  The  middle  words  [from  <consists)  to  <only)]  are  dis- 
cussed in  the  words  «all  fluctuations.^  He  discusses  the  first  ^clause  in  the 
phrase  «The  higher  ....  this.))  The  cessation  is  the  non-existence  of  fluctua- 
tions. That  which  effects  this  [passionlessness]  is  the  cause  [of  it].  The 
practice  of  it  is  the  repeated  pursuit  of  this  [cause].  [The  concentration]  is 
that  which  follows  upon  this  same  pursuit.  If  it  should  be  asked  why  lower 
passionlessness  is  not  the  cause  of  restriction,  the  reply  is  in  the  words  4Cwhen 
directed  towards  any  supporting-object.))  A cause  ought  to  be  homogeneous 
with  its  effect,  not  heterogeneous.  And,  because  it  is  directed  towards  a sup- 
porting-object, lower  passionlessness  is  heterogeneous  from  its  effect,  which  is 
concentration  [not  conscious  of  objects],  [and]  not  directed  towards  a support- 
ing-object. This  is  the  ground  for  the  statement  that  it  [restriction]  arises 
from  the  undisturbed  calm  of  perception  which  is  not  directed  towards  a sup- 
porting-object. For  when  all  the  defilements  of  rajas  and  tamas  have  fallen 
away  from  the  sattva,  it  is  the  concentration  of  the  Eain-cloud  of  [knowable] 

’ Literally,  [the  Rain-cloud]  is-made  the-  ^ The  words  first  and  two  apply  to  the 
supporting-object.  original,  not  to  the  translation. 


43]  Concentration  not  conscious  of  an  object  [ — i.  19 

things  which  is  produced  ; its  activity  continues  quite  transcendent  to  any 
object  ; it  has  no  end  ; it  beholds  the  taints  in  objects ; and  because  it  alto- 
gether rejects  all  objects,  it  remains  grounded  in  itself  and  so  is  not  directed 
to  any  supporting-object ; [and  thus]  it  may  consistently  be  the  cause  of  the 
concentration  wherein  subliminal-impressions  only  are  left  and  which  is  not 
directed  to  any  supporting-object  because  of  the  homogeneity  [between  the 
restriction  and  the  concentration  not  conscious  of  objects]  : this  is  his  meaning. 
Coming  to  be  directed  to  a supporting-object  (alambana)  is  coming  into  depen- 
dence upon  [an  object]  {dgrayana).  It  <5Cseems  as  if  it  were  itself  non-existent» 
because  it  does  not  perform  its  functions  as  a fluctuation.  It  is  <Kseedless,» 
that  is,  not  directed  to  any  supporting-object.  Another  interpretation  might 
be  [that  «seedless»]  is  that  from  which  the  seed,  namely,  the  latent-deposit  of 
the  karma  from  the  hindrances,  has  passed  away. 


This  same  concentration  is,  as  every  one  knows,  of  two  kinds.  It 
is  produced  either  by  [spiritual]  means  [i.  20]  or  by  worldly 
[means].  Of  these  two,  that  produced  by  [spiritual]  means  is  the 
one  to  which  yogins  [who  are  on  the  way  to  Isolation]  attain. 
19.  [Concentration  not  conscious  of  objects]  caused  by 
worldly  [means]  is  the  one  to  which  the  discarnate  attain 
and  to  which  those  [whose  bodies]  are  resolved  into  primary- 
matter  attain.  The  discarnate,  that  is,  the  gods,  attain  to  the 
[concentration  not  conscious  of  objects  which  is]  caused  by  worldly 
[means].  For  in  so  far  as  their  mind-stuff  uses  only  their  own 
subliminal-impressions  they  experience  a ^'Mast-state  of  Isolation, 
and  [then]  pass  beyond  [the  period  during  which]  the  fruit  corre- 
sponding to  their  own  subliminal-impressions  ripens  [for  their 
enjoyment].  [But  at  the  end  of  this  period  they  must  return  to 
the  world.]  Likewise  those  whose  bodies  are  resolved  into 
primary-matter  experience  a g'ltast-state  of  Isolation,  during  which 
the  mind  {cetas),  with  its  task  still  undone,  is  resolved  into 
primary-matter.  But  this  lasts  only  till  the  mind-stuff,  under  the 
pressure  of  its  [unfulfilled]  task,  returns  [to  the  world]. 

In  order  to  show  what  is  to  be  accepted  and  what  rejected  he  points  out  with 
the  words  ^This  same  ...  as  every  one  knows^  a subsidiary  distinction  [to  be 
found]  in  the  concentration  of  restriction.  The  word  <Sthis»  means  the  con- 
centration of  restriction ; it  is  <Sof  two  kinds.  It  is  produced  either  by 
[spiritual]  means  [i.  20]  or  by  worldly  [means]. » He  i-efers  to  that  concentra- 


i.  19 — 


Book  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[44 


tion  of  restriction  produced  [or]  caused  by  faith  and  other  [means]  as  will  be 
described  [i.  20].  The  world  ' {bhava)  is  undifferentiated-consciousness  [avidya). 
It  is  called  the  world  because  living  beings  are  born  [or]  grow  (bhavanti)  in  it. 
Those  whose  wishes  have  been  fulfilled  (taustilca),  who  have  attained  to  passion- 
lessness, find  the  self  (atman)  in  the  not-self,  either  in  the  elements  or  the  sense- 
organs,  which  are  evolved -effects  {vilcdra),  or  in  evolving-causes  {pralcrti),  which 
are  undeveloped  [primary-matter],  or  in  the  personality-substance  or  in  the  five 
fine-substances  (tanmatra). — The  [concentration]  produced  by  worldly  [means] 
is  that  concentration  of  restriction  produced  [or]  caused  by  the  world.  Of  these 
two  [concentrations]  that  produced  by  [spiritual]  means  is  for  yogins  who  are  on 
the  way  to  liberation.  By  specially  mentioning  [the  fact  that  spiritual  means 
are  for  yogins],  he  denies  that  the  other  [means]  have  any  relation  with 
persons  who  are  merely  desirous  of  liberation  [that  is,  who  are  not  yogins]. 
To  whom  then  do  the  worldly  [means]  appertain?  He  replies  to  this 
with  the  sutra.  19.  [Concentration  not  conscious  of  objects]  caused  by 
worldly  [means]  is  the  one  to  which  the  discarnate  attain  and  to  which 
those  [whose  bodies]  are  resolved  into  primary-matter  attain.  In  other 
words  [this  concentration]  is  attained  by  both  the  discarnate  and  by  those 
[whose  bodies]  are  resolved  into  primary-matter.  This  he  discusses  in  the 
words  «The  discarnate,  that  is,  the  gods.»  By  serving  one  or  the  other 
of  the  organs  or  elements  they  have  become  identified  with  them.  And 
inner-organs  are  permeated  by  subconscious-impressions  from  these  [organs 
or  elements].  After  the  body  falls  to  pieces  they  are  resolved  into  organs 
or  into  the  elements.  Their  central-organs  {manas)  contain  nothing  left  but 
subliminal-impressions.  And  they  are  stripped  of  the  outer  six-sheathed 
body.^  [Thus  they  may  be  termed]  discarnate.  For  in  so  far  as  their 
mind-stufif  uses  only  their  own  subliminal-impressions,  they  experience  a 
gwasi-state  of  Isolation.  Being  discarnate  they  attain  [to  this].  And  the 
similarity  [of  this  state]  with  Isolation  is  in  the  absence  of  fluctuations.  Its 
dissimilarity  is  in  the  presence  of  subliminal-impressions  with  their  task  [un- 
fulfilled]. In  some  [manuscripts]  there  is  the  reading  ‘by  the  enjoyment 
of  nothing  but  subliminal-impressions  ’.  The  meaning  of  this  would  be  ‘ that  of 
which  the  enjoyment  is  nothing  but  subliminal-impressions  ’.  The  meaning 
is  that  there  ai’e  no  fluctuations  of  mind-stuff.  When  they  have  reached  their 


* Vijfiana  Bhiksu  objects  to  this  interpre- 
tation and  interprets  the  compound 
(bhava-jxratyaya)  as  that  which  has 
birth  (janma)  as  its  cause.  But  he 
seems  to  assume  that  the  discussion  is 
in  respect  of  the  classification  of  two 
kinds  of  unconscious  concentration. 
Whereas  it  would  appear  that  the 
classification  is  of  the  two  kinds  of 
restriction  of  fluctuations.  That  re- 


striction which  is  temporary  and  which 
leads  again  to  fluctuations  is  called 
hkava-pratyaya ; that  which  follows 
upon  belief  (p-addhu)  as  the  result 
of  higher  passionlessness  is  upaya- 
pratyaya.  This  latter  is  fit  for  persons 
aiming  at  liberation.  The  former  is  a 
pseudo-yoga  and  is  to  he  rejected. 

^ See  Moksa-dharma,  MBh.  xii.  305.  5 f.  = 
11332-^3. 


45] 


Concentration  not  conscious  of  an  object  [ — i.  20 

limit,  they  pass  beyond  or  go  beyond  [the  period  during  which]  the  fruit 
corresponding  to  the  subliminal-impressions  ripens.  Yet  once  again  they  enter 
the  round-of-rebirth.  And  so  it  has  been  declared  in  the  Vayu[-purana],  “Ten 
periods  of  Manu  the  devotees  of  sense-organs  remain  here  below  ; a full  hundred, 
the  worshippers  of  elements.”*  Similarly  those  [w’hose  bodies]  have  been  resolved 
into  primary-matter, — in  so  far  as  they  have  become  identified  with  one  or  the 
other  of  the  five  fine-substances  or  the  personality-substance  or  the  Great 
[thinking-substance]  or  the  undeveloped  [primary-matter]  by  serving  [one  or 
the  other]  of  these, — have  their  inner-organs  permeated  by  subliminal- 
impressions  from  one  or  the  other  of  these.  After  the  body  falls  to  pieces  they 
are  resolved  into  one  or  the  other  [of  these]  from  the  undeveloped  [primary- 
matter]  downwards.  The  words  «with  its  task  still  undone»  mean  that  its 
purpose  is  unfulfilled.  For  that  mind  would  have  its  purpose  fulfilled,  if  it  could 
also  generate  the  discernment  of  the  difference.  The  mind,  however,  which 
has  not  generated  the  discernment  of  the  difference  has  not  fulfilled  its  purpose 
and  its  task  is  still  undone.  Thus,  as  he  says,  they  experience  a ^wasi-state 
of  Isolation,  during  which  the  mind  {cetas),  with  its  task  still  undone,  is  resolved 
into  primary-matter.  ^But  this  lasts  only  till  the  mind-stuff,  under  the  pressure 
of  its  [unfulfilled]  task,  returns  [to  the  world]. ^ Even  after  it  has  been  reduced 
to  a state  of  uniformity  with  primary-matter,  it  reaches  the  limit  [of  its  time] 
and  yet  once  again  appears,  that  is,  it  becomes  discriminated  from  this  [primary- 
matter].  Precisely  so  after  the  rains  are  passed,  a frog’s  “ body,  after  having 
been  reduced  to  an  earthy  state,  when  sprinkled  with  water  from  the  cloud, 
experiences  yet  once  again  the  state  of  being  a frog’s  body.  And  in  this  same 
sense  it  has  been  said  in  the  Vayu[-purana],  “But  those  who-identify-them- 
selves-with-illusions-of-personality  {ahliimanika),  remain  a thousand  [periods  of 
Manu]  ; those  who  identify  themselves  with  the  thinking-substance,  ten 
thousand,  and  from  them  fevers  [of  desire]  have  passed  away ; those  who 
meditate  upon  undeveloped  [primary-matter],  remain  for  a full  hundred  thousand ; 
but  after  attaining  to  the  Self,  who  is  out  of  relation  with  qualities,  there  is  no 
tale  of  time.”*  Thus  inasmuch  as  this  [state  which  is  resolved  into  primary- 
matter]  leads  to  a recurrence  of  births,  its  worthlessness  {heyatva)  has  been 
established. 


20.  [Concentration  not  conscious  of  objects,]  which  follows 


upon  belief  [and]  energy  [and] 
tration  [and]  insight,®  is  that 
yogins]  attain. 

* Not  yet  traced  in  either  edition. 

^ In  the  corresponding  passages  i.  27, 
p.  ii.  17,  p.  140*^  (Calc,  ed.),  we 
find  ‘ plant  ’ for  ‘ frog  ’. 

* These  five,  saddha,  viriya,  sati,  samadhi. 


mindfulness  [and]  concen- 
to  which  the  others  [the 

panna,  Buddha  says  that  he  too,  as  well 
as  Alara Kalama,  inculcates:  Majjhima 
Nikaya,  i.  p.  164.  Cf.  ‘The  Balance 
of  Powers,’  Visuddhi  Magga,  hook  4, 
p.  Ill  of  1st  Rangoon  ed. 


i.  20— ] Booh  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi  [46 

[That  concentration  not  conscious  of  objects,  which  is]  caused  by 
[spiritual]  means  is  that  to  which  yogins  attain.  Belief  is  the 
mental  approval  [of  concentration] ; for,  like  a good  mother,^  it 
protects  the  yogin.  For  him  [thus]  believing  and  setting  dis- 
crimination [before  him]  as  his  goal  there  is  the  further  [upa) 
attainment  of  energy.  For  him  who  has  reached  the  further 
attainment  of  energy  mindfulness  is  at  hand.  And  when  mindful- 
ness is  at  hand  the  mind-stuff  is  self-possessed  and  becomes  concen- 
trated. When  his  mind-stuff  has  become  concentrated  he  gains  as 
his  portion  the  discrimination  of  insight,  by  which  he  perceives 
things  as  they  really  are.  Through  the  practice  of  these  means 
and  through  passionlessness  directed  to  this  end  there  [finally] 
arises  that  concentration  which  is  not  conscious  [of  any  object]. 

But  for  yogins  he  describes  a series  of  means  for  the  attainment  of  concentration, 
20.  [Concentration  not  conscious  of  objects,]  which  follows  upon  belief 
[and]  energy  [and]  mindfulness  [and]  concentration  [and]  insight,  is  that 
to  which  the  others  [the  yogins]  attain.  It  might  be  objected  that  those  who 
reflect  upon  sense-organs  might  also  be  just  the  persons  to  have  belief.  To  this 
he  replies  in  the  words  ^Belief  is  the  mental  approval  [of  concentration].)^ 
This  [approval],  moreover,  has  as  its  object  a reality  which  is  quite  accessible 
by  verbal-communication  or  by  inference  or  by  the  instruction  of  teachers. 
For  it  is  this  mental  approval,  [which  is  itself]  an  extreme  delight  [and]  a great 
volition,  [that  is  called]  belief.  Those  who  are  under  the  illusion  that  the  self 
is  in  such  things  as  sense-organs,  have  not  an  extreme  delight.  Because  it  is 
a disapproval  [of  concentration  which  they  feel]  ; the  reason  [for  this  disapproval 
is  that]  it  has  its  origin  in  downright  infatuation.  This  is  the  meaning. — 
Why  does  he  speak  of  just  this  [particular]  belief  [in  concentration  not 
conscious  of  objects]  ? He  replies,  «for,  like  a good  mother,  it  protects  the 
yogin)?>  from  calamities  which  follow  upon  a deviation  from  the  way.  This  is 
a particular  kind  of  volition  and  it  generates  an  exertion  directed  towards  the 
object  desired.  So  he  says  <KFor  him  [thus]  believing.)^  The  exposition  for 
the  words  «for  him)^  is  in  the  words  ^setting  discrimination  [before  him]  as 
his  goal.)^  [For  such  a man]  <Kthere  is  the  further  [upa)  attainment  of  energy.)^ 
^Mindfulness)^,  is  contemplation  [dhyana).  <5CSelf-possessed)^  is  undistracted. 
«Becomes  concentrated»  means  having  [yuMa)  the  concentration  of  the  [eight] 
aids  to  yoga.  And  by  mentioning  the  concentration  which  is  inseparably 
connected  with  the  abstentions  [yama)  [ii.  30]  and  with  the  observances  [niyama) 
[ii,  32],  the  abstentions  and  the  observances  and  the  other  [six  aids]  are 
hinted  at. 

^ Compare  Metta  Sutta  in  Sutta  Nipata,  i.  8’,  p.  26,  Fausboll’s  ed. 


Methods  and  intensities 


47] 


[ — i.  21 


In  this  same  way  [concentration]  conscious  [of  objects]  arises  for  one  who  is 
endowed  mth  all  the  aids  to  yoga.  Therefore  he  says  ^when  his  mind-stuff 
has  become  concentrated.»  Discrimination  of  insight,  the  exceptional  quality 
(praTiarsa)  [of  mind-stuff],  is  attained.  In  the  words  ^through  pi-actice  of  these 
means»  he  states  that  concentration  not  conscious  [of  an  object]  follows  after 
conscious  [concentration].  After  reaching  the  stages  in  this  same  concentration, 
one  after  another,  and  as  a result  of  passionlessness  for  the  various  objects,  con- 
centration not  conscious  [of  an  object]  arises.  Now  this  is  the  occasion  for 
Isolation.  For  the  insight  into  the  difference  between  the  sattva  and  the  Self 
is  followed  by  restriction  which  causes  the  mind-stuff  to  cease  from  working  at 
its  task,  since  now,  inasmuch  as  all  its  duties  are  done,  its  purpose  is  fulfilled. 


Now  these  yogins  are  of  nine  kinds,  as  being  respectively  followers 
of  the  gentle  and  the  moderate  and  the  vehement  method  ; that  is 
to  say,  the  follower  of  the  gentle  method,  the  follower  of  the 
moderate  method,  and  the  follower  of  the  vehement  method. 
Among  these,  the  follower  of  the  gentle  method  is  also  of  three 
kinds  : with  gentle  intensity,  with  moderate  intensity,  and  with 
keen  intensity.  Likewise  the  follower  of  the  moderate  method  [is 
found  with  the  three  intensities].  Likewise  the  follower  of  the 
vehement  method  [is  found  with  the  three  intensities].  N ow,  among 
those  who  follow  the  vehement  method, 

21.  For  the  keenly  intense,  [concentration]  is  near. 

[For  them]  there  is  gaining  of  concentration  and  the  result  of 
concentration. 

Some  one  raises  the  objection  that  if  belief  and  the  other  qualities  are  means 
for  [attaining]  yoga,  then  all  [the  yogins]  without  distinction  would  possess 
concentration  and  its  results.  Whereas  it  is  observed  that  in  some  cases  there 
is  perfection  [siddhi) ; in  other  cases  the  absence  of  perfection ; in  some  cases 
perfection  after  a delay ; in  other  cases  perfection  after  still  more  delay ; [and] 
in  other  cases  quickly.  In  reply  to  this  objection  he  says  ^Now  these  yogins 
are  of  nine  kinds.»  Those  are  called  [followers  of  gentle  or  moderate  or 
vehement  methods],  in  whose  case,  through  the  force  of  subliminal-impressions 
and  the  invisible-influences  {adrsta)  of  previous  births,  the  methods,  that  is, 
belief  and  the  other  [means],  become  gentle  or  moderate  or  vehement. 
<Slntensity»  is  passionlessness.  And  its  gentle  or  moderate  or  vehement 
character  is  due  to  the  force  of  previous  subconscious-impressions  and  invisible- 
influences.  Among  these  [yogins,]  he  describes  those  who  are  of  such  a kind 


Book  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[48 


i.  21 — ] 

that  perfection  is  [for  them]  very  quick,  in  the  sutra  21.  For  the  keenly 
intense,  [concentration]  is  near.  This  is  the  statement  of  the  sutra  ; the 
comment  completes  the  phrase.  The  result  of  concentration  conscious  [of  an 
object]  is  [concentration]  not  conscious  [of  an  object]  ; and  [the  result]  of  this 
is  Isolation. 


22.  Because  [this  keenness]  is  gentle  or  moderate  or  keen, 
there  is  a [concentration]  superior  (vif^esa)  even  to  this 
[near  kind]. 

In  that  there  is  a gently  keen  and  a moderately  keen  and  a 
vehemently  keen,  there  is  a superior  even  to  this  [concentration]. 
Because  there  is  a superior  to  this  [near  kind],  the  attainment 
of  concentration  and  the  result  of  concentration  is  near  to  him 
who  follows  the  vehement  method  and  is  of  mildly  keen  intensity ; 
still  more  near  to  him  who  is  of  moderately  keen  intensity ; and 
most  near  to  him  who  is  of  vehemently  keen  intensity. 

22.  Because  [this  keenness]  is  gentle  or  moderate  or  keen,  there  is  a 
[concentration]  superior  {vigesa)  even  to  this  [near  kind].  This  is  explained 
by  the  Comment  which  is  explained  if  you  simply  read  it  aloud. 


Is  [the  attainment]  of  concentration  most  near  as  a result  of 
this  last  [method]  only,  or  is  there  some  other  method  also  for 
its  attainment,  or  not  ? 

23.  Or^  [concentration]  is  attained  by  devotion  to  the 
Igvara. 

By  devotion,-  by  a special  kind  of  adoration,  the  l9vara  inclines 
[to  him]  and  favours  him  merely  because  of  [this  yogin’s]  profound- 
desire.  Also  as  a result  of  the  profound-desire  for  Him,  the  yogin 
becomes  most  near  to  the  attainment  of  concentration  and  to 
[Isolation]  the  result  [of  concentration]. 

In  order  to  bring  forward  another  sutra  he  puts  forth  a topic  for  consideration 
in  the  words  <Kls  ....  as  a result  of  this  last  [method]  only.»  The  phrase 
«or  not»  is  the  remover  of  a doubt.  23.  Or  [concentration]  is  attained  by 

* As  distinguishing  from  the  conscious  ^ Compare  ii.  1,  and  see  Bhag.  Gita  xi.  55, 
concentration  of  i.  17,  and  from  the  and  also  SBE.  xlviii,  p.  284. 

not  conscious  or  ‘ other  ’ of  i.  18. 


49] 


[ — i.  24 


Nature  of  the  Igvara 

devotion  to  the  Igvara.  He  discusses  the  words  «By  devotion.»  By  devotion 
[that  is]  by  a special  kind  of  adoration  either  mental  or  verbal  or  bodily. 
«He  inclines)^,  that  is,  He  is  brought  near  [to  him]  and  favours  him.  «Pro- 
found-desired  is  a wish  for  some  thing  yet  to  come,  to  the  effect  that  this  thing 
coveted  by  him  may  be  his.  By  this  means  only  and  not  by  any  other 
functional-activity.  The  rest  is  easy. 


But  it  is  now  asked  who  is  this  [being]  that  we  have  called  the 
Icvara,  as  distinct  from  the  primary-substance  and  the  Self? 

24.  Untouched  by  hindrances  or  karmas  or  fruition  or  by 
latent-deposits  the  l9vara  is  a special  kind  of  Self. 

The  <hindrances>  are  undifferentiated-consciousness  and  the  rest 
[ii.  3].  The  <karmas>  are  good  [kufala)  or  evil.  The  <fruition>  is 
the  consequences  which  these  [evolve].  The  <latent-deposits> 
(dfaya)  are  subconscious-impressions  {vdsand)  corresponding  to 
these  [fruitions].  These  [hindrances  and  karmas  and  fruitions 
and  latent-deposits],  although  they  are  found  in  the  central-organ 
{manas),  are  attributed  to  the  Self.  For  it  is  he  that  is  said  to  be 
the  experiencer  of  the  results  of  these  [in  the  central- organ].  Just 
as  the  victory  or  defeat  which  depends  upon  the  combatants  is 
attributed  to  [their]  lord  (svdmin).  For,  the  l9vara  is  a special 
kind  of  Self  who  is  untouched  by  this  [kind  of]  experience. 

Then  there  are  those  who  have  obtained  Isolation  ; and  those 
who  are  in  Isolation  {kevalin)  are  many.^  Now  these  by  severing 
the  three  instruments  of  bondage  ^ have  obtained  Isolation ; and 
the  l9vara’s  relation  to  this  [Isolation]  belongs  neither  to  the  past 
nor  to  the  future,  [but  is  eternal].  Thus  it  is  not  with  Him  as 
with  the  [ordinary]  liberated  [Self]  that  there  has  been  expressly 
made  known  a terminus  a quo  of  bondage  {purvd  bandhakoti). 
Nor  is  it  with  Him,  as  it  is  with  one  [whose  body]  is  resolved  into 
primary-matter,  that  there  is  a terminus  ad  quern,  when  bondage 


* According  to  Samkhya-sutra  i.  91-92  the 
l9vara  should  be  classed  as  one  of 
these. 

“ The  three  bandhana  would  be  l.prakrti, 
2.  vikdra,  3.  daksind.  Compare  Sam. 
7 [h.o.s.  17] 


Tat.  Kaum.  xliv.  The  three  vipdka  are 
jdti,  dyiis,  and  bhoga  (ii.  13).  These 
three  are  also  the  upasarga  (Vacas- 
pati-micra,  i.  29,  Calcutta  edition, 
p.  66iq.' 


i.  24 — ] Booh  I.  Concent7'ation  07'  Samadhi  [50 

might  recur.  But  He  is  at  all  times  whatsoever  liberated  and  at 
all  times  whatsoever  the  I^vara. 

But  it  might  be  asked,  ‘ That  universally  admitted  eternal 
superiority  (utkarsa)  of  the  I^vara  which  results  from  his  assuming 
a sattva  of  perfect  [pi'ahrsta)  quality — has  that  any  proof  [to 
authorize  it],  or  is  it  without  proof?  ’ [The  reply  is,  His]  sacred- 
books  {pdsti'o)  are  its  proof.  [But  then]  again  [it  may  be  asked], 
what  proof  have  the  sacred-books  ? [The  reply  is]  they  have  their 
proof  in  the  perfect  quality  of  [His]  sattva.  Inasmuch  as  both  [the 
sacred-books  and  the  superiority]  reside  in  the  l9vara’s  sattva, 
there  is  a never-beginning  relation  between  the  two.  From  these 
[sacred-books,  therefore]  this  proves  to  be  true  that  He  is  at  all 
times  whatsoever  liberated  and  at  all  times  whatsoever  the  l9vara. 
Now  this  His  pre-eminence  {ai^varya)  is  altogether  without  any- 
thing equal  to  it  or  excelling  it.  For,  to  begin  with,  it  cannot  be 
excelled  by  any  other  pre-eminence,  because  whatever  might  [seem] 
to  excel  it  would  itself  prove  to  be  that  very  [pre-eminence  we  are 
in  quest  of].  Therefore  that  is  the  l9vara  wherein  we  reach  this 
uttermost  limit  of  pre-eminence.  Nor  again  is  there  any  pre-emi- 
nence equal  to  His.  [Why  not  ?]  Because  when  one  thing  is 
simultaneously  desired  by  two  equals,  the  one  saying  ‘ let  this  be 
new  ’ and  the  other  saying  ‘ let  this  be  old  ’,  if  the  one  wins  his 
way,  the  other  fails  in  his  wish  and  so  becomes  inferior.  And  two 
equals  cannot  obtain  the  same  desired  thing  simultaneously,  since 
that  would  be  a contradiction  of  terms.  Therefore  [we  maintain 
that,]  in  whomsoever  there  is  a pre-eminence  that  is  neither  equalled 
nor  excelled,  he  is  the  l9vara,  and  He  is,  as  we  said,  a special  kind 
of  Self. 

He  anticipates  the  objection  that  ‘ the  universe  (mfva)  is  pervaded  by  animate 
and  inanimate  [beings]  only  and  by  nothing  else.  Consequently  if  the  I^vara  be 
inanimate,  then  He  is  primary-substance  {pradhana),  since  what  is  evolved  from 
primary-substance  also  falls  within  primary-substance.  And  by  this  hypothesis 
he  could  not  be  made  inclined  since  he  is  inanimate.  Or  on  the  other  hand, 
if  he  be  animate,  still, — since  the  Energy  of  Intellect  is  indifferent  {audaslnya) 
and  since  in  so  far  as  it  is  not  in  the  round-of-rebirths  it  has  no  feeling-of- 
personality  or  other  [hindrance], — how  can  the  Energy  of  Intellect  be  inclined, 
[or]  how  can  profound-desire  [have  anything  to  do  with  Energy  of  Intellect]  ? ’ 


51] 


The  Igvara  and  the  other  Selves  [ — i.  24 

In  alluding  to  this  he  says  «But  now  ....  primary-substance.»  He  gives  the 
reply  to  this  objection  in  the  following  sutra.  24.  Untouched,  by  hindrances 
or  karmas  or  fruition  or  by  latent-deposits  the  Igvara  is  a special  kind  of 
Self.  «The  <hindrances>  are  undilferentiated-consciousness  and  the  rest^,  for  it 
is  these  that,  by  the  stroke  of  various  kinds  of  misery,  hinder  a man  within  the 
round-of-rebirth.  «Good  (kiigala)  or  evil)5>  are  merit  and  demerit ; and  by  a 
figurative  expression  they  are  called  karma,  because  they  proceed  from  karma. 
«Fruition^  is  birth  and  length-of-life  and  the  [kind  ofj  experience  [ii.  13]. 
«Corresponding  to  these :»  the  subconscious-impressions  corresponding  to  the 
fruitions.  These  subconscious-impressions  are  called  latent-deposits  because 
they  lie  in  the  ground  of  the  mind-stuff.  For,  until  [that  particular]  karma, 
[that  is,  some  demerit],  which  precipitates  {nirvartakaY  the  birth  [of  an  individual] 
as  a young  elephant,  makes  manifest  an  impression  [bhavana]  [latent  in  his 
mind-stuff]  which  is  characterized  by  a previously  (prag)  [existing]  and  potential 
kind  of  experience  [proper  to]  a young  elephant, — for  so  long  [that  karma]  is  not 
capable  of  [producing]  the  experience  proper  to  a young  elephant.  Therefore  it 
proves  to  be  true  that  the  impression  which  produces  the  experience  (anubliava) 
of  being  born  as  a young  elephant  corresponds  to  the  fruition  as  a young  elephant. 
It  might  be  said : ‘ Such  things  as  hindrances,  inasmuch  as  they  are  properties 
of  the  thinking-substance,  can  by  no  means  whatsoever  touch  the  Self.  Accord- 
ingly merely  by  mentioning  the  word  <Self>  the  absence  of  any  trace  of  these 
[hindrances]  is  established.  Consequently  what  need  is  there  of  the  words 
<hindrances  or  karmas>  and  the  rest?’  In  reply  to  this  he  says  «These.» 
These  [hindrances  and  karmas  and  fruitions  and  latent-impressions]  although 
they  reside  in  the  central-organ  (manas)  are  attributed  to  the  Self  who  is  in  the 
round-of-rebirths.  Why?  ^For  it  is  he  that  is  said  to  be  the  experiencer  of 
the  results  of  these  [in  the  central-organ].»  That  is  to  say,  he  is  the  thinker 
{cetayitr).  Consequently  the  l9vara,  because  he  is  a Self,  comes  into  relation 
with  these.  For  this  reason,  [because  these  are  only  attributed  to  the  Self],  it  is 
consistent  to  make  a denial  of  this  [relation].  This  he  does  in  the  word  ^who.» 
For  the  l9vara  is  a special  kind  of  Self  who  is  untouched  by  this  [kind]  of 
experience,  namely,  that  also  found  in  the  thinking-substance  and  common  to 
the  Selves  in  general. — It  is  <a  special  kind>  in  that  it  is  specialized  [and] 
discriminated  from  [all]  other  Selves.  Desirous  of  pointing  out  what  is  not 
to  be  included  in  the  words  <a  special  kind)  he  first  raises  a counter-objection 
{paricodana)  and  then  rebuts  it  in  the  words  «Now  these  . . . have  obtained 
Isolation.^  1.  There  is  the  bondage  to  primary-matter  in  the  case  of  those 
[whose  bodies]  are  resolved  into  primary-matter.  2.  There  is  [the  bondage] 
to  evolved-matter  in  the  case  of  the  discarnate.  3.  There  is  the  bondage  to 

’ This  word  is  glossed  in  the  Rahasyam  mean  an  elephant  which  eats  grass  and 

by  the  word  janaka.  And  the  word  twigs  {katakasthap  hastfti). 

‘young  elephant’  karahha  is  said  to 


i.  24 — ] 


Book  1.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[52 


sacrificial  gifts  in  the  case  of  those  who  partake  in  the  experience  of  objects 
supernal  or  not  supernal.  These  are  those  three  well-known  ^instruments  of 
bondage.^  For,  those  whose  central-organs  are  [subliminally]  refined  {samslcrta) 
by  impressions  from  primary-matter,  attain  to  resolution  into  primary-matter 
only  after  the  body  has  broken  up.  For  the  others  [the  liberated  Selves]  the 
terminus  a quo  is  expressly  made  known  ; accordingly  the  terminus  ad  quern 
alone  is  mentioned  [as  applying  to  those  whose  bodies  are  resolved  into  primary- 
matter,  although  the  terminus  a quo  also  applies  to  them].  But  in  this  case 
[of  the  l5vara]  both  the  terminus  a quo  and  the  later  terminus  are  denied. 
Having  stated  the  case  in  brief  he  now  gives  the  details  in  the  words  ^But  He 
is  at  all  times  whatsoever  liberated  and  He  is  at  all  times  whatsoever  the 
l9vara.^  He  possesses  pre-eminence  in  richness  of  knowledge  and  of  action 
and  of  power.  With  reference  to  this  he  asks  «That  universally  admitted  . . . 
which.^  Perception  and  action  are  impossible  in  the  case  of  the  Energy  of 
Intellect  which  does  not  enter  into  mutations.  In  case  this  be  admitted  and 
if  it  be  said  that  therefore  a substrate  must  be  supposed  to  be  made  up  of  pure 
sattva  without  rajas  and  tamas,  then  the  l9vara  who  is  at  all  times  whatsoever 
liberated  cannot  be  in  the  relation  of  proprietor  to  his  property  towards  an 
effulgence  (utkarsa)  of  the  sattva  in  a mind-stuff  which  depends  upon  undifferen- 
tiated-consciousness.  In  reply  to  this  he  says  ^from  his  assuming  a sattva 
of  perfect  {prakrsta)  quality.2>  In  the  case  of  the  l9vara  there  does  not  exist 
as  in  the  case  of  the  ordinary  man  a relation,  caused  by  undifferentiated-conscious- 
ness,  of  proprietor  to  his  property,  with  the  sattva  of  the  mind-stuff.  But  [the 
relation  is  that]  expressed  by  the  resolve,  ‘ By  the  teaching  of  knowledge  and 
right-living  [dharma)  I will  lift  up  beings,  encompassed  by  the  three  anguishes, 
from  the  great  sea  of  the  state  after  death  (preti/a).’  And  this  [knowledge  and 
right-living]  cannot  be  taught  unless  there  be  an  abundance  of  excellence  in  the 
adequacy  of  [His]  knowledge ' and  of  [His]  activity.  And  there  cannot  be  this 
[abundance  of  excellence]  unless  a sattva  be  assumed  which  has  been  purified 
from  stains  by  the  removal  of  rajas  and  tamas.  With  this  resolve  the  Exalted 
One  reflects,  and  assumes  a sattva  of  perfect  quality.  Although  He  is  untouched 
by  undifferentiated-consciousness,  it  appears  as  if  He  were  under  the  illusion  of 
identifying  Himself  with  undifferentiated-consciousness  and  as  if  He  were  ignorant 
of  the  real  nature  of  undifferentiated-consciousness.  But  He  does  not  deal  with 
undifferentiated-consciousness  as  if  it  were  undifferentiated-consciousness  as  such. 
The  actor  who  takes  the  role  of  Kama  and  represents  the  different  kinds  of 
behaviour  [belonging  to  the  character]  is  not  of  course  confused  [as  to  his  real 
personal  identity].  For  he  knows  that  this  [role]  is  only  a deliberately  assumed 
form  and  not  his  [form]  in  reality.  An  objector  might  say,  ‘ This  may  be  so. 
It  may  be  true  that  the  Exalted  One  must  assume  sattva  in  order  to  uplift  [the 
world].  On  the  other  hand  His  desire  to  lift  it  up  is  based  on  His  assumption  of 


Coni})are  ^veta9vat.  Up.  vi.  8. 


53] 


The  Igvara  mid  the  worlds  [ — i.  21 

this  [sattvd] ; and  inasmuch  as  this  [desire]  is  also  derived  fi-om  primary-matter 
[the  fallacy  of]  mutual  interdependence  results.’  In  reply  to  this  he  says 
«Etemal.»  This  [objection]  might  be  true,  if  this  were  the  very  first  creation. 
But  the  succession  of  creations  and  contractions  [of  worlds]  is  from  time-without- 
beginning.  And  when  the  period  of  the  desire  for  contraction  has  come  to  a full 
end,  then  the  Exalted  One,  while  in  the  act  of  contemplating  within  Himself, 
‘ I must  assume  a sattva  of  perfect  quality,’  contracts  the  world.  At  that  time 
the  sattva  of  the  Igvara’s  mind-stufi"  becomes  subconsciously-impressed  by  the 
contemplation.  And  although  the  l9vara’s  mind-stuff  be  tending  towards  a 
homogeneity  with  primary-matter,  still, — when  the  period  of  the  great  mundane- 
dissolution  has  come  to  a full  end,  under  the  pressure  of  the  subconscious- 
impression  of  the  contemplation, — it  enters  into  a mutation  of  precisely  the 
same  kind  as  a state  of  sattva.  In  precisely  the  same  way  Chaitra  contemplates 
‘ To-morrow  I must  get  up  just  at  day-break  ’ ; and  then  after  having  slept  gets  up 
at  that  very  time  because  of  the  subliminal-impression  resulting  from  his  con- 
templation. Consequently  since  [the  woidds]  are  from  time-without-beginning, 
and  in  so  far  as  the  Ifvara’s  contemplation  and  His  assumption  of  the  sattva  are 
eternal,  there  is  no  [logical  fallacy]  of  interdependence.  Nor  can  it  be  urged  ^ 
that  the  sattva  of  the  l9vara’s  mind-stuff  does  not  pass  out  [of  the  phenomenal 
state]  into  homogeneity  with  pi’imary-matter.  Eor  that  which  [by  reason  of  its 
subconscious-impression]  never  becomes  homogeneous  with  primary-matter  is  not 
secondary-matter  [pradhanika).  And  again  it  is  not  the  Energy  of  Intellect, 
because  it  is  non-perceptive  {ajfia).  This  being  the  meaning,  one  might  assume 
another  [kind  of]  thing  which  could  not  be  proven  by  any  source-of-valid-ideas. 
This  too  would  be  a quite  groundless  [assumption]. — Because  there  is  no  other 
[kind  of]  thing  distinct  from  primary-matter  and  the  Self,  has  this  kind  of 
universally  admitted  and  eternal  superiority  of  the  l9vara  any  proof  [to  authorize 
it,  and]  is  it  based  on  any  soui-ce-of-valid-ideas,  or  is  it  without  proof  [and]  not 
based  on  any  source-of-valid-ideas  ? The  answer  is  in  the  phrase  ^sacred-books 
(rastra)  are  its  proof.»  The  sacred  books  are  the  Eevealed-Word  {gruti)  and  the 
Tradition  {smrti)  and  the  Epics  and  Puranas. — He  brings  forward  an  objection 
in  the  words  <Kwhat  proof  have  the  sacred-books  ?»  For  sacred  books  pre- 
suppose that  there  is  inference  and  perception.  And  no  one  can  perceive  or 
infer  the  perfection  of  the  l9vara’s  sattva.  Again,  there  is  no  ground  for  saying 
that  the  saci'ed  books  have  their  source  in  a perception  by  the  l9vara.  For  even 
if  we  imagine  [Him  saying  that  he  perceives  the  sacred  books].  He  would  then 
be  speaking  to  publish  abroad  His  own  pre-eminence.  [This  is  inconceivable 
since  no  one  could  imagine  that  the  l9vara  would  boast.]  Such  is  the  [objector’s] 
meaning.  In  rebuttal  he  says  «they  have  their  proof  in  the  perfect  quality  of 
His  sattva.y>  This  is  what  he  intends  [to  say].  Incantations  {mantra)  and  the 
Medical  Vedas  are  composed  by  the  l9vara.  In  these  [two]  cases  their  authori- 


' Cp.  Comment  iii.  13. 


i.  24  — ] 


Booh  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[64 


tativeness  is  granted  by  reason  of  their  adequacy  in  action.  [This  adequacy]  is 
undoubted  because  there  is  no  failure  to  effect  purposes,  [The  authoritativeness 
is  granted.  He  shows  that  it  is  not  based  upon  experimental  evidence.]  And 
in  the  case  of  the  different  herbs  and  of  the  particular  combinations  of  one  [herb] 
with  another,  and  in  the  case  of  the  incantations  in  so  far  as  single  syllables  are 
connected  or  excluded,  no  one  who  uses  only  profane  methods  of  proof,  could, 
even  in  a thousand  lives,  make  the  connexions  and  exclusions. — Furthermore 
there  is  no  ground  for  asserting  that  connexions  and  exclusions  [of  the  proper 
hei'bs  or  syllables]  are  a result  of  verbal-communication  {dgama)  and  that  verbal- 
communication  is  a result  of  these  [connexions  and  exclusions]  on  the  ground 
that  the  succession  of  these  two  [1.  verbal-communication,  2.  connexions  and 
exclusions]  forms  a series  from  time-without-beginning.  The  reason  for  this  is 
that  the  succession  of  these  two  is  severed  at  the  time  of  a great  mundane 
dissolution.  Neither  [is  there  ground  for  saying  that]  there  is  no  method  of 
proving  that  there  is  this  [great  mundane  dissolution].  For  he  will  set  forth  in 
detail  [iii.  13]  that  the  world  is  an  evolved-foi'm  of  primary-substance  and  is 
identical  [with  it  in  substance].  There  is  evidently  a heterogeneous  mutation 
[e.g.  curds]  of  the  [original]  homogeneous  mutation  [e.g.  milk].  Analogously, 
milk  or  sugar-juice  or  similar  substances  assume  various  forms  such  as  curds 
or  treacle  [and  so  forth].  And  it  is  evident  that  the  heterogeneous  mutation 
presupposes  the  homogeneous  mutation.  So  in  the  point  at  issue,  the  primary- 
substance  can  also  have  heterogeneous  mutations  by  assuming  such  forms  as  the 
Great  [thinking-substance]  and  the  personality-substance  ; occasionally  also  it  can 
have  a homogeneous  mutation.  And  its  homogeneous  mutation  is  the  state  of 
equipoise  [of  the  primary-substance].  This,  moreover,  is  the  great  mundane 
dissolution.  [There  is  therefore  a great  mundane  dissolution.]  [To  revert  to  the 
argument  that  the  authoritativeness  of  the  sacred  books  is  not  experimentally 
to  be  found.]  Accordingly,  the  Exalted  One  is  first  of  all  the  composer  of  the 
Incantations  and  of  the  Medical  Vedas.  Hence  it  must  be  acknowledged  that,  in 
so  far  as  the  obscuration  due  to  the  stains  of  rajas  and  of  tamas  has  been  removed, 
the  substance  of  [His]  thinking-substance  illumines  everywhere. 

To  resume  the  argument  {tatha  ca).  Because  He  was  aiming  to  give  instruction 
in  [worldly]  happiness  and  in  [eternal]  bliss  [incapable  of  test  by  experience  here], 
the  Vedas  as  a whole  were  composed  by  the  l9vara  and  must  also  be  supposed 
to  have  their  source  only  in  the  perfect  quality  of  His  thinking-substance.  And 
in  the  superiority  of  the  substance  (sattva)  there  is  no  possibility  of  error  or  deceit, 
wdiich  have  their  origin  in  rajas  and  tamas.  This  [then]  is  established  that 
sacred  books  have  their  proof  in  the  perfect  quality  of  His  sattva. — [A  further 
objection.]  ‘ This  may  be  so.  But  then  if  the  sacred  books  make  known  the 
perfection  in  so  far  as  they  are  the  effect  of  the  perfection,  there  would  be  an 
inference  from  effect  to  cause'  {(;esavaf).  But  that  would  not  give  us  a verbal 


' See  Nyaya  Bhasya  xviii.  4. 


55] 


The  Igvara  and  the  Sacred  Word  [ — i.  25 

communication  [agama).’  Eeplying  to  this  he  says  ^Inasmuch  as  both.»  The 
sacred  books  do  not  make  known  a relation  of  cause  and  effect,  but  do  make 
known  the  correspondence  * from  time  without  beginning  between  the  word- 
expressing-a-meaning  {vacaka)  and  the  thing-expressed  {vacya).  For  the  perfection 
has  its  existence  in  the  substance  of  the  Ifvara’s  thinking-substance ; and  the 
sacred  books,  in  that  they  give  expression  to  this  [thinking-substance],  also  have 
their  existence  in  it.  In  summing  up  he  says  ^From  these.  From  these 
sacred  books,  which  give  expression  to  the  perfection  of  the  substance  of  the 
Igvara’s  thinking-substance,  this  proves  to  be  true,  [that  is]  is  known, — since  the 
object  [visaya)  [the  sacred  books]  is  the  distinguishing-characteristic  of  that-to- 
which-the-object-refers  [visayin)  [the  Ifvara], — that  <KHe  is  at  all  times  what- 
soever liberated  and  at  all  times  whatsoever  the  Ifvara.^ — Having  thus  dis- 
tinguished [Him]  from  any  other  Self,  he  distinguishes  [Him]  from  any  other 
Ifvara  also  by  saying  ^Now  this  His.^  He  describes  its  being  altogether  without 
anything  excelling  it,  in  the  words  ^For  to  begin  with.2>  Why  is  this  ? The 
reply  is  <Kwhatever  . . . very.»  For  what  reason  is  this  pre-eminence  altogether 
free  from  everything  that  might  excel  it?  He  replies  «Therefore  . . . that 
wherein.^  In  other  words,  as  applied  to  those  who  have  not  reached  the 
uttermost  limit,  the  term  pre-eminence  is  [only]  a figurative  expression. — He 
describes  the  state  of  freedom  from  anything  equal  to  it  by  saying  <SNor  again 
. . • equal  to  His.»  Wish  is  unhindered  volition ; by  failure  in  this  a man 
becomes  inferior.  Or  if  there  be  no  inferiority,  then  it  would  be  that  both  fail 
in  their  wishes.  For  no  effect  would  occur,  or  if  it  did  occur,  the  effect  [of  the 
two  wishes]  simultaneously  would  be  perceived  to  have  the  logical  mark 
{samalingita)  of  two  contradictory  qualities.  Alluding  to  this  he  says  ^And  two.» 
If  however  the  intentions  [of  the  two]  are  not  contradictory  and  if  the  pre-eminent 
quality  {i^varatva)  is  attached  to  each,  then  what  need  of  any  others  ? Because 
then  [the  intention]  could  be  accomplished  by  a single  pre-eminent  [igana)  alone. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  [all]  work  together,  no  one  would  be  the  l9vara ; but  there 
would  be  a parliament.  Furthermore  it  is  not  fitting  that  those  who  are  fit  for 
uninterrupted  pre-eminence  [should  rule]  by  turns.  And  besides  this  would  be 
a more  difficult  supposition.  Since  this  is  evident,  all  is  cleared  up. 


Furthermore, 

25.  In  this  [Igvara]  the  germ  of  the  omniscient  is  at  its 
utmost  excellence. 

This  our  process-of-knowing  {grahana)  the  supersensuous,  whether 
in  the  past  or  future  or  present,  whether  separately  or  collec- 
tively,— [this  process,]  whether  it  be  small  or  great,  is  the  germ 


' This  would  constitute  an  agama. 


i.  25 — ] 


Book  I.  Concentration  or  Samdclhi 


[56 


of  the  omniscient.  He,  verily,  in  whom  this  germ  as  it  increases 
progressively  reaches  its  utmost  excellence  is  the  omniscient. 
It  is  possible  for  the  germ  of  the  omniscient  to  reach  this 
[uttermost]  limit,  for  it  admits  of  degrees  of  excellence,  as  in  the 
case  of  any  ascending  scale.  He  in  whom  the  limit  of  thinking 
is  reached  is  the  omniscient  and  He  is  a special  kind  of  Self. 
[If  you  object  that  this  argument  would  prove  the  omniscience  of 
Buddha  or  of  Jina,  there  would  be  this  reply.]  An  inference  ex- 
hausts {upaksaya)  its  force  in  bringing  a general  proposition  to  a 
conclusion,^  but  is  powerless  to  prove  a particular  instance.  There- 
fore the  ascertainment  of  the  [Omniscient]  one’s  special  name  is 
[not  a matter  of  inference,  but  is  rather]  to  be  sought  out  in  the 
verbal-communication,  [which  excludes  the  supposed  cases,  since 
their  tradition  is  false].  Although  He  is  above  all  feelings  of  self- 
gratification, yet  [to  this  Icvara]  the  gratification  of  living  beings 
is  a sufficient  motive.  He  may  be  conceived  as  resolving,  ‘ By 
instruction  in  knowledge  and  in  right-living,  at  the  dissolution 
of  the  mundane  period  and  at  the  great  dissolution,  I will  lift  up 
human  beings,  who  are  whirled  in  the  vortex  of  existence.’  And 
likewise  it  hath  been  said,^  “ The  First  Knower,  assuming  a 
created  mind-stuff  through  compassion,  the  Exalted,  the  Supreme 
Sage,  unto  Asuri  who  desired  to  know,  declared  this  doctrine.” 

After  having  mentioned  the  sacred  books  as  a means  of  proving  [His]  power  of 
action  and  of  knowledge,  he  shows  that  inference  is  a means  of  proving  [His] 
power  of  knowledge.  This  is  stated  in  the  words  ^Furthermore.»  25.  In 
this  [iQvara]  the  germ  of  the  omniscient  is  at  its  utmost  excellence.  He 
discusses  [the  sutra]  in  the  words  «This  our.^  In  proportion  to  the  degree  to 
which  the  tamas  which  covers  the  sattva  of  the  thinking-substance  has  been  re- 
moved, this  our  process-of-knowing  supersensuous  things,  past  and  future  and 
present,  which  occur  separately  as  well  as  collectively, — [this]  process  may  be 
qualified  as  being  either  small  or  great.  This  is  the  germ  [or]  cause  of  the  omni- 
scient. Some  one  knows  a very  little  of  the  past  or  of  the  other  times,  another 


’ Compare  samanyenopasaihharah,  p.  100, 
line  4,  Calcutta  ed.  of  this  work. 

° By  Panca9ikha  in  the  first  fragment  as 
collected  by  Garbe  in  his  article  on 
Pahca9ikha  und  seine  Fragments  (in 
Festgruss  an  Roth,  Stuttgart,  1893), 


p.  77.  This  fragment  is  also  discussed 
by  Fitz  Edward  Hall  in  his  edition 
of  the  Saihkhya-Pravachana-Bhashya, 
1856,  Preface  pp.  10  and  17.  See  also 
Garuda  Parana  i.  18. 


57]  The  I^vara  as  the  limit  of  thinking  [ — i.  25 

much,  another  still  more.  Thus  with  regard  to  objects  to  be  known  there  is  a 
[relative]  smallness  or  greatness  of  the  knowing-process.  He,  verily,  in  whom 
this  [germ]  as  it  increases  progressively  has  come  to  a stop  because  of  its  excel- 
lence,— he  is  said  to  be  the  omniscient.  In  this  wise  only  the  object  of  proof  is 
described  ; now  he  gives  the  means  of  proof  in  the  words  «It  is  possible.)^  In 
the  words  «It  is  possible  for  the  germ  of  the  omniscient  to  reach  this  [utter- 
most] limit»  there  is  a statement  of  the  major  term.  The  limit  is  the  reaching 
of  the  utmost  excellence  ; it  is  that  state  higher  than  which  there  is  no  excellence. 
Accordingly  it  should  not  be  urged  that  this  is  establishing  what  is  already 
established.  For  [this  higher  than  which  there  is  no  excellence,  is  established] 
only  so  far  as  it  is  a terminal-point.  [For,]  the  middle  term  [hetu),  as  he  gives  it, 
is  «for  it  admits  of  degrees  of  excellence.^  Whatever  admits  of  degrees  of  excel- 
lence, all  that  is  [capable  of  reaching]  the  utmost  excellence.  Similarly  in  the 
case  of  the  huvalaya  berry  and  the  dmalaka  fruit  and  the  bilva  fruit  there  is  a size 
that  admits  of  degrees.  And  in  the  soul  (atman)  [there  is  a magnitude  which  has 
reached  its]  utmost  excellence.  Thus  he  shows  that  there  is  a concomitance  [of 
terms]. — And  when  he  says  ^as  in  the  case  of  any  ascending  scale, ^ it  is  not 
relevant  to  object  that  there  is  a discrepancy  in  so  far  as  the  properties  [of  a 
substance],  such  as  its  magnitude,  [form  an  ascending  scale  but  do  not  reach 
utmost  excellence].  For  in  the  case  of  the  whole,  its  magnitude  does  of  course 
not  excel  the  magnitude  of  the  parts.  But  whatever  magnitudes  there  are,  each 
functioning  by  itself,  from  the  smallest  atom  up  to  the  final  whole,  may  be  so 
arranged  that  one  may  assert  a progressive  increase  of  magnitudes.  But,  because 
it  is  not  finished  as  contrasted  with  the  object  to  be  thought,  in  so  far  as  it 
has  [successively]  one  or  two  or  a multitude  of  objects,  thinking  may  with  reason 
be  said  to  admit  of  degrees  of  excellence.  Thus  there  is  no  discrepancy.  He 
brings  the  discussion  to  a close  in  the  words  «He  in  whom  the  limit.» — It 
might  be  objected  that  there  are  many  authors  of  sacred  books  [tirthakara), 
Buddha  and  Arhata  and  Kapila  the  Sage  and  many  others.  Why,  by  this  line 
of  inference,  may  they  not  be  counted  as  omniscient?  In  reply  he  says  <Ka 
general  proposition.^  Whence  then  can  we  be  informed  of  his  particular 
qualities  ? The  reply  is  «the  [Omniscient]  one’s.»  The  point  is  that  the  pseudo- 
sacred-words  composed  by  Buddha  or  by  the  others  are  not  a Sacred  Word 
{dgama).  For  they  give  instruction  in  the  way  of  soullessness  and  of  momentari- 
ness, both  of  which  are  contradicted  by  all  sources-of-valid-ideas.  The  reason  for 
this  is  that  they  are  deceitful.  A Sacred  Word  has  as  its  distinguishing-charac- 
teristic the  Eevealed-Word  {gruti)  and  the  Tradition  {snirti)  and  the  Epics  and 
Puranas.  The  Sacred  Word  {d-gama)  is  that  from  which  the  [spiritual]  means 
for  [worldly]  happiness  and  [final]  bliss  come  to  {d-gam)  or  strike  upon  the 
thinking-substance.  From  this  [Sacred  Word]  comes  information  as  to  [the 
l9vara’s]  particular  qualities,  such  as  His  name — any  particular  name,  for  example 
^iva  or  the  l9vara — which  are  firmly  established  in  the  Kevealed  Word  and  in 
the  other  books.  Under  the  word  ‘ such  as  ’ [ddi)  are  included  the  sexpartite 
8 [b.o.s.  17] 


i.  25 — ] 


Booh  I.  Concentration  cn'  Samadhi 


[58 


nature  and  the  ten  eternal  principles,  as  described  in  the  Vayu  Purana  [xii.  32],' 
“ Omniscience  and  Contentment  and  Limitless  Knowledge  and  Freedom  and 
Ever-unthwarted  Energy  and  Infinite  Energy — these,  the  experts  in  the  sacred 
ordinances  tell  us,  are  the  six  parts  of  the  all-pervasive  Mahefvara.”  Likewise 
“ Knowledge  and  Passionlessness  and  Pre-eminence  and  Self-control  and  Truth 
and  Patience  and  Perseverance  and  Creative  Energy  and  Eight  Knowledge  of 
Self  and  Competency  to  Rule  [the  Universe] — these  ten  eternal  principles  abide 
eternally  in  ^amkara.”  It  is  objected,  ‘ This  may  be  so.  But  inasmuch  as  the 
Exalted  One,  who  is  eternally  free  and  who  has  attained  to  the  utmost  excellence 
of  passionlessness,  cannot  cherish  craving  merely  for  his  own  self ; and  inas- 
much as,  if  he  be  compassionate,  he  should  create,  to  the  end  that  every  one 
should  be  intent  upon  happiness,  for  the  reason  that  we  cAnnot  explain  the  pro- 
duction of  a world  of  living  beings  in  which  pain  predominates  ; and  inasmuch 
as,  if  he  have  no  motive,  we  cannot  explain  his  act  [of  creation]  as  being  that  of 
a being  of  understanding, — therefore,  even  if  he  be  endowed  with  the  power  of 
action,  the  world  cannot  be  the  result  of  his  action.’  In  reply  to  this  he  says 
« Although  He  is  above  all  feelings  of  self-gratifi cation.):^  The  gratification  of 
beings  in  whom  is  the  breath  of  life  is  [for  Him  a sufficient]  motive.  Now  it  is 
clear  that  the  mind-stuff  ceases  from  the  production  of  its  [two  kinds  of]  effects ; 
the  outer  experience  of  the  various  kinds  of  things  and  [secondly]  the  discrimi- 
native discernment.  Then  it  is  that  the  Self  enters  into  its  Isolation.  Accord- 
ingly as  a means  to  motivate  this  [Isolation]  the  compassionate  [Ifvara] 
describes  the  discriminative  discernment.  Accordingly,  although  the  I^vara 
with  the  help  of  merit  and  demerit  makes  living  creatures  feel  pleasure  and  pain, 
for  the  reason  that  the  mind-stuff  has  its  task  yet  to  fulfil, — still  he  is  not  incom- 
passionate. — He  tells  of  the  way  by  which  he  makes  known  the  discriminative 
discernment  as  a [spiritual]  means  in  the  words  ^By  instruction  in  knowledge 
and  in  right-living.^  Both  in  knowledge  and  in  right-living  ; by  instruction  in 
both  of  these.  By  the  combination  of  knowledge  and  of  right-living  as  a result  of 
reaching  full  maturity  of  discriminative  discernment.  «At  the  dissolution  of  the 
mundane  period,»  that  is,  at  the  end  of  a Day  of  Brahma®,  at  which  time  the  world 
with  the  exception  of  the  Heaven  of  Truth  (satya-loka),  vanishes.  <5CAt  the  great 
dissolution, » at  which  time  there  is  the  destruction  of  Brahma  together  with  the 
Heaven  of  Truth.  ^Whirled  in  the  vortex  of  existence»  that  is,®  those  merged 
in  the  [primary]  cause ; and  therefore  partaking  of  the  pain  of  that  [cause]  up  to 
the  time  of  death.  The  words  «dissolution  of  the  mundane  period»  is  an  ex- 
pression of  a part  for  the  whole  ; for  at  other  times  also  [the  Ifvara  may  be  con- 
ceived as]  resolving  ^I  will  lift  up  human  beings.»  In  other  words  human 
beings  by  attaining  to  Isolation  are  lifted  up.  It  might  be  objected  that  this 


' Ananda9rama  ed.,  p.  43'“®. 

® See  Visnu  Purana  vi.  3. 

® The  words  “ that  is  . . . resolving  ” are 


not  in  the  Bikaner  MS.  and  may  be 
a gloss. 


59] 


The  I^vara  unlimited  hy  time  [ — i.  26 

instruction  in  knowledge  and  right-living  by  one  whose  motive  is  compassion  is 
also  well  known  to  the  followers  of  Kapila.  In  reply  to  this  he  says  <KAnd  likewise 
it  hath  been  said.»  In  this  sense  it  hath  been  said  by  Panca9ikha  the  Master 
[acarya).  «The  First  Knower»  is  Kapila.  The  statement  of  Pahca^ikha  the 
Master  with  regard  to  the  First  Knower  applies  to  the  First  Teacher  in  the  succes- 
sion [ of  teacher  and  disciple]  to  which  he  belonged  ; and  [this  First  Teacher]  was 
the  First  Liberated.  But  it  does  not  apply  to  the  Supreme  Teacher  who  is  free 
from  time-without-beginning.  Of  those  who  were  the  First  Liberated  and  of  those 
[other]  knowers  who  were  at  other  times  liberated,  Kapila  is  for  us  the  First 
Knower  [and  the  First]  Liberated.  And  it  is  he  that  is  the  teacher,  [but  not  from 
time  without  beginning].  For  it  is  revealed  that  even  Kapila  attained  to  know- 
ledge, by  the  favour  of  Mahefvara  only,  just  as  soon  as  he  was  born.  He  whom 
we  call  Kapila  is  accepted  as  being  the  [fifth]  incarnation  of  Vishnu.  [It  might  be 
objected  that]  Hiranyagarbha  is  the  Self-existent  [and  thus  he  would  be  the  First 
Knower].  [For]  it  is  revealed  in  the  Veda ' [that  he  was  the  First-born  and]  that  he 
also  acquired  Sarhkhya  and  Yoga.  [The  reply  would  be  that]  this  same  I^vara, 
the  First  Knower,  the  Self-existent^  Vishnu  [is]  Kapila.  “ But  [He  is]  the 
Ifvara  of  those  descended  from  the  Self-existent.”  This  is  the  point. 


This  same  [l9vara  is] — 

26.  Teacher  of  the  Primal  [Sages]  also,  forasmuch  as  [with 
Him]  there  is  no  limitation  by  time. 

No-one-doubts-that  the  Primal  Sages  are  limited  by  time  ; [but] 
He  to  whom  time  does  not  apply,  in  so  far  as  it  might  be  a limiting 
object,  is  the  Teacher  even  of  the  Primal  Sages.  As  He  is  perfected 
{siddha)  in  that  mode-of-existence  (gati)  which  is  perfection  at  the 
commencement  of  the  present  creation,  so  He  is  to  be  recognized 
[as  being  in  this  mode  of  perfection]  at  the  beginning  of  past  crea- 
tions also. 

He  now  states  the  distinction  between  the  I^vara  and  such  beings  as  Brahma  by 
saying  «This  same  [l9vara].»  These  words  «This  same  [l9vara]»  form  the 
transition  to  the  sutra.  26.  Teacher  of  the  Primal  [Sages]  also,  forasmuch 
as  [with  Him]  there  is  no  limitation  by  time.  He  explains  the  sutra  in  the 
words  «No-one-doubts-that  the  Primal.»  Time,  however,  a period  of  a hundred 
years  or  some  other  period,  does  not  apply,  [that  is]  has  no  reference  [to  Him]  in 

‘ Qvet.  Up.  iii.  4,  iv.  12,  vi.  18.  this  passage  the  term  ‘ First  Knower’ 

* If  the  reading  be  na  sva°,  the  meaning  applies  to  Kapila  and  not  to  the  Self- 

would  be  that  although  the  Self-  existent, 

existent  is  the  First  Knower,  still  in 


i.  26 — ] 


Book  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[60 

so  far  as  it  might  be  a limiting  object,  [that  is]  limiting  motive.  The  mode-of- 
existence  of  perfection  is  the  attainment  of  perfection.  This  is  to  be  recognized 
as  coming  from  the  Sacred- Word.  Such  is  the  inner  meaning. 


27.  The  word  - expressing  Him  is  the  Mystic  - syllable 

(pranava). 

The  l9vara  is  the  object-expressed  by  the  mystic  syllable.  Is  the 
expressiveness  of  this  [Syllable]  the  work  of  [ordinary]  usage  (sam- 
keta),  or  is  it  permanent  [and  self-manifesting]  like  [the  relation  of] 
the  light  to  the  lamp  ? The  relation  of  this  thing-to-be-expressed 
to  the  expressive-word  is  fixed.  But  the  usage  [as  determined]  by 
the  Igvara  declares  this  its  fixed  meaning.  Thus  the  [actual]  rela- 
tion of  father  and  son  is  permanent,  but  the  verbal  statement  that 
that  man  is  this  man’s  father  is  suggested  [to  the  mind]  by  usage. 
And  the  usage  with  regard  to  the  relation  between  expressive-words 
and  things-expressed  is  made  by  [the  l9vara]  to  serve  with  a dis- 
tinct reference  to  the  power  of  expression  which  they  had  in  former 
creations  also.  The  authoritative  sages  maintain  that  the  relation 
between  a word  and  an  intended-object  is  eternal  is  so  far  as  the 
consensus  {sampratipatti)  [of  successive  generations  of  speakers] 
is  eternal. 

In  this  same  series  [of  sutras]  the  Exalted  Ifvara  has  been  made  known.  Now 
in  order  to  make  known  the  devotion  [paid]  to  Him  he  tells  of  the  word- 
expressive  of  Him.  27.  The  word-expressing  Him  is  the  Mystic-syllable 
{pranava).  He  begins  the  explanation  with  the  words  « . . . the  object-expressed. » 
On  this  point  he  clears  up  [the  topic]  by  setting  forth  for  consideration  the 
opinion  of  others.  [This  he  begins]  by  asking  <Kls  the  expressiveness.» 
«Expressiveness»  is  ability  to  give  information.  For  to  others  ’ it  seems  as  if 
the  relation  between  word  and  intended-meaning  is  natural.  [And]  if  this 
object-intended  is  to  be  recognized  as  having  an  essence  of  such  a kind  when 
it  comes  by  usage  from  this  word,  then,  whenever  that  [natural]  relation  does 
not  exist,  that  [object-intended]  will  not  be  manifested  even  by  hundreds  of 
usages.  For  when  a water-jar,  which  is  capable  of  being  made  manifest  by 
a lamp,  is  not  [there],  then  even  with  thousands  of  lamps  it  cannot  be  made 
manifest.  On  the  other  hand,  the  word  young-elephant  {hardbha),  made  by 

’ He  refers  to  the  Vaiyakaranas,  such  as,  (Kielhorn’s  edition),  vol.  i,  p.  6*f. 

for  example,  Patafijali  in  Mahabhasya 


61]  Symbol  of  the  Ifvara  [ — i.  28 

usage  to  denote  an  elephant  [varana]  evidently  gives  information  with  regard  to 
an  elephant.  As  a result  of  this,  one  might  say  that  expressiveness  is  made  by 
usage  only.  After  reflection  [as  to  whether  the  relation  is  accidental  or  eternal] 
he  determines  what  the  author’s  opinion  is  by  saying  «is  fixed. » The  import 
would  be  this.  All  words  are  capable  of  naming  intended-objects  of  all  kinds  of 
forms.  Thus  the  natural  relation  of  them  [i.  e.  of  words]  to  iutended-objects  of  all 
kinds  of  forms  is  most  surely  fixed.  The  usage,  however,  [as  determined]  by 
the  Ifvara  is  both  a manifester  [of  this  natural  relation]  and  a limitation.  And 
this  [relation]  has  a word  expressing  it  when  the  usage  [as  determined]  by  the 
Ifvara  [is  followed]  ; [but  the  relation  suffers]  corruption  when  the  usage  [as 
determined]  by  the  l9vara  is  not  [followed].  This  is  the  distinction.  It  is  this 
that  he  states  in  the  phrase  <KBut  the  usage  [as  determined]  by  the  I^vara.^  He 
gives  an  example  when  he  says  ^Thus.»  It  is  objected,  ‘ A word  is  a product 
of  the  primary-cause  ; at  the  time  of  the  great  dissolution  it  tends  towards  the 
primary  causal  state  ; and  its  [expressive]  power  would  also  be  resolved  [into 
primary  matter].  Then  it  would  not  be  possible  that  the  usage  [as  determined] 
by  the  Great  Ifvara  (mdhegvara)  should  reAUve  the  expressive  power  [of  such 
a word]  only  as  had  been  deprived  of  its  expressive  [power]  after  having  been 
changed  successively  into  [the  different  evolved  forms  of  primary  matter]  begin- 
ning with  the  Great  [thinking-substance].’  In  reply  to  this  he  says  «in  former 
creations.^  Although  the  word  together  with  its  expressive  power  passes  into 
the  primary  causal  state  of  equipoise,  when  it  appears  again  it  does  appear 
endowed  with  the  [expressive]  power  of  that  [word].  Similarly  a plant  [udbhijja], 
utterly  reduced  to  an  earthly  condition  after  the  rains  have  [ceased]  to  fall, 
[becomes  as  it  was  before]  when  sprinkled  vigorously  with  the  stream  of  water 
let  fall  from  the  clouds.  Therefore  the  Exalted  One  makes  the  usage  conform  to 
the  previous  relation  [of  the  word  to  the  intended  object].  Accordingly,  in  so 
far  as  the  consensus  [of  previous  creations,  which  is  the  same  as]  the  series 
of  similar  modes-of-expression  [vyavalidra),  is  eternal,  the  authoritative  sages 
(dgamiJca)  maintain ' that  this  relation  is  not  absolutely  eternal.  But  their  point 
is  that  it  is  impossible  without  the  help  of  the  Sacred  Word  to  assert  that  the 
usage  was  exactly  of  the  same  kind  in  other  creations  also. 


No'w,  by  the  yogin  who  has  recognized  the  power  of  the  word  to 
express  the  thing, 

28.  Repetition  of  it  and  reflection  upon  its  meaning  [should 
be  made]. 

The  repetition  of  the  Mystic  Syllable,  and  reflection  upon  the 
Igvara  who  is  signified  by  the  Mystic  Syllable.  Then  in  the  case 


* See  Patafijali,  Mahabhasja  (Kielhorni,  vol.  i,  p.  6'®  and  T’t 


i.  28 — ] Book  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi  [62 

of  this  yogin  who  thus  repeats  the  Mystic  Syllable  and  reflects 
upon  its  meaning,  mind-stuff*  attains  to  singleness-of-intent.  And 
so  it  hath  been  said,^ 

“ Through  study  let  him  practise  yoga  ; 

Through  yoga  let  him  meditate  on  study. 

By  perfectness  in  study  and  in  yoga 
Supreme  Soul  shines  forth  clearly.” 

Having  designated  the  Mystic  Syllable  he  tells  of  the  contemplation.  28.  Repe« 
tition  of  it  and  reflection  upon  its  meaning  [should  be  made].  He  explains 
[the  sutra]  by  saying  «0f  the  Mystic  Syllable.)^  Eeflection  is  an  absorption  in 
the  mind  again  and  again.  What  follows  from  this?  He  replies  by  saying 
«the  Mystic  Syllable.»  He  attains  to  singleness-of-intent  [and  his]  mind-stuff 
comes  to  rest  in  the  One  Exalted.  In  illustration  of  this  he  introduces  a stanza 
from  Vyasa  [vaiyasiki  gatha)  by  saying  <3CAnd  so.»  The  l9vara  then  gratifies  him 
by  conferring  upon  him  concentration  and  the  fruit  of  concentration. 


What  else  comes  to  him  ? 

29.  Thereafter  comes  the  right-knowledge  of  him  who  thinks 
in  an  inverse  way,  and  the  removal  of  obstacles.  Whatever 
obstacles  there  be,  disease  and  the  rest,  all  these  are  removed  by 
devotion  to  the  I^vara,  and  [the  yogin]  comes  to  a sight  of  his  own 
real  self.  He  has  the  right  knowledge  which  sees  that  as  the 
I^vara  is  a Self  and  is  undefiled  and  undisturbed  [by  hindrances] 
and  isolated  and  exempt  from  accidents,  so  he  also  is  a Self 
conscious  [by  reflection]  of  its  thinking-substance. 

What  in  addition  comes  to  him  ? 29.  Thereafter  comes  the  right-knowledge 
of  him  who  thinks  in  an  inverse  way,  and  the  removal  of  obstacles.  One 
is  inverted  who  knows  in  an  opposite  way  [to  the  ordinary  person  whose  mind- 
stuff  flows  out  and  becomes  modified  by  objects].  One  who  thinks  in  that  way 
thinks  inversely ; [in  other  words]  the  [ordinary]  man  [stilt]  under  the  condi- 
tions of  undifferentiated-consciousness  [avidyavant).  In  such  wise  [the  author] 
demarks  [such  a one]  from  the  l9vara  who  is  free  from  undifferentiated-con- 
sciousness {vidyavant),  and  who  is  endowed  with  eternal  superiority  of  the  sattva. 
Right- knowledge  comes  to  the  kind  of  thinking  which  is  under  the  conditions 
of  undifferentiated-consciousness  and  which  is  inverted.  A perception  of  himself 
as  he  is  in  his  own  self  comes  to  him. — <Obstacles>  and  <the  removal)  of  them  are 


Compare  Visn.  Pur.  vi.  7,  33  f. ; Naradiya  Pur.  xlvii.  12-14. 


63]  Results  of  meditation  upon  the  Ifvara  [ — i.  30 

to  be  described  [ii.  32].  The  words  <JCWhatever . . .»  give  the  exposition  of  these 
[latter  words].  The  word  <Kown»  [refers  to  his]  soul  {atman),  that  is,  his  self. 
The  word  «selfi^  (rupa)  excludes  all  qualities  attributed  [to  him]  by  undifferen- 
tiated-consciousness.  One  might  well  say  that  devotion  to  the  l9vara  has  the 
l5vara  as  its  object ; how  then  can  it  apparently  give  a direct  perception, 
a thinking  in  the  inverse  way  [upon  one’s  own  real  self]  ? For  this  would 
prove  too  much.  In  reply  to  this  he  says  «as  the  I9 vara. » «Undefiled:» 
not  subject  to  origination  or  dissolution  in  so  far  as  He  is  absolutely  unchanged. 
«Undisturbed)»  means  free  from  hindrances.  ^Isolated»  means  beyond  the 
scope  of  merit  and  demerit  [and]  consequently  <Kexempt  from  accidents.»  «Acci- 
dents)^  are  birth  and  length  of  life  and  kind  of  experience  [ii.  13]. — Since  a 
homogeneity  implies  a certain  degree  of  difference,  he  shows  the  difference 
between  [Selves  in  general]  and  the  l9vara  by  saying  «conscious  [by  reflec- 
tion] of  its  thinking-substance.»  In  such  wise  the  word  <inverse>  has  been 
described. — In  the  case  of  two  objects  which  are  totally  irrelevant  to  each 
other,  prolonged  meditation  on  either  one  unfits  one  for  a direct  perception  of 
the  other.  Whereas  prolonged  meditation  upon  one  object  proves  to  be  of 
service  for  the  direct  perception  of  another  similar  to  it.  Similarly  the 
study  of  one  book  proves  to  be  of  service  for  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  of 
another  book  similar  to  it.  As  for  (tu)  immediate-perception  [pratyasatti),  it  is 
the  cause  of  direct  perception  with  regard  to  one’s  own  self,  but  not  with  regard 
to  another  self.  [Thus  by  meditating  upon  the  l9vara,  we  learn  about  our  own 
selves.]  Thus  the  argument  is  cleared  up. 

But  what  are  these  obstacles  ? Those  which  distract  the  mind- 
stuff.  But  what  are  these  [that  are  distractive]  and  {vd)  how  many 
are  they  ? [He  replies.] 

30.  Sickness  and  languor  and  doubt  and  heedlessness  and 
listlessness  and  worldliness  (avirati)  and  erroneous  perception 
and  failure  to  attain  any  stage  [of  concentration]  and  insta- 
bility in  the  state  [when  attained]— these  distractions  of  the 
mind-stuff  are  the  obstacles. 

There  are  nine  obstacles,  the  distractions  of  the  mind-stuff.  These 
appear  together  with  the  fluctuations  of  the  mind-stuff.  And  they 
are  not  found  where  the  aforesaid  fluctuations  of  mind-stuff  are 
not.  Sickness  is  a disorder  in  the  humours  [of  the  body]  or  in  the 
secretions  or  in  the  organs.  Languor  is  a lack  of  activity  in  the 
mind-stuff.  Doubt  is  a kind  of  thinking  which  touches  both  alter- 
natives [of  a dilemma],  so  that  one  thinks  ‘ This  might  be  so  ; 
might  not  be  so.’  Heedlessness  is  a lack  of  reflection  upon  the 


i.  30 — ] 


Book  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[64 


means  of  attaining  concentration.  Listlessness  is  a lack  of  effort 
due  to  heaviness  of  body  or  of  mind-stuff.  Worldliness  is  greed  of 
the  mind-stuff ; and  its  essence  lies  in  addiction  to  objects  of  sense. 
Erroneous  perception  is  the  thinking  of  misconceptions.  Failure 
to  attain  any  stage  is  not  attaining  any  stage  of  concentration. 
Instability  in  the  state  [when  attained]  is  the  failure  of  the  mind- 
stuff  to  remain  in  the  stagje  attained.  If  the  concentrated  stage 
of  development  had  been  reached,  [the  mind-stuff]  would,  of  course, 
have  remained  in  it. — Thus  it  is  that  these  distractions  are  called 
the  nine  blemishes  of  yoga  [and]  the  nine  foes  of  yoga  [and]  the 
obstacles  of  yoga. 

He  asks  a question  by  saying  <Kwhat.»  He  gives  the  answer  in  general  in 
the  words  <KThose  which.»  With  regard  to  their  kinds  and  their  number  he 
asks  «But  what.»  He  gives  the  answer  by  the  sutra  beginning  with  the  word 
30.  Sickness.  Obstacles  are  nine.  These  are  fluctuations  of  mind-stuff  and 
obstructive  to  yoga  and  opposed  to  yoga.  Distractions  of  the  mind-stuff  are,  of 
course,  so-called  because  sickness  and  the  other  [obstacles]  distract  [or]  divert 
the  mind-stuff  from  yoga.  He  gives  the  reason  for  their  being  foes  to  yoga  by 
saying  «These  . . . together  with.»  First,  in  the  case  of  doubt  and  of  erroneous 
perception,  they  are  foes  to  the  restriction  of  fluctuations  from  the  mere  fact  that 
they  are  fluctuations.  And  of  those  that  are  not  fluctuations,  such  as  sickness 
and  the  rest, — these  too  are  foes  to  it  because  they  associate  with  fluctuations. 
He  explains  the  things  intended,  by  the  words  beginning  with  «Sickness.)^ 
The  humours  [dhatu),  wind  and  bile  and  phlegm,  are  so-called  because  they 
sustain  (dJiarana)  the  body.  A secretion  is  a special  kind  of  mutation  of  nourish- 
ment eaten  or  drunk.  The  organs  are  the  senses  (indriya).  A disorder  in  them 
is  a state  of  defect  or  excess.  A lack  of  activity  is  an  incapacity  for  action. 
Doubt  is  a kind  of  thinking  which  touches  both  * alternatives  [of  a dilemma]. 
Although  there  is  no  difference  between  doubt  and  error  {viparyasa)  in  so  far  as 
both  do  not  remain  in  the  proper  form  of  that  [in  respect  to  which  they  are 
entertained],  still, — by  emphasizing  the  subsidiary  difference,  that  is,  the  touch- 
ing or  not  touching  of  the  two  alternatives  [of  the  dilemma],  the  distinction  in 
this  case  [of  doubt)  is  made  clear.  A lack  of  reflection  is  a lack  of  action.  This 
is  about  the  same  as  saying  that  it  is  a lack  of  effort  with  regard  to  this  thing. 
Heaviness  of  the  body  is  the  result  of  phlegm  ; heaviness  of  the  mind-stuff  is  the 
result  of  tamos.  Greed  is  thirst.  The  stages  of  concentration  are  the  Madhu- 
matl  and  the  other  [three].  If  after  reaching  a given  stage  [the  yogin]  should 
deem  himself  sufficiently  well  off  with  only  so  much  [progress],  there  would  be 
a breach  in  the  concentration  ; and  as  a result  of  this  there  would  be  a retro- 


’ Compare  Nyaya-sutra  i.  1.  23. 


65] 


[— i.  32 


VaHeties  of  distractions 

gression  even  from  that  stage.  An  effort  should  therefore  be  made  in  such 
a way  that  when  [the  yoginj  has  reached  concentration,  [the  mind-stuff]  should 
be  stable  there. 


31.  Pain  and  despondency  and  unsteadiness  of  the  body 
and  inspiration  and  expiration  are  the  accompaniments  of 
the  distractions. 

Pain  proceeding  from  self  [and]  pain  proceeding  from  living  crea- 
tures and  pain  proceeding  from  the  gods.  Pain  is  that  by  which 
living  beings  are  stricken  down  and  for  the  destruction  of  which 
they  struggle.  Despondency  is  agitation  of  mind  due  to  an 
impediment  [to  the  fulfilment]  of  a desire.  Unsteadiness  of  the  body 
is  that  which  makes  it  unsteady  [and]  makes  it  tremble.  Inspira- 
tion is  breathing  which  sips  in  the  air  which  is  outside.  Expiration 
is  that  which  makes  abdominal  ^ air  flow  outwards.  These  are  the 
accompaniments  of  the  distractions.  These  occur  in  one  whose 
mind-stuff  is  distracted.  These  do  not  occur  in  one  whose  mind- 
stuff  is  concentrated. 

Not  only  the  nine  obstacles  but  also  pain  and  the  other  accompaniments  of  these 
[obstacles]  occur  to  this  [yogin].  So  [Vyasa]  recites  the  sutra  beginning  with  the 
word  31.  Pain.  Pain  is  that  which  is  to  be  felt  as  unpleasant.  [Pain]  pro- 
ceeding from  self  is  bodily  by  virtue  of  sickness,  or  mental  by  virtue  of  such 
things  as  passion.  [Pain]  proceeding  from  living  creatures  is  such  as  is 
generated  by  tigers.  [Pain]  proceeding  from  the  gods  is  such  as  is  generated 
by  the  baleful  influence  of  planets.  And  this  pain,  inasmuch  as  living  beings 
in  general  would  feel  * it  to  be  unpleasant,  is  to  be  rejected.  Accordingly  he 
says  ^by  which  • . . stricken  down.»  The  breathing  which  without  volitional 
action  sips  in  the  air  which  is  outside  [and]  drinks  it  [or]  makes  it  enter, — this 
inspiration  is  opposed  to  emission  {recaha),  which  is  accessory  to  concentration. 
The  breathing  also,  which  without  volitional  action  makes  abdominal  air  flow 
outwards  [and]  expels  it, — this  expiration^  is  opposed  to  inhalation  {j^uraka), 
which  is  an  accessory  to  concentration. 


Furthermore  these  distractions,  the  foes  of  concentration,  are  to 


* Only  one  MS.  has  kosthyam.  Yet  as  Bala- 
rama  points  out,  the  rule  as  given  in 
Panini  v.  1.  6 (see  Siddhanta  Kaumudi, 
third  Nirnaya  Sagara  edition,  1904, 
p.  265®)  would  require  that  the  vrddhi 
9 [b.o.s.  jt] 


should  not  take  place  when  the  ter- 
mination yat  is  affixed  to  a stem  signi- 
fying a member  of  the  body. 

“ See  Tarka-sariigraha,  § 67. 

® Recaka  and  puraka  are  volitional  (ii.  51). 


i.  32 — ] Booh  I.  Concentration  or  SamdcUti  [G6 

be  restricted  by  the  same  ^ practice  and  passionlessness.  Of  these 
[two],  in  summing  up,  he  describes  the  object  to  which  the  practice 
[applies]. 

32.  To  check  them  [let  there  be]  practice  upon  a single  entity. 

To  check  them  let  [the  yogin]  practise  his  mind-stuff  by  making  it 
rest  upon  a single  entity.  But  one  whose  mind-stuff  is  nothing 
more  than  an  idea  limited  to  one  object  after  another,  and  is 
momentary  [hsanika), — of  this  [Buddhist]  the  mind-stuff  as  a w^hole 
is  surely  not  single-in-intent  and  it  is  surely  not  distracted.  But 
if  this  [mind-stuff  when  single-in-intent]  is  withdrawn  from  all 
[objects]  and  concentrated  upon  one  [entity],  then  it  may  be  said 
to  be  single-in-intent  [and]  hence  not  limited  to  one  object  after 
another.  If,  on  the  other  hand, — [in  the  opinion]  of  him  who  main- 
tains that  the  mind-stuff  becomes  single-in-intent  as  a stream  of 
similar  ideas, — singleness-in-intent  be  a property  of  the  mind-stuff 
[conceived]  as  a stream,  then  the  mind-stuff  [conceived  as]  a stream 
could  not  be  a single  thing,  because  [as  he  insists]  it  changes  from 
moment  to  moment.  If  however  [it  be  maintained  ^ that]  single- 
ness-of-intent  is  a property  of  an  idea  only  in  so  far  as  it  forms  a 
part  of  the  stream,  then — whether  it  consist  in  a stream  of  similar 
ideas  or  in  a stream  of  dissimilar  ideas — it  is  all  of  it  in  nowise 
other  than  single-in-intent,  inasmuch  as  it  is  limited  to  one  object 
after  another,  and  the  fact  that  mind-stuff  is  distracted  is  unex- 
plained. Therefore  it  may  be  said  that  mind-stuff  is  a single  thing 
[and]  has  many  intended  objects  [and]  is  stable. 

Furthermore  if  ideas  accidentally  related  and  different  in  nature 
were  produced  by  a single  mind-stuff,  then  what  a situation  ! One 
idea  would  be  the  remembrancer  of  a thing  seen  by  another  idea ; 
and  one  idea  would  be  later  the  experiencer  of  the  latent- 
impression  of  karma  accumulated  by  another  idea.  Even  if  this 
could  in  some  way  be  harmonized  ^ (samadhlya),  it  would  surpass 
[in  falsity]  the  maxim  of  the  Cowdung  ^ as  a milky  preparation. 


> See  i.  12. 

As,  for  example,  by  Dharmakirti. 

® This  same  word  also  has  the  meaning  of 
‘ concentrated  ’. 


* See  Colonel  Jacob’s  Handful  of  Popular 
Maxims,  Part  1,  2nd  ed.,  p.  25.  Com- 
pare Sarvadarfana-samgraha  (Anand^ 
9rama  ed.),  p.  15'. 


67] 


One  common  substrate  of  ideas  [ — i.  32 

Moreover  if  the  mind-stuff  is  to  be  [one  idea  after]  another,  then 
[the  Buddhist  who  holds  this  opinion]  denies  the  experience  of  his 
own  self.  How  does  the  idea  ‘ I ’ in  such  expressions  as  ‘ I am 
touching  what  I have  seen  ’ and  ‘ I am  seeing  what  I have  touched  ’ 
inhere  in  one  common  [abheda)  substrate-of-ideas,  if  all  the  ideas 
have  nothing  in  common  ? How  could  the  idea  ‘ I am  this  un- 
divided self’ — which  has  a single  idea  [‘  I ’]  as  its  object  and  which 
persists  in  absolutely  different  mind-stuffs — become  hypostasized 
(aprayet)  in  one  generic  substrate-of-ideas  ? The  idea  ‘ I am  this 
undivided  self’  is  knowable  in  one’s  own  experience.  Moreover 
the  authority  of  a perception  is  not  overthrown  by  [that  of]  any 
other  source-of-valid-ideas.  Whereas  any  other  source-of-valid- 
ideas  comes  into  use  only  by  virtue  of  a perception.  Consequently 
the  mind-stuff  is  one  [and]  has  many  objects  and  is  stable. 

He  introduces  a sutra  which  summarizes  the  meaning  which  he  has  been  stating. 
This  he  does  by  saying  <Krurthermore  these.S>  Furthermore  [that  is]  after  the 
meaning  which  he  has  been  stating.  The  connexion  [of  the  sentences]  is  that 
he  sums  up  by  reciting  this  sutra.  The  reason  why  [the  distractions]  must  be 
restricted  is  told  in  the  words  <gthe  foes  of  concentration.^  Although  the  words 
beginning  ‘By  devotion  to  the  l9vara’  [i.  23]  refer  to  practice  only,  still  in  this 
case  passionlessness  must  be  deemed  to  be  a co-operator  with  this  [practice]. 
Accordingly  he  says  <SCby  the  same  two.S>  By  the  same  two  already  character- 
ized, by  practice  and  by  passionlessness,  [distractions  are]  to  be  restricted.  The 
words  «of  theseS>  [mean]  of  these  two,  namely,  practice  and  passionlessness  ; 
the  words  «the  practice»,  that  which  is  to  be  described  next.  32.  To  check 
them  [let  there  be]  practice  upon  a single  entity.  A single  entity,  that  is,  the 
l9vara.  For  [He]  is  the  subject-matter  [of  the  discussion]. — According  to  the 
Destructionists  the  mind-stuff  as  a whole  is  single-in-intent,  [that  is]  is  not  in  any 
degree  whatsoever  distracted.  Consequently  their  teachings  and  their  actions 
subservient  to  their  teachings  are  meaningless,  as  he  says  in  the  words  ^But  one 
whose.^  [He  refers  to  one]  in  whose  opinion  [the  mind-stuff]  is  directed  to 
one  object  after  another  whether  to  one  [at  a time]  or  to  more  than  one  [at  a 
time].  Limited  [in  time],  that  is,  present  {samutpamia)  only  so  long  as  the 
intended-object  is  vivid  {ahhasa),  [and]  ending  just  there  [and]  not  going  else- 
where. ‘ Why  not  first  take  the  foremost  intended-object  and  afterwards  take  the 
next  object?’  In  reply  he  says  <Sand  is  momentary.»  Inasmuch  as  a moment 
is  indivisible,  it  cannot  have  [within  itself]  the  relation  of  before  and  after.  In 
our  system,  however,  since  mind-stuff  is  not  momentary ; and  since  it  can  be 
stable  with  regard  to  its  object,  whether  this  be  one  or  many  ; and  since  at  each 
moment,  in  so  far  as  one  object  is  taken  and  another  left,— [mind-stuff  can  be] 


i.  32 — ] 


Booh  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[68 


distracted.  Consequently,  by  removing  the  mutations  of  distraction,  singleness- 
of-intent  may  be  imposed  [upon  the  mind-stuff  J.  That  the  teaching  and  the  doing 
of  this  is  not  futile,  is  stated  in  the  words  «But  if.»  He  sums  up  by  saying  «hence 
not.:»  He  sets  up  for  refutation  a Destructionist  {vainagilca)  by  the  words  «on 
the  other  hand  . . . who.)^  The  meaning  is  that  there  shall  be  no  attempt  to 
impose  singleness-of-intent  upon  a mind-stuff  that  is  single  and  momentary.  But 
in  the  case  of  a mind-stuff  in  serial  order  that  is  from  time  without  beginning  and 
that  is  not  momentary,  distraction  will  be  removed  and  singleness-in-intent  will 
be  imposed.  He  takes  up  these  two  alternatives  and  shows  the  faults  [of  the  one] 
by  saying  «of  him.S>  In  his  system,  if  singleness-of-intent  is  to  be  the  property  of 
the  mind-stuff  conceived  as  a stream  or  of  a serial-order  of  mind-stuff,  then  the 
stream  of  mind-stuff  is  not  a unit  and  is  not  persistent  in  the  p resen ted-ideas  as 
they  successively  arise.  Why  [is  this  so]  ? Because  in  your  system  whatever  is 
at  all  is  all  of  it  momentary,  and  there  is  nothing  not  momentary : this  is  the 
point.  He  takes  up  the  other  alternative  in  the  words  «If  however.^  A pre- 
sented-idea  which  is  a portion  of  [this  whole]  subjective  (sdihvrta)  stream  might 
be  real.  For  this  reason  the  singleness-of-intent  with  reference  to  this  presented- 
idea  would  be  a property  [belonging  to  a portion  of  the  stream]  [and]  to  be 
obtained  by  an  effort.  He  shows  the  fault  [in  this  alternative]  by  saying  <Kall  of 
it.)^  Accordingly  in  so  far  as  it  has  the  form  of  real  being,  it  is — since  it 
[must]  be  limited  to  one  object  after  another  [and]  because  it  therefore  arises 
during  the  vividness  [ahlmsa]  of  the  object-intended  by  this  {yat)  [presented-idea] 
and  because  it  is  finished  during  this  [moment  of  vividness] — single-in-intent  only. 
And  thus  the  fact  that  mind-stuff  is  distracted  remains  unexplained.  While  it 
is  to  remove  this  [distraction]  that  singleness-in-intent  is  imposed.  He  sums 
up  by  saying  «Therefore.X>  Hence  also  mind-stuff  is  one  and  has  many  objects 
and  is  stable  as  he  explains  by  saying  «Furthermore  if.^  For  just  as  Chaitra 
cannot  be  he  who  remembers  the  book  read  by  Maitra  and  just  as  Chaitra  cannot 
be  the  enjoyer  of  the  fruit  of  the  latent-impressions  of  karma,  heaped  up  by  Maitra, 
mth  which  he  has  had  no  connexion,  whether  meritorious  or  bad,  so  likewise 
something  seen  by  one  presented-idea  cannot  be  remembered  by  another  presented- 
idea  ; nor  can  the  fruit  of  a latent-deposit  of  karma  heaped  u^)  by  one  presented-idea 
be  experienced  by  another  idea.  [The  Destructionist  might  reply  that  his  doctrine 
of  momentariness]  does  not  prove  too  much,  provided  we  add  the  qualification 
‘ if  there  be  a relation  of  cause  and  effect  For  in  such  cases  as  the  funeral- 
sacrifice  (rraddha)  and  the  vdicvdnarl  sacrifice  {isti)  [at  the  birth  of  a son]  we  find 
that  the  fruition  [of  the  sacrifice]  passes  [in  the  one  case]  to  the  father  and 
mother  and  [in  the  other  case]  to  the  son,  whereas  none  [of  the  three]  is  the 
actual  agent'  [in  the  sacrifice].  Or  [again]  in  such  cases’*  as  that  of  the  [bitter] 

* In  the  grdddha  the  son  sacrifices  for  the  of  the  two  sacrifices  is  found  in  the 

benefit  of  the  father ; in  the  vdicvunarl,  Bhasya  on  Jaimini-sutra  iv.  3.  38. 

the  father  for  the  son.  For  the  latter  This  seems  to  refer  to  Kumarila’s  refuta- 
see  Taittiriya  Ar.  ii.  6.  A discussion  tion  of  the  Buddhists  in  Qlokavarttika, 


69] 


[— i.  32 


Permanence  of  the  ego 


mango-seeds  that  have  been  nourished  with  sweet  juices  [we  see]  that  the  fruition 
by  an  indirect  process  must  become  sweet.  [Thus  the  effort  of  one  momentary 
idea  could  find  its  result  in  another  idea  single-in-intent  and  indirectly  related  to  it 
through  a serial-order.]  In  reply  to  this  he  says  «Even  if  this  could  in  some  way 
be  harmonized. 2>  The  connexion  of  thought  is  this.  What  shall  we  say  is  the 
difference  between  ideas  resident  in  one  serial-order  and  different ' ideas  resident  in 
another  serial-order,  so  that — when  [something]  has  been  experienced  or  ^ when 
[some]  latent-impression  of  karma  has  been  heaped  up  by  an  idea  resident  in  one 
serial-order — [another]  idea  belonging  to  the  same  serial-order  should  be  the  one  to 
remember  or  to  enjoy  it  and  not  an  idea  belonging  to  a different  serial-order?  For 
this  that  we  call  a serial-order  is  not  such  a [materially]  real  thing  that  it  could 
[as  such]  distinguish  the  unit-in-the-serial-order  [santanin)  from  [ideas]  resident  in 
other  serial-orders.  Furthermore  an  imaginary  distinction  cannot  consistently 
exert  activity.  Surely  the  Brahman-boy  cannot  cook  with  fire  that  he  imagines  to 
be  present.  Moreover  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect  is  also  nothing  that  is 
[materially]  real  [in  this  case  of  the  two  ideas,  one  of  which  appears  in  a series 
after  the  other  has  disappeared].  Because  it  is  impossible  that  there  should  be  in 
the  present  time  a substrate  for  two  things  which  are  not  co-existent,  just  as 
there  cannot  be  [a  substrate]  for  two  things  [separate  in  space]  like  the  left 
horn  and  the  other  horn  which  do  however  coexist  [in  time].  For  the  past  and 
the  future  cannot  function  as  the  present  by  being-partially-in-relation-and- 
partially-out-of-relation®  {vyasanj)  [since  momentariness  is  byhypothesisassumed]. 
Consequently  ideas  are  not  under  the  limiting-conditions  either  of  a serial- 
order  or  of  a causal  relation  which  is  a part  of  their  being ; [and],  because  they 
are  real,  they  cannot,  in  so  far  as  there  are  no  reciprocal  contacts,  be  dis- 
tinguished from  other  ideas  whether  resident  in  the  same  serial-order  or  in  other 
serial-orders.  This  same  line-of-reasoning  is  continued  by  an  allusion  to  the 
cow-dung  and  the  milk  ; cow-dung  is  milk,  because  it  is  a product  of  the  cow, 
like  milk,  which  both  sides  admit  [to  be  a product  of  the  cow].  [The  Buddhist 
argument]  <SCsurpasses»  this  [in  falsity]  because  it  is  superior  [in  falsity]  even  to 
this  [line-of-reasoning]  in  so  far  as  it  has  the  false  appearance  of  being  a line-of- 
reasoning. — And  this  [system  of  ours]  cannot  be  charged  [with  the  fault  of] 
destroying''  what  has  been  accomplished  and  accepting  what  has  not  been 
accomplished.  For  [we  hold  that]  it  is  mind-stuff  that  is  the  agent  of  actions  ; 


pp.  262  and  267  (Chowkambha  ed.). 
Compare  De  la  Vallee  Poussin’sLe  Boud- 
dhisme,  1902,  page  63,  notes  1 77  and  178. 

‘ Reading  hliinnapratyayandm  with  the 
Bombay  Sanskrit  Series  edition  and 
with  the  Bikaner  MS. 

^ This  word  is  omitted  by  the  two  texts 
just  mentioned  and  ca  is  inserted 
before  karmdgayasya. 

’ That  which  is  in  several  simultaneously 


and  is  not  completely  in  any  one.  See 
Nyayako9a  s.v.  vydsanga  and  contrast 
it  with  its  opposite  ekaparydptatva. 

* See  Bhaskarodaya  (Nirn.  Sag.  ed.),  p.  49^. 
The  charge  by  the  Buddhist  is  that  the 
Yoga  system  assumes  a common  sub- 
stance for  the  thinking-substance  as 
causal  agent  and  for  the  Self  as  ex- 
periencer.  Whereas  the  Yoga  system 
itself  denies  such  a common  substrate. 


i.  32—] 


Booh  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[70 


it  is  this  [mind-stuff]  that  is  connected  with  the  pleasures  and  the  pains 
generated  by  these  actions.  For  the  mind-stuff  when  changed  [by  receiving]  the 
image  {chdya)  of  the  intelligence  experiences  pleasures  and  pains.  Hence  the 
supposition  that  experience  in  the  Self  is  because  of  the  assumption  (graha) 
of  an  identity  of  the  mind-stuff  and  the  Self.  Such  is  the  very  nature  itself  of 
these  [mental  pleasures  and  pains],  which  originate  in  dependence  upon  their 
own  causes,'  that  they  themselves  remember  and  experience  later  the  conse- 
quence, while  others  ^ do  not  [remember].  And  the  very-natures  [of  these 
mental  pleasures  and  pains]  ought  not  to  be  an  injunction  {nigoga)  so  that  one 
says  ‘ Let  this  be  so  ’ or  ‘ Let  this  not  be  so  ’,  nor  should  it  be  a question 
{jgaryanuyoga)  so  that  one  asks  ‘ Why  is  this  not  so  ? ’ — To  him  who  will  not  be 
satisfied  with  what  has  already  been  said  he  speaks  with  the  words  <SMoreover 
. . . his  own  self.»  The  idea  ‘ I ’ is  bound  up  with  the  mind-stuff  which  is  not 
distinguished  [from  the  idea]  and  is  the  substrate  of  experiences  and  of  memories 
of  experiences  that  have  qualities  of  originating  and  of  ceasing,  however  varied 
they  may  be.  How  can  [this  idea]  be  attached  to  ideas  that  are  absolutely 
distinguished  from  itself?  It  might  be  objected  that — inasmuch  (a)  as  there  is 
a distinction  between  the  two  causes  1.  the  process-of-knowing  [in  direct  percep- 
tion] and  2.  memory,  and  inasmuch  (&)  as  there  is  a coherence  (samsarga)  of  the 
two  contradictory  qualities  of  immediate-perceptibility  and  of  mediate-percepti- 
bility— the  so-called  recognition  [that  this  was  that]  (pratyahhijndna)  is  not  a 
single  idea  such  that  there  could  be  a unity  of  the  mind-stuff  which  contains  these 
[contradictory]  ideas.  For  this  reason  he  says  <&in  one’s  own  experience.)^  The 
objector  might  reply  that  ‘ 1.  the  distinction  between  the  two  causes  and  2.  the 
coherence  between  two  contradictory  causes  have  been  mentioned  as  inhibiting 
this  [one’s  own  experience].’  In  reply  to  this  he  says  «Moreover  ...  of  a per- 
ception . . . not.»  The  totalities-of-causes  [sdmagn)  do  not  remain  distinct, — 
on  one  condition  only,  that  they  are  reduced-to-terms  {anusdra)  of  perception. 
And  [that  the  totalities-of-causes  do  not  remain  distinct]  is  not  contradicted  by 
the  fact  that  the  qualities  are  immediate-perceptibility  and  mediate-perceptibility, 
— this  is  shown  to  be  consistent  in  the  Nyayakanika.  And  the  action  of  objects- 
intended  by  a [mind-stuff]  that  is  not  momentary  is  shown  to  be  consistent  in  the 
Nyayakanika*  and  in  the  Brahmatattvasamlksa.  Thus  all  is  made  clear. 


Of  which  [stable  mind-stuff]  this  purification  ^ is  enjoined  by  the 
system.  By  what  means  is  this  ? 


' Compare  Qilmkarabhasya  ii.  2.  21  (Nirn. 
Sag.  ed.,  1904,  p.  457,  last  line). 

“ It  is  the  agent  himself  that  has  the 
experience  of  the  consequences. 

® Both  these  books  are  in  Vacaspatimi^ra’s 
own  list  of  his  works  which  he  gives 
at  the  close  of  the  Bhamati-vyakhya  ; 
the  first  is  a gloss  on  the  Miniahsa 


book  called  Vidhiviveka,  the  second  is 
a gloss  on  the  Vedanta  work  called 
Brahma-siddhi.  The  first  has  been 
published  in  Benares  by  E.  J.  Lazarus, 
first  in  the  Pandit  (1907)  and  later  as 
a separate  volume. 

* Sec  pp.  80'  and  84'®  (Calc.  ed.). 


71] 


Friendliness,  com2ocission,  joy,  indifference  [ — i.  33 


33.  By  the  cultivation  of  friendliness  towards  happiness 
and  compassion  towards  pain  and  joy  towards  merit  and 
indifference  towards  demerit  [the  yogin  should  attain]  the 
undisturbed  calm  of  the  mind-stuff. 

Of  these  ^ [four]  he  should  cultivate  friendliness  towards  all  living 
beings  that  have  reached  the  experience  of  happiness  ; compas- 
sion towards  those  in  pain  ; joy  towards  those  whose  character 
is  meritorious  ; indifference  towards  those  whose  character  is 
demeritorious.  When  he  thus  cultivates  [friendliness  and  the  rest] 
the  white  ^ quality  [of  karma]  comes  into  being  [within  him]. 
And  then  the  mind-stuff  becomes  calm  ; and  when  calm  it  becomes 
single-in-intent  and  reaches  the  stable  state. 

Because  one  whose  central-organ  is  unpurified  and  full  of  such  [feelings]  as 
jealousy  cannot  successfully  (sampatti)  effect  concentration  and  the  means  of 
concentration,  he  proceeds  to  set  forth  the  means  of  [securing]  undisturbed  calm 
of  the  mind,  which  are  hostile  to  such  [feelings]  as  jealousy.  This  he  does 
by  saying  4COf  which  [stable  mind-stuff]  this.)?>  In  other  woi’ds,  of  which 
stable  mind-stuff  this  is  the  purification.  The  sutra  begins  with  the  words 
33  . . . friendliness  and  compassion  and  ends  with  the  words  undisturbed 
calm  ....  When  towards  those  who  are  happy  the  mind-stuff^  cultivates 
friendliness,  that  is,  cordiality^,  [then]  the  taint  of  envy  ceases.  When 
towards  those  who  are  in  pain  [the  mind-stuff]  cultivates  compassion,  that  is, 
a desire  to  destroy  pain  in  another  as  if  it  were  his  own,  [then]  the  taint  of  a 
desire  to  injure  others  ceases  from  the  mind.’’  When  towards  living- creatures 
whose  disposition  is  meritorious  the  mind  cultivates  joy,®  that  is,  gladness, 
[then]  the  taint  of  jealousy  ceases.  When  towards  those  whose  disposition  is 
demeritorious,  the  mind  cultivates  indifference,  that  is,  neutrality,  [then]  the 
taint  of  wrath  ceases.  And  then,  after  the  qualities  (dharma)  made  of  rajas  and  of 
tamas  have  ceased,  the  white  quality  made  of  sattva  comes  into  being.  One  may 
say  that  he  becomes  endowed  with  a superiority  of  sattva.  When  there  can- 
properly-be-said-to-be  {palisa)  a restriction  of  the  fluctuations,  his  mind-stuff. 


* These  form  the  chapter  on  the  Brahma 

viharas  in  the  Visuddhi-Magga. 

^ Compare  the  statements  in  iv.  7 on  white 
and  black  karma ; and  in  ii.  13  on  the 
rise  of  white  karma. 

* This  construction  is  a good  instance  of 

djro  Koivov  (Tcahaksi), 

* This  form  (sauhdrdam)  does  not  seem  to 

accord  with  the  examples  given  in 
Siddhanta  kaumudi  on  vi.  3.  52  (Nirn. 
Sag.  ed.,  1904,  p.  207^. 


® Medhatithi  on  Manu,  in  a characteristi- 
cally Schopenhaurian  frame  of  mind, 
informs  us  that  friendliness  is  the 
absence  of  aversion  {dvesdbhdva)  and 
not  an  attachment  to  one’s  friends. 
For  that  would  be  bondage.  Similarly 
joy  is  the  cessation  of  grief  hut  not 
positive  gladness.  Because  that  would 
be  the  result  of  passion.  See  Balarama’s 
notetp.77  (Calc.ed.).  I have  not  traced 
the  passage  to  Medhatithi-bhatta. 


i.  33—] 


Booh  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[72 


because  its  true  nature  is  undisturbed  calm,  becomes  undisturbedly  calm.  And 
when  undisturbedly  calm,  by  means  which  are  to  be  stated,^  it  becomes  single- 
in-intent and  gains  the  stable  state.  But  if  there  be  no  cultivation  of  friendliness 
and  the  other  [feelings]  these  means  are  not  adequate  for  stability. 


34.  Or  [he  gains  stability]  by  expulsion  and  retention  of 
breath. 

Expulsion  is  the  ejection  of  the  abdominal  air  through  the  aper- 
tures of  the  nose  by  a special  kind  of  effort.  Retention  is  restraint 
of  the  breath. — <Or>  by  these  two  he  should  attain  to  a stability 
of  the  central-organ. 

He  now  states  these  means  of  [obtaining]  stability. 

84.  Or  [he  gains  stability]  by  expulsion  and  retention  of  breath. 

The  word  <Or>  signifies  that  there  is  a choice  with  regard  to  other  means  [now] 
to  be  stated,  but  not  with  regard  to  cultivation  of  friendliness  and  of  the  [other] 
feelings ; because  [the  alternatives  now  mentioned]  are  in  addition  to  that 
[cultivation].  He  explains  the  expulsion  by  saying  «of  the  abdominal.^  By 
a special  kind  of  effort,  described  in  books  of  Yoga,  by  means  of  which  the 
abdominal  wind  is  gradually  emitted  through  the  apertures  of  the  nose.  He 
explains  retention  by  saying  «Eetention  is  restraint  of  the  breath.)^  It  is  the 
restraint  of  that  portion  of  the  abdominal  wind  that  is  emitted  breath  ; it  is  the 
keeping  of  it  outside  ; it  is,  on  the  other  hand,  not  allowing  it  to  enter  suddenly. 
By  these  two,  the  expulsion  and  retention  of  wind,  his  body  becomes  light  and 
his  central  organ  gains  the  stable  state.  In  this  [sutra]  we  have  to  supply 
{cikrs)  the  word  ‘ stability  ’ from  the  phrase  ‘ comes  into  a relation  of  stability  ’ 
found  in  the  next  sutra ; and  this  is  to  be  connected  with  the  words  ‘ should 
attain  ’ as  is  understood  from  the  context  {artha). 

35.  Or  [he  gains  stability  when]  a sense-activity  {pravrtti) 
arises  connected  with  an  object  [and]  bringing  the  central- 
organ  into  a relation  of  stability. 

The  consciousness  of  supernormal  (divya)  odour  in  one  who  attends 
fixedly  to  the  tip  of  his  nose  is  sense-activity  with  odour  [as  object]  ; 
on  the  tip  of  the  tongue,  the  consciousness  of  supernormal  taste ; on 
the  palate,  supernormal  colour ; on  the  middle  of  the  tongue,  the 
consciousness  of  touch  ; on  the  root  of  the  tongue,  the  conscious- 
ness of  sound.  These  sense-activities  when  arisen  bring  the  mind- 
stuff  into  a relation  of  stability  [and]  dispel  doubt  and  become  a 
way  of  approach  to  concentrated  insight.^  Thus  sense-activity 
^ Book  ii.  Iff.  * Compare  i.  20. 


73] 


[ — i.  35 


Steadying  the  mind-stuff 


with  regard  to  the  moon  or  the  sun  or  planets  or  gems  or  [the 
rays  of]  a lamp  or  similar  objects,  when  it  arises,  should  be 
regarded  as  being  connected  with  an  object.  For  although  the 
true  nature  of  things  as  they  really  are  ^ becomes  accessible  by 
means  of  the  various  sciences  and  by  inferences  and  by  the 
instruction  of  masters, — since  these  [means]  are  adequate  to 
inform  us  of  the  things  as  they  are, — still,  so  long  as  any  part 
whatsoever  has  not  become  consciously  knowable  by  the  appro- 
priate organ,  the  whole  seems  mediately-perceived.  And  the 
thinking-substance  is  not  made  to  arise  firmly  with  regard  to 
such  subtile  intended-objects  as  Release.  Therefore  [if]  only  for 
the  sake  of  reinforcing  books  and  inferences  and  the  instruction  of 
masters,  some  one  particular  thing  must  necessarily  be  made  an 
object  of  perception.  Then  after  a portion  of  the  intended-object 
as  taught  by  these  [three  means]  has  been  made  the  object  of  per- 
ception, the  whole,  even  unto  such  an  exceeding  subtile  object  as 
Release,  is  thoroughly  believed.  For  precisely  this  purpose  the 
purification  ^ of  the  mind-stuff  is  enjoined.  If  there  are  fluctua- 
tions unrestrained  [as  contrasted  with  this  portion],  then,  when  the 
Consciousness  of  being  Master  with  regard  to  these  has  been  pro- 
duced, [the  mind-stuff]  would  be  adequate  to  effect  a perception  of 
these  various  intended-objects.  And  this  done,  [the  yogin]  will 
without  hindrance  acquire  belief  [and]  energy  [and]  mindfulness 
[and]  concentration  [i.  20]. 

He  tells  of  another  means  for  stability.  35.  Or  [he  gains  stability  when] 
a sense-activity  (pravrtti)  arises  connected  with  an  object  [and]  bringing 
the  central-organ  into  a relation  of  stability.  He  explains  by  saying  «in 
one  who  attends  fixedly  to  the  tip  of  his  nose.»  In  one  performing  fixed- 
attentions  [and]  contemplations  [and]  concentrations  there  arises,  as  a result 
of  success  in  these,  that  direct-perception  which  is  a supernormal  consciousness 
of  odours.  Similarly  [what  is  said]  is  applicable  to  the  other  sense-activities 
also.  And  this  is  to  be  believed  on  the  strength  of  the  authoritative-word  ^ 
and  not  from  probable-reasonings  (upapattitas).  An  objection,  ‘This  may  be 


' This  word  yathdhhuta  is  thought  by  Mrs. 
Rhys  Davids  to  be  ‘specifically  and 
uniquely  Gotamic’.  (C.  A.  F.  Rhys 
Davids  : Seeing  Things  as  they  Really 
are,  in  Buddhism,  vol.  i,  no.  3,  p.  382, 
March,  1904.)  The  fact  that  it  occurs 
10  [h.o.s.  it] 


here  is  another  proof  of  the  intimate 
connexion  between  the  Yoga  system  of 
philosophy  and  Buddhism. 

“ See  also  above,  p.  70  end,  or  text,  p.  77* 
(Calc.  ed.). 

* Compare  Maitri  Up.  vi.  20. 


i.35 — ] Booh  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi  [74 

so.  But  of  what  use  is  this  kind  of  fluctuations  which  are  of  no  service  as 
regards  Isolation?’  In  reply  he  says  «These.»  These  fluctuations,  when 
once  arisen,  in  a very  short  time  bring  the  mind-stuff"  into  a relation  of 
stability  with  the  object  whether  it  be  the  I^vara  or  the  discriminative 
discernment.  Another  objection,  ‘How  could  a fluctuation  in  relation  to 
one  object  bring  [the  mmd-stuff]  into  a relation  of  stability  with  another 
object?’  In  reply  to  this  he  says  <Kdispel  doubt.»  It  dispels  [that  is]  it 
removes.  Consequently  [it  becomes  a way  of  approach]  «to  concentrated 
insight.»  By  the  word  «Thus)^  he  shows  by  analogy  that  other  fluctuations 
also,  which  are  taught  in  the  revealed  word,  can  be  made  objects.  If  it  be 
objected,  ‘Whence  can  there  be  a doubt  with  regard  to  matters  made  known 
by  the  revealed  word  and  by  other  [authorities],’  he  replies  with  the  words 
«For  although.»  For  Yoga  is  based  upon  belief.  And  when  a portion  of 
the  intended-objects  taught  is  made  the  object  of  perception,  contemplation 
and  the  other  [states]  which  are  based  upon  this  [belief],  follow  for  him 
without  obstruction. 

36.  Or  an  undistressed  [and]  luminous  [sense-activity  when 
arisen  brings  the  central-organ  into  a relation  of  stability]. 

The  words  ‘ sense-activity  when  arisen  brings  the  central-organ 
into  a relation  of  stability  ’ are  supplied  from  [sutra  35].  This  is 
that  consciousness  of  the  thinking-substance  which  occurs  when 
[the  yogin]  fixes  his  attention  upon  the  Lotus  of  the  Heart.  For 
1.  the  sattva  of  the  thinking-substance  becomes  resplendent  and 
[all-pervasive]  like  the  air  [dhdga).  By  skill  in  keeping  [his  central- 
organ]  stable  in  this  [Lotus],  this  sense-activity,  because  resplen- 
dent as  the  sun  or  the  moon  or  planets  or  gems,  becomes  trans- 
formed in  appearance.  Thus  2.  his  mind-stuff  comes  to  a state  of 
balance  with  regard  to  the  feeling-of-personality  and  becomes  wave- 
less like  the  Great  Sea  [and]  peaceful  [and]  infinite  [and]  the  feel- 
ing-of-personality and  nought  beside.  With  regard  to  which  it  has 
been  said  ^ “ Pondering  upon  this  self  which  is  a mere  atom,  one  is 
conscious  in  the  same  way  as  when  one  is  conscious  to  the  extent 
that  one  says  ‘ I am  This  undistressed  sense-activity  is  of  two 
kinds  : 1.  in  connexion  with  an  object,  and  2.  the  feeling-of-per- 
sonality and  nought  beside ; [and]  is  called  luminous.  By  means 
of  which  the  mind-stuff  of  the  yogin  gains  the  stable  state. 

^ Garbe  (Festgruss  an  Roth,  p.  78j  from  not  however  refer  to  a particular  state 

this  fragment  infers  a doctrine  of  the  only  of  the  self  ? 

atomic  nature  of  the  self.  Might  it 


75]  Pondering  upon  the  self  [ — i.  36 

36.  Or  an  undistressed  [and]  luminous  [sense-activity  when  arisen  brings 
the  central-organ  into  a relation  of  stability].  Without  distress  means 
freed  from  pain.  Luminous  means  something  having  luniination.  Luminous 
in  the  form  of  [casting]  radiance  <5Cupon  the  Lotus  of  the  Heart.»  That  lotus 
eight-petal  led  which  is  situated  with  head  downwards  between  the  abdomen 
and  the  thorax,  he  should  turn,  by  the  force  of  an  emissive  restraint  of  breath, 
head  upwards  and  fix  the  mind-stuff  attentively  upon  it.  In  the  middle  of 
this  [lotus]  is  the  circle  of  the  sun  [and]  the  letter  A*  [and]  the  locus  of  the 
waking-state.  Above  it  is  the  circle  of  the  moon  [and]  the  letter  U [and] 
the  locus  of  sleep.  Above  this  is  the  circle  of  fire  [and]  the  letter  M [and] 
the  locus  of  deep-sleep.  Above  which  is  the  highest,  whose  essence  is  the 
air  [and]  the  prolonged  nasal  {bralima-nada)  [and]  the  locus  of  the  fourth 
\turiya]  state  [and]  a half-measure.  [All  this]  the  knowers  of  Brahma  relate. 
In  this  [Lotus],  that  is,  in  the  pericarp  [of  the  lotus],  is  the  tube  {nudi)  of 
Brahma,  with  upturned  face,  and  reaching  to  the  circle  of  the  sun  and  the 
other  [circles].  And  upwai’d  from  this  there  extends  the  tube  called  Sushumna.^ 
This  passes  through  the  outer  circles  also  beginning  with  that  of  the  sun. 
Now  this  [tube]  is  the  locus  of  the  mind-stufif.  And  by  fixing  attention  upon 
this  [tube]  the  yogin  acquires  in  addition  the  consciousness  of  mind-stuff. 
After  showing  the  consistency  [of  his  statement]  he  indicates  what  the  appear- 
ance of  the  consciousness  of  the  thinking-substance  is  by  saying  <5CFor  1.  the 
sattva  of  the  thinking-substance.»  The  words  ^like  the  air  {dkdga)'^  describe 
its  pervasive  character.  It  takes  various  forms,  it  is  transformed  into  the 
appearance  [that  is]  into  the  form  of  the  splendours  of  such  [bodies]  as  the  sun. 
And  here  thinking-substance  (buddhi)  is  understood  to  be  the  central-organ 
(manas)  and  not  the  Great  Principle  {mahat-tattva).  Moreover,  placed  in  the 
Sushumna  and  produced  from  the  personality-substance  which  is  itself  evolved  * 
[from  sattva],  it  has  an  abundance  of  sattva  ; for  this  reason  its  luminosity  is 
emphasized.  Furthermore,  in  so  far  as  it  is  concerned  with  various  objects, 
its  pervasiveness  is  also  established.  Having  shown  the  state  of  balance 
[samapatti]  with  regard  to  the  central-organ,  an  effect  of  the  feeling- of-per- 
sonality,  he  describes  what  the  state-of-balance  is  in  itself  with  regard  to  the 
feeling-of-personality  by  saying  «Thus  . . . comes  to  a state  of  balance.^ 
«Peaceful»  [that  is]  that  from  which  the  waves  of  rajas  and  tamas  have  passed 
away.  <§Tnfinite)J>  is  all-pervading.  «The  feeling-of-personality  and  nought 
beside^  is  a form  in  which  the  splendours  of  various  kinds  do  not  reoccur. 
He  makes  his  own  opinion  accord  with  another  authoritative-work  [agama) 
by  saying  «With  regard  to  which. With  regard  to  which  this  has  been 
said  by  Pancafikha.  It  is  called  an  atom  because  it  is  hard  of  access  [to 
knowledge].  The  self  has  the  personality-substance  as  its  basis.  Pondering 
[that  is]  reflecting  [upon  it],  one  knows  in  the  same  way  as  when  one  knows 
‘ I am  ’.  An  objector  says,  ‘ This  may  be  true  that  the  luminous  [sense-activity] 
* See  Mand.  Up.  9.  * So  MSS.,  not  susumna.  ® See  Sam.  Ear.  xxv. 


i.  36—] 


Booh  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[76 


assumes  various  forms  of  splendour,  but  how  can  the  luminous  [sense-activity] 
assume  the  form  of  the  feeling-of-personality  and  nought  beside  ? ’ In  reply 
to  this  he  says  «This  ...  is  of  two  kinds. ^ The  point  is  that  the  sense-of- 
personality  is  itself,  when  cleansed  from  the  defilement  of  rajas  and  tamas, 
lumination.  He  states  also  the  consequences  of  the  two-fold  luminous  [sense- 
activity]  by  saying  <KBy  means  of  which. ^ 


37.  Or  the  mind-stuflf  [reaches  the  stable  state]  by  having  as 
its  object  [a  mind-stuff]  freed  from  passion.  Or  influenced  by 
having  as  the  supporting-object  a mind-stuff  freed  from  passion,^ 
the  yogin’s  mind-stuff  reaches  the  stable  state. 

37.  Or  the  mind-stuflf  [reaches  the  stable  state]  by  having  as  its  object 
[a  mind-stuflf]  freed  from  passion.  Those  freed  from  passion  are  Krsnadvai- 
payana  - and  certain  others.  Mind-stuff  is  affected  by  having  as  the  supporting- 
object  the  mind-stuflf  of  these. 


38.  Or  [the  mind-stuff  reaches  the  stable  state]  by  having  as 
the  supporting-object  a perception  in  dream  or  in  sleep.  Or, 

assuming  that  form  which  has  as  its  supporting-object  either  a 
perception  in  dream  or  in  sleep,  the  yogin’s  mind-stuff  reaches  the 
stable  state. 

38.  Or  [the  mind-stuflf  reaches  the  stable  state]  by  having  as  the  support- 
ing-object a perception  in  dream  or  in  sleep.  For  when  in  his  dream  he 
adores  the  Exalted  Mahe^vara’s  image  which  abides  within  a sequestered  forest 
and  seems  as  if  it  were  sculptured  out  of  the  moon’s  orb  ; [and]  its  members  and 
limbs  are  soft  as  lotus  stems ; it  is  made  of  precious  moonstone-gems  and 
festooned  with  garlands  of  exceeding  fragrant  jasmine  and  Malatl  flowers ; 
it  captivates  the  heart. — When  in  the  very  [act  of  adoration]  he  awakens  with 
mind  in  undisturbed  calm  ; then,  reflecting  upon  that  same  [image]  which  had 
become  the  object  supporting  the  perception  in  his  dream,  while  his  central- 
organ  is  identical  in  form  with  that  [object],  his  mind-stuflf  reaches  a stable 
state  in  that  very  [condition]. — And  sleep  in  this  case  is  to  be  understood  as 
having  the  quality  of  sattva.  Of  which  sleep,  when  he  wakes,  he  has  the 
connecting-memory  ‘ I slept  well  ’.  For  in  this  sleep  his  central-organ  has 
become  single-in-intent.  And  to  this  extent  only  [that  is,  in  a sleep  tainted  only 
in  so  far  as  it  refers  to  some  sattva  aspect  of  a thing],  the  knowers  of  Brahma 

' For  an  illuminatinginstance, see  Hopkins,  ^ SeeQamkaraBhasyaNirn.Sag.  ed.p.732^'’. 

Yoga-technique  (1901),  Journal  Am.  CompareTelang,  Journal  ofthe  Bombay 

Oriental  Soc.,  vol.  xxii,  pt.  2,  p.  356-7.  Br.  RAS.,  vol.  xvi  (1885),  p.  196. 


[ — i.  41 


77]  Mastery  of  the  mind-stuff 

tell  us  that  the  form  of  Brahma  is  in  a state  of  deep  sleep. — Moreover,  since 
perception  severed  from  the  object  to  be  perceived  cannot  come  within  the 
range  [of  the  sense-organs],  he  brings  that  object  also  which  is  to  be  perceived 
within  the  range  [of  the  sense-organs]. 


39.  Or  [the  mind-stuff  reaches  the  stable  state]  by  contem- 
plation upon  any  such  an  object  as  is  desired. 

Let  [the  yogin]  contemplate  whatever  object  he  desires.  Having 
reached  stability  there,  the  mind-stuff  reaches  the  stable  state 
elsewhere  also. 

39.  Or  [the  mind-stuff  reaches  the  stable  state]  by  contemplation  upon 
any  such  an  object  as  is  desired.  Why  say  more  ? Whatsoever  [object]  is 
desired,  [let  him  contemplate]  just  that,  whichsoever  particular  deity  it  be. 


40.  His  mastery  extends  from  the  smallest  atom  to  the 
greatest  magnitude. 

The  mind-stuff  entering  into  a subtile  thing  reaches  a stable  state 
which  extends  to  the  smallest  atom ; entering  a coarse  thing  it 
reaches  a stable  state  which  extends  to  the  greatest  magnitude. 
This  freedom  from  obstruction  of  his,  while  advancing  in  this  way 
to  both  of  these  kinds  of  limits,  is  complete  mastery.  So  the  yogin’s 
mind-stuff  filled  full  of  mastery  needs  not  again  the  purification 
perfected  by  practice. 

But  how  is  the  becoming  one's  self  (dtmlbJiava)  to  be  understood  as  being 
a stable  state  ? In  reply  he  says,  40.  His  mastery  extends  from  the  smallest 
atom  to  the  greatest  magnitude.  He  explains  by  saying  «into  a subtile 
thing.»  Summarizing  the  meaning  given  above  he  tells  the  meaning  of  the 
word  <mastery>  by  the  words  «both  of  these  kinds.»  He  tells  of  the  secondary 
results  of  mastery  by  saying  <5CSo  ...  of  mastery.)^ 


Now  when  the  mind  has  reached  stability,  what  is  the  balanced- 
state  {samdpatti)  as  such  {svarupa)  and  (vd)  as  directed  to  an 
object  ? This  is  told  [in  the  sutra]. 

41.  [The  mind-stuff]  from  which,  as  from  a precious  gem, 
fluctuations  have  dwindled  away,  is,  with  reference  either  to 


i.  41 — ] Booh  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi  [78 

the  knower  or  to  the  process-of-knowing  or  to  the  object-to- 
be-known,  in  the  state  of  resting  upon  [one]  of  these  [three] 
and  in  the  state  of  being  tinged  by  [one]  of  these  [three],  and 
[thus]  is  in  the  balanced-state. 

The  meaning  of  the  words  <from  which  ....  fluctuations  have 
dwindled  away>  refers  [to  the  mind-stutf]  of  which  the  presented- 
ideas  have  come  to  rest.  He  takes  as  the  example  the  words  <as 
from  a precious  gem.>^  Just  as  a crystal  is  tinged  by  the  various 
colours  of  the  different  things  next  to  which  it  lies  and  appears  as 
having  the  form  of  the  coloured  (rupa)  thing-next-to-which-it-lies 
{updgraya),  so  the  mind-stuff  is  influenced  by  referring  to  the 
object-to-be-known  and  comes  into  a state-of-balance  with  the 
object- to-be-known  and  appears  as  having  the  form  of  the  object-to- 
be-known  as  it  is  in  itself.  Influenced  by  a subtile  element  it  comes 
into  a state-of-balance  with  the  subtile  element  and  seems  to  be 
the  subtile  element  itself.  Likewise,  influenced  by  referring  to  a 
coarse  [element]  it  comes  into  a state-of-balance  with  a coarse  form 
and  seems  to  have  a coarse  form.  Similarly,  influenced  by  particu- 
lar things  of  the  world  it  comes  into  a state-of-balance  with  the 
particular  thing  of  the  world  and  seems  to  have  the  form  of  the 
world.  An  analogous  situation  would  be  found  to  exist  also  with 
reference  to  the  processes-of-knowiug,  [that  is]  in  the  organs  of 
sense.  Influenced  by  referring  to  a process-of-knowing  it  comes 
into  a state-of-balance  with  the  process-of-knowing  and  appears  as 
having  the  form  of  the  process-of-knowing  as  it  is  in  itself.  Simi- 
larly, influenced  by  referring  to  the  Self  as  knower  it  comes  into  a 
state-of-balance  with  the  Self  as  knower  and  appears  as  having  the 
form  of  the  Self  as  knower.  Similarly,  influenced  by  referring  to 
a liberated  Self  it  comes  into  a state-of-balance  with  the  liberated 
Self  and  appears  as  having  the  form  of  the  liberated  Self.  Thus  it 
is  that  the  mind,  which  is  like  a precious  gem,  in  the  state  of  rest- 
ing upon  [one]  of  these,  upon  the  knower  or  upon  a process-of- 
knowing  or  upon  the  object-to-be-known  [that  is]  upon  the  Self  or 
a sense-organ  or  an  element,  [and  which  is]  in  a state  of  being 
tinged  by  [one  of]  these,  [that  is]  while  resting  upon  [one  of]  these, 


Compare  Qakuntala,  First  prose  speech  after  ii.  7 (Pischel,  p.  125'*). 


79]  Conscious  balanced-states  [ — i.  41 

changes  into  their  form — this  [mind]  is  said  to  be  in  the  balanced- 
state. 

Thus  the  means  for  stability  of  the  mind-stuff  have  been  stated.  The  mastery 
of  that  mind-stuff  which  has  reached  stability  has  also  been  shown.  Now 
a question  is  asked,  ‘ When  the  mind  has  reached  stability,  what  object  has 
[concentration]  conscious  [of  an  object]  and  what  is  [concentration]  itself?’ 
This  he  asks  by  saying  ^Now.»  Referring  to  this  he  introduces  the  next 
sutra  by  saying  ^This  is  told.»  He  recites  the  sutra  41.  [The  mind-stuff]  .... 
as  from  a precious  gem ....  the  balanced-state.  He  explains  this  by  the 
words  <Kdwindled  away.»  The  mind-stuff  from  which  such  fluctuations  as 
sources-of-valid-ideas,  when  they  are  of  rajas  or  of  tamas,  have  dwindled  away 
as  a result  of  practice  and  of  passionlessness.  The  explanation  of  this  is 
^of  which  the  presented-ideas  have  come  to  rest.!^  In  this  manner  it  is  stated 
that  the  sattva  of  the  mind-stuff,  which  is  naturally  pure,  is  not  overpowered 
by  the  rajas  and  the  tamas.  He  makes  the  example  clear  by  saying  «Just  as.» 
— ^The  thing  next  to  which  it  lies)^  is  the  limiting  condition,  such  as  the 
hibiscus  flower. — <Slnfluenced  byS>  means  changed  into  its  likeness.  It 
appears  as  if  marked  by  the  form  of  the  red  or  blue  or  other  colour  which  is 
peculiar  to  the  thing  next  to  which  it  lies.  He  applies  [the  illustration]  to  the 
thing  illustrated  by  saying  ^so  ....  the  object-to-be-known.»  It  is  influenced 
by,  [that  is]  it  penetrates  into,  the  object-to-be-known  to  which  it  refers.  In 
this  way  he  distinguishes  the  object-to-be-known  from  the  knower  and  from  the 
process-of-knowing.  [The  mind-stuff]  covers  over  its  own  peculiar  form  as  inner 
organ  and  comes  into  a state  of  balance  with  the  object-to-be-knovvn  ; or  it  might 
be  said  that  it  seems  to  change  into  an  objective  state  of  being  known.  As 
a result  of  this  it  appears  as  having  the  form  of  the  object-to-be-known  as  it  is 
in  itself.  Influence  (upardga)  comes  only  from  an  object-to-be-known.  [This] 
he  subdivides  into  subtile  and  into  coarse  [forms]  by  saying  «a  subtile 
element.»  The  particular  things  of  the  world  are  evidently  those  with  an 
animate  nature,  for  instance,  cows ; and  those  with  an  inanimate  nature,  for 
instance,  water-jars.  In  accordance  with  this  it  has  been  shown  that  there  are 
two  concentrations  : that  accompanied  by  deliberation  [upon  coarse  objects]  ; 
and  that  accompanied  by  reflection  [upon  subtile  objects].  When  he  says 
^An  analogous  situation  ....  also  with  reference  to  the  processes-of-knowing, 
[that  is]  in  the  organs  of  sensed  he  means  that  sense-organs  are  processes  of 
knowing  in  that  by  them  intended-objects  are  known.  He  makes  the  same 
clear  by  saying  <Kreferring  to  a process  of  knowing.)^  Since  the  process  of 
knowing  is  itself  that  to  which  it  refers,  it  is  influenced,  [that  is]  permeated, 
by  this.  It  covers  over  its  own  peculiar  form  as  inner  organ  and  seems  to  be 
changed  * into  a process  of  knowing,  as  if  it  were  an  outer  organ.  Having 
described  in  this  way  [the  concentration]  accompanied  by  joy,  he  tells  of  that 

' The  cosmological  analogue  is  found  in  iii.  26,  p.  240,  last  line  (Calc.  ed.). 


1.  41—] 


Book  I.  Concentration  or  Samdclhi 


[80 


accompanied  by  the  feeling-of-personality  by  saying  <KSimilarly  . . . the  Self  as 
knower.»  Because  the  Self  as  Knower  is  the  locus  of  the  feeling  of  personality  : 
this  is  the  point.  Since  there  is  no  distinction  between  Selves,  released  Selves, 
like  ([!uka*  and  Prahlada,  as  objects  of  concentration,  must  be  included  as  being 
described  by  the  words  «Similarly . . . released. » Coming  to  a close  he  explains 
the  words  <resting  upon  [one]  of  these  [three]  and  in  the  state  of  being  tinged 
by  [one]  of  these  three)  by  saying  «Thus  it  is  that.))  The  mind-stuff’s  sattva 
freed  from  the  defilement  of  the  rajas  and  tamas  [aspects],  by  virtue  of  the 
purification  by  contemplation,  rests  upon  [that  is]  fixedly  attends  to  one  of 
these,  either  the  knower  or  the  process-of-knowing  or  the  object-to-be-known. 
This  state  of  being  tinged  by  [one]  of  these  [three],  [that  is]  taking  the  form 
of  [one]  of  them,  is  called  the  balanced-state,  in  other  words.  Yoga  with  the 
distinguishing-characteristic  of  being  conscious  [of  an  object]. — And  here  the 
order  of  words  in  the  sutra  <knower  or  jjrocess-of-kuowing  or  object-to-be- 
known)  need  not  be  heeded  since  it  runs  counter^  to  the  order  of  objects- 
intended  [as  given  in  experience].  Similarly,  in  the  Comment  also,  the  clearing 
[of  the  statement  with  regard  to  the  concentration  upon]  the  subtile'  elements 
as  being  the  first  [in  the  order  of  statements]  is  not  to  be  respected.  Thus  all 
becomes  satisfactory. 


42.  Of  these®  [balanced-states]  the  state-balanced  with  de- 
liberation is  confused  by  reason  of  predicate-relations 
between  words  and  intended-objects  and  ideas. 

For  example,  although  the  word*  ‘ cow  ’ and  the  intended-object 
‘ cow  ’ and  the  idea  ‘ cow  ’ are  things  distinct  from  each  other,  one 
finds  that  in  the  process-of-knowing  they  are  undistinguished. 
When  these  are  distinguished  from  each  other,  the  properties  of 
words  are  of  one  kind,  the  properties  of  objects-intended  are  of 
another  kind,  [and]  the  properties  of  thoughts  are  of  another  kind. 
Thus  the  levels-of-existence  (panthan)  are  distinct.  If  now  a 
yogin  has  come  into  a state  of  balance  with  one  of  these  [objects  in 


^ The  Vedanta  books  place  Quka  in  the  suc- 
cession between  Vyasa  and  Gaudapada. 

* See  the  discussion  by  Jacobi : the  Dates 

of  the  Philosophical  Sutras,  JAOS., 
vol.  xxxi  (1911),  p.  26. 

® Rajendra  Lala  Mitra  apparently  omits 
this  word  from  the  sutra  in  his  edition 
of  Bhojaraja’s  Rajamartanda  (1883). 

* Compare  Patahjali : Mahabbasya,  vol.  i. 


p.  1®  (Kielhorn’s edition), and  the  elabo- 
rate discussion  in  Vacaspatimifra’s 
Tattvabindu  in  which  he  contrasts  two 
different  theories  of  the  Vaiyakaranas 
(Bhartrhari  in  his  Vakyapadiya  and 
Vatsyayana)  with  three  schools  of 
Mimahsakas  (1.  followers  of  Dpavarsa, 
such  as  Qaihkara,  2.  Prabhakara,  3. 
Kumarila). 


81] 


[ — i.  42 


Words,  ideas,  and  things 

the  predicate-relation],  and  if  such  an  intended-object  as  ‘ cow  ’ 
strikes  upon  his  concentrated  insight,  and  if  it  comes  to  him 
permeated  with  predicate-relations  between  words  and  intended- 
objects  and  ideas,  then  that  confused  balanced-state  is  said  to  be 
<with  deliberation.> 

The  balanced-state  in  general  has  been  described.  By  classification  into  sub- 
divisions there  are  four  kinds  of  it : deliberative  and  super-deliberative,  reflec- 
tive and  super-reflective.  Of  these  [four]  he  describes  the  state-balanced  in 
deliberation  [upon  a coarse  object]  in  the  sutra  beginning  with  the  words  42. 
Of  these  and  ending  with  the  words  balanced-state  . . . <Of  these>  [that  is] 
from  among  these  balanced-states  it  is  the  state  balanced  in  deliberation  that  is 
to  be  understood.  Of  what  kind  is  this  [balanced-state]  ? Although  in  reality 
diverse,  words  and  intended-objects  and  ideas  have  predicate-relations  because  the 
words  and  the  other  [two]  are  attributed  the  one  to  the  other.  And  the  predi- 
cate-relation represents  the  diversity  that  there  is  in  one  thing  and  the  identity 
that  there  is  in  diverse  things.  Consequently  [the  balanced-state]  is  confused 
or  mixed  with  predicate-relations  between  words  and  intended-objects  and  ideas. 
When  he  says  «For  example  . . . the  word  ‘ cow  ’»  it  is  evident  that  there  is  a 
predicate-relation  which  identifies  the  word  with  the  intended-object  and  the 
idea,  both  of  which  have  been  appropriated  by  the  [word]  ‘ cow  ’.  When  he  says 
«the  intended-object  ‘ cow  ’»  it  is  evident  that  there  is  a predicate-relation 
which  identifies  the  intended-object  with  the  word  and  the  idea,  both  of  which 
have  been  appropriated  by  the  [intended-object]  ‘ cow  ’.  When  he  says  ^the  idea 
‘ cow  ’3>  it  is  evident  that  there  is  a predicate-relation  which  identifies  the  idea 
with  the  word  and  the  intended-object,  both  of  which  have  been  appropriated  by 
the  [idea]  ‘cow’.  Thus  in  ordinary  life  it  is  evident  that,  although  word  and 
intended-object  and  idea  are  distinct,  in  the  process  of  knowing  they  are  not  dis- 
tinguished. If  in  the  process  of  knowing  they  are  not  distinguished,  why  then 
should  there  be  any  distinction  ? In  reply  to  this  he  says  <3CWhen  these  are  dis- 
tinguished.When  in  accordance  with  methods  of  agreement  and  difference 
they  are  distinguished  by  experts,  then  1.  properties  of  words  are  of  one  kind 
[that  is]  a word  which  is  nothing  but  a mutation  of  sound  has  such  properties  as 
high  [pitch],  2.  [properties]  of  an  intended-object  are  of  another  kind  [that  is]  such 
properties  as  insensibility  and  [definite]  shape,  3.  properties  of  an  idea  are  of 
another  kind  [that  is]  illumination  and  no  [definite]  shape.  Therefore  the  level 
[panthan]  of  their  existences  is  distinct  [that  is]  the  way  which  leads  to  the  various 
things  themselves.  When  it  is  said  that  a yogin  has  come  into  a state  of  balance 
with  one  of  these  intended-objects,  such  as  a cow,  then  the  lower  perception  of  the 
yogin  has  been  described.  — The  rest  is  easy. 


1 1 [h.O.S,  17j 


i.  43 — ] Booh  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi  [82 

When  however  the  memory  is  purified  from  [remembrances  of]  the 
conventional-use  [samheta)  of  -words  and  when  the  concentrated 
insight  is  free  from  predicate-relations  [in  the  form]  of  ideas  either 
of  inferences  or  of  something  that  has  been  heard,  the  intended 
object  remains  as  it  is  in  itself  and  nothing  more,  and  is  specifically 
characterized  as  having  just  that  form  which  it  has  in  itself  and 
as  nothing  more.  And  this  is  the  super-deliberative  balanced- 
state.  This  is  the  higher  perception.  And  this  is  the  germ  of 
inference  and  of  anything  that  has  been  heard.  From  it  inference 
and  anything  heard  have  their  being.  Moreover  this  knowledge 
{dargana)  is  not  accompanied  by  an  idea  either  of  an  inference  or 
of  anything  that  has  been  heard.  Therefore  the  yogin’s  know- 
ledge derived  from  super-deliberative  concentration  is  not  con- 
fused by  any  other  source  of  a valid  idea.  He  illustrates  the  dis- 
tinguishing characteristic  of  the  super-deliberative  concentration 
by  the  sutra. 

43.  When  the  memory  is  quite  purified,  [that  balanced- 
state]— which  is,  as  it  were,  empty  of  itself  and  which 
brightens  [into  conscious  knowledge]  as  the  intended  object 
and  nothing  more— is  super-deliberative. 

That  insight  which,  wdien  the  memory  is  quite  purified  from  pre- 
dicate-relations [in  the  form]  of  ideas  either  of  inferences  or  of  any- 
thing that  has  been  heard,  and  from  the  conventional  usage  of 
words,  is  influenced  by  the  thing  in  itself  {svarupa)  which  is  to  be 
known  ; and  which,  after  as  it  were  in  its  form  of  insight  throwing 
off  itself,  the  essence  of  which  is  a process  of  knowing,  becomes 
the  thing-intended  {padartha)  and  nothing  more ; [and  becomes] 
as  it  were  changed  into  the  thing  in  itself  which  is  to  be  known, — 
this  is  the  super-deliberative  balanced-state.  And  as  such  it  has 
[just]  been  explained.  For  to  this  [balanced-state]  the  world  [so 
far  as  it  is  visible],  whether  [it  be  an  animate  object]  such  as  a 
cow  or  whether  [it  be  an  inanimate  object]  such  as  a w^ater-jar,  is 
1.  the  formation  of  a single  mental -act  (huddhi),  2.  its  essence  is 
an  intended-object,  3.  [and]  its  essence  is  that  it  is  a special  kind 
of  conglomeration  of  atoms.  And  this  particular  kind  of  arrange- 
ment ^ [which  constitutes  the  object]  is  an  apparent-form  (dharma) 
^ For  this  word  saihsthuna  see  pp.  170'^,  205^®,  216^^  272''  (Calc.  ed.). 


[ — i.  43 


83]  The  coarse  object  and  nothing  more 

common  to  the  subtile  elements  [which  compose  it]  and  it  is  in- 
ferred [as  being  a whole]  from  its  phenomenalized  effects  ^ ; it  is 
self-dependent  and  presents  itself  by  [changing]  into  its  pheno- 
menal ^ form  by  the  operation  of  the  conditions-which-phenomena- 
lize  it  {sva)  ; and  it  disappears  when  another  apparent-form  arises 
in  consciousness.  This  same  apparent-form  is  called  a whole 
[avayavin).  And  it  is  this  that  is  one  ® and  great  or  very  small 
and  tangible  and  that  in  which  actions  occur  and  impermanent.  By 
this  [kind  of]  wholes  the  business-of-life  is  carried  on.  But  one  to 
whom  such  a particular  conglomeration  is  not  [perceptibly]  real — 
since  by  an  indefinite-first-impression  ^ (avikalpa)  a subtile  cause 
is  imperceptible — for  him,  since  there  is  no  whole,  nearly  every- 
thino-,  in  accordance  with  the  statement  that  an  erroneous  idea  is 
not  based  upon  the  form  [i.  8]  of  that  [in  respect  of  which  the  idea 
is  entertained],  is  reduced  to  erroneous  ideas.  And  then  what 
would  be  a complete  idea,  seeing  that  there  are  no  objects  to  which 
it  would  refer?  For  whatever  is  perceived,  all  that  is  a bit 
influenced  by  its  nature  of  being  a whole-having-parts.  Therefore 
a whole  exists  which  becomes  changed  by  receiving  what  is  called 
sizes  and  the  like.  This  is  the  object  of  the  super-deliberative 
balanced-state. 

In  order  to  show  the  connexion  of  the  sutra  he  explains  first  super-deliberative 
[concentration]  by  saying  ^When  however.)^ — Purification  is  removal.  For 
certainly  inference  and  verbal-communication  begin  to  function  when  occasioned 
by  memories  of  the  conventional  use  of  words.  And  this  conventional-usage  has 
its  essence  in  the  false  attribution  to  each  other  of  the  word  and  the  intended 
object  and  the  idea  ‘ cow  ’.  And  as  a result  of  this  the  two  predicate-relations  in 
the  form  of  an  idea  either  of  an  inference  or  of  a verbal-communication  arise.  So 
when  occasioned  by  one  of  these,  concentrated  insight  still  has  deliberation 
[upon  some  coarse  object].  But  when  the  mind, — in  so  far  as  it  is  absorbed  in 
the  intended  object  and  nothing  more  and  is  zealous  for  the  intended  object  and 
for  nothing  more, — reaches  by  practice  upon  this  [intended  object]  a state  of 
inseparable  fusion  [with  this  object],  [then]  the  memory  of  conventional-usages 

^ The  atom  carries  within  itself  the  minia-  in  Nyaya-sutra  ii.  1.  36  and  iv.2. 14  ff., 

ture  of  its  efFects.  and  also  in  Udayana’s  Atma-Tattva- 

® The  expression  sva-vyanjaka-anjana  also  Viveka. 

occurs  at  pp.  37®,  112®,  207®,  and  282^  * All  the  MSS.  including  the  Bikaner  and 

(Calc.  ed.).  Gangadhara  Shastri’s  MSS.  omit  this 

® The  relation  ofwhole  and  part  is  discussed  word. 


i.  43 — ] 


Book  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[84 


is  thrown  off.  And  when  these  are  thrown  off,  predicate-relations  in  the  form  of 
an  idea  either  of  an  inference  or  of  anything  heard,  which  two  are  rooted  in 
memory,  are  thrown  off.  Then  in  the  concentrated  insight,  freed  from  these 
predicate-relations,  the  intended  object  remains  as  it  is  in  itself  and  nothing  more  ; 
and  becomes  accurately  characterized  as  having  just  that  form  which  it  has  in 
itself  and  as  nothing  more,  and  as  not  having  any  form  of  predicated-relation. 
This  is  the  super-deliberative  balanced-state.  This  is  the  higher  perception  of 
the  yogin,  since  in  it  there  is  not  even  a trace  of  false  attribution.  An  objec- 
tion might  be  raised,  ‘ This  may  be  so.  But  yogins,  having  known  the  that-ness 
of  the  intended  object,  make  it  consistent  [with  other  knowledge]  and  teach  it. 
And  (m)  how  can  this  intended  object  be  taught  by  verbal  communication  or  be 
made  consistent  by  inference  which  is  intended  for  another,  both  of  which  cases 
not  referring  to  that  [object  which  is  intended  in  the  higher  perception]  ? 
Accordingly  verbal-communication  and  inference  [must]  refer  to  that  [higher 
object].  And  since  these  two  are  predicate-relations,  the  higher  perception  is 
also  nothing  but  a predicate-relation.’  In  reply  to  this  he  says  «And  this  . . . 
anything  heard.^  For  if  this  [knowledge],  like  that  with  deliberation,  were 
accompanied  by  inference  or  by  anything  that  had  been  heard,  that  is,  if  it  had 
been  tainted  by  either  of  these,  then  it  would  be  confused.  But  it  is  only  the 
germ  of  these  two.  For  from  it  inference  and  anything  that  has  been  heard  have 
their  being.  And  it  is  not  the  rule  that  whatever  is  a cause  of  an  effect  has  the 
same  object  as  itself  as  its  effect.  For  because  the  idea  of  smoke  is  the  cause 
of  the  idea  of  fire,  it  does  not  therefore  have  this  [fire]  for  its  object.  Con- 
sequently [the  yogins]  having  known  [the  thatness  of  the  intended  object]  by 
a perception  free  of  predicate-relations  *,  teach  it  and  make  it  consistent  through 
the  medium  of  predicate-relations.  He  sums  up  by  saying  «Therefore,»  and 
shows  the  connexion  with  the  sutra  which  is  to  be  explained  by  using  the 
word  ^super-deliberative.3>  The  sutra  begins  with  the  words  43.  When  the 
memory  is  quite  purified.  The  purification  ^ is  the  removal  of  the  memory 
which  follows  {tasmud)  upon  the  predicate-relation  which  is  nothing  but  the 
idea  of  the  inference  and  of  anything  that  has  been  heard  and  of  the  con- 
ventional-usage of  words.  When  this  occurs  {tasyam).  And  in  this  case  the 
purification  from  the  memory  of  conventional-usages  is  the  cause  (hetu),  and 
the  purification  from  the  memory  of  ideas,  such  as,  of  anything  that  has  been 


' A favourite  verse  to  illustrate  the  gradual 
advance  from  the  first  dim  impression 
to  an  assertion  in  distinct  predicate 
form  is  Magha’s  verse  in  9i9upalavadha 
i.3.  First  a ball  of  light ; then  a body; 
then  a person  is  seen ; finally  one  says 
“ It  is  Narada ! ” as  one  beholds  him 
falling  from  the  sky. 

* This  purification  seems  to  be  a relaxation 


of  attention  which  has  been  given 
to  a too  closely  limited  field.  Our 
deepest  convictions  may  speak  to  us 
in  dissociative  processes  wherein  any 
fixed  succession  of  apperceptive  acts 
has  ceased.  The  purification  lies  in 
a distribution  of  attention  so  that  it 
regards  a whole  and  disregards  the 
successive  parts. 


85] 


[— i.  43 


Nature  of  the  subtile  object 


heard,  is  the  effect  [lietumant). — And  the  word  «inference]^  is  to  be  understood 
as  expressing  the  object  ‘ of  the  action  [as  expressing  that  which  is  inferred,  and 
not  that  from  which  an  inference  is  drawn]  ; it  is  a word  denoting  the  thing 
to  be  inferred. — The  word  ^as  it  were^  (iva)  in  the  clause  <Kas  it  were  . . , 
itselft?>  {svam  iva)  is  out  of  its  right  position  and  should  be  construed  after 
the  words  ^throwing  off.2>  — He  rejects  the  theory  ^ that  there  is  [in  this 
state]  a diversity  of  objects  by  saying  «to  this  ...  a single.»  It  is  1.  the  for- 
mation of  a single  mental-act,  in  the  sense  that  it  forms  ^ or  brings  forth  a 
single  mental-act.  Consequently  since  it  is  [single],  the  atoms,  in  that  they 
are  many,  are  not  the  objects  of  the  super-deliberative  [balanced-state].  What 
he  has  wished  to  say  is  this  : Assuming  that  they  are  fit  [to  be  the  object  of 
the  balanced-state],  still,  in  that  they  are  very  subtile,  and  because  they  are  collected 
into  a manifold  [each  unit  of  which  has  its  own  subtile  idea],  they  are  not  fit 
to  be  the  object  of  a presented  idea  which  brightens  [into  a conscious  know- 
ledge] of  the  unity  of  the  single  intended-object  which  has  magnitude  [mahattva 
as  contrasted  with  anu\.  An  objection,  ‘ Granted  that  the  atoms  are  real  ‘ exis- 
tences, then  the  [so-called]  coarseness  would  be  [only]  a subjective  [samvrta) 
property  of  that  which  shines  clearly  [in  consciousness].’  In  reply  to  this® 
he  says  ^2.  its  essence  is  an  intended  object.»  The  point  is  that  when  once 
a coarse  object  [as  a whole]  has  been  established  in  experience,  it  cannot,  unless 
there  be  something  inhibitory,  be  denied. — To  those  [Vai9esika]  who  think  that 
[animate  things]  like  cows  and  [inanimate  things]  like  water-jars  are  produced  ® 
by  binary  and  other  atoms  in  gradations,  he  says  «3.  conglomeration  of  atoms. » 
A conglomeration  of  atoms  is  a mutation  in  gross  form  and  this  [form  of] 
mutation  difierentiates  ’ it  from  other  [coarse]  mutations.  That  of  which  this 
[differentiated]  mutation  is  the  essence®,  in  other  words,  the-thing-itself  (svari/^a), 
is  that  which  is  called  [<Ka  conglomeration  of  atoms»].  [Animate]  things 
such  as  cows  possess  an  [animate]  seat-of-experience.®  And  such  [inanimate] 
things  as  water-jars  are  [merely  inanimate]  objects  [of  this  balanced-state].  And 
both  of  these  same  two  kinds  of  objects  are  also  seen  {lokyate) ; and  so  [each]  may 
be  called  the  world  {loka)  [so  far  as  it  is  visible  to  this  balanced-state].  It  might 
be  objected  that  this  [conglomeration,  which  is  a gross  form  of  mutation]  might 


^ Pan.  iii.  3.  113. 

® The  theory  of  the  Sarvastivadin.  See 
Sarvadarcanasamgraha  (An  and.  ed.), 
p.  7,  1.  9.’ 

® This  would  be  the  theory  of  the  Vaibha- 
sika  school,  which  asserts  the  percep- 
tion of  outer  objects.  See  Sarvadar- 
ganasamgraha  (Anand.  ed.),  p.  7®. 

* Compare  Dharmakirti’s  Nyayahindutika 
(Peterson’s  ed.),  p.  16“,  (Tscherbatskoi’s 
ed.  Bibl.  Buddhica),  p.  13^',  also  the 
tippani,  p.  37. 


® This  would  be  the  doctrine  of  the  Yoga- 
cara  School. 

® See  on  the  whole  subject  Jacobi’s  illumi- 
nating article  on  the  ‘ Atomic  Theory  ’ 
in  Hastings’s  Diet,  of  Religion  and 
Ethics,  and  especially  p.  201%  line  10. 

’ Compare  Vai9esika-sutra  vii.  i.  9 and 
Qariikara  on  ii.  2.  12. 

® As  contrasted  with  a special  kind  of  con- 
glomeration (pracaya-vigesa). 

® This  seat-of-experience  is,  according  to 
the  Patanjala  Rahasyam,  the  body. 


i.  43 — ] 


Booh  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[86 


be  either  different  from  the  subtile  elements  or  not  different  [from  them].  1.  If 
it  be  different  from  them,  how  can  it  be  the  [common]  substrate  of  them  and 
how  can  it  be  the  form  {akdra)  [which  gives  them  oneness]  ? For  a water- 
jar  is  a different  thing  from  a piece-of-cloth  and  cannot  be  the  substrate  [of 
the  properties  of  the  piece-of-cloth]  nor  can  it  be  that  which  gives  the  form 
[of  oneness]  to  this  piece-of-cloth.  2.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  [the  object,  so 
far  as  visible,  which  is  a conglomeration  of  atoms]  be  not  different  [from  its 
subtile  elements],  then  it  would  be,  like  them,  subtile  and  not  common  [to  the 
whole  group].  The  point  is  this  : any  such  thing  as  a water-jar  is  not  absolutely 
different  from  the  atoms,  neither  is  it  absolutely  identical  [with  them].  In  case 
it  were  different,  as  a horse  and  a cow  are  different,  the  relation  [between 
them]  of  substance  to  its  properties  could  not  be  consistently  explained.  In 
case  it  were  identical,  [so  that  the  atoms  were]  like  the  substance,  then  this  [sub- 
stance] could  not  be  consistently  explained.  Consequently  it  is  in  some  respects 
different  and  in  some  respects  identical.  And  so  it  must  be,  if  all  is  to  be  con- 
sistently explained.  By  putting  the  words  ^subtile  elements3>  in  the  genitive 
case,  he  indicates  that  there  is  in  some  respects  a difference  ; and  by  the  words 
«it  is  self-dependent)^,  that  there  is  an  identity.  [It  is  inferred]  by  its 
phenomenalized  effects : phenomenalized  in  the  sense  that  its  [effect]  is  ex- 
perienced ; and  phenomenalized  in  the  sense  that  it  [serves]  the  business-of-life. 
[And]  it  is  proven  by  inference  to  any  one  who  takes  the  opposite  view.  And 
in  so  far  as  it  is  identical  with  its  cause,  we  may  consistently  say  that  it  has  the 
form  of  its  cause.  Accordingly  he  says  ^by  [changing]  into  its  phenomenal  form 
by  the  operation  of  the  conditions-which-phenomenalize  it.^ — ‘ Is  this  apparent- 
form  {dharma),  which  is  identical  with  it,  permanent  ? ’ He  gives  a negative 
answer  in  the  words  «when  another  apparent-form.»  Another  apparent-form 
[that  is,]  as  a potsherd  [is  another  apparent-form  of  a water-jar  broken  in  pieces]. 
— That  this  whole  has  a form  not-to-be-found  {vydvrttam)  in  the  atoms  he  shows  by 
saying  ^This  same.»  For  it  has  properties,  which  give  it  a specific-character, 
such  as  the  holding  of  honey  or  of  water,  which  actions  are  other  than  actions 
which  could  be  accomplished  by  atoms.^  [The  whole  is  known]  not  only  by 
[perceptual]  experience,  but  also  by  the  business-of-life  since  the  conduct  of  men 
depends  upon  these  [wholes].  This  he  states  in  the  words  ^and  by  this.» 
A [Buddhist]  objection,  ‘ This  may  be  true.  If  there  were  nothing  to  contradict, 
experience  might  establish  [by  the  help  of  inferences]  that  [the  mutation  in  its 
gross  form]  is  a whole-having-parts.  But  (ca)  there  is  a contradiction.  [For  in 
the  line  of  reasoning,] — (a)  All  that  exists  is  without  parts,  {fi)  like  thought 
{vijharm),  and  (y)  such  things  as  cows  and  water-jars  exist, — we  have  a natural 
[and  valid]  middle-term  ^ [that  is,  existence].  [But  the  point  is  made  that  there 

* The  system  insists  that  not  even  the  * This  is  a term  of  the  “ Eastern  school  ” of 
subtile  (siiksma)  is  perceptible  to  the  Logicians,  equivalent  in  their  usage  to 

avikalpita  type  of  thinking.  an  unconditioned  middle  term,  which 


87] 


Subtile  object  2^ermanent  and  impermanent  [ — i.  43 


is  no  existence  in  coarse  form.]  For  existence  is  subsumed  {vyapta)  under 
absence  of  contradictory  qualities.^  And  connexion  with  contradictory  qualities, 
which  is  contradictory  with  it  [that  is,  existence],  being  found  to  exist  in  a 
thing-having-pai-ts,  excludes  existence  also,  since  in  such  a case  something  contrary 
to  the  subsumer  [which  is,  absence  of  contradictory  qualities]  has  been  found.  And 
so  [to  revert  to  the  original  point]  there  is  in  the  whole  a connexion  with  con- 
tradictory qualities,  for  example,  belonging  to  that  place  and  not  belonging  to 
that  place,  being  covered  and  not  being  covered,  being  red  and  not  red,  moving 
and  not  moving.  [Accordingly  wholes  in  gross  form  do  not  exist.]  ’ In  reply 
to  this  he  says  <5iBut  one  to  whom.»  The  intention  [of  what  was  first  asserted] 
is  this.  [The  whole  in  gross  form  is  now  said  to  be  given  in  experience  and  to 
be  an  action  realizing  a purpose.]  The  existence  which  is  given  as  the  middle - 
term  {Jietu)  must  either  be  given  by  experience  and  be  such  as  even  a ploughman 
with  dusty  feet  can  understand,  or  it  must  be  other  than  what  is  given  by 
experience.  Of  these  two  the  latter  is  not  a middle-term  since  it  is  not  given  in 
experience,  [that  is,  it  must  itself  be  established  as  existing  in  the  middle-term]. 
But  water-jars  and  such  things  have  an  existence  given  in  experience,  namely, 
activity  realizing  a purpose.  [This  form]  is  not  other  than  its  gross  [form].  This 
[form  given  by  experience  and  realizing  a purpose]  is  the  middle-term,  [that  is, 
existence],  and  by  removing  [the  existence  of]  coarseness  [as  thus  defined,  this 
middle-term]  destroys  itself.  In  reply  to  this  [the  Buddhist]  says,  ‘ Existence 
is  not  [a  permanent]  coarseness,  but  is  the  negation  of  non-existence.  And 
coarseness  is  negative  non-coarseness.  Moreover  negativations  differ  according 
to  the  variations  of  the  things  negatived.  So  even  when  there  is  no  coarseness, 
there  is  no  destruction  of  existence.’  [The  reply  to  this  would  be  :]  By  reason 
of  variations  in  the  negativations  we  may  admit  that  there  is  a variation  in  the 
objects  of  the  determination  [avasaya).  But  would  you.  Sir,  be  good  enough 
to  say  what  the  object  is  of  the  source-of-the-valid-idea  which  is  not  a first 
faint  impression  {vikalpa),  and  which  is  the  necessary-condition  (purvaka)  for 
the  determinations  ? For  if  you  say  that  the  atoms  of  colour  which  arise  con- 
tinuously, and  the  minute  that-ness  of  which  is  unknown,  [are  the  object], 
the  reply  is.  Very  well.  These  are  intermingled  ® with  the  atoms  of  odour  and  taste 
and  touch  and  are  [therefore]  not  continuous.  Therefore  if  it  be  unaware  of  the 


would  not  be  a hetvahhdsa,  but  a valid 
(sad)  term.  The  later  term  would  be 
sad-anumdna.  See  Nyaya-Koca,  s.v. 
Such  terminology  points  to  the  Eastern 
country  as  the  home  of  Vacaspati- 
mifra.  Compare  for  this  kind  of  logical 
language  Dharmakirti’s  Nyaya-bindu- 
tlka  (Peterson’s  ed.),  p.  104. 

’ See  Nyaya-bindu-tika  ii.  2 (Peterson’s  ed.), 
p. 106b 


^ Compare  Patanjali : Mahabhasya  on  i.  1. 
23  (Kielhorn  i.  81*). 

* One  does  not  see  merely  the  colour  series. 
For  this  is  intersected  by  the  taste  and 
smell  and  touch  series.  On  the  other 
hand  the  continuum  of  colour  is  not  an 
illusion  as  the  Vedantin,  Udayana  for 
example,  would  say  (Atma-Tattva- 
Viveka,  Jibananda’s  ed..  Calc.,  1873, 
p.  83*).  The  Yogasystem  explains  these 
series  as  the  mutations  of  a substance. 


i.  43—] 


Booh  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[88 


intei’inediate  [atoms],  this  indefinite-first-impression,  based  upon  the  atoms,  like 
the  presented-idea  of  a forest  as  single  and  as  dense  [although  it  too  is  full  of 
intermediate  spaces,]  would  be  false.  Accordingly  the  indefinite-first-impressions 
proceeding  from  this  [other  first  faint  impression]  are  not  even  mediately  in 
relation  with  a [perceptible]  object.  Thus  how  could  one  succeed  in  establishing 
that  there  are  no  parts  in  existences  which  are  determined  by  these  [indefinite-first- 
impressions]?  Therefoi’e  if  one  desires  to  hold  to  the  validity  of  perceptions 
which  are  definite-later-impressions,  the  existence  of  that  very  coarseness  which 
is  being  experienced  by  this  [perception]  must  be  admitted,  [even]  if  one  does 
not  assent  to  that  which  is  to  be  determined  by  [perception  which  is]  definite- 
and-later-impression.  To  proceed  : if  existence  inhibits  this  [kind  of  percep- 
tion], it  would  inhibit  itself.  That  the  atoms  are  exceedingly  subtile  and  that 
they  become  the  objects  of  experience  through  the  medium  of  other  kinds  of 
atoms — to  acknowledge  this  is  self-destructive.  Having  this  in  view  he  says 
«One  to  whom  this  particular  conglomeration  which  is  not  [perceptibly]  real» 
[is  the  object  of  a perception  which  is  a definite-and-later-impression],  one,  that 
is,  who  says  that  the  subtile  atoms  should  therefore  be  objects  of  percep- 
tions which  are  definite-and-later-impressions — to  him  he  replies  ^ince  by  an 
indefinite-first-impression  a subtile  cause  is  imperceptible.  ;?>  For  the  reason  that 
for  him  there  is  no  whole,  everything, — according  to  the  characterization  given 
[i.  8]  that  “ an  erroneous  idea  is  not  based  on  that  form  [in  respect  of  wliich  it 
is  entertained],” — is  reduced  to  erroneous  idea,  all  that  which  rests  upon  coarse- 
ness and  all  that  which  rests  upon  the  existence  which  is  the  locus  of  this 
[coarseness]. — It  might  be  objected  that  even  so  [and  finally]  knowledge  is 
not  erroneous  in  regard  to  one's  self,  because  this  does  not  appear  as  a whole 
having  parts.  In  reply  to  this  he  says  ^Nearly. » The  objector  might  reply 
‘What  even  if  it  be  so?’  In  reply  to  this  he  says  «And  then.:^  If  such 
an  idea  as  that  of  existence  be  erroneous,  then  such  an  idea,  caused  by  existence 
or  something  of  the  kind  as  this  that  there  are  no  wholes  having  parts,  would 
also  be  erroneous.  Because  its  object  also,  in  so  far  as  it  is  something  to  be 
determined,  is  certainly  nothing  coarse  ^ [and  this  latter  is]  not  concerned  with 
definite-and-later-impressions.  And  this  [object]  does  not  exist.  Such  is  the 
meaning  of  the  argument.  And  if  it  be  asked  why  there  is  no  object,  he 
replies  with  the  word  <Kwhatever.»  And  the  [apparent]  contradiction  must 
be  removed  in  accordance  with  the  explanation  (upapatti)  previously  given 
based  on  identity  in  difference  and  on  manifoldness  in  mutations.  Then  all 
would  be  satisfactory. 


44.  By  this  same  [balanced-state]  the  reflective  and  the 
super-reflective  [balanced-states]  are  explained  as  having 
subtile  objects. 

’ One  susjDects  that  the  reading  might  be  sthftlam. 


89] 


[ — i.  44 


The  subtile  object  and  nothing  more 


Of  these  [two],  that  is  called  the  reflective  (savicdra)  balanced-state 
which  refers  to  subtile  elements  the  apparent  forms  of  which  have 
been  manifested  and  which  are  characterized  by  an  experience  of 
place  and  time  and  cause.  In  this  case  also  a subtile  element 
capable  of  being  apperceived  by  one  idea  and  particularized  by 
uprisen  (udita)  apparent-forms  serves  as  that  upon  which  the  con- 
centrated insight  rests.  But  that  balanced-state  which  in  all  ways 
and  by  all  means  refers  to  such  [subtile  elements]  as  are  free  from 
characterization  by  apparent-forms  whether  quiescent  [ganta]  or 
uprisen  (udita)  or  indeterminable  (avyapadegya)  and  which  yet 
corresponds  to  all  apparent-forms  and  is  the  essence  of  all  apparent- 
forms  is  called  super-reflective  (nirvicdra).  Since  the  subtile 
element  is  of  this  kind,  it  becomes,  in  this  very  form,  that  on  which 
the  concentrated  insight  rests  and  it  influences  the  insight  itself. 
When  moreover  the  insight  becomes,  as  it  were,  emptied  of  itself 
and  becomes  the  intended  object  and  nothing  more,  then  it  is 
called  super-reflective.  Of  these  [four]  the  deliberative  and  the 
super-deliberative  have  as  object  ^ something  great  ; while  the 
reflective  and  the  super-reflective  have  a subtile  object.  Thus  by 
this  same  super-deliberative  [balanced-state]  the  destruction  of 
predicate-relations  of  both  ^ kinds  has  been  explained. 

44.  By  this  same  [balanced-state]  the  reflective  and  the  super-reflective 
[balanced-states]  are  explained  as  having  subtile  objects.  Those  [whose 
apparent-forms  have  been  manifested]  are  those  by  which  the  apparent-forms  of 
such  things  as  water-jars  have  been  manifested,  in  other  words,  those  that  have 
included  the  apparent-forms  of  such  things  as  water-jars.  ^laceX>  [for  instance] 
above  or  below  or  at  one  side.  «Time»  [for  instance]  the  present.  ^Cause)^  [for 
instance]  the  atom  of  earth  is  produced  by  the  five  fine  elements  among  which 
the  fine  element  of  odour  predominates.  Likewise  the  atom  of  water  [is  pro- 
duced] from  the  four  fine  elements  among  which  the  fine  element  of  taste  pre- 
dominates. Likewise  the  atom  of  fire  [is  produced]  from  the  three  fine  elements, 
excluding  the  fine  element  of  odour  and  of  taste,  and  among  which  the  fine 
element  of  colour  predominates.  Likewise  the  atom  of  wind  [is  produced] 
from  the  [two]  fine  elements  beginning  with  odour,  and  of  which  [two]  the 


^ Vijfiana  Bhiksu  glosses  mahad-vastu  with 
the  words  ‘ coarse  ’ {sthula)  and  ‘ modifi- 
cation only  ’ (kevalavikrti).  This  is  the 
use  of  the  word  in  iii.  44. 

* The  two  kinds  must  be  the  super-delibera- 
12  [h.o.s.  1?] 


tive  and  the  super-reflective ; and  not, 
as  Vijnana  Bhiksu  says,  the  reflective 
and  the  super-reflective.  This  would 
be  a gross  inconsistency.  For  the 
reflective  kind  has  predicate  relations, 


i.  44—] 


Booh  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[90 


fine  element  of  touch  predominates.  Likewise  [the  atom]  of  air  from  the  fine 
element  sound  alone. — This  is  the  cause  in  the  case  of  the  subtile  elements. 
These  [subtile  elements]  are  experienced  when  they  have  a place  and  a time 
and  a cause.  An  idea  (huddhi)  which  is  capable  of  being  particularized  does 
not  follow  unless  it  be  particularized  by  [such]  an  experience.  An  objector 
might  ask,  ‘ What  similarity  is  there  between  [the  balanced-state]  with  delibera- 
tion and  [that]  with  reflection  ? ’ In  reply  to  this  he  says  ^In  this  case  also.» 
For  the  atom  of  earth  which  consists  of  the  conglomeration  of  the  five  fine 
elements  may  be  apperceived  by  a single  idea.  Similarly  the  atom  of  water 
and  the  other  atoms  [too]  which  have  as  their  essences  four  or  three  or  two 
or  one  fine  element  may  be  apperceived  by  a single  idea. — ^Uprisen»  means 
a present  apparent-form  ; [the  element]'  would  be  particularized  by  that.  And 
finally  with  regard  to  this  [uprisen  apparent-form],  it  is  pointed  out  that  there 
is  an  interpenetration  of  the  predicate-relations  of  verbal-communications  and 
of  inferences  by  the  memory  of  the  conventional-use  [of  words].  For  when 
something  coarse  is  the  object  of  perception,  the  atoms  do  not  appear.  But 
[they  do  appear  objectively]  as  the  result  of  verbal-communications  and  of  infer- 
ences. Thus  it  is  consistent  that  this  [balanced-state]  should  be  confused. — 
He  describes  the  super-reflective  [balanced-state]  in  the  words  <SBut  that 
which.»  «Cln  all  ways»  means  in  all  forms  [of  phenomenalization],  such  as  blue 
and  yellow.  The  termination ' -tas  [Pan.  iv.  3.  13]  in  the  word  <^.sarvatas'^  is  used 
[as  equivalent]  to  all  inflected  case-endings.  In  other  words  it  means  «by  all 
means»  [that  is]  by  experiences  of  place  and  of  time  and  of  cause.  By  this 
statement  it  is  shown  that  the  atoms  as  such  are  not  particularized  by  time. 
Neither  are  they  [particularized  by  time]  mediately  through  apparent-forms 
which  have  their  origin  in  these  [atoms].  It  is  this  that  he  describes  in  the 
word  «quiescent.S>  «Quiescent»  are  past.  ^Uprisen»  are  present.  ^Inde- 
terminable»  are  future  apparent-forms.  [Atoms]  are  not  characterized  by  these. 
Not  being  characterized  by  apparent-forms,  is  it  quite  right  to  say  that  atoms 
are  unrelated  to  them  ? In  reply  to  this  he  says  «correspond  to  all  apparent- 
forms.» — With  “ which  kind  of  a relation  do  these  atoms  correspond  to 
apparent-forms  ? In  reply  to  this  he  says  ^are  the  essence  of  all  apparent- 
forms.»  In  other  words,  the  apparent-forms  are  different  from  the  atoms  in 
some  respects  and  in  other  respects  not  different. — But  why  has  this  balanced- 
state  this  kind  of  an  object  ? In  reply  to  this  he  says  ^Since  ...  of  this 
character.»  In  other  words,  having  an  apperception  of  the  that-ness  of  a per- 
ceptible object,  it  does  not  become  active  with  regard  to  that  which  has  not  this 
that-ness. — Having  stated  the  object  of  this  [balanced-state],  he  tells  what  it 
is  itself  by  saying  ^Moreover  the  insight.»  Bringing  the  [four]  together,  he 

' The  termination  tasi  is  the  same  as  tasil  sy am  thinks  that  some  words  have  been 

(Pan.  V.  3.  7).  lost  at  this  point  from  the  Tattva 

* RaghavanandaYatiinhis  PatanjalaRaha-  Vai9aradi  of  Vacaspati-mi9ra. 


91] 


The  limit  of  subtile  objects 


[ — i.  45 


describes  the  object  as  being  serviceable  to  distinguish  what  they  are  them- 
selves by  saying  «0f  these. » He  sums  up  with  the  word  «Thus.^  «0f  both 
kinds^  means  both  its  own  [super-deliberative]  and  also  super-reflective  forms. 


45.  The  subtile  object  likewise  terminates  in  unresoluble- 
primary-matter  {alinga). 

In  the  case  of  the  earthen  atom  the  fine  element  of  odour,  [which  is 
the  cause  of  the  atom  of  earth,]  is  the  subtile  object  of  the  [reflec- 
tive and  super-reflective]  balanced-states  ; in  the  case  of  the  v'atery 
atom  the  fine  element  of  taste  [is  the  subtile  object] ; in  case  of 
the  fiery  atom  the  fine  element  of  colour ; in  case  of  the  windy 
atom  the  fine  element  of  touch  ; in  case  of  the  aerial  atom  the  fine 
element  of  sound.  The  personality-substance  which  is  the  cause 
of  these  [elements  is  also  the  subtile  object  of  this  balanced-state]. 
Resoluble-primary-matter-as-such  {lihgamdtra)  [which  is  the  cause] 
of  this  [personality- substance]  also  is  the  subtile  object  [of  the 
balanced-state].  Unresoluble-primary-matter  [which  is  the  cause] 
of  this  [resoluble-primary-matter-as-such]  also  is  the  subtile  object 
[of  the  balanced-state].  And  beyond  the  unresoluble-primary- 
matter  there  is  nothing  subtile.  If  the  objection  be  raised  that  the 
Self  is  subtile,  the  reply  is  that  this  is  true.  The  subtilty  of  the 
Self  in  relation  to  the  resoluble-primary-matter  [thinking-sub- 
stance] is,  however,  not  that  of  the  unresoluble-primary-matter  to 
the  resoluble-primary-matter.  For  the  Self  is  not  the  material 
cause  [anvayin]  of  resoluble-primary-matter,  but  the  instrumental 
cause  ihetu). 

Accordingly  it  is  explained  that  subtilty  reaches  its  utmost  degree 
in  the  primary-substance. 

Does  the  balanced-state,  which  has  a thing-to-be-known  as  its  object,  end  in  the 
subtile  element  only  ? No.  But,  45.  The  subtile  object  likewise  terminates 
in  unresoluble-primary-matter  {alinga).  That  state  of  the  flne  element  of  odour 
which  is  in  relation  to  the  earthen  atom  is  the  subtile  object  of  the  balanced- 
state.  Similarly  in  the  later  cases  also  the  connexion  is  to  be  made.  The 
resoluble-primary-matter-as-such  {linga-mdtra)  is  the  Great  Principle  [that  is, 
the  thinking-substance  (buddhi)^.  For  it  goes  to  dissolution  (laya)  in  the  primary- 
substance.  Unresoluble-primary-matter  is  primary-substance.  For  it  does  not 
dissolve  into  anything.  This  is  the  meaning.  He  says  that  subtilty  terminates 


i.  45 — ] Booh  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi  [92 

in  unresoluble-primary-matter  in  the  words  <KAnd  beyond  the  unresoluble- 
primary-matter  there  is  nothing  subtile.»  He  raises  a doubt  by  saying  «If 
the  objection  be  raised.»  That  is  to  say,  the  Self  also  is  subtile  not  the  unre- 
soluble primary-substance  alone.  He  rebuts  [this  objection]  by  saying  ^true.^ 
In  other  words,  in  so  far  as  it  is  a material  cause  there  is  in  the  unresoluble- 
primary-substance  subtilty,  but  not  in  the  other  [that  is,  the  Self].  In 
this  case,  since  the  purpose  of  the  Self  is  the  instrumental  cause  of  the 
Great  Principle  and  of  the  personality-substance  and  of  the  others,  the  Self  is 
also,  like  unresoluble-primary-matter,  a cause.  Having  in  mind  the  question  as 
to  how  subtilty,  characterized  in  this  way,  is  to  be  understood  as  regards  the 
unresoluble,  he  asks  <Showever.»  He  gives  the  answer  in  the  words  ^ot  that 
of  the  resoluble-primary-matter.»  True,  [the  Self  is]  a cause,  but  not  a material 
cause.  For  the  Self  is  not,  like  the  primary -substance,  a cause  of  these  [states], 
in  so  far  as  being  the  Great  or  the  other  [states]  it  enters  into  mutations.  This 
is  the  meaning.  He  sums  up  in  the  words  <SCAccordingly  it  is  explained  that 
subtilty  reaches  its  utmost  degree  in  the  primary-substance. » 


46.  These  same  [balanced-states]  are  the  seeded  concentra- 
tion. 

These  four  balanced-states  have  external  [perceptible]  things  as 
their  seed.  Therefore  the  concentration  is  seeded.  Of  these  four 
the  deliberative  and  the  super-deliberative  refer  to  a coarse  intended- 
object,  the  reflective  and  super-reflective  to  a subtile  intended-object. 
Thus  in  four  kinds,  one  after  another,  concentration  has  been 
enumerated. 

And  in  the  four  balanced-states  the  object  of  which  is  a thing-to-be-known  he 
says  that  [concentration]  conscious  [of  an  object  may  occur].  46.  These  same 
[balanced-states]  are  the  seeded  concentration.  The  word  eva  is  out  of  place 
and  should  be  understood  after  <seeded.>  As  a result  of  this,  the  four  balanced- 
states,  the  object  of  which  is  the  thing-to-be-kno^vn,  are  limited  in  so  far  as  they 
are  seeded.  The  seeded  state,  however,  is  not  limited  [to  the  thing-to-be-known], 
since,  even  in  the  case  of  the  balanced-state  the  object  of  which  is  the  knower 
or  the  process-of-knowing,  it  persists,  not  being  negated  by  the  distinction  into 
predicate-relations  and  unpredicated-relations  [with  reference  to  the  thing-to-be- 
known].  So  with  regard  to  the  thing-to-be-known  there  are  four  balanced-states 
and  four  in  respect  of  the  knower  and  the  process-of-knowing : thus  there 
are  eight’  of  these  [concentrations].  The  Comment  is  explained  by  a [mere] 
reading. 


’ The  Bikaner  MS.  and  the  Bombay  San.  Ser.  text  read  siddha  in  place  of  te. 


93] 


Internal  undisturhed  calm 


L — 1.  47 


47.  When  there  is  the  clearness  of  the  super-reflective 
[balanced-state,  the  yogin  gains]  internal  undisturbed  calm. 

When  freed  from  obscuration  by  impurity,  the  sattva  of  the  think- 
ing-substance, the  essence  of  which  is  light,  has  a pellucid  steady 
flow  not  overwhelmed  by  the  rajas  and  tamas.  This  is  the  clear- 
ness. When  this  clearness  arises  in  the  super-reflective  balanced- 
state,  then  the  yogin  gains  the  internal  undisturbed  calm,  [that  is 
to  say]  the  vision  by  the  flash  {sphuta)  of  insight  which  does  not 
pass  successively  through  the  serial  order  [of  the  usual  processes 
of  experience]  and  which  has  as  its  intended-object  the  thing  as  it 
really  is.  And  in  this  sense  it  has  been  said,^  “ As  the  man  who 
has  climbed  the  crag  sees  those  upon  the  plain  below  [bhumistha), 
so  the  man  of  insight  who  has  risen  to  the  undisturbed  calm  of  in- 
sight, himself  escaped  from  pain,  beholds  all  creatures  in  their  pain.” 
Of  the  four  balanced-states  which  have  as  their  object  the  thing-to-be-known, 
excellence  belongs  to  the  super-reflective  [balanced-state].  [This]  he  describes  in 
the  sutra  47.  When  there  is  the  clearness  of  the  super-reflective  [balanced* 
state,  the  yogin  gains]  internal  undisturbed  calm.  He  describes  the  meaning 
of  the  word  <clearness>  by  [the  words  beginning  with]  ^impurity Impurity 
is  an  accretion  of  rajas  and  tamas.  And  it  is  the  defilement  which  has  the 
distinguishing-characteristic  of  obscuration.  [Clearness]  is  freed  from  this. 
«The  essence  of  which  is  lights  means  naturally  light.  For  this  reason  the 
sattva  of  the  thinking-substance  is  not  overwhelmed.  An  objection  is  made, 
‘ This  may  be  true.  But  if  the  balanced-state  has  as  its  object  the  thing-to-be- 
known,  how  could  the  undisturbed  calm  have  itself  as  its  object  ? ’ To  this  he 
replies  with  the  words  <Khas  as  its  intended-object  the  thing  as  it  really  is.:^  In 
other  words,  it  does  not  have  the  self  as  its  object  but  as  its  substrate  * {adhara). 
«Does  not  pass  successively  through  the  serial  order»  means  that  it  is  simul- 
taneous. On  this  very  point  he  cites  the  teaching  of  the  Supreme  Sage  {para- 
marslm  gdtham)  with  the  words  ^And  in  this  sense.^  Seeing  that  he  is  above  all 
by  virtue  of  the  perfection  of  his  perceptive  vision,^  he  knows  that  the  creatures 
are  ^n  their  pain]^,  encompassed  by  the  three  kinds  of  pain. 


' Compare  MBh.  xii.  17.  20 ; 151.11 ; Dham- 
mapada  28.  Compare  also  Bacon’s 
Essay  on  Truth,  “ No  pleasure  is  com- 
parable to  the  standing  upon  the 
vantage-ground  of  truth  (a  hill  not  to 
be  commanded  and  where  the  air  is 
always  clear  and  serene)  and  to  see 
the  errors  and  wanderings  and  mists 


and  tempests,  in  the  world  below.” 

^ This  is  explained  in  the  PatanjaJa  Raha- 
syam  thus,  ‘ There  is  a doubt  as  to 
there  being  a relation  of  cause  and 
effect  in  things  which  are  in  different 
places  {vyadhikaranatve  kdryakdranatd 
ndstity  dgankya).' 

® Compare  p.  62'^  and  Sutra  ii.  15. 


i.  48—] 


Book  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[94 


48.  In  this  [calm]  the  insight  is  truth-bearing. 

In  one  whose  mind-stuff  is  concentrated,  the  insight  ^ which  arises 
in  this  [calm]  receives  the  technical  name  of  <truth-bearing.>  And 
this  is  a [term]  whose  meaning  is  intelligible  of  itself ; [this  insight] 
bears  truth  ^ and  nothing  else  ; in  it  there  is  not  even  a trace  of  mis- 
conception. And  in  this  sense  it  has  been  said,  “By  the  Sacred  Word 
[and]  by  inference  and  by  eagerness  for  practice  in  contemplation, 
in  three  ways  he  promotes  his  insight  and  gains  the  highest  yoga.” 
With  regard  to  this  same  point  he  gives  the  consensus  of  yogins  by  telling  of  the 
term  current  among  yogins  which  itself  expresses  the  intended-object.  48.  In 
this  [calm]  the  insight  is  truth-bearing.  The  Comment  is  easy.  By  the 
expression  ^Sacred  Word»  is  meant  the  hearing  {^ravana)  prescribed  by  the  Vedas  ; 
by  the  expression  ^inference^  is  meant  consideration  (manana).  Contemplation 
is  reflection.  Practice  in  this  is  following  it  up  one  time  after  another.  Eager- 
ness for  this  is  close  attention  [to  it].  So  in  this  way  absorption  (nididhyasana) 
is  described. 


But  this  [insight]  — 

49.  Has  an  object  other  than  the  insight  resulting  from 
things  heard  or  from  inferences  inasmuch  as  its  intended- 
object  is  a particular. 

<A  thing  heard>  is  knowledge  derived  from  verbal-communication. 
This  deals  with  generic  objects.  For  a particular  cannot  be  con- 
noted by  a verbal-communication.  Why  [not]  ? Because  a word 
does  not  have  its  conventional-usage  established  by  the  particular. 
Similarly  inference  deals  with  generic  objects  only.  [For  instance, 
compare  i.  7],  we  say,  where  there  is  getting  [to  a place],  there  is 
motion ; and  where  there  is  no  getting  [to  a place],  there  is  no 
motion.  And  by  an  inference  we  get  a conclusion  in  generic 
[terms  only].  Therefore  no  particular  can  be  the  object  of  verbal- 
communication  or  of  inference.  And  of  this  subtile  and  hidden 
and  remote  ^ thing  there  is  no  knowledge  by  ordinary  percep- 
tion. Furthermore  we  cannot  assert  that  this  particular  has  no 
validity  and  does  not  exist.  Therefore  this  particular  as  object, 
whether  it  belong  to  a subtile  element  or  to  the  Self,  is  apper- 

' See  iii.  51.  ^ Patanjala  Rahasyam  gives  the  gloss  : dtma-fattvam. 

’ Compare  Sariikh.  Kar.  vii. 


95] 


Normative  insight  [ — i.  49 

ceptible  by  the  concentrated  insight  only.  Consequently  this 
insight  has  an  object  other  than  [the  object  of]  the  insight  result- 
ing from  a thing  heard  or  from  inference,  inasmuch  as  its  intended- 
object  is  a particular. 

The  objection  is  made,  ‘ This  may  be  true.  But  the  super-reflective  [balanced- 
state]  which  is  produced  by  perfection  of  impressions  whose  objects  ‘ refer  to  that 
which  is  known  by  verbal-communication  or  by  inference  can  refer  [gocarayef) 
only  to  the  objects  of  verbal-communication  and  of  inference.  For  surely  a sub- 
liminal impression  derived  from  the  experience  of  one  object  is  not  able  to  pro- 
duce knowledge  with  regard  to  another.  For  that  would  be  an  unwarranted 
assumption.  Therefore  if  the  super-reflective  [balanced-state]  is  truth-bearing, 
verbal  communications  and  inferences  must  also  be  assumed  to  be  this  [that  is, 
truth-bearing].’  In  reply  to  this  he  says  49.  Has  an  object  other  than  the 
insight  resulting  from  things  heard  or  from  inferences  inasmuch  as  its 
intended-object  is  a particular.  For  the  sattva  of  the  thinking-substance  is 
naturally  bright ; although  it  has  the  power  of  seeing  all  intended-objects,  it 
becomes  obscured  by  tarms ; only  when  by  rajas  it  is  set-free-to-stream-forth,  then 
only  does  it  know  [the  object].  But  when  by  practice  and  passionlessness  the 
defilement  of  rajas  and  tamas  is  cast  off  and  it  shines  forth  spotlessly  clear,  then 
passing  beyond  the  limits  of  all  measures  {mdna)  and  of  all  things  measurable 
{meya)  and  having  endless  brightness — what  then,  pray,  can  there  be  that  is  not 
within  its  scope  ? He  explains  [the  sutra]  in  the  words  <Lk.  thing  heard  is  know- 
ledge derived  from  verbal-communication.  This  deals  with  generic  objects.» 
Why?  «For  a particular  cannot  be  connoted  by  a verbal-communication.» 
For  what  reason  ? Because  a word  does  not  have  its  conventional  usage  estab- 
lished by  a particular,  since  [the  word]  is  an  infinite  and  since  it  has  a too-wide- 
pervasion  [vydbhicdra).  For  we  do  not  perceive  the  relation  of  word  and  thing 
expressed  in  connexion  with  any  particular  instance  of  this  [word].  And 
furthermore  the  sense  of  the  sentence  cannot  be  such  a particular.  Even  in  case 
of  an  inference  which  depends  for  its  origin  upon  the  knowledge  of  the  relation 
between  the  syllogistic-mark  {jinga)  and  the  subject-of-the-proposition  {lingin),  the 
same  procedure  holds  good,  as  he  says  <5^Similarly  inference.»  In  the  expression 
^where  there  is  no  getting  to  a place»  the  words  ^where^  and  ^there»  should 
by  logical  conversion  be  made  to  indicate  the  pervaded  and  the  pervader.  There- 
fore here  by  an  inference  we  get  a conclusion  in  generic  [terms  only].  He  sums 
up  with  the  word  «Therefore.S>  It  might  be  admitted  that  then  we  have 
ordinary  perception  irrespective  of  a knowledge  of  the  relation  [between  the 
word  and  the  thing-expressed]  and  that  this  [perception]  does  not  deal  with 
generic  objects  only.  In  reply  to  this  he  says,  ^And  of  this  . . . no.^  It  may 
not  be  admitted  that  ordinary  perception  depends  upon  a knowledge  of  the  rela- 
tion [of  word  and  thing-expressed] ; but  it  must  be  admitted  that  it  depends  upon 

^ The  sequence  is,  first  an  amihhava,  next  a saniskara,  and  then  a smiii. 


i.  49 — ] 


Booh  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[96 


the  senses.  And  with  this  [higher  insight]  the  senses  have  no  pre-established 
harmony.  This  is  the  meaning.  It  is  objected  that  if  the  individual  is  not 
within  the  scope  of  verbal-communications  and  inferences  and  perceptions,  then 
it  does  not  exist.  For  there  is  no  source-of-valid-ideas  for  [it].  In  reply  to  this 
he  says  «Furthermore  . . . not.»  For  a source-of-vahd-ideas  is  not  [necessarily] 
a pervader  nor  a cause  of  the  object-of-knowledge  (prameya)  to  the  extent  that,  if 
that  [source-of-valid-ideas]  should  cease,  the  [object-of-knowledge]  would  cease  to 
be.  For  surely,  when  the  moon  is  a slender  crescent  {kalavant),  those  who  accept 
sources-of- valid-ideas  do  not  doubt  the  real  existence  of  the  deer’  which  is  situated 
in  the  other  part  [of  the  moon’s  sui’face  not  then  visible].  «Therefore,»  for  this 
reason  it  ^is  apperceptible  by  the  concentrated  insight  only.^^  And  here  the 
atoms  and  the  selves  which  are  subjected  to  [this]  discussion  are  endowed  with  a 
particularity  peculiar  to  themselves,  because,  being  substances,  they  are  distinct 
from  each  other.  Whatever  things,  being  substances,  are  distinct  from  each 
other,  these  are  endowed  with  particularity  peculiar  to  themselves,  like  a cripple 
or  a man  with  a shaven  head.  According  to  this  inference,  and  to  the  verbal-com- 
munication which  is  devoted  to  teaching  what  the  truth-bearing  insight  is,  [the 
pecuhar  individuality  of  this  insight  has  been  defined].  Although  the  individual 
is  described,  still  in  the  absence  of  such  a description  doubt  might  arise,  because 
it  has  been  obtained  by  a line-of-reasoning  ; yet  in  so  far  as  it  is  not  far  “ or  re- 
mote, this  sattva  is  brought,  with  some  difficulty,  within  the  scope  of  verbal-com- 
munication or  of  inference.  But  they  do  not  [make  evident  the  existence  of  the 
particular]  by  as  direct  an  experience  as  words  of  connexion,  for  instance,  through 
their  application  of  gender  and  number,  [bring]  the  meaning  of  the  word  ‘ and  ’ 
[within  the  scope  of  verbal-communication  or  of  inference].  Therefore  it  is 
established  that  [this  insight]  has  an  object  other  than  the  insights  resulting  from 
things  heard  or  from  inferences. 


When  the  yogin  has  gained  concentrated  insight,  the  subliminal- 
impression  made  by  the  insight  is  reproduced  again  and  again. 

50.  The  subliminal-impression  produced  by  this  [super- 
reflective  balanced-state]  is  hostile  to  other  subliminal- 
impressions. 

The  subliminal-impression  arising  from  concentrated  insight  inhi- 
bits the  latent-impression  from  the  emergent  subliminal-impres- 
sion. After  emergent  subliminal-impressions  have  been  repressed. 


’ Compare  Subhasitaratnabhandagaram 
(Nir.  Sag.  fourth  ed.),  p.  318,  no.  162, 
s.v.  ankam  ke  'pi.  See  also  Kuvalaja- 
nanda  Karika  (Nir.  Sag.  ed.),  p.  27’. 

* According  to  Patanjala  Rahasyam  the 
meaning  of  ‘ not  far  ’ is  that  from 


which  there  results  a generic  idea 
(samanyato  hodhayatah) ; and  of  ‘ re- 
mote ’,  that  from  which  there  results 
no  particular  idea  vifesato  na  bodh- 
ayata  iti. 


97]  Inhibition  of  emergent  subliminal-impressions  [ — i.  50 

the  presented-ideas  arising  from  them  do  not  occur.  When 
presented-ideas  are  restricted,  concentration  follows  after.  Then 
concentrated  insight ; after  that,  subliminal-impressions  made  from 
insight  ; thus  latent-impressions  from  subliminal-impressions  are 
reproduced  again  and  again.  Thus  first  comes  insight  and  then 
[follow]  subliminal-impressions.  How  is  it  that  this  excess  of  sub- 
liminal-impressions will  not  provide  the  mind-stuff  with  a task  ? 
[The  answer  is  :]  these  subliminal-impressions  made  by  the  insight 
do  not  provide  the  mind-stuff  with  a task  since  they  cause  the 
dwindling  of  the  hindrances.  For  they  cause  the  mind-stuff  to 
cease  from  its  work.  For  the  movement  of  the  mind-stuff  termi- 
nates at  [the  time  of]  discernment  (khydti). 

‘ Let  this  be  granted.  Let  the  [concentration]  conscious  [of  an  object]  have  a 
reality  as  its  object  by  the  practice  of  the  aforesaid  means.  But  this  concentrated 
insight  may  be  obstructed  by  beginningless  emergent  subliminal-impressions  in 
so  far  as  it  is  closely  enveloped  [by  them],  like  minute  flashes  [of  light]  from  a 
lamp  in  the  eddy  of  a whirling  wind.’  To  remove  this  doubt  he  introduces  the 
next  sutra  with  the  words  ^concentrated  insight.^  He  recites  the  sutra  50. 
The  subliminal-impression  produced  by  this  [super-reflective  balanced- 
state]  is  hostile  to  other  subliminal-impressions.  The  word  <this>  refers  to  the 
super-reflective  balanced-state.  The  word  <other>  describes  the  emergence.  It 
is  the  nature  of  thoughts  to  incline’  to  intended-objects  as  they  really  are. 
This  instability  continues  unsteady  only  so  long  as  it  does  not  reach  the  reality 
[literally,  that-ness].  After  reaching  that  and  because  it  has  taken  a stable 
position  there,  [this]  idea  from  the  subliminal-impression  does  most  certainly 
inhibit  the  series  of  ideas  from  subliminal-impressions  which  refer  to  what  is 
not  reality,  even  although  [this  series]  is  beginningless  and  rolls  on  as  the  wheel  ^ 
of  the  series  of  [fluctuations  and]  subliminal-impressions.  And  in  this  sense 
outsiders^  also  say,  “ There  is  no  inhibition  of  the  unviolated  essence  of  a thing- 
as-it-really-is  by  contradictions  even  although  these  latter  be  from  time  without 
beginning.  For  it  is  the  nature  of  the  mind  to  incline  to  things  as  they  are.” 
The  objector  would  say,  ‘ This  may  be  true.  We  may  admit  that,  as  a result  of 
concentrated  insight,  there  is  a restriction  of  a subliminal-impression  produced 
during  the  emergent  state.  Still  there  exists  uninjured  (avikala)  an  excess  of 
subliminal-impressions  which  is  produced  by  concentration  and  which  causes  the 
generation  of  the  concentrated  insight.  So  the  fact  that  the  mind-stuff"  has  a 
task  still  remains.’ — With  this  in  mind,  he  raises  an  objection,  ^How  is  it  that 

’ Compare  Samkh.  Tatt.  Kau.  Ixiv.  tion  is  found  in  Vacaspatimifra’s  Bha- 

* Compare  i.  5,  p.  20^  (Calc.  ed.).  matl  (Jiban.  ed.),  p.  60“b 

® Either  Jains  or  Buddhists.  The  quota- 
13  [h.o.s.  17] 


i.  50 — ] 


Book  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi 


[98 


this,»  which  he  removes  with  the  words  <Kthese  ...  do  not.»  For  the  work  of 
the  mind-stuff  is  of  two  kinds,  the  enjoyment  of  sounds  and  other  [perceptible] 
things  {(^abdadi)  and  discriminative  discernment.  With  regard  to  these  two 
[kinds  of  woi’k],  the  mind-stutf,  when  it  has  latent-impressions  of  karma  from 
the  hindrances,  proceeds  to  the  enjoyment  of  sounds  and  other  [perceptible] 
things  ; but  for  the  mind,  all  of  whose  latent-impressions  of  karma  from  the 
hindrances  have  been  uprooted  by  subliminal-impressions  arising  in  insight,  and 
whose  state  is  that  its  task  is  nearly  ended,  the  only  work  that  remains  is  dis- 
criminative discernment.  Accordingly  subliminal-impressions  from  concentra- 
tion are  not  the  reasons  why  the  mind-stuff  has  enjoyment  as  its  task.  On  the 
contrary  they  are  hostile  to  that.  They  cause  the  mind-stuff  to  cease  from  its 
work  ; they  make  it  incapable  [of  that  work]  which  has  the  character  of  enjoy- 
ment. This  is  the  meaning.  Why  ? «For  the  movement  of  the  mind-stuff 
terminates  at  [the  time  of]  discernment.^  Since  in  order  to  enjoy,  the  mind-stuff 
moves  until  it  experiences  discriminative  discernment.  But  when  discrimina- 
tive discernment  has  come  to  pass,  hindrances  cease  and  it  has  no  longer  the 
task  of  enjoyment.  Consequently  the  complete  quiescence  of  the  task  of  enjoy- 
ment is  the  purpose  for  which  subliminal-impressions  from  insight  exist.  It  is 
this  that  has  been  stated  here. 

What  further  does  he  gain  ? 

51.  When  this  [subliminal-impression]  also  is  restricted, 
since  all  is  restricted,  [the  yogin  gains]  seedless  concentra- 
tion. 

This  [seedless  concentration]  is  counter  not  only  to  concentrated 
insight  but  is  opposed  even  to  subliminal-impressions  made  in 
insight.  Why?  Because  the  subliminal-impression  produced  by 
restriction  inhibits  the  subliminal-impressions  produced  by  concen- 
tration. The  existence  of  subliminal-impressions  made  by  the 
mind-stuff  in  restriction  may  be  inferred  from  the  experience  of  the 
lapse  of  time  during  which  there  is  stability  {sthiti)  of  the  restric- 
tion. Together  with  the  subliminal-impressions  which  arise  out 
of  the  emergent  and  restricted  concentrations  and  which  are  con- 
ducive to  Isolation,  the  mind-stuff  resolves  itself  into  its  own  per- 
manent primary-matter.  Therefore  these  subliminal-impressions 
are  counter  to  the  mind-stuff’s  task  and  are  not  causes  of  its 
stability.  Consequently,  its  task  ended,  together  with  the  sub- 
liminal-impressions which  are  conducive  to  Isolation,  the  mind- 
stuff  ceases  [from  its  task].  When  it  ceases,  the  Self  abides  in 
himself  and  is  therefore  called  pure  and  liberated. 


[— i.  51 


99]  Attainment  of  Isolation 

He  asks,  «What  further  ?»  What  does  he  also  gain  ? [Since]  the  mind-stuff 
contains  subliminal-impressions  [produced]  in  insight,  it  has,  as  before,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  capable  of  generating  a stream  of  insight,  a task  [to  fulfil].  Thus 
to  remove  the  task  something  else  is  also  still  required.  This  is  the  meaning. 
He  gives  the  answer  in  the  sutra  51.  When  this  [subliminal-impression]  also 
is  restricted,  since  all  is  restricted,  [the  yogin  gains]  seedless  concentration. 
The  higher  passionlessness,  ^ which  has  as  its  distinguishing  characteristic  the 
undisturbed  calm  of  perception,  by  an  increase  in  subliminal-impressions  restricts 
even  those  subliminal-impressions  made  by  insight  and  not  merely  the  insight 
[itself].  This  is  the  meaning  of  the  word  ^even.^  Since  the  whole  stream  of 
subliminal-impressions  as  it  rises  [into  consciousness]  is  restricted,  [then,]  in- 
asmuch as  there  is  no  cause,  no  effect  can  be  produced.  This  same  is  seedless 
concentration.  He  explains  [the  sutra]  in  the  words  ^This  [seedless  concen- 
tration].^  «This^  is  seedless  concentration  arising  out  of  higher  passionless- 
ness, which  is  counter  to  concentrated  insight,  and  which  with  the  help  of  itself 
as  cause  ^ becomes  not  only  counter  to  concentrated  insight,  but  also  contra- 
dictory to  subliminal-impressions  made  by  insight.  It  might  be  objected  that, 
‘ A distinct-idea  (vi/nawa)  produced  by  passionlessness  would,  since  a distinct -idea 
is  real,  inhibit  what  is  insight  and  nothing  more.  But  how  does  it  inhibit  a 
subliminal-impression  which  is  different  in  kind  from  a distinct-idea?  For 
evidently  a man  even  when  awake  has  a memory  of  the  object  seen  in  [his] 
dream.  [Therefore  subliminal-impressions  are  not  inhibited].’  With  this  in 
mind  he  asks,  «Why  ?»  He  gives  the  answer  in  the  words  ^produced  by 
restriction.^  Eestriction  is  that  by  which  insight  is  restricted.  It  is  the  higher 
passionlessness.  Produced  from  this  it  is  [called]  a subliminal- impression  produced 
by  restriction.  Only  by  the  subliminal-impression  produced  by  the  higher  passion- 
lessness when  it  has  been  cultivated  for  a long  time  and  uninterruptedly  and 
with  earnest  attention,  and  not  by  a distinct-idea,  are  the  subliminal-impressions 
of  insight  inhibited.  This  is  the  meaning. — The  objector  continues,  ‘This 
may  be  so.  But  what  is  the  source-of-valid-ideas  for  the  existence  of  subliminal- 
impressions  produced  by  restriction  ? It  might  be  either  perceived  directly,  or 
inferred  from  memory,  its  effect.  And  when  all  the  [mind-stuff’s]  fluctuations  are 
restricted,  the  yogin  has  no  perception  nor  yet  memory,  forasmuch  as,  in  so  far  as 
he  has  destroyed  all  fluctuations  whatsoever,  it  is  impossible  for  him  to  produce 
a memory.’  In  reply  to  this  he  says,  «dn  restriction. » The  stability  of  the 
restriction  is  the  restricted  state  of  the  mind-stuff. — [The  existence  of  subliminal- 
impressions  is  proved]  by  an  experience  of  the  lapse  of  time  in  [periods  of]  eight- 
and-forty  minutes  [mulmrta)  or  half-a-watch  or  a whole  watch,  or  a day  and  night 
and  so  forth.  What  he  means  to  say  is  this  : according  to  the  degree  of  the  perfec- 
tion in  passionlessness  and  in  practice,  perfection  of  restriction  is  experienced  by 
the  yogin.  And  the  moments  of  the  higher  passionlessness,  in  so  far  as  they  are 

‘ Patanjala  Rahasyam  identifies  this  with  dharma-megha. 

^ As  explained  in  i.  18. 


i,  51]  Book  I.  Concentration  or  Samadhi  [100 

not  related  to  each  other  in  a fixed  sequence,  are  not  capable,  in  so  far  as  they 
last  for  various  periods  of  time,  of  producing  the  full  excellence  of  restriction. 
So  the  point  is  that  we  must  admit  that  there  is  a permanent  accumulation  of 
subliminal-impressions  produced  by  the  accumulations  of  the  various  moments  of 
passionlessness.  The  objector  says,  ‘ Subliminal  impressions  from  insight  may 
perish,  but  why  should  the  subliminal-impression  from  restriction  perish  with 
them  ; or  if  it  does  not  perish,  [then  the  mind-stuff  would  still]  have  its  task  [to 
perform].’  In  reply  to  this  he  says,  «out  of  the  emergent.»  [This  is  the 
analysis  of  the  compound  :]  conscious  [concentration]  has  {tasya)  both  emergence 
and  the  concentration  of  emergence  which  restricts  this  [emergence].  The  sub- 
liminal-impressions arising  out  of  these  two  are  the  subliminal-impressions  which 
are  conducive  to  Isolation.  [And  these  are  the  same  as]  those  produced  by  re- 
striction. The  subliminal-impressions  of  emergent  insight  are  resolved  into 
mind-stuff.  Thus  the  mind-stuff  contains  subliminal-impressions  of  emergent 
insight.  But  the  subliminal-impression  from  restriction  lies  {aste)  just  uprisen 
in  the  mind-stuff.  Although  [this]  subliminal-impression  is  [uprisen],  the 
mind-stuff  has  no  task  [to  fulfil].  For  the  mind-stuff  has  its  task  [to  fulfil] 
when  it  is  bringing  to  pass  the  two  purposes  of  the  Self,  the  experience  of  sounds 
and  other  [perceptible  things]  and  the  discriminative  discernment.  Such  are  the 
two  purposes  of  the  Self.  But  when  nothing  is  left  but  subliminal-impressions 
[of  restriction], — now  that  the  Self  is  not  assimilated-by- reflection'  {pratisaih- 
vedin)  to  the  thinking-substance, — this  is  not  one  of  the  purposes  of  the  Self. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  the  case  of  the  discarnate  and  of  those  [whose  bodies]  are 
resolved-into-primary-matter,  the  mind-stuff, — not  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  conducive 
to  restriction,  but  also  in  so  far  as  it  is  pervaded  {vdsita)  with  hindrances, — still 
has  its  task  [to  fulfil].  With  this  in  mind  he  says  ^Consequently. The  rest 
is  easy. 

The  announcement  (uddega)  and  the  definition  {nirdega)  of  Yoga,  the  characteristic- 
mark  of  the  fluctuations  which  exist  for  the  sake  of  this  [Yoga],  the  means  of 
Yoga  and  its  subdivisions, — [these]  have  been  sketched  in  this  Book. 


Of  Patanjali’s  Yoga-treatise  entitled  Exposition  of  Sainkhya 
(Sdrhkhya-pravacana),  the  First  Book,  on  Concentration. 

Of  the  Explanation  of  the  Comment  on  Patanjali’s-Treatise,  which  Explanation 
is  entitled  Clarification  of  Entities  (Tattva-Vdigaradi)  and  was  composed  by  the 
Venerable  Vacaspatimifra,  the  First  Book,  on  Concentration,  is  finished. 


' Compare  pp.  22';  66’;  138’;  152’;  and  305’ (Calcutta  ed.). 


BOOK  SECOND 


MEANS 


OF  ATTAINMENT 


BOOK  SECOND 


MEANS  OF  ATTAINMENT 

It  has  been  stated  what  the  yoga  is  of  one  whose  mind  is  concen- 
trated. [This  sutra]  gives  the  start  to  the  problem  [which  considers] 
how  even  one  whose  mind-stuff  is  emergent  may  be  concentrated 
{yukta)  in  concentration  {yoga). 

1.  Self-castigation  and  study  and  devotion  to  the  l9vara 
are  the  Yoga  of  action. 

Yoga  is  not  perfected  in  him  who  is  not  self-castigated.  Impurity 
— which  is  variegated  with  subconscious-impressions  (ydsand),  from 
time  without  beginning,  coming  from  the  hindrances  and  from  karma, 
— and  into  which  [the  meshes  of]  the  net  of  objects  have  [there- 
fore] found  entrance,  is  not  reduced  {samhhedam  apadyate)  except 
by  <self-castigation.>  This  is  the  use  ^ of  self-castigation.  And 
this  [kind  of  self-castigation],  not  being  inhibitory  to  the  undis- 
turbed calm  of  the  mind-stuff,  is  therefore  deemed  [by  great  sages] 
to  be  worthy  of  his  {anena,  the  yogin’s)  earnest  attention,  dlecita- 
tion>  is  the  repetition  ^ of  purifying  formulae  such  as  the  Mystic 
Syllable  {pranava)  or  the  study  of  books  on  Liberation.  <Devo- 
tion  to  the  Icvara>  is  the  offering  ^ up  of  all  actions  to  the  Supreme 
Teacher  or  the  renunciation  of  the  fruit  of  [all]  these  [actions]. 

If  it  be  objected  that  the  First  Book  described  yoga  with  its  means  [and]  with 
its  subordinate  divisions  [and]  with  its  results,  and  that  no  reason  remains 
why  a Second  Book  should  be  begun,  he  replies  in  the  words  ^has  been 
stated.»  For  in  the  First  Book  practice  and  passionlessness  were  described 
as  means  to  yoga.  And  since  these  two,  for  one  whose  [mind-stuff]  is 
emergent,  do  not  instantly  come  into  being,  he  stands  in  need  of  the  means 
taught  in  the  Second  Book  in  order  to  purify  the  sattva.  For  by  these  he 
quite  purifies  the  sattva  and  performs  the  protective  ordinances  and  daily 

' Similarly  i.  41,  p.  85®  (Calc.  ed.).  ® Contrast  this  with  i.  23  and  see  also  Lihga 

^ See  ii.  44  and  compare  Linga  Pur.  viii.  39.  Pur.  viii.  40. 


[104 


ii.  1 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana 

cultivates  practice  and  passionlessness.  The  state  of  being  concentrated  is  the 
state  of  being  undistracted. — How  could  even  a man  whose  mind-stutf  is 
emergent  be,  because  concentrated  (yukta)  by  the  means  which  are  to  be  taught, 
a yogin?  This  is  the  meaning.  From  among  those  observances  which  are 
to  be  described,  having  made  a selection  [of  some]  as  being  rather  more  service- 
able to  the  beginner,  the  author  of  the  sutras  first  of  all  teaches  [what]  the 
yoga  of  action  [is].  1.  Self-castigation  and  study  and  devotion  to  the 

iQvara  are  the  Yoga  of  action.  Action  which  is  itself  yoga  is  the  yoga  of 
action  since  it  is  a means-of-effecting  yoga.  Therefore,  in  the  Visnu  Purana, 
in  the  dialogue  between  Khandikya  and  Ke9idhvaja,  starting  with  the  passage,* 

‘ At  first  the  yogin  who  is  [just]  beginning  to  apply  himself  is  called  a novice 
iyoga-yuj),’  self-castigation  and  recitation  and  the  like  are  set  forth.  With  the 
words  «in  him  who  is  not  self-castigated)^  he  shows  by  a negative  instance 
that  self-castigation  is  a means.  By  the  words  «from  time  without  beginning» 
he  shows  that  self-castigation  has  a subsidiary  function  which  is  serviceable 
as  a means*  [of  attaining  yoga].  Variegated  by  reason  of  the  subconscious- 
impressions,  from  time  without  beginning,  coming  from  hindrances  and  from 
karma,  [and]  therefore  that  in  which  [the  meshes  of]  the  net  of  objects  have 
found  entrance,  that  is,  inserted  themselves,  impurity,  which  is  the  excess  of 
rajas  and  tamas,  is  not  thoroughly  reduced  without  self-castigation.  Eeduction 
is  the  thorough  thinning  out  of  that  which  was  closely  woven. — The  objection  is 
raised : ‘ Even  if  we  have  recourse  to  self-castigation,  still — in  so  far  as  it 
causes  disorders  of  the  humours — it  is  hostile  to  yoga ; how  then  is  it  a means 
[to  attain]  this  [yoga]?’  In  reply  to  this  he  says,  ^And  this’  [kind].)» 
Self-castigation  should  be  performed  only  so  long  as  it  does  not  bring  on 
a disorder*  of  the  humours.  This  is  the  meaning.  «Such  as  the  Mystic 
Syllabled  that  is,  such  as,  the  Hymn  to  the  Purusa  [EV.  x.  90]  or  the  Eudra- 
mandala’  or  a Brahmana  or  the  like  from  the  Vedas,  or  the  Brahma-parayana® 
from  the  Puranas. — l9vara,  that  is,  the  Supreme  Teacher,  the  Exalted, — to 
him.  With  regard  to  Whom  this*  hath  been  said,  “Whatever  I do,  whether 
auspicious  or  inauspicious,  whether  intentionally  or  unintentionally,  all  that 
is  committed  unto  Thee.  Moved  by  Thee  I do  [it  all].” — Eenunciation  of  the 
fruit  of  [all]  these  [actions]  is  doing  the  actions  without  attachment  to  the 
fruit  [thereof].  And  with  regard  to  this  it  hath  been  said,®  “You  are  concerned 
with  actions  only  and  never  with  fruits.  Do  not  be  one  whose  motive  is  the 
fruit  of  actions.  Nor  let  your  attachment  be  to  inaction.” 


* VP.  vi.  7.  33.  See  also  Naradiya  Pur.  xlvii. 

* Literally,  is  serviceable  by  being  a means, 

upagatd'.’upayoginam. 

^ As  opposed,  for  instance,  to  VP.  ii.  11. 

* Compare  i.  30,  p.  67*  (Calc.  ed.). 

’ This  seems  to  refer  to  the  ^atarudriya- 


homamantras,  TaittirTya-samhita  iv.  5, 
Vajasaneyi-sariabita  xvi,  Kathaka  xvii. 
® Refers  perhaps  to  Visnu  Purana  i.  15. 

* Vijnana  Bhiksu  calls  this  smrti. 

® Bhagavad  Gita  ii.  47. 


105] 


[ — ii.  2 


Purposes  of  the  yoga  of  action 

Now  this  yoga  of  action  is — 

2.  For  the  cultivation  of  concentration  and  for  the  attenua- 
tion of  the  hindrances. 

For  when  the  yoga  of  action  is  given  earnest  attention,  it  cultivates 
concentration ; attenuates  the  hindrances  to  an  extreme  degree  ; 
[and]  will  make  the  hindrances,  when  they  are  extremely  attenuated, 
disqualified  for  propagation,  like  seeds  burned  by  the  fire  of  Eleva- 
tion {prasamkhydna).  But  the  subtile  insight,  which  is  the  dis- 
criminative discernment  between  the  sattva  and  the  Self,  untouched 
by  the  hindrances  because  they  are  so  much  attenuated,  with  its 
task  finished,  will  be  ready  for  inverse-propagation  ^ {pratiprasava). 
In  order  to  mention  the  purpose  of  this  [yoga  of  action]  he  introduces  the 
Sutra  with  the  words  «For  the.)^  2.  For  the  cultivation^  of  concentration 
and  for  the  attenuation  of  the  hindrances.  It  is  objected  that  if  the  yoga 
of  action  alone  is  able  to  attenuate  the  hindrances,  then  there  is  no  need  of 
Elevation.  To  this  he  replies  with  the  words  ^the  extremely  attenuated. » 
The  yoga  of  action  operates  only  for  the  extreme  attenuation,  but  not  for  the 
sterilization  of  the  hindrances,  but  Elevation  [operates]  for  the  sterilization 
of  those  [hindrances].  The  words  «like  burned  seeds2>  indicate  that  the 
burned  seeds  of  winter  rice  [and  the  hindrances]  are  of  the  same  kind  in  so 
far  as  both  are  sterile.  The  objector  says,  ‘ This  may  be  true.  But  if  Elevation 
alone  can  disqualify  the  hindrances  from  propagation,  then  there  is  no  need 
for  their  attenuation.’  In  reply  to  this  he  says,  ^of  these.)^  For  if  the 
hindrances  are  not  attenuated,  the  discriminative  discernment  between  the 
sattva  and  the  Self,  submerged  {grasta)  by  mighty  foes,  is  incapable  even  of 
uprising,  still  less  of  sterilizing  them.  But  when  the  hindrances  are  quite 
thinned  out  and  impotent,  [the  discernment],  although  in  opposition  to  them, 
does,  with  the  aid  of  passionlessness  and  of  practice,  finally  arise.  And  when 
the  discernment  which  is  nothing  more  than  the  [sense]  of  the  difference 
between  the  sattva  and  the  Self  is  finally  arisen,  it  is  un-touched  by  them, — 
that  is,  not  overwhelmed  by  them, — for  just  so  long  as  it  is  not  touched 
[by  them].  «The  subtile  insight)^  is  so-called,  because  its  object  is  subtile 
inasmuch  as  its  object  is  beyond  the  range  of  the  senses.  «Will  be  ready 
for  in  verse-propagation, » that  is,  for  resolution.  Why?  Because  its  task 
is  finished.  [In  other  words,]  that  is  said  to  be  of  this  kind  by  which,  acting 
as  a cause,  the  task  of  giving  starts  to  the  effects  of  the  aspects  [guna]  has 
been  finished. 


* Compare  ii.  2,  p.  107®;  ii.  10,  p.  120*;  Deussen’s  excellent  rendering  of  this  word 
ii.  27,  p.  167“;  iii.  50,  p.  265“;  iv.  34,  is  Verinnerlichung. 

p.  319“  (Calc.  ed.). 

14  [h.o.s.  it] 


[106 


ii.  3 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana 

Now  what  are  these  ^ hindrances  and  [vd)  how  many  are  they  ? 

3.  Undifferentiated-consciousness  {avidyd)  and  the  feeling- 
of-personality  and  passion  and  aversion  and  the  will-to- 
live  are  the  five^  hindrances. 

This  means  that  the  so-called  hindrances  are  five  misconceptions 
[i.  8].  These  when  flowing  out  make  the  authority  (adhikdra)  of 
the  aspects  {guna)  more  rigid  ; make  a mutation  more  stable  ; swell 
the  stream  of  effects  and  causes  ; and,  becoming  interdependent 
upon  one  another  for  aid,  bring  forth  the  fruition  of  karma. 

He  raises  a question  by  saying  «Now)^  and  replies  [to  it]  by  the  sutra 
upon  «Undifferentiated-consciousness.^  3.  Undifferentiated-consciousness 
(avidya)  and  the  feeling-of-personality  and  passion  and  aversion  and  the 
will-to-live  are  the  five  hindrances.  He  explains  the  word  <Khindrances» 
by  the  words  ^five  misconceptions.»  Undifferentiated-consciousness,  to  begin 
with,  is  nothing  but  misconception.  The  feeling-of-personality  and  the  others 
also  have  undifferentiated-consciousness  as  their  material  cause,  [and]  since 
they  cannot  exist  without  it,  [they  too]  are  misconceptions.  And  hence  when 
undifferentiated-consciousness  is  destroyed,  there  would  follow  the  destruction 
of  them  also.  He  mentions  the  reason  why  they  should  be  destroyed,  in  that 
they  are  the  cause  of  the  round-of-rebirths.  This  he  states  in  the  word 
«These.»  When  flowing  out  [that  is]  moving*  continuously  forth,  «make 
the  authority  of  the  aspects  more  rigid,»  that  is,  more  powerful ; [and]  in 
consequence  «make  a mutation  [more]  stable.»  For  in  successive  forms  as 
unphenomenalized  [primary  matter]  and  as  the  Great  [thinking-substance] 
and  as  the  personality-substance,  they  swell,  that  is,  they  intensify,  the  stream 
of  cause  and  effect.  He  shows  for  what  pm-pose  they  do  all  this  in  the  words 
«one  another.»  The  [three]  fruitions  of  karma,  distinguished  [ii.  13]  as 
being  birth  and  length  of  life  and  kind  of  experience,  have  their  purpose  (artha) 
in  the  Self.  That  [purpose]  those  hindrances  bring  to  pass,  that  is,  accomplish. 
Do  they  accomplish  this  singly  ? He  says,  ‘ No.’  But  ^upon  one  another  for 
aid,»  that  is,  the  hindrances  [aided]  by  the  karmas,  and  the  karmas  [aided]  by 
the  hindrances. 


4.  Undifferentiated-consciousness  {avidyd)  is  the  field  for 
the  others  whether  they  be  dormant  or  attenuated  or 
intercepted  or  sustained. 

Of  these  [five],  undifferentiated-consciousness  is  the  field  [or] 
propagative  soil.  The  others  are  feeling-of-personality  and  the  rest 

^ Many  MSS.  omit  te.  * Many  MSS.  omit  panca. 

* Compare  ii.  4,  p.  110®;  iii.  13,  p.  207'^ 


107] 


Varieties  of  undiffer entiated-consciousness  [ — ii.  4 

[of  the  five  hindrances].  In  four  kinds  of  forms,  the  dormant  and 
the  attenuated  and  the  intercepted  and  the  sustained. — 1.  Of  these 
[four],  what  is  the  dormant  state  ? It  is  the  tendency  [of  the 
hindrances]  which  remain  merely  potential  in  the  mind  towards  the 
condition  of  seed.  The  awakening  of  that  [dormant  hindrance]  is 
the  coming  face-to-face  with  the  [particular]  object  [which  makes 
that  dormant  hindrance  manifest].  But  for  one  who  has  [reached] 
Elevation  {jprasamkhydna),  and  whose  hindrances  have  become 
burned  seed,  there  is  not  that  [awakening  of  the  hindrances]  even 
when  he  is  brought  face-to-face  with  the  object  [which  manifests 
them].  For  out  of  what  can  burned  seed  germinate  ? For  this 
reason  the  fortunate  {hugala)  man  whose  hindrances  have  dwindled 
away  is  said  to  be  in  his  last  ^ body  {caramadeha).  In  him  only 
the  burned  state  of  the  seeds,  the  fifth  stage  of  the  hindrances  [is 
found],  and  not  in  other  [persons].  So  although  the  hindrances 
are  existent,  the  vitality  {sdmarthya)  of  the  seed  is  said  to  be 
already  burned.  Accordingly,  even  when  the  object  is  face-to-face, 
there  is  no  awakening  of  these  [hindrances].  Thus  dormancy  and 
the  failure  of  the  burned  seed  to  propagate  have  been  described. — 
2.  Attenuation  is  now  described.  The  hindrances,  when  over- 
powered {upahata)  by  the  cultivation  of  their  opposites,^  become 
attenuated. — 3.  When  this  is  the  case,  [the  other  hindrances]  inter- 
cept [the  attenuated  hindrances]  repeatedly,  and  move  forth  actively 
again  in  this  or  that  [unattenuated]  form  {dtmana).  In  that  case  ^ 
they  are  called  intercepted.  How  is  this  1 Since  [for  instance] 
when  one  is  in  love,  no  anger  is  felt,  inasmuch  as,  when  one  is  in 
love,  anger  does  not  actively  move  forth  ; and  love,  when  felt  in 
one  direction,  is  by  no  means  unfelt  towards  another  object.  When 
Chaitra  is  known  to  be  in  love  with  one  woman,  it  is  not  assumed 
that  he  is  out  of  love  for  other  women.  Bather,  his  love  finds  its 
fluctuation  fixed  in  this  direction,  in  other  directions  its  fluctuation 
is  yet  to  come.  For  this  [third  fluctuation]  is  for  the  moment  both 
dormant  and  attenuated  and  intercepted. — 4.  That  fluctuation 
which  is  fixed  upon  an  object  is  sustained  {uddra).  No  one  of  all 

’ 'When  they  form  a succession  of  tanu  and 
atanu. 


' See  VP.  V.  10.  7 and  Bh.  Gita  viii.  26. 
’ See  ii.  33. 


[108 


ii.  4 — ] Booh  II  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana 

these  [four]  passes  beyond  the  limits  of  the  hindrances  [and  there- 
fore all  four  are  to  be  rejected].  If  this  is  so  (tarhi),  what  is  this 
hindrance  that  is  intercepted  [or]  dormant  [or]  attenuated  or 
sustained  ? The  answer-is-now-given  [ucyate).  It  is  exactly  true 
[that  all  hindrances  are  forms  of  undilferentiated-consciousness]. 
But  only  when  these  [hindrances]  are  particularized,  do  they 
become  intercepted  and  so  on.  For  just  as  these  stages  cease 
when  their  opposites  are  cultivated,  so  they  become  manifest 
(ahhivyakta)  when  [changed]  into  the  phenomenal-form  (anjana) 
by  the  operation  of  their  phenomenalizing-conditions  {yyanjaha). 
So  all  those  hindrances  without  exception  are  varieties  of 
undilferentiated-consciousness.  Why  is  this  ? Since  it  is  un- 
differentiated-consciousness  and  nothing  else  that  pervades  ^ all 
[hindrances].  Whatever  [perceptible]  object  is  given  a form  by 
the  undilferentiated-consciousness,  it  is  that  [object]  which  is  per- 
meated 2 by  the  hindrances.  Whenever  there  is  a misconceived 
idea,  they  become  apperceived  ; and  when  undilferentiated-con- 
sciousness dwindles,  they  too  dwindle  away. 

He  shows  that  hindrances  are  to  be  rejected  in  that  they  have  their  root  in 
undifferentiated-consciousness.  4.  TJndifferentiated-consciousness  [avidya)  is 
the  field  for  the  others  whether  they  be  dormant  or  attenuated  or  inter- 
cepted or  sustained.  When  he  asks  «1.  Of  these  [four],  what  is  the  dormant 
state  ?»  his  intention  is  to  say  that  there  is  no  proof  for  the  real  existence  of 
hindrances,  if  they  are  not  performing  their  peculiar  purposeful  activity.  He 
tells  the  answer  in  the  words  <Kin  the  mind.)^  The  hindrances  may  not  indeed 
perform  their  purposeful  activity,  but  in  the  case  of  the  discarnate  and  of  those 
[whose  bodies]  are  resolved  into  primary  matter,  they  assume  the  form  of  seed 
and  exist  merely  potentially,  as  curds  exist  in  milk.  For  other  than  discrimina- 
tive insight  there  is  nothing  to  cause  the  sterility  of  these  [hindrances].  Hence 
the  discarnate  and  those  [whose  bodies]  are  resolved  into  primary  matter,  who 
have  not  obtained  discriminate  discernment,  have  their  hindrances  dormant, 
until  such  time  as  [these  hindrances]  reach  the  time  of  their  limitation.  But 
when  they  reach  that,  since  the  hindrances  revert  once  more,  they  come  face-to- 
face  with  the  various  objects  [of  sense].  Thus  these  [hindrances]  are  those  of 
which  the  basis  is  merely  potential.  In  this  way  theii-  potential  rising  [into 
consciousness]  is  described.  By  the  words  «tendency  . . . towards  the  condition 

> Balarama  says,  ‘ Undifferentiated -con-  Balarama  explains  the  word  anu^erate 
sciousness  is  inseparably -connected  by  saying ‘become  inherent  in  ’ (ani<- 

with  hindrances  ’ {kle^esv  avidyanvTya).  gatd  bhavanti). 


109]  Undifferentiated-consciousness  the  source  of  hindrances  [ — ii.  4 

of  seed)^  their  potentiality  of  action  is  indicated.  To  meet  the  question  why, 
in  the  case  even  of  one  who  has  discriminative  discernment,  hindrances  are  not 
dormant,  he  says,  «for  one  who  has  [reached]  Elevation.^  <5Cln  his  last  body,» 
in  other  words,  in  his  case  no  other  body  will  be  produced  with  reference  to 
which  [this]  body  of  his  could  be  called  prior.  ^Not  in  other  persons,^  in  other 
words,  not  in  the  discarnate  and  similar  cases.  An  objection  is  raised,  ‘ Since 
there  is  no  total  destruction  of  any  existing  thing,  what,  we  ask,  becomes  of  the 
force  of  the  magical  powers  of  this  kind  of  yoga?  Ai’e  not  the  hindrances 
awakened  when  face-to-face  with  objects  ? ’ In  reply  to  this,  he  says,  «existent.» 
Although  the  hindrances  are  existent,  still  in  their  state  as  seeds  they  are  burned 
by  the  fire  of  Elevation  {prasamhhyana).  This  is  the  meaning. — 2.  The  opposite 
of  the  hindrances  is  the  yoga  of  action  ; by  the  cultivation,  by  the  following  up, 
of  this,  the  hindrances  become  overpowered,  that  is,  attenuated.  Or  we  may  say 
that  thinking-focused-to-a-point  [saiiiyag-jncina)  is  the  opposite  of  undifferentiated- 
consciousness  ; that  the  knowing  of  distinctions  is  [the  opposite]  of  the  feeling- 
of-personality ; that  the  detached  attitude  {madhyasthya)  is  [the  opposite]  of 
passion  and  aversion  ; [and]  that  the  cessation  of  the  thought  of  continuance  is 
[the  opposite]  of  the  will-to-live. — 3.  He  describes  the  interception  with  the 
words  ^When  this  is  the  case.»  Either  because  overcome  by  any  one  of  the 
hindrances  which  moves  actively  forth,  or  because  resorting  excessively  to  objects, 
they  intercept  repeatedly  and  move  actively  forth  in  one  form  or  another,  that 
is,  come  into  appearance  {avirhhavcmti),  either  as  the  result  of  using  aphrodisiacs 
and  the  like  or  as  the  result  of  the  weakness  of  [the  other  hindrances]  which 
overcome  it.  By  the  repetition  he  signifies  the  reiteration  of  the  interruption 
and  of  the  moving  actively  forth.  Thus  the  difference  [of  this]  from  the  afore- 
said dormant  [hindrance]  has  been  described.  When  love  moves  actively  forth, 
anger  which  is  different  in  kind  is  overpowered ; or  again  love  itself  set  upon 
one  object  overpowers,  though  like  in  kind,  another  love  which  is  set  upon 
a different  object.  This  he  states  by  the  word  «love.)^ — The  fluctuation  which 
is  yet  to  come  is  to  be  understood  as  having  a three-fold  course  according  to 
circumstances.  With  this  in  mind  he  says,  «For  this.)^  The  pronoun  [‘  this’] 
refers  only  to  the  hindrance  from  the  fluctuation  which  is  yet  to  come  ; it  does 
not  refer  to  Chaitra’s  love,  just  because  that  [love]  is  intercepted. — 4.  He  describes 
the  sustained  [hindrance]  in  the  words  ^upon  an  object.»  If  some  one 
suggests  as  an  objection  that  the  sustained  [hindrance],  since  it  hinders  men, 
might  be  [properly]  called  a hindrance,  but  that  the  others  do  not  hinder  [and  so 
can]  by  no  means  be  called  hindrances,  he  says  in  reply  «all  these  [four].»  They 
do  not  pass  beyond  the  limits  of  the  hindrances,  that  is,  beyond  the  limits  of  the 
thing  expressed  by  the  word  hindrance,  when  they  become  changed  into  the 
sustained  state.  Therefore  they  too  are  to  be  rejected.  This  is  the  point. — 
Presupposing  the  unity  of  the  hindrances  * he  raises  an  objection  in  the  words 


Literally,  Presupposing  a unity  in  so  far  as  the  quality  of  being  a hindrance  goes. 


[110 


ii.  4 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana 

«If  this  is  so,  what.»  He  rebuts  it  by  showing  that  although  they  are  of  the 
same  kind  in  so  far  as  they  are  hindrances,  they  are  particular  because  of  the 
different  previously  described  states.  This  he  does  in  the  words  <KThe  answer- 
is-now-given.  It  is  true.»  The  objector  says,*  ‘ This  may  be  true.  The 
hindrances  may  result  from  undifferentiated-consciousness ; still  why  should  they 
cease  when  undifferentiated-consciousness  ceases  ? For  surely  no  one  would 
suppose  that  a piece  of  cloth  ceases  to  be,  when  the  weaver  ceases  to  be.’  In 
reply  to  this  he  says  «all  these  . . . without  exception.^  The  distinctions  ^ are 
only  apparently  distinctions,  that  is  to  say,  they  do  not  exist  separably  from 
this  [undifferentiated-consciousness].  He  asks  a question  in  the  words  ^Why 
is  this?»  He  gives  the  reply  in  the  words  ^all  [hindrances].»  This  same 
point  is  made  clear  by  the  word  ^whatever.»  ^Is  given  a form»  [that  is]  is 
falsely  attributed.  The  rest  is  easy. 

‘ In  the  case  of  those  who  have  been  resolved  into  entities,  the  hindrances  are 
dormant ; for  yogins,  attenuated  ; and  in  case  of  those  attached  to  objects, 
hindrances  are  intercepted  or  sustained.’  This  is  the  summarizing-stanza.* 


At  this  point  undifferentiated-consciousness  itself  is  described. 

5.  The  recognition  of  the  permanent,  of  the  pure,  of  pleasure, 
and  of  a self  in  what  is  impermanent,  impure,  pain,  and  not- 
self  is  undifferentiated-consciousness. 

1.  It  is  the  recognition  of  the  permanent^  in  an  impermanent 
effect,  for  example,  that  the  earth  should  be  perpetual,  that  the 
sky  with  the  moon  and  stars  should  be  perpetual,  that  celestial 
beings  are  deathless. — 2.  Likewise  in  the  impure  and  highly  re- 
pulsive ® body  there  has  been  the  recognition  of  purity.  And  it 


* Namely,  in  reply  to  the  hedgings  which 

in  the  Comment  follow  ^It  is  true)^. 

* Compare  Kav.  Prak.  Ullasa  iii.  and  the 

verse  quoted  in  the  comment  on  Appa- 
yadlksita’s  Kuvalayanandakarika  p.  1 1* 
(Nirnaya  Sag.  ed.,  1903) : 

Gaganam  gaganakaram 
sdgarah  sdgaropamdh 
Bumaruvanayor  yuddham 
rdmardmnayor  iva. 

® Discussed  in  Patanjali’s  Mahabhasya 
(Kielhorn's  ed.),  p.  6'*.  The  application 
is  only  general  here. 

* The  parallel  between  this  and  the  dis- 


cussion in  Aryadeva’s  Catuhfataka  is 
very  striking.  The  concept  of  avidyd 
is  fundamental  in  the  Mahayana.  Arya- 
deva  is  said  to  be  the  pupil  of  Nagar- 
juna;  consequently  he  wrote  a couple 
of  centuries  before  Patanjali.  We  are 
indebted  for  this  important  discovery 
to  Mahamahopadhyaya  Haraprasad 
Shastri  (Notes  on  the  newly -found 
Manuscript  Chatuhsatika  by  Aryadeva, 
Journal  Asiatic  Society  of  Bengal,  New 
Series,  vol.  vii,  no.  7,  1911,  p.  431). 

’ Compare  Maitrl  Up.  iii.  4. 


Ill]  Four  errors  of  undifferentiated-consciousness  [ — ii.  5 

has  been  said,  “ Because  of  its  [first]  abode  [and]  because  of  its 
origin  [and]  because  of  its  sustenance  [and]  because  of  its  exuda- 
tions [and]  because  of  its  decease  and  because  it  needs  [constant] 
cleaning,  the  learned  recognize  that  the  body  is  impure.”  Here 
the  recognition  of  the  pure  in  the  impure  is  evident.  If  we  say, 
‘ This  girl,  beautiful  as  the  sickle  of  the  new  moon,  her  limbs 
formed  of  honey  and  nectar,  her  eyes  large  as  the  petals  of  the 
blue  lotus,  seeming  to  refresh  the  living  world  with  her  coquettish 
glances,  so  that  we  think  that  she  has  issued  forth  from  the  moon,’ — 
then  what  could  be  the  connexion  of  this  [body]  with  that  (kena) 
[to  which  it  is  compared]  ? Just  so^  it  is  that  there  is  a miscon- 
ceived idea  of  the  pure  in  the  impure.  In  this  way,  [by  showing 
the  recognition  of  the  pure  in  the  impure,  one  sees  that  there  is] 
the  [misconceived]  idea  of  merit  where  there  is  only  demerit  and  of 
the  useful  where  there  is  only  the  useless. — 3.  Similarly  [Patanjali] 
will  describe  ^ the  recognition  of  pleasure  in  pain  in  the  words,  “ By 
reason  of  the  pains  of  mutations  and  of  anguish  and  of  subliminal- 
impressions  and  by  reason  of  the  opposition  of  fluctuations  of  the 
aspects  (guna) — to  the  discriminating  all  is  nothing  but  pain.”  Un- 
differentiated-consciousness  is  the  recognition  that  there  is  pleasure 
in  this  [pain]. — 4.  Likewise  the  recognition  of  a self  in  the  not-self, 
either  in  external  aids  ^ whether  animate  or  inanimate,  or  in  the 
body  as  the  seat  of  outer  experience,  or  in  the  central-organ  which 
aids  the  Self, — this  is  the  recognition  of  a self  in  the  not-self  In 
this  sense  it  has  been  said  of  this,  “ He  who  counts  any  existing 
thing,  whether  phenomenalized  or  unphenomenalized  [primary 
matter],  as  himself ; or  who  rejoices  in  the  success  of  these  (tasya) 
[things],  deeming  it  his  own  success,  or  who  grieves  at  the  ill- 
success  of  these  [things],  deeming  it  his  own  ill-success, — these  {sa) 
are  all  unenlightened.”  It  is  this  four-fold  undifferentiated-con- 
sciousness  which  becomes  the  root  of  that  unbroken-series  (sanfdna) 
of  hindrances  and  of  latent-impressions  of  karma  together  with  its 
fruition.  And  this  undifferentiated-consciousness  {a-vidya),  pre- 

^ Compare  the  tale  in  Henry  Warren’s  ® Balarama  says  ‘ Such  as  sons  or  cattle  or 
Buddhism  in  Translations,  p.  297.  servants  or  beds  or  seats,  which  are 

* See  ii.  15.  not  the  self’. 


[112 


ii.  5 — ] Booh  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana 

cisely  as  in  the  case  of  a foe  [ci-mitra)  or  of  a trackless  forest  (a- 
gospada),  is  to  be  conceived  as  a really  existing  object  {vastusa- 
tattva).  Just  as  a foe  [amitra)  is  not  a negative  friend  [and]  not 
something  amounting  to  a friend,  but  the  opposite  of  this  [friend], 
a rival, — so  too  a trackless  forest^  [a-gospada)  is  not  [a  place] 
not-visited-by-cows  (gospada-abhava),  nor  again  is  it  merely  a 
[quantity  of]  land  which  has  a cow’s  foot  as  its  measure,  but,  on 
the  contrary,  it  is  nothing  less  than  a definite  place,  a different 
thing,  other  than  these  two  [and  the  opposite  of  a cow’s  footprint]. 
Precisely  so,  undifferentiated-consciousness  is  not  a source-of-valid- 
ideas  nor  the  negation  of  a source-of-valid-ideas,  but  another  kind 
of  thinking  the  reverse  of  knowledge. 

6.  The  recognition  of  the  permanent,  of  the  pure,  of  pleasure,  and  of  a 
self  in  what  is  impermanent,  impure,  pain,  and  not-self  is  undifferentiated- 
consciousness.  1.  The  word  «effect»  is  a qualification  which  serves  [to 
indicate]  the  impermanence.  Some  indeed,  deeming  the  elements  permanent  and 
longing  to  attain  to  the  foi-m  of  these,  pay  devotion  even  to  these.  Thus  deeming 
the  moon  and  sun  and  stars  and  heavenly  regions  permanent,  in  order  to  attain 
these,  they  pay  devotion  to  the  Paths  [that  is,  the  Way  of  the  Fathers  and  the 
Way  of  the  Gods]  which  begin  with  the  Smoke.  Similarly  deeming  the  celestial 
beings,  that  is,  the  gods,  to  be  deathless,  they  drink  soma  in  order  to  reach  their 
condition.  For  it  is  written  [KV.  viii.  48.  3],  “We  have  drunk  the  soma;  we 
have  become  deathless.”  It  is  this  recognition  of  the  permanent  in  the  imper- 
manent that  is  undifferentiated-consciousness.  2.  ^Likewise  in  the  impure  and 
highly  repulsive  body)^ — when  the  sentence  is  only  half-finished  he  recites  a 
stanza  (gathd)  from  Vyasa  to  show  the  repulsiveness  of  the  body.  The  words 
are  ^Because  of  its  [first]  abode.X>  The  abode  is  the  mother’s  womb  polluted 
by  such  things  as  urine  ; the  seed  is  the  mother’s  blood  and  the  father’s  semen. 
The  sustenance  is  formation  into  juices  of  the  food  eaten  and  drunk  ; for  by  it 
the  body  is  held  together.  Exudation  is  sweat.  And  death  defiles  the  body  of 
even  a scholarly  man.  Inasmuch  as  a bath  is  required  after  his  [dead  body]  is 
touched. — An  objector  might  say,  ‘If  the  body  is  impure,  there  is  no  use  in 
cleansing  it  with  earth  and  with  water.’  To  this  he  replies  «because  it  needs 
[constant]  cleaning.^  Although  the  body  is  naturally  impure,  purification  must 
be  applied  [to  it],  just  as  women  produce  fragrance  [by  applying]  ointments 

* This  illustration  occurs  in  Siddhanta  2.  ‘ Measure  ’ •pramdne ; thus  gospada- 

KaumudI,  § 1060,  on  Pan.  vi.  1.  145.  mutram  = hsetram. 

The  word  has  the  two  meanings  given  * Patanjali  discusses  the  word  Vdiyasikih 
in  the  Comment:  1.  ‘ Not-visited  ’ in  the  first  varttika  on  iv.  1.  97. 

(asevife);  thus  gospadany  = aranydni ; 


113]  Undifferentiated-consciousness  is  something  'positive  [ — ii.  5 

to  the  body.  He  completes  the  half-finished  statement  by  saying  «Here  . . . 
in  the  impure. » The  meaning  is  that  it  is  impure  on  the  grounds  stated 
before.  He  describes  the  recognition  of  purity  [in  the  impure]  by  the  words 
«the  new.»  <KCoquettish»  is  that  which  is  playful  as  the  result  of  an 
erotic-mood.  What  could  be  the  connexion  of  the  highly  repulsive  body,  by 
a highly  remote  {momdatama)  similarity,  with  such  a thing  as  the  sickle  of  the 
new  moon  ? — <5Cln  this  way,^  by  showing  the  recognition  of  purity  in  the  impure 
body  of  a woman.  <SWhere  there  is  only  demerit»  as  in  the  case  of  murder 
(hinsd),  there  is  [the  discovery  of]  an  idea  of  merit  in  things  which  liberate  from 
the  round-of-rebirths.  Similarly  in  case  of  a thing  that  is  useless,  such  as  money, 
because  of  the  amount  of  pains  [required]  for  getting  it  and  keeping  it,  it  is 
explained  that  there  is  [a  discovery  of]  the  idea  of  the  useful  [in  the  useless]. 
All  these  in  that  they  are  abhorrent  are  impure. — 3.  ^Similarly  ...  in  pain.^ 
Easy. — 4.  ^Likewise  ...  in  the  not-self.»  Easy. — It  was  Panca^ikha^  who 
spoke  of  this  in  this  way. — The  “ phenomenalized  ” [primary-matter]  is  the  ani- 
mate, such  as  sons  or  wives  or  cattle ; the  “ unphenomenalized  ” is  the  inanimate, 
such  as  beds  or  seats  or  food. — ■^These  (sa)  are  all  unenlightened)^  [that  is] 
stupid. — It  is  called  four-fold  (catuspada)  because  it  has  four  parts  (pada),  four 
places  [where  it  becomes  phenomenaUzed].  It  might  be  objected,  ‘ There  is 
also  another  kind  of  undifferentiated-consciousness  which  has  as  its  object  such 
[states]  as  loss  ^ of  the  sense  of  orientation  or  as  [the  sight]  of  the  firebrand  [whirled 
about  so  as  to  be  seen  as  a]  circle.  Undifferentiated-consciousness  has  [therefore] 
an  indefinite  number  of  parts.  Why  then  say  that  it  is  four-fold  ? ’ In  reply 
to  this  he  says,  ^the  root  ...  of  that.:^  There  may  also  be  of  course  other 
undifferentiated-consciousnesses,  but  the  undifferentiated-consciousness  which  is 
the  seed  of  the  round-of-rebirths  has  only  four  parts. 

An  objector  says,  ‘ Undifferentiated-consciousness  {a-vidya)  might  be  a nega- 
tive determinative^  compound  (nafi-samasa).  In  which  case,  1.  the  first  member 
(a-)  might  be  determinative  {pradhana),  as  for  example,  without-flies  [a-maksika) ; 
or  2.  the  final  member  might  be  determinative,  as  for  example,  not  a-king’s 
ofiicer  [a-rdjapwusa) ; or  3.  [the  compound]  might  have  a third  thing  as  deter- 
minative, as  for  example,  a flyless  place  [amakdka  dega).  This  being  the 
situation,  if  we  suppose  1.  that  the  first  member  is  determinative,  then  un- 
differentiated consciousness  {a-vidya)  would  be  understood  as  a negation  whereto 
an  affirmative  is  expected^  {prasajjya-pratisedha).  And  this  [kind  of  a nega- 
tion] could  not  be  the  cause  of  such  things  as  the  hindrances.  Or  if  we 


* This  is  the  fifth  fragment  according  to 
Garbe  : Festgruss  an  Roth,  1893,  p.  78. 
See  also  Garbe’s  Introduction  to  his 
translation  of  the  Samkhya-Tattva- 
KaumudI,  p.  7. 

“ Compare  i.  6,  p.  21®  (Calc.  ed.). 

® Pan.  ii  2.  6. 

15  [h.o.s.  it] 


* A negative  connected  with  a verbal  stem. 
See  Patanjali : Mahabhasya  (Kielhorn’s 
ed.)  i.  215,  last  line ; 221ii ; 319'“ ; 341® ; 
iii.  35,  last  line.  See  also  the  discussion 
in  Apodeva : Mimansa-nyaya-prakaja 
(1906),  p.  109.  There  is  also  a chapter 
on  this  in  Vaiyakarana  Bhusana. 


[114 


i.  5 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana 

suppose  2.  that  the  final  member  is  to  be  the  determinative,  then  it  is  undifferen- 
tiated-consciousness  that  is  to  be  particularized  by  the  negation  of  something. 
And  this  [kind  of]  undifferentiated-consciousness  would  be  destructive  of  such 
things  as  the  hindrances  and  not  the  seed  of  them  [because  it  would  be 
a consciousness  of  the  absence  of  something].  For  it  cannot  be  that  the 
[member]  subordinate  (gum)  to  the  determinative  [pradhdna)  [member  of  the 
compound]  should  break  down  that  determinate.  Therefore  in  order  to  make 
sure  that  it  does  not  break  down  the  determinative,  something  irregular,  [that  is, 
the  absence  of  something]  must  be  supposed,  on  the  other  hand,  to  be  found  in 
the  subordinate  [member  of  the  compound].  Accordingly,  in  order  that  un- 
differentiated-consciousness as  such  should  not  be  broken  down,  another  meaning 
must  be  given  to  the  negative  or  [another]  negative  must  be  supplied.  Or  if  we 
suppose,  on  the  other  hand,  3.  that  another  thing  be  the  determinative  [to  the 
compound],  we  should  have  to  say  that  [undifferentiated-consciousness]  is  a state- 
of-mind  {buddhi)  in  which  knowledge  {vidya)  does  not  exist.  And  that  could  not 
be  the  seed  of  such  things  as  the  hindrances  merely  in  so  far  as  it  is  the  absence 
of  knowledge.  For  then  a similar-state-of-things  would  also  have  to  be  admitted 
in  the  case  of  that  [form  of  undifferentiated-consciousness]  which  is  attained  in 
the  restriction  when  preceded  by  discriminative  discernment,  [since  here  too 
there  is  absence  of  knowledge].  Accordingly  in  all  [these  three]  ways  [it  has 
been  shown]  that  undifferentiated-consciousness  is  not  the  root  of  such  things  as 
the  hindrances.’  In  reply  to  this  he  says,  «And  this  . . . has.»  <Lk.  really 
existing  objects  is  the  state  of  existence  of  a real  object,  that  is,  really  existing 
objectivity.  So  in  this  way  [it  is  evident]  that  undifferentiated-consciousness  is 
neither  1.  a uegation-whereto-an-affirmative-is-expected  (prasajjya-pratisedha) ; 
nor  again  2.  nothing  but  [a  defective  kind  of]  knowledge ; nor  even  3.  is  it 
a state-of-mind  characterized  as  being  the  absence  of  this,  [that  is,  knowledge]  ; 
but  4.  undifferentiated-consciousness  is  described  as  being  misconceived  thinking, 
the  opposite  of  knowledge  (vidya).  For  the  relation  of  word  and  thing  is 
determined  by  conforming  to  the  [usage  of  the]  world.  And  because  [according 
to  the  usage]  of  the  world  even  a [compound]  whose  final  member  is  determina- 
tive and  which  is  a negative  compound  and  which  suppresses  (upamardaka)  the 
thing  to  be  described  by  the  last  word  [of  the  compound]  is  now  and  then  found 
in  a sense  contrary  to  this  [final  member  as  determinative]  and  [at  the  same 
time]  suggested  by  this  [final  member], — there  is  [therefore]  in  this  case  also 
an  expressive-meaning  (vrtti)  in  the  sense  of  being  contrary  to  this  [knowledge]. 
— He  analyses  the  example  «Just  as  a foe  (a-mitra)  is  not.^  [A  foe]  is  not 
«a  negative  friend»  nor  again  «.  . . amounting  to  a friend. Supply  ^ at  this 
point  [in  the  text]  ‘ Some  other  thing,  but  ^the  approach  of  this,  a rival.»’ 
«So  too  a trackless  forest»  is  not  a negative  cow’s®  footprint,  nor  again  is  it 
merely  a [quantity  of]  land  which  has  a cow’s  foot  as  its  measure ; but,  on 
* It  would  appear  that  Vacaspatimifra  did  ® See  the  discussion  s.v.  in  ^abda- 

not  read  the  words  Mm  tu  .. . sapatnah.  Kalpa-Druma. 


115] 


Mistake  of  the  feeling-of -'personality  [ — ii.  e 

the  contrary,  nothing  less  than  a spacious  place,  the  opposite  [in  extent]  of  a cow’s 
foot  and  other  than  the  two  negative  a-gospada  [that  is,  1.  without  footprints- 
of-the-cow,  and  2.  not-a-cow’s  footprint  would  form  together  the  first  negative 
cow’s  footprint ; and  3.  land  covered  by  a cow’s  footprint  would  form  the  second 
negative  cow’s  footprint],  in  fact,  a different  thing  [altogether,  the  trackless 
forest].  He  applies  this  to  the  matter  in  hand  which  he  is  illustrating,  with  the 
words  ^CPrecisely  so.)» 


6.  When  the  power  of  seeing  and  the  power  by  which  one 
sees  have  the  appearance  {iva)  of  being  a single-self,  [this  is] 
the  feeling-of-personality. 

The  Self  is  the  power  of  seeing ; the  thinking-substance  is  the 
power  by  which  one  sees.  The  hindrance  called  the  feeling-of- 
personality  is  a change  by  which  these  two  appear  to  become 
a single  essence  {svarupa).  When  there  is  any  kind  of  failure  to 
distinguish  him  who  has  the  power  of  the  enjoyer  from  that  which 
has  the  power  of  being  enjoyed,  which  are  as  distinct  as  possible 
and  as  unconfused  as  possible,  enjoyment  is  ready  at  hand.  But 
when  each  has  recovered  its  own  essence,  there  is  Isolation. — How 
is  it  that  [at  that  time  there  could  be  anything]  that  could  be 
called  enjoyment  ? In  this  sense  it  has  been  said,^  “ He  who 
should  fail  to  see  that  the  Self  is  other  than  the  thinking-substance, 
distinct  in  nature  and  in  character  and  in  consciousness  and  in 
other  respects,  would  make  the  mistake  of  putting  his  own 
thinking-substance  in  the  place  of  that  [Self].” 

Having  said  that  undififerentiated-consciousness  [avidya)  is  the  cause,  he  says  that 
the  feeling-of-personality  is  the  effect,  which  [in  its  turn]  is  supreme  {varistha) 
over  passion  and  the  other  [hindrances].  6.  When  the  power  of  seeing  and 
the  power  by  which  one  sees  have  the  appearance  of  being  a single-self, 
[this  is]  the  feeling-of-personality.  The  seeing  and  that  by  which  one  sees  are 
precisely  the  two  powers  of  the  two,  the  self  and  the  not-self.  That  undifferen- 
tiated-consciousness  [avidya)  which  is  characterized  as  being  the  perception  of 
a self  in  what  is  the  not-self,  and  which  has  the  appearance  of  being  a single 
intended-object,  but  which,  in  the  strict  sense,  is  not  a single  self, — this  [avidyai] 
is  the  feeling-of-personality.  Instead  of  saying  ‘ of  seeing  and  of  that  by  which 
one  sees  ’,  he  uses  the  words  <power  of>  in  order  to  indicate  the  relation  between 
them,  that  is,  the  capacity  to  be  an  enjoyer  and  to  be  objects  to  be  enjoyed. — 
He  elaborates  the  sutra  by  saying  ^The  Self.)^ — It  might  be  asked,  ‘ Why,  since 

^ This  is  the  sixth  fragment  of  Pahcafikha  according  to  Garbe.  Compare  Bh.  Gita  vi.  41. 


ii.  6 — j Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [116 

they  are  perceived  as  identical,  should  they  not  be  identical  and  why  should  [the 
appearance  of]  unity  hinder  the  Self?  ’ In  reply  he  says  «he  who  has  the  power 
of  the  enjoyer  . . . that  which  has  the  power  of  being  enjoyed.^  He  who  has 
the  power  of  the  enjoyer  is  the  Self ; that  which  has  the  power  of  being  enjoyed 
is  the  thinking-substance.  These  two  are  as  distinct  as  possible.  If  it  be  asked, 
‘ Whence  comes  this  distinction  ? ’ the  reply  is,  «as  unconfused  as  possible.^ 
Immutability  and  other  [qualities]  are  the  properties  of  the  Self  ; mutability  and 
other  [qualities]  are  the  properties  of  the  thinking-substance.  Thus  there  is  no 
confusion.  Thus  by  these  words  it  is  asserted  that  the  identity,  although 
presented-as-an-idea,  is  not  in-the-strict-sense-real. — The  words  «failure  to  dis- 
tinguish»  state  the  fact  that  hindrances  exist.  After  having  given  an  affirmative 
[line  of  reasoning],  he  states  a negative  [line  of  reasoning]  in  the  words  <SCits  own 
essence. » The  recovery  is  the  discriminative  discernment.  That  another  also 
holds  this  same  opinion  he  says  in  the  words  ^In  this  sense  it  has  been  said» 
byPancafikha  that  «the  thinking-substance.» — «In  nature»  means  in  its  own 
self,  which  is,  at  all  times  whatsoever,  pure  [of  aspects  (gu?iaj]  ; «in  character^ 
means  in  its  detachment ; «in  consciousness)^  means  in  its  intelligence 
{caitanya) ; whereas  the  thinking-subject  is  impure  and  not  detached  and  inani- 
mate (jada).  Undifferentiated-consciousness  (avidya)  is  the  mental  state  with 
regard  to  these  two  [to  the  effect  that  they  are  one]  self.  «The  mistake^  is  a 
subliminal-impression  generated  by  a previous  undifferentiated-consciousness ; 
or  else  it  is  the  tamas  [quality],  because  undifferentiated-consciousness  is  tamas. 


7.  Passion  is  that  which  dwells^  upon  pleasure. 

That  greed  [or]  thirst  [or]  desire,  on  the  part  of  one  acquainted 
with  pleasure,  ensuing  upon  a recollection  of  pleasure,  for  either 
the  pleasure  or  for  the  means  of  attaining  it,  is  passion. 

When  one  feels  the  discrimination,  such  states  as  passion  cease.  So  the  feeling- 
of-personality  brought  to  pass  by  undifferentiated-consciousness  [avidya)  is  the 
root  [nidana]  of  such  states  as  passion.  Accordingly,  directly  after  the  feeling-of- 
personality  he  gives  the  distinguishing-characteristic  of  passion  and  of  the  rest 
[of  the  hindrances].  7.  Passion  is  that  which  dwells  upon  pleasure.  Since 
memory  [of  pleasure]  is  impossible  in  the  case  of  one  unacquainted  with  pleasure, 
the  text  says  «acquainted  with  pleasure.^  Passion  for  a recollected  pleasure 
ensues  «upon  a recollection  of  pleasure.)^  But  while  a pleasure  is  in  experience 
there  is  no  need  of  recollection.  Since,  however,  the  means  for  attaining 
pleasure  are  either  remembered  or  perceived,  the  passion  must  ensue  upon  a 
recollection  of  pleasure.  And  even  when  the  means  of  attaining  pleasure  are 

‘ See  the  gloss  sukJiam  anugete  visayJkaroti  [anukurvanti),  p.  28P’  (Calc,  ed.),  and 

(Maniprabha).  Compare  i.  11,  p.  38*  the  last  words  of  the  Bhasya  on  iv.  28 

(Calc.  ed.).  See  also  Vacaspati’s  gloss  with  Balarama’s  note. 


117] 


Passion,  aversion,  will-to-live 


[ — ii.  9 

perceived,  it  is  only  after  remembering  that  one  of  this  same  kind  is  the  source 
of  pleasure  that  he  infers  that  this  one  is  a source  of  pleasure  in  so  far  as  it  is  of 
the  same  kind.  After  this  follows  the  desire.  He  explains  the  words  <dwells 
upon>  by  the  word  «That.» 


8.  Aversion^  is  that  which  dwells  upon  pain. 

That  repulsion  [or]  wrath  [or]  anger,  on  the  part  of  one  acquainted 
with  pain,  ensuing  upon  a recollection  of  pain,  for  either  the  pain 
or  for  the  means  of  attaining  it,  is  aversion. 

8.  Aversion  is  that  which  dwells  upon  pain.  The  words  <Kacquainted  with 
pain:^  are  to  be  explained  as  [in  the]  previous  [sutra].  He  explains  the  words 
<dweUs  upon>  by  the  word  «that.^  Kepulsion  in  the  sense  that  it  repels.  The 
same  he  elaborates  by  synonyms,  [for  instance,]  «wrath.» 


9.  The  will-to-live  {ahhinivega)  sweeping  on  [by  the  force  of] 
its  own  nature  ^ exists  in  this  form  even  in  the  wise. 

In  all  living  beings  this  craving  for  one’s  self  ceaselessly  rises, 
‘ May  I not  cease  to  live  ! May  I live  ! ’ This  craving  for  one’s 
self  does  not  arise  except  in  one  in  whom  the  experience  of  death 
resides.  And  from  [the  existence]  of  this  [hope]  the  experience  of 
other  births  is  made  clear.  And  this  is  that  well-known  hindrance 
[called]  the  will-to-live.  This  [fear  of  death],  inconceivable  as  a 
result  of  either  perception  or  inference  or  verbal-communication, 
sweeping  on  [by  the  force  of]  its  own  nature,  as  a vision  of  extermi- 
nation, forces  the  inference  that  the  pangs  of  death  have  already 
been  experienced  in  previous  births.  And  just  as  it  is  evident  that 
this  fear  is  to  be  found  in  the  unspeakably  stupid,  so  also  even  in 
the  wise,  who  have  some  understanding  of  the  prior  limit  [of 
human  lives],  [that  is,  the  round-of-rebmths,]  and  of  their  final 


* Professor  Deussen  quotes  most  appositely 
Spinoza,  Ethica  iii.  13,  Scholion, 
nihil  aliud  est,  quam  laetitia  concomi- 
tante  idea  causae  extemae;  et  odium 
nihil  aliud,  quam  tristitia  concomitante 
idea  causae  externae. 


* See  Ruyyaka : Alamkarasarvasva  (Kavya- 
mala  35),  p.  55‘,  interprets  the  word  as 
meaning  merely  eo  ipso  or  by  its  own 
nature.  Compare  Ramananda  Yati  in 
Maniprabha  (Benares  Sanskrit  Series), 
1903,  p.  30^,  vdsana-dsahgah  svarasah. 


[118 


li.  9 — ] Booli  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana 

limit  [that  is,  Isolation].  Why  is  this  ? Because  this  subconscious- 
impression,  the  result  of  the  fear  of  death,  is  alike  in  both  fortunate 
and  unfortunate. 

9.  The  will-to-live  sweeping  on  [by  the  force  of]  its  own  nature  exists  in  this 
form  even  in  the  wise.  He  discusses  the  meaning  of  the  term  ^will-to-live^  in  the 
words  «all  living  beings.)^  «This  craving  for  one’s  self»  is  the  longing  for  one’s 
self  expressed  in  the  words  «May  I not  cease  to  live,»  that  is,  ‘ May  I not  become 
non-existent,’  [and  also  expressed]  in  the  words  «May  I live  [bhuyasam)y>  [that  is] 
‘ May  I be  alive  {jivyasam).'  The  longing  for  one’s  self  is  not  possible  unless  the 
living  creature  have  had  residing  in  himself  an  experience  of  death.  It  is  he  only 
that  has  this  craving  for  himself,  [that  is]  the  will-to-live,  the  fear  of  death.  In 
the  course  of  the  discussion  (prasangatas)  he  refers  by  the  words,  «And  from  [the 
existence]  of  this)^  to  a heterodox-person  {nastika)  who  denies  that  there  is 
another  birth.  From  the  fact  that  the  present  body  is  being  held  together,  it 
follows  that  there  is  an  experience  of  a previous  birth.  In  other  words,  a birth 
is  a conjunction  ‘ [of  the  soul]  with  a body  and  sense-organs  and  feelings  which 
are  different  from  those  of  any  previous  [conjunction]  and  are  characterized  by 
the  [definite  location]  in  the  collection.  This  [birth]  is  experienced  [or]  attained. 
And  it  is  this  [experience  or  attainment]  that  is  made  clear.  How  is  this  ? In 
reply  he  says  «And  this  is  that  well-known  will-to-live.»  Breaking  off  the 
sentence  in  the  middle  he  tells  of  its  hindering  character  in  the  word  «hin- 
drance.»  This  [will-to-live]  is  called  a hindrance  because  it  hinders,  [that  is] 
pains,  living-creatures  with  unkindly  actions  and  the  like.  He  finishes  what  he 
had  begun  to  say  by  the  words  ^sweeping  on  by  its  own  nature.»  It  has 
a disposition  to  sweep  on  by  virtue  of  its  own  nature  in  the  form  of  subconscious- 
impressions.  But  this  disposition  is  not  accidental.  Even  in  the  case  of  a worm 
just  born  [that  is]  full  of  pain  and  low  in  intelligence  [this  disposition]  is  not 
accidental.  He  tells  the  reason  for  this  in  the  words  ^as  a result  of  perception.» 
This  fear  of  death,  being  inconceivable,  that  is,  not  acquired  in  this  present 
{pratyudita)  birth  as  a result  of  perception  or  inference  or  verbal-communication, 
it  must  be  inferred  that  the  pangs  of  death  have  been  experienced  in  a previous 
birth.  This  is  the  point  at  issue.  For  even  a child  just  born  trembles  at  the 
sight  of  a murderous  thing.  And  from  this  peculiar  quivering  [the  child]  infers 
the  nearness  {pratyasatti)  to  himself  of  the  experience  of  death  and  is  found  to  be 
afraid  of  it.  Thus  we  see  that  fear  results  from  pain  or  from  whatever  leads  to 
pain.  Moreover  in  this  birth  he  has  not  experienced  or  inferred  or  heard  of  death. 
So  we  gather  that  he  has  known  only  in  a previous  [birth]  the  pains  [of  death]  or 
that  which  leads  to  the  pain.  And  from  this  a memory  of  himself  as  he  was  in  that 
condition  persists.  This  moreover  does  not  occur  unless  there  be  subliminal- 
impressions.  Furthermore  this  subliminal-impression  [cannot  occur]  without 
experience  and  the  experience  does  not  belong  to  this  life.  Therefore  the  only 

* See  Qamkara  on  Brahma-sQtra  ii.  2.  23  with  Anandagiri’s  gloss. 


119]  Removal  of  hindrances  by  contemplation  [ — ii.  lo 

remaining  alternative  is  [a  subliminal-impression]  from  a pre-existent  birth. 
Thus  there  was  a connexion  with  a previous  birth. — The  word  <so  (tatha)> 
requires  a correlative  ^just  as.»  Thus  by  supplying  the  word  ^just  as» 
from  the  sense  of  the  sentence,  he  shows,  in  the  words  «just  as  . . . this,^  how 
the  meaning  of  the  sentence  would  be. — «In  the  unspeakably  stupid)^ 
means  in  the  most  sluggish  intelligences. — He  shows  [what  the  kind  of]  learning 
is  by  saying  ^ome  understanding  of  the  prior  and  of  the  final  limits  [of  human 
lives].»  The  limit  is  the  end.  Now  the  prior  limit  of  man  is  the  round-of- 
rebirths  ; the  latter  is  Isolation.  He  by  whom  this  has  been  understood  from 
things  heard  or  from  inferences  is  called  [one  who  has  understanding  of  the 
prior  and  of  the  final  limits]. — This  Avell-known  fear  exists  [and]  has  become 
established  in  the  case  of  the  worm  and  of  the  wise  man.  It  might  be  objected 
that  in  the  case  of  the  unwise  fear-of-death  is  conceivable,  but  not  in  the  case  of 
the  wise  man,  since  [in  him]  it  has  been  eradicated  by  knowledge.  Or  else  if  the 
fear-of-death  has  not  been  eradicated,  it  would  be  eternally  present.  With  this 
in  view  he  asks  4lWhy  is  this  The  answer  is  ^Because  . . . it  is  alike.» 
He  does  not  refer  to  the  wise  man  who  has  conscious  [concentration],  but  to  him 
who  discriminates  upon  the  basis  of  things  heard  and  of  inference.  This  is 
the  point. 


10.  These  [hindrances]  [when  they  have  become]  subtile  are 
to  be  escaped  by  the  inverse-propagation.^ 

These  five  hindrances  when  they  have  become  like  burned  seeds, 
after  the  mind  which  has  predominated  over  the  deeds  of  the  yogin 
is  resolved  [into  primary  matter],  come  with  it  to  rest. 

Thus  the  hindrances  have  been  characterized,  and  of  those  which  should  be 
escaped,  four  states,  the  dormant  and  the  attenuated  and  the  intercepted  and  the 
sustained,  have  been  shown.  But  ‘ why  is  not  the  fifth  state,  which  is  subtile, 
mentioned  by  the  author  of  the  sutras,  inasmuch  as  it  is  in  the  state  of  burned 
seed  ? ’ To  this  he  replies,  10.  These  [hindrances]  [when  they  have  become] 
subtile  are  to  be  escaped  by  the  inverse-propagation.  It  is  that  of  course 
which  is  within  the  scope  of  the  exertions  of  man  which  has  been  described  ; 
but  the  subtile  is  not  within  the  scope  of  a man’s  exertions  that  he  might  escape 
(hdna)  [it].  It  may,  however,  be  escaped  <by  the  inverse-propagation>  [that  is] 
by  a reduction  of  the  mind-stuff,  which  is  an  effect  and  which  is  characterized  by 
the  feeling-of-personality,  to  the  state  of  its  own  cause,  [the  thinking-substance]. 
He  explains  [the  sutra]  by  the  word  <KThese.»  Easy. 


^ Compare  ii.  2,  p.  107®  (Calc,  ed.),  and  the  passages  given  above,  at  p.  105. 


[120 


ii.  11 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana 


But  of  permanent  hindrances  consigned  to  the  condition  of  seeds — 

11.  The  fluctuations  of  these  should  be  escaped  by  means  of 
contemplation. 

Those  fluctuations  of  the  hindrances  which  are  coarse,  after  having 
been  attenuated  by  the  yoga  of  action,  should  be  escaped  by  the 
Elevated  [prasamkhydna)  contemplation  until  subtilized  [and] 
made  like  burned  seeds.  And  just  as  a spot  of  coarse  matter  upon 
pieces  of  cloth  is  first  shaken  off  and  afterwards  the  spot  of  fine 
matter  is  removed  with  an  effort  and  by  [some  appropriate]  means, 
so  coarse  fluctuations  are  those  whose  opposition  to  hindrances  is 
very  slight,  but  the  subtile  fluctuations  are  those  whose  opposition  ^ 
is  very  great. 

‘ Now  when  the  hindrances  have  been  attenuated  by  the  yoga  of  action,  by 
directing  his  exertions  towards  what,  does  a man  accomplish  the  rejection 
[of  these  hindrances]  ? ’ In  reply  to  this  he  says  «But  of  permanent  hindrances 
consigned  to  the  condition  of  seeds.^  By  these  words  he  distinguishes  them 
from  those  that  have  been  sterilized  [vandhya).  He  recites  the  sUtra.  11.  The 
fluctuations  of  these  should  be  escaped  by  means  of  contemplation.  He 
discusses  [the  sutra]  in  the  words  «of  the  hindrances.l^  Now  when  attenuated 
by  the  yoga  of  action  these  also  may  be  eradicated — themselves  and  their 
effects — by  reducing  them  to  the  condition  of  [their  own]  causes.  [This  is 
the]  inverse  propagation.  Thus  the  coarse  fluctuations  have  been  explained. 
When  a man’s  exertion  is  [still]  within  the  scope  of  the  Elevation,  [the  author] 
states  what  the  limit  is  in  the  words  [beginning]  «until.;»  He  elaborates 
the  expression  «subtilized»  by  saying  ^burned.»  On  this  same  point  he 
gives  a simile  in  the  words  «And  just  as  . . . upon  pieces  of  cloth.^  With 
an  effort,  such  as  by  washing  it  [and]  by  some  means,  such  as  an  alkaline  {ksara) 
mixture.  The  likeness  between  the  simile  and  the  thing  to  which  it  is  com- 
pared lies  merely  in  the  fact  that  there  is  a coarseness  and  a subtilty,  but  not 
in  the  [fact  that  they  are  both]  removable  by  an  effort.  For  this  [removal] 
is  impossible  in  the  case  of  hindrances  which  are  to  be  escaped  by  the  process 
of  inverse  propagation. — Those  whose  opposition  is  very  slight,  which  have 
been  described,  are  such  as  have  [slight]  causes  of  destruction.  Those  whose 
opposition  is  very  great  are  such  as  have  [great]  causes  of  destruction.  And 
next  below  “ the  inverse  propagation  as  a means  of  attaining  the  destruction 


* Some  MSS.  read  pratipakseti.  If  correct, 

a case  of  double  sandhi.  Corrected  in 
the  Benares  revision  of  the  Calcutta 
edition. 

* Coarse  stains  are  removed  by  shaking; 

minute  stains  by  washing ; more 


minute  by  alkali.  Hindrances  which 
are  sustained  are  attenuated  by  yoga 
of  action  ; the  attenuated  are  reduced 
to  burned  seed  by  Elevation;  the 
burned  seed  is  destroyed  by  inverse 
propagation. 


Karma  rooted  in  hindrances 


121] 


[ — ii.  12 


of  the  hindrances  would  be  the  Elevation  {prasamhhyana).  In  view  of  this 
inferiority  the  Elevation  has  been  called  very  slight. 


12.  The  latent-deposit  of  karma  has  its  root  in  the  hindrances 
and  may  be  felt  in  a birth  seen  or  in  a birth  unseen. 

In  this  case  we  have  a latent-deposit  of  the  karma  of  merit  and  of 
demerit  propagated  ^ from  lust  [or]  from  greed  [or]  from  infatuation 
[or]  from  anger.  And  this  may  be  felt  either  in  a birth  seen  or 
may  be  felt  in  a birth  not  seen.  Of  these,  that  [latent-deposit  of 
karma]  which,  in  so  far  as  there  is  keen  intensity,  proceeds  from 
sacrificial  formulae  [and]  from  self- castigation  [and]  from  con- 
centration, and  which  is  perfected  by  worship  of  the  Icvara  [or] 
of  a deity  [or]  of  a sage  or  magnanimous  ^ beings,  has  instantly 
its  fruition  as  a latent-deposit  of  meritorious  karma.  Thus  [for 
instance]  when,  in  so  far  as  the  hindrance  is  keen,  contempt  is 
shown  again  and  again  to  those  who  have  sought  protection  in 
terror  and  in  sickness  and  in  wretchedness,  or  again  to  those 
magnanimous  beings  who  castigate  themselves,  this  [contempt] 
also  has  fruition®  as  a latent-impression  of  evil  karma.  Just  as 
the  youth  Nandi§vara  passed  out  of  the  human  form  and  was 
transformed  into  a divinity,  so  also  Nahusa,  Prince  of  the  Gods, 
passed  out  from  his  proper  mutation  and  was  transformed  into  the 
condition  of  a brute.^  Among  these  [latent-deposits]  there  is,  in 
the  case  of  those  who  dwell  in  the  underworlds,  no  latent-deposit 
of  karma  which  might  be  felt  in  a birth  seen  [in  this  life] ; and  in 
the  case  of  those  hindrances  which  have  dwindled,  there  is  no  latent- 
deposit  of  karma  which  might  be  felt  in  a birth  unseen  [that  is,  in 
another  life]. 

‘This  may  be  true.  Hindrances  [are  hindrances]  because  they  hinder  [and 
because]  they  are  the  causes  of  birth  and  of  length-of-life  and  of  kind-of- 
experience  ; and  the  latent  impressions  of  karma  are  of  this  kind  [tatha).  But 
undifferentiated-consciousness  {avidya)  and  the  other  [hindrances  do  not  hinder 

^ A better  reading  is  prabhava.  and  Siddhanta  Kaum.  (Nir.  Sag.  ed.), 

® If  mahaniihhava  were  a title  of  respect,  it  1904,  p.  155*. 

would  precede  the  other  members  of  * See  Linga  Pui.  viii.  43.  7-53. 
the  compound  according  to  Pan.  ii.  2.30  ‘ See  MBh.  v.  17. 

16  [a.o.s.n] 


ii.  12 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [122 

and  are  not  such  causes].  How  then  can  undifferentiated-consciousness  and 
the  rest  be  called  hindrances  ? ’ In  reply  to  this  he  says  12.  The  latent- 
deposit  of  karma  has  its  root  in  the  hindrances  and  may  be  felt  in 
a birth  seen  or  in  a birth  unseen.  That  for  whose  production  and  causal 
activity  a hindrance  is  the  root, — that  [is  the  latent-deposit  of  karma].  What 
he  means  to  say  is  this.  The  latent-deposit  of  karma  which  is  the  cause  of 
birth  and  of  length-of-life  and  of  kind-of-experience  has  its  root  in  undifferen- 
tiated-consciousness. So  undifferentiated-consciousness  and  the  rest  are  also 
the  causes  of  them.  — He  explains  the  sutra  with  the  words  «In  this  case.)^ 
That  in  which  all  Selves  in  the  round-of-rebirths  are  latent  (dgerate)  is'  a 
latent-deposit  [dgai/a).  The  latent-deposits  of  karma  are  merit  and  demerit. 
Merit  which  is  the  cause  of  heaven  and  similar  states  occurs  when,  as  a result 
of  some  desire,  there  is  an  inclination  for  a work  which  is  desirable.  Similarly 
there  is  demerit  in  such  cases  as  when  from  avarice  another  is  robbed  of  his 
money.  Likewise  there  is  nothing  but  demerit  in  such  cases  as  when  from 
infatuation  the  idea  of  merit  directs  itself  to  killing  or  something  of  the  kind 
which  is  demerit.  But  there  is  no  merit  which  comes  from  infatuation. 
Merit  does,  however,  come  from  anger,  as  for  instance,  the  case  of  Dhruva  ^ 
from  anger  at  the  slight  [put  upon  him]  by  his  father  [Uttanapada].  For  as 
a result  of  the  meritorious  latent-deposits  of  karma  which  were  performed 
in  the  desire  to  surpass  his  father,  he  obtained  a position  above  the  dwellers 
in  regions  of  the  sky.  Demerit,  however,  due  to  anger  and  resulting  in  the 
murder  of  Brahmans  is  well  enough  known  to  every  one.  He  describes  the 
double  character  of  this  [latent-deposit]  by  saying  ^CAnd  this  may  be  felt  in 
a birth  seen.)^  He  describes  this  that  may  be  felt  in  a birth  seen  by  saying 
«in  so  far  as  there  is  keen  intensity.»  In  their  respective  order  he  gives 
examples  in  the  words  «Just  as  Nandl9vara.2>  The  dwellers  in  the  under- 
worlds are  those  who  make  latent-deposits  of  karma  as  a result  of  which  certain 
underworlds,  such  as  the  Cooking  Pot,*  are  reached.  These  have  no  latent- 
deposits  to  be  felt  in  a birth  seen  [in  this  life]  For  no  human  body  nor  any 
kind  of  mutation  of  it  can  endure  such  torment  (vedand)  as  is  to  be  endured 
by  them  and  uninterruptedly  for  thousands  of  years.  The  rest  is  easy. 


13.  So  long  as  the  root  exists,  there  will  be  fruition  from  it 
[that  is]  birth  [and]  length-of-life  [and]  kind-of-experience. 

While  the  hindrances  exist,  the  latent-deposit  of  karma  starts  the 
fruition,  but  not  so  the  cut  root  of  the  hindrances.  Just  as  the 


' This  sentence  is  omitted  in  the  Bikaner  * Mann  xii.  76 ; Bhag.  Pur.  v.  25.  13 ; com- 
MS.  It  might  well  be  a gloss.  pare  Jataka,  vol.  iii,  p.  43,  no.  314. 

* VP.  i.  11.  24  with  the  context. 


123]  Three-fold  fruition  of  karma  [ — ii.  13 

grains  of  rice,  when  encased  within  the  chaff,  as  seeds  in  an  un- 
burned condition,  are  fit  for  propagation,  but  neither  the  winnowed 
chaff  nor  seed  in  the  burned  condition  is  so  [fit],  similarly  the 
latent-deposits  of  karma,  when  encased  within  hindrances,  are  pro- 
pagative of  fruition,  but  neither  the  winnowed  hindrances  nor  seed 
in  the  condition  of  having  been  burned  by  the  Elevation  {pra- 
samkhydna)  [is  propagative].  And  this  fruition  is  of  three  kinds, 
birth  and  length-of-life  and  kind-of-experience.  In  regard  to  these 
[three,]  this  is  under  discussion,  whether  1.  one  karma  is  the  cause 
of  one  birth,  or  whether  2,  one  karma  gives  the  impulse  to  more 
than  one  birth.  There  is  a second  discussion  as  to  whether 

3.  more  than  one  karma  projects  more  than  one  birth,  or  whether 

4.  more  than  one  karma  projects  one  birth.  Now  it  is  not  true 
1.  that  one  karma  is  the  cause  of  one  birth.  Why  so  ? Because 
if  the  karma  remaining  over,  accumulated  from  time-without- 
beginning  and  innumerable,  and  [the  karma]  of  the  present,  should 
not  have  in  their  results  an  order  limited  [in  its  time],  discourage- 
ment would  be  inflicted  upon  everybody.  And  this  is  prohibited. 
Neither  2,  is  one  karma  the  cause  of  more  than  one  birth.  Why 
is  this  ? Because  if,  while  there  were  more  than  one  karma,  only 
one  karma  at  a time  were  to  be  the  cause  of  more  than  one  birth, 
a lack  of  time  for  fruition  would  be  inflicted  upon  the  remaining 
karmas.  And  that  too  would  be  prohibited.  Neither  3.  is  more 
than  one  karma  the  cause  of  more  than  one  birth.  Why  is  this  1 
Since  it  is  impossible  that  more  than  this  one  birth  should  occur 
simultaneously,  it  must  be  supposed  that  they  occur  successively. 
This,  likewise,  would  involve  the  same  difficulty  as  in  the  last  [case]. 
The  result  is  then  4.  the  diverse  accumulation  of  latent-deposits  of 
karma,  whether  of  merit  or  of  demerit,  made  between  birth  and  the 
end  of  life,  remains  in  a relation  of  subordinate  [parts]  and  a dominant 
[part].  This  is  made  manifest  at  the  ending  of  life  after  growing 
compact  by  one  single  impulse  [ekapraghaUahena).  After  accom- 
plishing death,  it  assumes  a rigid  form  and  causes  a single  birth 
only.  And  this  birth  receives  its  length  from  that  same  karma.  And 
again  in  that  same  length-of-life  from  that  same  karma  it  attains  to 
its  kind-of-experience.  This  latent-deposit  of  karma  since  it  is  the 


ii.  13 — ] Booh  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [124 

source  of  the  birth  and  the  length-of-life  and  the  kind-of-experience, 
is  said  to  have  a three-fold  fruition.  Consequently  [this]  latent- 
deposit  of  karma  is  said  to  have  [its  limit  in]  one  existence.  On  the 
other  hand  [a  latent-deposit  of  karma]  which  is  to  be  felt  in  [this] 
seen  birth  is  said,  since  it  is  the  cause  of  the  kind-of-enjoyment  only, 
to  originate  a single  [kind  of]  fruition  [and  not  a single  existence]. 
Or,  when  it  is  the  source  of  the  length-of-the-life  and  the  kind-of- 
enjoyment,  it  is  said  to  originate  two  fruitions,  as  for  instance  in  the 
case  of  Nandl9vara  or  of  Nahusa.  But  this  mind-stuft*  like  a fish -net 
made  in  different  shapes  on  all  sides  and  having,  from  time  without 
beginning,  a form-fixed  {sammurchita)  by  subconscious  impressions, 
which  are  like  knots,  caused  by  the  experience  of  the  fruition  of  the 
karma  from  the  hindrances,  is  spread  abroad.  Therefore  these  sub- 
conscious-impressions are  said  to  be  preceded  by  more  than  one 
existence.  It  is  this  particular  latent-deposit  of  karma,  however, 
which  is  said  to  have  [its  limit]  in  one  existence.  Those  sub- 
liminal-impressions which  produce  memory^  are  said  to  be  sub- 
conscious-impressions (yasand)  and  these  are  said  to  subsist  from 
time-without-beginning.  But  that  latent-deposit  of  karma  which 
has  [its  limit]  in  a single  existence  has  both  a fruition  limited  [in 
time]  and  a fruition  which  is  without  limit  [of  time].  Of  these 
two  [orders],  the  limitation  [in  time]  [niyama),  [in  so  far  as  it  has 
its  limit  in  one  existence],  belongs  only  to  the  fruition  which  is  to 
be  felt  in  a birth  of  [this]  seen  [life]  and  which  is  limited  [in  time] ; 
whereas  the  fruition  which  is  not  to  be  felt  in  [this]  seen  [life]  and 
which  is  without  limit  [of  time]  does  not  [have  the  limit  in  time 
which  has  its  limit  in  a single  existence].  Why  so  ? Because 
that  fruition  which  is  not  to  be  felt  in  [this]  seen  [life]  and  which 
is  without  limit  [of  time]  has  three  kinds  of  outcome  ^ {gati)  : 
Either  1.  it  is  annihilated  (ndga)  when  this  [latter]  fruition  is 
finished  and  become  unfruitful ; or  2.  it  is  cast  away  [dvdpa-gamana) 
into  the  dominant  karma  ; or  3.  it  may  continue  for  a long  time, 
subjected  to  the  dominant  karma  which  has  a fruition  limited  [in 
time].  Of  these  [three],  1.  the  annihilation  of  [the  karma]  which  is 
finished  and  become  unfruitful  is  like  the  annihilation  in  this  present 
' See  iii.  18,  p.  230^  (Calc.  ed.). 


^ Consult  9abda-Kalpa-Drunia,  p.  846"^. 


125]  Three  outcomes  of  karma  [ — ii.  13 

world  of  the  dark  karma  when  once  the  bright  karma  has  dawned. 
With  regard  to  which  this  has  been  said,  “ Verily  indeed  karmas 
should  be  known  to  be  by  twos  and  twos,  A single  mass  made  of 
merit  destroys  [the  dark  and  the  dark-bright]  evil  ^ [mass].  Wish 
thou  then  to  do  well-done  deeds.  Right  here  to  thee  the  wise  make 
karma  known.” — 2.  Casting  away  into  the  dominant  karma  : with 
reference  to  which  it  has  been  said^,  “Should  there  be  a very 
slight  admixture  of  guilt  in  the  sacrifice,  it  is  either  to  be  removed 
or  to  be  overlooked.  [Therefore  this  admixture  is]  not  enough  to 
remove  the  good-fortune  [won  by  merit].  Why  [not]  ? Because 
in  my  case  there  is  much  other  good-fortune.  Where  then  this 
[admixture  of  guilt]  is  cast  away  [into  the  dominant  karma],  even 
in  heaven  it  will  make  only  a slight  reduction  [of  merit].” — 
3.  When  he  said,  ‘ it  may  continue  for  a long  time  subjected  to 
the  dominant  karma  which  has  a fruition  limited  [in  time],’  how 
was  this  ? [The  answer  is],  because,  in  the  case  of  the  karma  the 
fruition  of  which  is  not  to  be  felt  in  [this]  seen  [life]  and  which  is 
limited  [in  time],  death  is  said  to  be  the  appropriate  cause  of  the 
manifestation.  Not  so,  however,  in  the  case  [of  the  karma]  the 
fruition  of  which  is  not  to  be  felt  in  [this]  seen  [life]  and  which  is 
without  limit  [of  time].  On  the  contrary,  [in  this  latter  case], 
karma  the  fruition  of  which  is  not  to  be  felt  in  [this]  seen  [life]  and 
which  is  not  limited  [in  time],  either  is  annihilated  or  is  cast  away 
or  is  quiescent  (updslta)  in  subjection  [to  the  dominant  karma]  for 
a long  time  until  the  appropriate  manifesting-conditions  of  the 
cause  of  the  karma  bring  it  close  to  its  fruition.  But  since  of  this 
very  fruition  [of  karma]  the  place  or  the  time  or  the  cause  is  none 
of  them  determinable,  therefore  it  is  that  the  ways  of  karma  are 
[known  as]  mysterious  and  not  easily  discernible.  Moreover,  since 
the  general  rule  is  not  broken  down,  even  if  there  be  exceptions, 


’ The  genitive  is  object  of  apahanti  ac- 
cording to  the  Varttika,  which  refers 
to  Panini  ii.  3.  56.  Vacaspatimi9i-a 
makes  krsna-krsnagukle  an  accusative 
object  of  apahanti.  In  this  case  papa- 
kasija  would  mean  belonging  to  a sinful 
man  (see  p.  129®^  below). 


^ See  the  careful  discussion  of  this  fragment 
of  Panca9ikha  in  Garbe’s  translation  of 
the  Samkhya  Tattva  Kaumudi,  1892, 
p.  538,  note  2.  Compare  also  ^andilya- 
sutra  xc  (1861)  and  Cowell’s  translation 
(1878),  p.  96. 


ii.  13 — ] Booh  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [126 

therefore  the  latent-deposit  of  karma  having  [its  limit  in]  a single 
existence  [must]  be  acknowledged. 

[The  objector  says,]  ‘Let  this  be  granted.  Since  the  latent-deposit  of  karma 
is  based  upon  undifferentiated-consciousness  (avidya),  there  may  result,  after  the 
production  of  knowledge  [vidya),  a destruction  of  undifferentiated-consciousness, 
and  so  there  might  not  be  any  subsequent  latent-deposit  of  karma.  Still  the 
latent-deposits  of  karma,  done  previously  and  accumulated  by  the  succession  from 
time  without  beginning  of  innumerable  births,  being  unsettled  in  their  period 
of  development,  it  would  be  impossible  by  realizing  the  effects  to  cause  [these 
latent-deposits]  to  dwindle  in  so  far  as  they  might  be  experienced.  Because  of 
this  it  would  be  impossible  to  cut  off  the  round-of-rebirths.’  To  this  he 
replies  with  the  sutra  13.  So  long  as  the  root  exists,  there  will  be  fruition 
from  it  [that  is]  birth  [and]  length-of-life  [and]  kind-of-experience. 
What  he  means  to  say  is  this.  The  result  of  the  latent-deposit  of  karma  is 
pleasure  and  pain,  and,  in  so  far  as  both  birth  and  length-of-life  have  the 
same  purpose  [as  the  latent-deposit]  and  are  the  necessary  consequence  of  it, 
[these  two]  are  also  propagated  [by  the  latent  deposit].  Moreover  pleasure 
and  pain  are  attached  to  passion  and  aversion.  And  the  latter  are  the  necessary 
conditions  [for  pleasure  and  pain],  since  pleasure  and  pain  are  not  possible 
in  the  absence  of  these  [that  is,  passion  and  aversion].  Furthermore  it  is 
impossible  to  say  that  that  wherein  a man  is  pleased  or  disgusted  is  not  to 
him,  as  the  case  may  be,  either  a pleasure  or  a pain.  So  this  soil  of  the  self 
sprinkled  with  the  water  of  the  hindrances  becomes  a field  propagating  the 
fruits  of  karma.  Thus  it  is  true  that  the  hindrances  co-operate  with  the  latent- 
deposit  of  karma  for  producing  also  the  after-effects  of  the  fruits.  So  when  the 
hindrances  are  quite  cut  off,  [the  latent-deposits]  are  deprived  of  this  [aid] 
also.  Therefore,  although  the  latent-deposits  are  endless  and  their  period 
of  ripening  is  unsettled,  still,  when  in  their  condition  as  seeds,  they  are  burned 
by  Elevation  {prasamkhyana),  they  cannot  be  in  a position  to  bear  fruit. 
The  sense  expressed  is  made  clear  by  the  Comment  in  the  words,  «While  . . . 
exist.)^  With  regard  to  this  same  point  he  gives  a simile  «Just  as  . . . the 
chaff.»  Although  they  have  their  chaff,  their  condition  as  seed  is  burned 
by  heat  {sveda)  and  in  other  ways.  He  applies  the  simile  to  the  point-to-be- 
illustrated  by  saying,  «similarly.2>  If  it  be  objected  that  the  hindrances 
cannot  be  removed,  because  no  [really]  existing  things  are  removed,  he  replies 
in  the  words,  «:nor  seed  in  the  condition  of  having  been  burned  by  the 
Elevation.^  He  shows  the  threefold  character  of  the  fruition  in  the  words, 
«And  this.)^  Fruition  is  that  which  is  brought  to  fi-uition  or  brought  to 
perfection  by  karmas.  The  first  point-under-discussion  [1.  and  2.]  deems  the 
unity  of  karma  to  be  fixed  and  considers  whether  births  are  one  or  more  than  one. 
The  second  [3.  and  4.],  however,  deems  the  manifoldness  to  be  fixed  and  considers 
whether  births  are  one  or  more  than  one.  Thus  there  are  four  alternatives 


127]  Limits  of  time  for  fruition  [ — ii.  13 

(viJcalpa).  Of  these  he  refutes  the  first  with  the  words  «Now  it  is  not  true 
1.  that  one  karma  is  the  cause  of  one  birth.)^  He  asks,  <s.Why  so  He  gives 
the  answer  by  saying,  ^rom  time-without-beginning. » If  the  karma  accumu- 
lated by  each  birth,  one  after  another,  in  time  without  beginning,  and  therefore 
innumerable,  which  remains  over  after  the  karma  which  has  been  made  to 
dwindle  in  each  life,  one  after  another,  has  been  deducted,  the  world  would 
feel  discouragement.  And  this  is  prohibited.  What  he  means  to  say  is  this. 
Since  the  dwindling  of  karma  is  broken-by-intervals  {virala),  and  since  [karma] 
is  produced  in  abundance,  the  latent-deposits  pressing  one  against  the  other 
and  springing  up  incessantly,  in  breathless  haste,  towards  their  own  fruition, — 
[for  this  reason]  even  a very  clever  man  could  not  determine  the  order  of 
the  results.  Thus  discouragement  as  regards  the  following  up  of  meritorious 
[acts]  would  be  inflicted  [upon  everybody]. — He  rejects  the  second  alternative 
in  the  words  ^Neither  2.  is  one  karma  the  cause  of  more  than  one  birth.» 
He  asks,  «Why  is  this  ?»  He  gives  the  answer  by  saying,  «of  more  than 
one  birth.^  If  a single  karma  only  belonging  to  (dhita)  more  than  one  birth 
is  the  cause  of  a fruition  which  characterizes  more  than  one  birth,  then  a lack 
of  time  would  be  inflicted  upon  the  remaining  karmas.  And  that  too  would 
be  prohibited.  Thus  in  so  far  as  karma  would  be  fruitless,  there  would  be  the 
likelihood  that  it  would  not  be  followed  up.  And  if  there  would  be  discourage- 
ment on  the  ground  that  there  is  no  order  of  fruition  limited  [in  time]  (niyata), 
in  case  one  karma  is  to  be  uprooted  in  one  life,  how  much  more  there  would 
be  in  case  one  karma  must  be  uprooted  during  more  than  one  life.  For  then, 
since  there  is  no  chance,  [one  would  infer]  that  there  would  be  no  time  [in  the 
future]  for  the  fruition  of  the  present  karma  [and  thus  again  discoirragement 
would  follow]. — He  refutes  the  third  alternative  with  the  words,  ^Neither 
3.  is  more  than  one  karma  the  cause  of  more  than  one  birth.  ^ He  gives  the 
reason  for  this  in  the  word,  «this.^  Since  for  those  who  are  not  yogins  it  is 
impossible  that  more  than  this  one  birth  should  occur  simultaneously,  it  must 
be  supposed  to  occur  successively.  For  if  a thousand  karmas  could  simultaneously 
generate  a thousand  births,  there  would  be — since  a thousand  karmas  would 
have  dwindled  away — time  for  the  fruition  of  the  remainder  and  an  order  of 
results  limited  [in  time].  But  there  is  no  such  simultaneity  of  births. — Having 
thus  rejected  the  three  propositions,  he  accepts  as  the  result  of  the  process  of 
elimination  4.  the  proposition  which  remains,  to  the  effect  that  more  than  one 
karma  is  the  cause  of  one  birth,  as  he  says  in  the  words,  ^The  result  is  . . . 
birth.^  The  compound  «between-birth-and-the-end-of-life»  means  in  the 
interval  [that  is]  between  the  two,  both  birth  and  the  end-of-life. — [This 
accumulation  is]  diverse  because  it  gives  forth  results  diversified  by  pleasures  and 
pains.  That  is  dominant  which  will  give  its  result  with  absolute  intensity  and 
immediately.  Whereas  that  is  subordinate  which  [gives  its  result]  after  a delay. 
The  «ending-of-life»  is  death.  «Made  manifest»  by  it  means  being  brought 
into  the  presence  of  that  which  tends  to  produce  its  effects. — By  one  single  impulse 


[128 


ii.  13 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana 

means  simultaneously.  Growing  compact  or  rolled ' together  into  one  lump 
in  relation  to  the  effect  to  be  produced  [that  is]  the  next  birth,  it  produces  one 
birth  only  and  not  more  than  one  birth.  And  this  birth  is  the  human  or  some 
other  state.  ^CAnd  this  birth  receives  its  length-of-life  from  that  same  karma^ 
[would  mean  that]  its  life  is  limited  by  various  periods  of  time.  «And  again 
in  that  same  length-of-life  from  that  same  karma  it  attains  to  its  kind-of- 
experience)^  [would  mean  that]  a direct  experience  of  pleasure  and  of  pain  is 
attained.  Thus  this  latent-deposit  of  karma  since  it  is  the  source  of  the  birth 
and  of  the  length-of-life  and  of  the  kind-of-experience  is  said  to  have  a threefold 
fruition.  He  sums  up  the  main  statement  in  the  words,  ^Consequently  [this] 
latent-deposit  of  karma  is  said  to  have  [its  limit  in]  one  existence.^ — Having 
one  existence  is  one  existence.  [This]  compound  is  in  accordance  [with 
Panini’s  sutra  ii.  1.  49]  beginning  with  the  words,  “ A temporal  antecedent, 
eka,  &c.”  The  termination  [-ika]  is  in  the  sense  of  possession  {matvarthiya).^ 
Thus  the  meaning  [of  the  compound]  is  ‘ one  who  has  one  existence  ’.  Else- 
where the  reading  is  {aikahhavika).  In  this  case  the  dhak  termination  [-ika]  in  the 
sense  of  ‘ existing  in  ’ is  added  to  the  word  ‘ one-existence  ’.  Then  the  meaning 
would  be  that  its  existing  is  limited  to  one  birth.  Thus  having  announced 
his  main  statement,  namely,  that  [this]  karma  which  [has  its  limit]  in  one 
existence  has  a three-fold  fruition,  he  now  distinguishes  the  three  different 
kinds  of  fruition  which  belong  to  the  karma  that  is  to  be  felt  in  [this]  seen 
birth  and  that  is  a part  of  this-present-world  (aikika).  By  the  word  «seen» 
he  refers,  of  course,  to  Nandifvara  whose  length-of-life  in  a human  birth  was 
cut  off  at  eight  years.  [Here]  was  a particular  kind  of  merit  produced  by 
a vehement  method  of  keen  intensity.  This  merit  had  two  fruitions  in  that 
it  was  the  source  of  the  length-of-life  and  of  the  kind-of-experience.  But  in 
the  case  of  Nahusa,  since  the  length  of  his  life  had  been  determined  by 
a karma  which  led  him  to  the  attainment  of  Indra’s  position,  there  was  a 
particular  kind  of  demerit,  leading  only  to  a kind-of-enjoyment,  by  reason 
of  the  contrary  [karma]  coming  from  his  striking*  Agastya  with  his  heel.  An 
objector  asks,  ‘ Have  the  subconscious-impressions  from  the  hindrances,  like 
a latent-deposit  of  karma,  their  [limit]  in  one  existence?  And  [if]  the  sub- 
conscious-impressions of  the  experiences  of  the  fruition  of  the  karma  are 
favourable  to  [the  pointing  out  of]  the  kind-of-experience,  then  a human  being 
reduced  to  the  body  of  a beast  would  not  experience  {bhunjlta)  what  is  proper 
to  his  species.’  In  reply  to  this  he  says  «the  karma  from  the  hindrances.^ 
Having  a fixed  form  {sammurchita)  means  rolled  together  into  one  lump.  He 
describes  the  subconscious-impression  as  such  in  order  to  distinguish  it  from 


* Vijnana  Bhiksu  glosses  the  word  sam- 

murchita by  pravrddhavega  (p.  106*) 
and  by  upacitam  or  pustam  (p.  107* 
Benares  ed.). 

* Panini  v.  2.  115. 


* This  story  is  given  in  its  setting  by 
Jacobi  in  his  article  on  Agastya 
(Hastings ; Cycl.  of  Rel.  and  Ethics,  I, 
p.  181^  line  10). 


129] 


Fruitions  not  limited  in  time 


[ — ii.  13 


right-action  {dharma)  and  from  wrong-action  by  saying  «subliminal-impres- 
sions  which.» — In  order  to  state  certain  exceptions  to  the  general  proposition 
[that  the  latent-deposit  of  karma]  has  [its  limit  in]  a single  existence  he 
prepares  the  ground  by  saying  «But  that  . . . which.)^  By  the  word  ^But» 
he  shows  that  there  is  a distinction  from  the  subconscious-impressions. 
The  limitation  [in  time]  of  having  [a  limit  in]  a single  existence  is  that  which 
belongs  only  to  the  fruition  which  is  to  be  felt  in  a birth  of  [this]  seen  [life] 
and  which  has  a limit  [in  time] ; whereas  the  fruition  which  is  not  to  be 
felt  in  [this]  seen  [life]  does  not  [have  the  limit  in  time  which  has  its  limit 
in  a single  existence]. — Of  what  kind  then  is  fruition  which  is  not  limited 
in  time  ? He  asks  the  reason  in  the  words  ^Why  so  He  tells  the  reason 
in  the  words  ^Because  that.)^  First  he  gives  one  outcome  (gati)  in  the  words 
^is  finished  ;»  the  second,  in  the  words  ^dominant  ;»  the  third,  in  the  words 
«has  a limit  [in  time.]»  Of  these  three  he  analyses  1.  the  first  by  saying  «Ot 
these  [three]  ...  is  finished.)^  Other  than  the  karmas  of  the  mendicant  (sam- 
nydsin),  which  are  neither  bright  nor  dark,  there  are  only  three  karmas,  the 
dark  and  the  bright-dark  and  the  bright.  Now  in  this  world  a latent-deposit 
of  bright  karma,  to  be  obtained  by  self-castigation  and  by  recitation  and  by 
other  means,  when  once  uprisen  [in  the  mind,]  is  the  annihilator  of  dark 
[karma]  which  has  not  yet  given  its  fruit.  And  because  there  is  no  distinction 
[between  the  dark  and  the  dark-bright]  we  must  suppose  [that  it  is  the 
annihilator]  of  the  many-coloured  [that  is,  the  dark -bright  karma]  by  reason 
of  the  conjunction  [of  this  last]  with  the  dark  part.  With  reference  to  the 
same  the  Exalted  [Vyasa]  cites  the  Sacred  Word  when  he  says,  ^With  regard 
to  which  this.;^  Verily  indeed  karmas  [should  be  known  to  be]  ^by  twos  and 
twos,)^  that  is,  the  dark  and  the  dark-bright.  [These  the  mass  made  of  merit] 
destroys.  Such  is  the  construction  [of  the  sentence].  By  repeating  the  word 
«twos»  he  indicates  that  there  is  a very  great  number.  In  reply  to  the 
question,  ‘Belonging  to  whom’  he  says,  ^belonging  to  a sinful.^  In  other 
words,  belonging  to  a sinful  man.  What  is  it  that  destroys?  To  this  he 
replies,  «A  single  mass  made  of  merit. Because  a collection  includes  the 
units-of-the-collection  {samuMn).  Thus  the  bright  latent-deposit  of  karma  is 
described  as  the  third.  What  he  means  to  say  is  this.  This  bright  latent- 
deposit  of  karma,  which  is  to  be  obtained  by  methods  which  are  free  from 
injury  to  others,  is  of  such  a kind,  we  may  say,  that  although  it  is  single,  it 
destroys  dark  and  dark-bright  latent-deposits  of  karma,  which  are  absolutely 
opposed,  even  when  they  are  in  great  numbers. — The  word  <Kthen 
means  therefore. — The  word  «Wish  thou»  is  middle  because  Vedic.  The  rest 
is  easy.  And  so  we  see  [atra)  that  the  power  in  the  uprising  of  the  bright 
karma  is  so  indescribably  great  that  it  alone  makes  the  others  cease  to  be. 
But  one  could  not  say  that  they  cease  because  of  the  pain  resulting  from  recita- 
tions and  other  [right  actions].  For  a wrong-action  (adharma)  does  not  have,  as 
its  opposite,  pain  in  general,  but  only  that  particular  kind  of  pain  which  is 

17  [h.o.s.  17] 


ii.  13 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [130 

the  effect  of  itself  [that  is,  the  wrong-action].  Now  the  pain  resulting  from 
recitations  and  other  [right  actions]  is  not  their  effect.  [And  if  this  pain  resulting 
from  recitations  and  other  right  actions]  is  supposed  to  be  the  effect  of  this 
[wrong-action],  then  it  is  needless  to  make  [special]  prescriptions  of  recitations 
and  other  right  actions,  because  then  these  [recitations  and  right  actions]  could 
be  produced  [utpatti)  merely  by  the  help  of  those  [wrong-actions].  And  if  [this 
wrong-action]  should  not  produce  {anutpatti)  [the  pain  which  results  from 
recitations  and  other  right  actions],  then  the  Cooking  Pot  [Hell]  and  other 
[pains]  are  [specially]  prescribed, — [because  the  wrong-action  must  result  in 
something — and]  because,  if  [Hells  and  other  pains]  be  not  [specially]  pre- 
scribed, these  [Hells]  would  never  be  produced  at  all.' 

Thus  all  is  four-square. — He  analyses  2.  the  second  outcome  in  the  word 
«dominant.»  In  the  dominant  karma,  as  for  instance  in  the  Jyotistoma  and 
similar  [sacrifices],  that  which  is  accessory  [anga)  [karma]  to  this,  namely  the 
killing  of  the  animal,  is  cast  away  [into  the  dominant  karma].  For  there  are 
two  effects  of  killing  and  of  the  other  [acts]  : 1.  since  it  is  prescribed  [by  the 
tradition]  in  so  far  as  it  is  accessory  to  the  dominant  [karma],  it  assists ; 
2.  since  killing  is  forbidden  by  the  rule  “ Let  no  living  being  be  killed  ”,  it 
is  needless.  We  see  then  that  [killing],  because  it  is  performed  as  accessory 
to  the  dominant  [karma]  and  not  as  being  the  dominant,  ought  not  immediately 
[dray]  and  independently  of  the  dominant  [karma]  to  generate  its  own  fruition, 
a useless  result,  but  that  it  remains  rendering  assistance  to  the  dominant  [karma], 
the  fruition  of  which  has  already  commenced.  And  while  rendering  assistance 
to  the  dominant  karma  it  remains,  with  reference  to  its  own  effect,  as  seed 
only,  and  is  cast  away  into  the  dominant  karma.  ^With  reference  to  which 
it  has  been  said!^  by  Panca^ikha.  The  slight  admixture  of  the  invisible- 
influence  {apurva),  which  is  the  dominant  [karma]  resulting  from  the  Jyotistoma 
and  other  [sacrifices],  with  the  invisible-influence  resulting  from  the  killing  of 
the  animal  and  similar  [acts]  and  producing  what  is  not  desired  {anartha), — [this 
admixture]  may  be  removed.  For,  by  doing  a certain  amount  of  penance 
it  may  be  removed.  Or  should  a man  heedlessly  not  have  gone  through  the 
penance,  [the  slight  admixture  of  guilt]  comes  to  fruition  at  the  time  of  the 
fruition  of  the  dominant  karma.  In  spite  of  all  this,  whatever  undesired  result 
be  generated  by  this  [accessory  invisible-influence]  may  be  overlooked.  For 
the  fortunate  (Jcugala),  plunging  deep  into  the  great  pool  of  the  nectar  of  pleasure 
brought  near  by  the  gathering  together  of  merit,  overlook  a slight  spark  of 


' Since  however  Hells  are  produced  without 
any  special  prescription  (vidhana),  it 
follows  as  a general  rule  that  the  con- 
sequences of  wrong-actions  require  no 
special  prescription.  But  in  the  case 
of  recitations  and  other  right-actions 
there  is  the  special  prescription.  There- 


fore right-actions  and  the  pain  result- 
ing from  right-actions  cannot  be  the 
consequences  of  wrong-actions.  Not 
being  such  a consequence,  the  pain 
from  right-action  cannot  annihilate 
wrong-action. 


131]  Fruition  limited  in  time  [ — ii.  14 

the  fire  of  pain  brought  about  by  a very  little  evil.  Hence  [the  slight  ad- 
mixture] is  not  enough  or  adequate  to  remove  or  to  cause  to  dwindle  good- 
fortune  or  great  merit.  He  asks  <5CWhy  [not]  The  answer  is  ^the 
good-fortune.^  For  in  the  case  of  me,  the  meritorious,  much  other  good-fortune 
exists,  the  fruition  of  dominant  karma,  beginning  with  the  initiatory  rites 
and  ending  with  the  donations.  Where  then  this  admixture  is  very  slight, 
it  will  make  even  in  heaven,  the  result  of  it,  a slight  commingling  of  pain, 
that  is,  a slight  reduction  from  the  heaven  which,  [although]  its  beginning  is 
gained  by  mixed  merit,  is  [in  itself]  quite  untouched  by  pain. — He  analyses 
3.  the  third  outcome  in  the  words,  ^limited  [in  time].^  The  predominance 
here  is  conceived  as  being  extremely  powerful  but  not  as  having  accessories. 
And  it  is  powerful  in  so  far  as  its  fruition  is  without  limit  [of  time],  because 
there  is  no  opportunity  [for  its  fruition]  at  any  one  time.  But  in  the  case 
of  [the  dominant  karma]  the  fruition  of  which  is  without  limit  [of  time]  there 
is  a weakness,  because  there  is  an  opportunity  [for  its  fruition]  at  some  other 
time.  The  continuance  for  a long  time  is  only  in  the  condition  of  seed,  but 
not  as  [actively]  helping  the  dominant  [karma]  because  this  latter  is  inde- 
pendent. It  is  objected,  ' It  has  been  stated  that  the  latent-deposit  of  karma 
is  by  the  ending-of-life  made  manifest  at  one  point  of  time  only.  Whereas 
now  you  say  that  it  continues  a long  time.  How  then  is  the  latter 
[statement]  not  in  opposition  to  the  previous  [statement]?’  With  this  in 
mind  he  asks,  ^how  was  this  He  answers  in  the  words,  «not  ...  in  [this] 
seen  [life].^  The  singular  number  denotes  a class.  He  determines  the 
outcome  of  that  which  is  different  from  this  by  the  words,  ^On  the  contrary 
. . . not ...  in  [this]  seen  [life].^  The  rest  is  easy. 


14.  These  [fruitions]  have  joy  or  extreme  anguish  as  results 
in  accordance  with  the  quality  of  their  causes  whether  merit 
or  demerit. 

<These>  [that  is]  birth  and  length-of-life  and  kind-of-experience. 
Those  with  merit  as  cause  have  pleasure  as  result ; those  with 
demerit  as  cause  have  pain  as  result.  And  just  as  the  nature  of 
this  pain  is  counteractive,  so  for  the  yogin,  even  at  the  moment  of 
pleasure  in  an  object,  there  is  nothing  but  counteractive  pain. 

It  has  been  stated  that  karma  is  rooted  in  hindrances  and  that  fruitions  are 
rooted  in  karma.  Now  the  question  is,  ‘ of  what  are  the  fruitions  the  root,  since 
you  say  that  these  are  to  be  renounced  ? ’ In  reply  to  this  he  says,  14.  These 
[fruitions]  have  joy  or  extreme  anguish  as  results  in  accordance  with  the 


ii.  14 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [132 

quality  of  their  causes  whether  merit  or  demerit.  He  explains  the  sQtra  in 
the  words,  «<These>  [that  is]  birth  and  length-of-life  and  kind-of-experience.» 
Although  birth  and  length-of-life,  since  they  precede  joy  and  extreme  anguish, 
do  have  the  latter  as  their  results, — whereas  the  kind-of-experience  follows  the 
rise  [in  consciousness]  of  joy  and  extreme  anguish  and  in  fact  has  its  essence  in 
the  [direct]  experience  {anubhava)  of  them, — still  in  so  far  as  being  [directly] 
experienced  is  the  same  as  a kind-of-experience  {bhoga),  we  may  suppose  that 
[joy  and  extreme  anguish]  are  results  of  the  kind-of-experience  only  so  far  as  they 
are  the  objects  of  the  kind-of-experience.  It  is  objected,  ‘ The  birth  and  length- 
of-life  and  kind-of-experience,  which  are  the  results  of  extreme  anguish,  are 
things  to  be  rejected  {heya),  since  they  are  felt  to  be  counteractive.  But  why 
should  those  [fruitions]  which  have  merit  as  cause  be  renounced?  they  have 
pleasure  as  their  result  since  they  are  felt  to  be  co-active  [anukula].  Nor  can 
their  co-activity,  which  may  be  felt  by  every  one,  be  gainsaid  by  even  a thousand 
verbal  communications  and  inferences.  Moreover  neither  joy  nor  extreme 
anguish  can  exist  without  the  other.  For  while  joy  is  being  received,  extreme 
anguish,  since  it  cannot  be  driven  off,  may  also  fall  to  one’s  lot,  because  the  two 
have  separate  causes  and  because  they  have  separate  forms.’  In  reply  to  this  he 
says,  «And  just  as  . . . this.»  Although  ordinary  individuals,  at  the  time  when 
there  is  pleasure  in  objects,  are  not  conscious  of  them  as  counteractive,  still 
yogins  are  conscious  of  this  [counteractiveness]. 


How  can  this  be  accounted  for  ? 

15.  As  being  the  pains  which  are  mutations  and  anxieties 
and  subliminal-impressions,  and  by  reason  of  the  opposition  ^ 
of  the  fluctuations  of  the  aspects  {guna), — to  the  discriminat- 
ing all  is  nothing  but  pain. 

1.  For  every  one  this  experience  of  pleasure  is  permeated  with 
passion  and  is  dependent  upon  animate  and  inanimate  instruments. 
In  this  case  we  have  a latent-deposit  of  karma  arising  from  passion. 
Likewise  also  [a  man]  hates  the  instruments  of  pain  and  becomes 
infatuated  [by  the  instruments  of  infatuation].  Thus  there  is  also 
a latent-deposit  made  by  aversion  and  by  infatuation.  And  in 
this  sense  it  has  been  said,  “ Enjoyment  is  impossible  unless  one 
has  killed  some  living  creature.”  Therefore  there  is  also  the 
latent- deposit  of  karma,  effected  by  killing,  belonging  to  the  body. 
Thus  it  has  been  said,  “ Undifferentiated-consciousness  {avidya) 

' This  sutra  seems  to  have  influenced  Umasvati : Tattvarthadhigama-sutra  vii.  6. 


133]  Inevitability  of  imin  [ — ii.  15 

is  pleasure  in  an  object  of  sense  That  which  is  the  subsi- 
dence of  the  organs  because  of  their  satiation  with  enjoyments  is 
pleasure  ; after  there  has  been  a craving,  the  failure  to  subside 
is  pain.  And  by  the  application  of  the  organs  to  enjoyments 
one  cannot  make  one’s  self  free  from  thirst  [for  enjoyment]. 
Why  is  this?  Since  passions  increase  because-of  applica- 

tion to  enjoyments,  and  the  skill  of  the  organs  also  increases. 
Therefore  application  to  the  enjoyment  of  pleasure  is  not  a way 
of  approach  [to  freedom  from  thirst  for  objects].  Surely  one 
aiming  at  pleasure  and  permeated  by  objects  is  sunk  in  the  deep 
bog  of  pain,  like  the  man  who,  while  in  fear  of  the  scorpion’s 
poison  2 is  bitten  by  the  poisonous  snake.  This  is  the  so-called 
painfulness  of  mutation;  it  is  counteractive;  even  in  a condition  of 
pleasure  it  hinders  the  yogin  himself. — 2.  Now  what  is  the  pain- 
fulness of  anxiousness  ? Every  one  has  the  experience  of  anxious- 
ness ; it  is  permeated  by  aversion  and  is  dependent  upon  animate 
and  inanimate  instruments.  Here  w^e  have  a latent-deposit  of  karma 
arising  from  aversion.  And  [a  man]  yearning  for  the  instruments  of 
pleasure,  throbs  in  the  body  and  in  [the  organs  of]  speech  and  in  the 
central-organ  [manas).  Since  it  then  aids  or  (ca)  thwarts  others 
by  aiding  them  or  by  injuring  them,  it  amasses  right-actions  and 
wrong-actions.  This  latent-deposit  of  karma  is  the  result  of  greed 
and  of  infatuation.  For  this  reason  it  is  called  the  painfulness  of 
anxiousness. — 3.  But  what  is  the  painfulness  of  subliminal- 
impressions  ? There  is  a latent-deposit  of  subliminal-impressions 
of  pleasure  arising  from  the  experience  of  pleasure ; and  there 
is  a latent -deposit  of  subliminal-impressions  of  pain  arising  from 
the  experience  of  pain.  Thus  analogously  (evam),  w'hile  the 
fruition  from  the  karmas  is  under  experience,  there  is  on  the  other 
hand  an  accumulation  of  a latent-deposit  of  karma.  Thus  this 
stream  of  pain  from  time-with out-beginning,  spreading  wider  and 
wider,  agitates  even  the  yogin  because  its  essence  is  counteractive. 
Why  is  this  ? It  is  because  a wise  man  is  like  an  eyeball.  Just 


* Perhaps  an  allusion  to  the  phrase  sukha- 

khydtir  avidyd  (ii.  5,  Calc.  ed.  IIP). 

* Colonel  Jacob  (Second  Handful  of  Popular 


Maxims,  2nd  ed.,  1909,  p.  76)  points  out 
that  Vacaspati  uses  this  nyaya  again 
in  the  Tatparyatika  (1898),  p.  53'^. 


ii.  15 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [134 

as  a fine  thread  of  wool  fallen  upon  the  eyeball  by  its  touch  gives 
pain,  but  not  so  when  it  falls  upon  other  parts  of  the  body,  so  these 
pains  [from  subliminal-impressions]  hinder  the  yogin  only,  who  is 
like  an  eyeball,  but  not  any  other  perceiver.  But  upon  the  other, 
[not  a yogin], — who  casts  off  the  pain  received  time  after  time 
which  has  been  brought  upon  him  by  his  own  karma, — and  who 
receives  the  pain  cast  off  time  after  time, — and  who  is  as  it  were 
permeated  through  and  through  from  all  sides  with  fluctuating 
mind-stuff  complicated  from  time-without-beginning  with  its 
subconscious-impressions, — and  who  under  [the  influence  of] 
undifferentiated-consciousness  [avidya)  conforms  [himself]  to  the 
‘ I-substance  ’ and  to  the  ‘ Of  me-substance  ’ with  regard  to 
those  very  things  which  are  to  be  rejected, — upon  him,  horn  again 
and  again,  the  triple  anguishes  from  both  kinds  of  causes,  both 
inner  and  outer,  sweep  down.  This  being  so,  the  yogin,  having 
seen  himself  and  the  whole  multitude  of  creatures  borne  away  by 
this  stream  of  pain  from  time-without-beginning,  seeks  refuge  in 
the  focused-insight  {samyag-daiyana),  the  cause  of  the  dwindling 
of  all  pain. — <And  by  reason  of  the  opposition  of  the  fluctuations 
of  the  aspects  {guna), — to  the  discriminating  all  is  nothing  but  pain.> 
The  aspects  {guna)  of  the  thinking-substance  in  the  form  of  bright- 
ness and  of  activity  and  of  inertia,  having  become  interdependent 
by  aid  given  each  to  the  other,  give  rise  to  a presen ted-idea  either 
tranquil  or  cruel  or  infatuated,  [either  one  or  the  other]  of  just 
these  three  aspects.  “ And  because  the  changes  {vrtta)  of  the 
aspects  {guna)  are  unstable,  the  mind-stuff  is  in  rapid  mutation.” 
Thus  we  have  been  told.^  “ The  [outer]  forms  [when  developed  to] 
a high  degree  and  the  [inner]  fluctuations  [when  developed  to]  a 
high  degree  oppose  each  other ; but  the  generic  forms  co-operate 
with  [these  when  developed  to]  a high  degree.”  Thus  since  these 
aspects  {guna)  have  presented-ideas  of  pleasure  and  of  pain  and  of 
infatuation  obtained  by  reliance  of  one  [aspect]  upon  another,  each 
{sarve)  [of  them]  has  the  form  of  each  of  [the  others].  But  the 
distinction  between  them  is  due  to  their  being  either  in  a subordi- 
nate {guna)  or  in  a dominant  state.  Therefore  <to  the  discrimi- 

* By  Panca9ikha.  Compare  iii.  9 and  13,  pp.  199*  and  204* ; iv.  15,  p.  298'  (Calc.  ed.). 


135]  Medical  analogues  to  the  Four  Noble  Truths  [ — ii.  15 

nating  all  is  nothing  but  pain.>  So  the  seed  out  of  which  this 
huge  aggregate  of  pain  grows  forth  is  undifferentiated-consciousness 
(avidyd).  And  the  reason  for  the  failure-of-growth  (abhdva)  in 
this  \avidya\  is  the  focused-insight. — Just  as  a system  of  medicine 
has  four  divisions,  [on]  Disease  [and  on]  Cause  of  Disease  [and  on] 
Health  [and  on]  Remedy,  so  this  system  also  has  four  divisions, 
[on]  the  Round-of-Rebirth  [and  on]  the  Cause  of  the  Round-of- 
Rebirth  [and  on]  Release  [and  on]  the  Way  to  Release.  Of  these 
[four],  the  Round-of-Rebirth  with  its  mass  of  pains  is  that  which 
is  to  be  escaped  ; the  conjunction  of  the  primary-cause  and  of  the 
Self  is  the  cause  of  this  which  is  to  be  escaped  iheya)  ; the  final 
destruction  of  the  correlation  is  the  escape  {liana) ; the  means 
of  escape  is  focused-insight.  In  this  [focused-insight]  he  who 
escapes — as  he  is  in  himself — can  neither  be  accepted  nor  rejected 
{Jieya).  For  if  there  be  a rejection  (hdna),  that  would  involve  the 
doctrine  of  the  extermination  of  him  [who  escapes].  And  ^ if  there 
be  an  acceptance  [that  would  involve]  the  doctrine  [that  he  has] 
a cause.  And  ^ by  denying  both  [the  rejection  and  the  acceptance], 
we  have  the  doctrine  [that  the  Seer  as  he  is  in  himself  is]  eternal. 
This  is  the  focused-msight. 

In  order  to  account  for  this  he  introduces  the  sutra  after  first  asking  the  question, 
«How  can  this  be  accounted  for?:^  The  stitra  begins  with  the  word  15.  . . . 
mutation  and  ends  with  the  word  discriminating  . . . [The  compound  in  the 
sutra  is  analysed,]  mutation  and  anxiety  and  subliminal-impression — these 
themselves  are  the  pains — it  is  by  these  . . . He  describes  the  painfulness  of 
the  pleasure  in  objects  of  sense  in  so  far  as  mutations  are  painful  by  saying, 
«For  every  one  this.»  Pleasure  is  surely  impossible  unless  it  be  permeated  by 
passion.  For  one  cannot  possibly  say  that  one  finds  no  happiness  in  a thing 
and  at  the  same  time  take  pleasure  in  it.  Moreover,  since  pleasure  leads  to 
action  and  action  causes  a latent-deposit  of  merit  and  demerit,  there  is  also 
a latent-deposit  of  karma  produced  by  passion,  because  a thing  which  does  not 
exist  cannot  be  produced.  Under  these  circumstances  (tada),  a man  experiencing 
pleasure  and  feeling  attachment  to  it,  feels  aversion  towards  the  instruments  of 
pain  with  an  aversion  that  is  in  an  intercepted  state.  Furthermore,  being  unable 
to  prevent  these  [instruments  of  pain]  he  becomes  infatuated.  Thus  there  is 
also  a latent-deposit  of  karma  made  by  aversion  and  by  infatuation.  And  there 
is  nothing  contradictory  in  making  infatuation,  whose  other  name  is  misconcep- 
tion, the  cause  of  a latent-deposit  of  the  karma  of  infatuation  also.  If  it  be  asked, 

^ Omitted  in  most  MSS. 


il.  15 — ] Booh  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sddhana  [136 

How  can  a man  in  love  feel  aversion  or  infatuation,  since,  when  he  is  in  love, 
aversion  and  infatuation  are  not  evidently  existent,  he  replies,  «And  in  this 
sense  it  has  been  said»  by  us  when  explaining  [ii,  4 j hindrances  with  intercepted 
states.  In  this  way  merit  and  demerit  have  been  shown  as  produced  by  sense- 
activities  of  speech  and  mind.  Because  a mental  volition  produced  by  passion, 
so  that  one  wills,  ‘ this  must  be  done,’  is  also  not  to  be  distinguished  from  the 
verbal  form  [of  the  volition]  in  so  far  as  it  is  equally  desired.  As  they  say, 
‘A  volition  with  desire  does  not  go  beyond  intended-objects  which  can  be 
expressed  by  words.’  He  also  shows  a latent-deposit  of  karma  belonging  to  the 
body  in  the  words,  ^“Impossible  . . . unless  one  has  killed”^.  Hence  authors 
of  the  Law  Books  say  [Manu  iii.  68,  Visnu  lix.  19],  “ Five  kinds-of-slaughter  are 
open  to  the  householder.”  The  objector  says,  ‘This  may  be  true.  Yet  it  is  not 
fitting  that  a yogin  should  reject  pleasure  in  objects-of-sense  which  can  be  felt 
by  anybody.  For  that  would  be  running  counter  to  experience.’  In  reply  to  this 
he  says,  ^it  has  been  said,  “ Undifferentiated-consciousness  {avidya)  is  pleasure 
in  an  object-of-sense  ”»  by  [us  when]  showing  [ii.  5]  that  undifferentiated- 
consciousness  is  characterized  by  four  kinds  of  misconceived  ideas.  The  ancient 
sages  {vf'ddha)  do  not  pay  heed  to  anything  merely  at  the  first  impression. 
There  is  of  course,  merely  at  the  first  impression  {apatatas),  an  experience  which 
any  one  can  feel  of  pleasure  which  follows  even  after  eating  food  mixed  with 
sweet  poison  ; but  after  a lapse  of  time  there  is  no  pleasure.  And  as  such  it  has 
been  shown  by  The  Exalted  [Ifvara  in  the  Gita  xviii.  38],  “ After  there  has  been 
contact  of  the  sense-organs  with  objects,  that  pleasure  which  is  at  the  beginning 
like  nectar  and  in  the  course  of  time  like  poison  is  known  to  be  full  of  rajas.” 
He  raises  a doubt  by  saying,  «which  . . . with  enjoyments.^  The  objector  says, 
‘ We  do  not  accede  to  the  statement  that  pleasure  is  the  joy  in  objects.  On  the 
contrary,  when  men  are  not  satiated  and  when  their  minds  are  afflicted  with 
yearnings  for  one  object  after  another,  it  is  the  very  thirst  itself  that  is  the 
great  pain.  And  this  [thirst]  does  not  subside  unless  enjoyment  follow. 
Furthermore  the  full  subsidence  of  this  [thirst]  is  not  permeated  with  passion 
and  similar  [states  of  mind].  Thus  it  cannot  be  said  that  this  subsidence  has 
the  painfulness  of  mutation.’  This  is  the  point. — ^Because  of  their  satiation» 
means : Because  the  thirst  [for  enjoyment]  has  dwindled,  there  is  a subsi- 
dence of  the  organs,  in  other  words,  there  is  no  activity  [of  the  organs]  with 
regard  to  objects-of-sense.  He  makes  this  same  clear  by  a negative  instance 
in  the  words  ^arising  from  a craving.»  He  rebuts  an  objection  with  the  words 
«And  ...  by  the  organs  . . . not.^  The  word  ^[because  of  [anu]'^  is  used  in 
the  sense  of  cause.  It  is  true  that  the  dwindling  of  thirst  [for  objects]  is  the 
flawless  ^ pleasure.  But  application  to  enjoyment  is  not  the  cause  of  this 
[dwindling  of  thirst]  ; but  it  is  the  cause  of  the  thirst  Avhich  is  just  the  opposite 
of  this  [dwindling  of  thirst].  Just  as  they  say,^  “Lust  by  the  enjoyment  of 

* Without  the  flaw  of  ?v7pra.  Naradiya  Parana  xxxiii.  38;  Linga 

^ See  Manu  ii.  94  ; Visnu  Puruna  iv.  10.  9 ; Parana  Ixvii.  17. 


137]  Pain  is  past  and  present  and  future  [ — ii.  15 

lusts  never  subsides ; just  as  by  the  butter-oblation  the  flames  flare  up  yet 
once  again.” — The  rest  is  without  obscurity. — 2.  He  asks  a question  with  regard 
to  the  painfulness  of  anxiety  in  the  words,  «Now  what?»  The  answer  is 
«every  one.»  As  everybody  knows  what  it  is,  he  does  not  make  a detailed 
statement  of  it  as  such.  And  the  detailed  statement  is  analogous  to  that  of  the 
painfulness  of  mutation. — 3.  He  asks  about  the  painfulness  of  subliminal- 
impressions  by  saying  ^what?)^  He  gives  the  answer  in  the  words  ^the 
experience  of  pleasure.^  For  an  experience  of  pleasure  gives  rise  to  a subliminal 
impression  and  this  to  a memory  of  pleasure  ; and  this  to  a passion  ; and  this  to 
movements  of  the  central-organ  and  of  the  body  and  of  [the  organ  of]  speech ; 
and  this  [gives  rise]  to  merit  and  demerit ; from  these  [comes]  the  experience 
of  fruition  ; from  this  a subconscious-impression.  Thus  there  is  a beginningless 
[chain].  Here  the  connexion  should  be  understood  in  this  way.  There  is 
a memoiy  of  pleasure  and  of  pain  according  to  the  variation  in  the  degree  of  the 
subliminal-impressions  of  pleasure  and  of  pain ; and  from  this  comes  passion 
and  aversion ; from  these  two  come  karma;  from  the  karmas,  fruition.  Streaming 
on  in  this  way  the  stream  of  pain  hinders  the  yogin  only,  but  not  the  other 
perceiver,  [that  is]  any  ordinary  person,  as  he  says  in  the  words  ^Thus  this  . . . 
from-time-without-beginning.»  But  the  triple  anguishes  sweep  down  upon  the 
other.  This  is  the  construction  [of  the  sentence]. — In  so  far  as  the  two 
anguishes,  that  from  the  gods  and  that  from  the  elements,  are  [each]  external, 
their  unity  is  emphasized. — Since  it  is  a fluctuation  in  the  mind-stuff,  undifferen- 
tiated-consciousness  {avidya)  is  said  to  be  ^fluctuating  mind-stuff.»  Under  [the 
influence  of]  this,  ^with  regard  to  those  very  things  which  are  to  be  rejected» 
[that  is]  with  regard  to  the  thinking-substance  and  the  organs  and  the  body  and 
so  on  [as  the  ‘I’,]  and  with  regard  to  wife  and  children  [as  the  ‘of  me’],  «he 
conforms  [himself]  to  the  ‘ I-substance  ’ and  to  the  ‘ Of-me-substance.’:»  This 
being  the  case,  there  is  no  other  refuge  for  him  than  the  focused-insight.  So 
he  says  ^This  being  so.^  This  being  so,  he  has  mentioned  the  extrinsic 
{aupadhika)  painfulness  of  the  pleasure  in  objects  as  a result  of  mutation  and 
of  subliminal-impressions  and  of  contact  with  anxiousness.  He  [now]  indicates 
the  intrinsic  [painfulness]  by  saying  ^<And  by  reason  of  the  opposition  of  the 
aspects  {guna).>^  He  explains  [this  part  of  the  sutra]  by  saying  ^brightness.» 
Brightness  and  activity  and  inertia  are  the  forms,  in  so  far  as  they  are  forms 
of  the  thinking-substance,  which  enter  into  mutation.  The  aspects  {guna)  are 
sattva  and  rajas  and  iamas  [and  they]  are  interdependent  upon  each  other.  They 
give  rise  to  either  1.  a tranquil  (its  essence  is  pleasure),  or  2.  a cruel  (its 
essence  is  pain),  or  finally  (eva)  3.  an  infatuated  (its  essence  is  dejection) 
presented-idea  of  [these]  three  aspects,  although  its  form  is  an  experience  of 
pleasure.  And  not  even  this  mutation  of  this  [thinking-substance]  having  such 
a presented-idea  as  its  form  is  fixed.  Because  of  this  he  says  <5C“And  because 
the  changes  of  the  aspects  {guna)  are  unstable,  the  mind-stufi"  is  in  rapid  muta- 
tion. ”»  It  is  objected,  ‘ [There  is]  one  presented-idea ; how  can  it  at  one  time 

18  [h.o.s.  17] 


ii.  15 — ] Booli  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [138 

make  known  tranquillity  and  cruelty  and  infatuation,  which  are  opposed  to  each 
other?’  In  reply  to  this  he  says,  <S“The  [outer]  forms  [wdien  developed  to] 
a high  degree  and  the  [inner]  fluctuations  [when  developed  to]  a high  degree 
oppose  each  other. ”»  The  «forms»  are  the  eight  states'  [bhdva)  beginning 
with  right-action.  The  «fluctuations»  are  pleasure  and  so  on.  So  in  this  case 
wrong-action,  since  it  is  in  such  a condition  [of  high  development],  is  opposed  by 
right-action  when  it  is  in  process  of  fruition.  Similarly  with  knowledge  [and] 
with  passionlessness  [and]  with  power  [as  well  as]  with  pleasure  and  so  on  their 
corresponding  contraries  are  in  opposition.  But  the  generic  “ forms,  which  are 
not  actively  moving  forth,  since  they  do  not  oppose  [those  which  are  developed] 
to  a high  degree,  co-operate  wdth  those  which  are  actively  moving  forth. — The 
objector  says,  ‘ We  know  [all]  this.  Yet  how  can  pleasure  in  objects  have  an 
intrinsic  painfulness  ? ’ In  reply  to  this  he  says,  «Thus  since  these.»  Because 
the  material  cause  [of  both]  is  not  different  and  because  their  essence  is  the 
material  cause,  there  is  also  no  difference  in  the  material  effects  [upadeya). 
‘ So  then  is  this  identity  absolute  ? If  so,  the  difference  [between  the  two  terms] 
in  the  attributive  relations  of  the  thinking-substance  would  not  be  possible.’ 
In  reply  to  this  he  says,  <^n  a subordinate  or  in  a dominant.»  In  relation  to 
the  generic  element  {dtman)  there  is  subordination ; in  relation  to  the  element 
[which  is  developed]  to  a high  degree  there  is  dominance.  So  both  extrinsically 
and  intrinsically  (svabhavatas)  <to  the  discriminating  all  is  nothing  but  pain.> 
Consequently  by  men  of  insight  pain  should  be  escaped  {heya).  And  it  cannot  be 
escaped  unless  its  cause  (niddna)  be  escaped.  Moreover  it  cannot  be  escaped 
unless  its  cause  be  thoroughly  understood.  So  he  shows  w’hat  its  radical  cause 
is  in  the  w'ords,  «:So  ...  of  this.)^  That  seed  out  of  which  the  aggregate  of  pain 
grows  forth  [or]  arises.  He  shows  the  reason  for  the  extermination  of  this 
grow'th  in  the  words  «And  ...  in  this.2>  Now  he  shows  that  this  system  which 
has  entered  upon  its  activity  for  the  sake  of  showing  favour  [i.  1]  to  all  is  similar 
to  another  system  of  the  same  kind  by  saying,  <KJust  as.»  [A  system  described 
as  being  of  four  divisions]  is  one  of  which  there  are  the  four  divisions,  that  is, 
four  compactly  arranged  parts. — It  is  objected,  ‘ Why  is  there  not  a contradiction 
when  you  said  that  pain  is  to  be  escaped  and  when  you  [now]  describe  the 
round-of-rebirth  as  something  to  be  escaped  ? ’ In  reply  to  this  he  says  <KOf  these 
[four],  ....  with  its  mass  of  pains.»  That,  by  doing  which  undifferentiated- 
consciousness  (avidyd)  makes  the  round-of-rebirth,  [that  constitutes]  its  special 
form  of  activity  which  is  the  cause  of  the  round -of-rebirths.  This  he  describes 
in  the  words,  «of  the  primary  cause  and  of  the  Self.»  He  tells  what  liberation 
is  in  the  words,  ^of  the  correlation. » He  tells  what  the  means  of  liberation 
are  in  the  w’ords,  «the  means  of  escape.»  Some*  there  are  who  regard  the 
extermination  of  him-who-escapes  [Mtr) — as  he  is  in  himself — to  be  Liberation. 

1 Eight-action,  knowledge,  passionlessness,  ^ The  unspecialized  forms.  See  iii.  44. 

power,  and  their  opposites.  See  * The  Yogacara  school  of  Buddhists. 

Samkhya  Ear.  xl. 


139] 


The  Self  may  escajye  pain  [ — ii.  16 

In  this  sense  they  say,  “Like  the  blowing-out  {yiirvana)  of  a lamp  is  the  deliver- 
ance of  this  anguished’  [tapin)  [mind].”  Others^  again  teach  that,  as  a result 
of  the  extermination  of  the  hindrances  with  their  subconscious  impressions, 
purified  mental-states  {vijhana)  are  produced ; and  that  this  itself  is  liberation. 
In  reply  to  these  he  says,  «In  this  [focused-insight].^  In  this  case  he  first 
finds  fault  with  the  escape  by  saying,  <SFor  if  there  be  an  escape  . . . for  him.» 
Since  no  rational  man  ever  exerts  himself  to  exterminate  himself.  It  is  objected, 
‘ We  see  some  persons,  all  of  whose  pleasures  are  uprooted  by  intense  disease  and 
who  drag  about  their  bodies,  as  it  were,  laden  with  pain,  striving  to  exterminate 
themselves.’  True,  he  says  in  reply,  there  are  a few  such.  But  not  of  this  kind 
are  men  living  in  [the  ordinary], round-of-rebirth.  [For]  their  lot  is  to  enjoydiverse 
and  strange  and  celestial  delights.  Even  those  [others],  however,  are  evidently 
desirous  of  liberation.  Accordingly  we  should  not  concede  that  liberation  is 
the  extermination  of  him  who  escapes — as  he  is  in  himself — since  that  would 
involve  what  is  not  one  of  the  aims  of  man.  The  objector  says,  ‘ Very  well  then^ 
let  us  say  that  he  who  escapes — as  he  is  in  himself — is  something  that  may  be 
accepted.’  In  reply  to  this  he  says,  «And  if  there  be  an  acceptance  . . . the 
doctrine  [that  he  has]  a cause.^  For  if  there  be  an  acceptance  [of  him],  then, 
because  he  would  be  impermanent  in  so  far  as  he  is  an  effect,  he  might  also  fall 
even  from  [his]  state  of  liberation.  For  liberation  is  deathlessness.  And  [we 
could]  not  [say]  that  an  uninterrupted  succession  of  purified  mental-states  is 
deathless.  Because  the  uninterrupted  series,  over  and  above  the  members-of-the- 
series  {samtanin),  not  being  anything  [perceptibly]  real,  does  not  exist ; and 
because  the  members-in-the-series  are  not  permanent.  Therefore  we  should 
strive  to  have  such  a theory  as  [would  teach  that  the  Self  as  he  is  in  himself  is] 
eternal.  For  this  being  so,  liberation  (apavarga)  might  be  [one  of]  the  aims  of 
men.  So  he  says,  ^And  by  denying  both. Consequently,  liberation  is  nothing 
but  [the  Seer]  abiding  in  himself  [i.  3].  Precisely  this  is  the  right  point  of  view. 

This  same  system  is  set  forth  in  its  four  divisions. 

16.  That  which  is  to  be  escaped  is  pain  yet  to  come. 

Pain  past,  that  is,  transferred  beyond  experience,  cannot  properly 
be  called  [pakse  vartate)  a thing  to  be  escaped.  And  present  pain  in 
its  own  moment  [of  existence]  has  attained  experience  ; so  it  cannot 
at  the  next  moment  be  so  changed  that  it  can  be  escaped.  Conse- 
quently only  that  pain  which  is  yet  to  come  is  that  which  hinders 
the  yogin  only,  who  is  like  an  eye-ball,^  but  [this  does]  not  [hinder] 
any  other  perceiver.  Only  this  pain  becomes  so  changed  that  it 
may  be  escaped. 

’ The  Bikaner  MS.  reads  celasa  iti.  Tapin  ^ The  Madhyamika  school  of  Buddhists, 

appears  to  be  correct  instead  of  tayin.  ^ Compare  ii.  15,  p.  13P  (Calc.  ed.). 


ii.  16 — ] Booh  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [140 

«This  same  system  is  set  forth  in  its  four  divisions.^  16.  That  which  is  to  be 
escaped,  is  pain  yet  to  come.  The  words  <5Cyet  to  come2>  exclude  the  past  and 
the  present.  He  makes  this  consistent  by  saying  «pain  past.^  If  it  be 
objected  that  present  pain  now  in  experience  is  not  to  be  transferred  beyond 
experience,  he  replies  «And  present.^  Easy. 


Therefore  the  cause  of  this  same  thing  that  is  described  as  some- 
thing to  be  escaped  is  once  more  specified. 

17.  The  correlation  of  the  Seer  and  the  object-of-sight  is  the 
cause  of  that  which  is  to  be  escaped. 

The  Seer  is  the  Self  conscious  by  reflection  of  the  thinking- 
substance.  Objects-of-sight  are  all  external-aspects  {dharma) 
which  have  struck  upon  the  sattva  of  the  thinking-substance.  So 
this  same  object-of-sight  giving  its  aid,  like  a magnet,^  by  the  mere 
fact  of  being  near,  becomes,  by  reason  of  its  being  an  object-of-sight, 
the  property  of  the  Self,  its  proprietor,  whose  nature  is  seeing.  It 
becomes  changed  into  an  object  upon  which  experience  operates, — 
in  so  far  it  has  the  nature  of  another.  Having  acquired  [this  new] 
being,  although  self-dependent,  [it  becomes]  by  serving  one-not- 
itself,^  dependent  on  one-not-itself.  The  correlation  of  these  two, 
the  power  of  seeing  and  the  power  by  which  one  sees,  is  from  time- 
without-beginning  and  is  effected  for  [two]  purposes.  [This  corre- 
lation is]  the  cause  of  that  which  is  to  be  escaped,  in  other  words, 
the  cause  of  pain.  And  in  this  sense  it  has  also  been  said,  “ By 
avoidance  of  the  cause  of  correlation  with  this  [thinking-substance] 
the  antidote  for  pain  would  be  absolute.”  Why  [would  this  be  so]  ? 
Because  we  know  the  antidote  to  prevent  the  cause  of  pain.  For 
example,  we  know  that  the  liability-to-scratches  inheres  in  the 
sole  of  the  foot,  the  power  to  scratch  inheres  in  the  thorn, 
the  prevention  [of  scratching]  is  either  by  not  stepping  with  the 
foot  upon  the  thorn  or  by  stepping  [upon  it  when  the  sole 
of  the  foot]  is  covered  by  a foot-protector.  Whoever  understands 
these  three  [scratch  and  cause  and  prevention]  has  begun  the 
antidote  therefor  and  is  not  exposed  to  the  pain  from  scratches. 

' Compare  i.  4,  p.  17‘ ; ii.  18,  p.  143* ; iv.  17,  300'^  (Calc.  ed.). 

* Compare  iv.  24. 


[ — ii.  17 


141]  Cause  of  pain 

Why  [is  this]  ? Because  of  his  power  to  apperceive  the  three-fold 
character  [of  the  case].  And  to  resume  the  argument  {atrdpi),  the 
sattva,  the  castigated,  comes  under  the  ownership  of  rajas,  the 
castigator.  Why  [so]  ? Since  it  stands  in  a passive  relation  to 
the  activity  of  the  castigator.  The  act  of  castigation  affects 
the  sattva  as  a passive  object,  but  does  not  affect  the  immutable 
and  inactive  Soul  {ksetrajna).  [Why  inactive  ?]  Since  it  has 
objects  shown  to  it.  But  if  the  sattva  be  under  castigation,  the 
Self,  it  appears,  conforming  itself  to  the  form  of  this  [sattvail  is 
itself  castigated  along  with  [the  sattva]. 

That  which  is  to  be  escaped  has  been  described.  Its  cause  {nidana)  is  [now] 
described  17.  The  correlation  of  the  Seer  and  the  object-of-sight  is  the  cause 
of  that  which  is  to  be  escaped.  He  tells  of  the  Seer  himself  in  the  words 
^The  Seer  . . . conscious  by  reflection  of  the  thinking-substance. » The  intelli- 
gence {citi)  belonging  to  the  Self  {Pums),  although  it  is  detached,  becomes  con- 
scious by  reflection  of  the  thinking-substance,  and  this  consists  in  the  thinking- 
substance  being  imaged  [cJiat/a)  [in  the  intelligence].  It  is  objected  that  ‘ even  if 
this  be  so,  [the  Self]  could  see  the  thinking-substance  only,  but  could  not  see 
the  various  things  {^ahdddi)  which  are  absolutely  shut  off  [from  it]  ’.  To  this  he 
replies,  ^Ohjects-of-sight  . . .the  [sattva]  of  the  thinking-substance.^  When  by 
the  channel  of  the  senses  the  thinking-substance  enters  into  mutations  having 
the  forms  of  various  things  and  when  it  is  an  object-of-sight,  the  various  things, 
the  external-aspects,  are  also  objects-of-sight.  It  is  objected,  ‘ In  so  far  as  the 
thinking-substance  has  assumed  the  form  of  these  [things],  it  may  have  the  form 
of  the  various  things.  But  if,  in  the  case  of  the  Self,  his  relation  to  the  think- 
ing-substance be  assumed,  he  would  be  mutable.  Yet  if  there  be  no  relation 
between  them,  how  can  the  various  things,  although  present  in  the  [sattva)  of 
the  thinking-substance,  be  objects-of-sight?  For  surely  an  object-of-sight  not 
in  relation  with  the  Seer  cannot  be  called  an  object-of-sight.’  To  this  he  replies, 
«this  same  object-of-sight.)^  All  this  has  been  given  in  detail  by  us  in  Book  First, 
where  we  showed  [i.  7,  p.  22]  that  the  sattvaoi  the  thinking-substance,  although  not 
in  combination  with  intelligence  [cditamja],  in  so  far  as  it  is  absolutely  clear,  still, 
in  so  far  as  it  contains  the  image  [himba]  of  the  intelligence,  seems  to  come  into 
a balanced  state  [with  the  intelligence]  and  [so]  experiences  the  various  things. 
Hence  also  the  Seer,  enjoying  within  himself  the  pleasures  and  other  [experi- 
ences] offered  by  the  sattva  of  the  thinking-substance  which  has  entered  into 
mutation  in  the  form  of  the  various  things,  becomes  the  proprietor.  And  the 
sattva  of  the  thinking-substance  [having  mutations]  of  such  a kind  becomes  his 
property.  So  this  same  sattva  of  the  thinking-substance,  containing  the  forms 
of  the  various  things,  becomes  the  object-of-sight ; and  being  like  a magnet,  it 
becomes  the  property  of  the  Self  whose  nature  is  seeing  and  who  is  the  proprietor. 


ii.  17 — ] Booh  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [142 

Why  [is  this]  ? He  says,  ^the  experience.)^  Because  [the  sattva  of  the  think- 
ing-substance] is  changed  into  an  object  upon  which  experience  operates.  The 
«experienceS>  is  the  enjoyment  on  the  part  of  the  Self  ; the  «operation»  is  the 
activity  ; the  ^object^  is  the  condition  of  being  enjoyed  ; because  it  is  «changed 
into:^  this,  it  becomes  the  property  [of  the  Self]. — The  objection  is  made,  ‘ How 
can  the  sattva  of  the  thinking-substance,  which  is  luminous  in  itself,  be  the 
object  of  an  experience  ? ’ In  reply  to  this  he  says,  «in  so  far  as  it  has  the 
nature  of  another.»  For  if  the  sattva  of  the  thinking-substance  were  really  like 
the  intelligence  (caitanya),  it  would  be  luminous  in  itself.  But  it  has  acquired 
[this  new]  being,  it  is  property  (sva),  it  is  other  than  intelligence  (caitanya),  and 
inert  in  nature.  Therefore  it  is  the  object  of  the  experience  on  the  part  of  this 
[intelligence].  It  is  objected,  ‘ One  thing  is  dependent  upon  another  thing,  when 
in  some  way  or  other  it  exerts  itself  for  the  sake  of  the  other.  Whereas  the 
sattva  of  the  thinking-substance  does  not  in  any  way  exert  itself  for  the  Self 
which  is  detached  [from  it].  And  how  can  [the  thinking-substance]  be  depen- 
dent on  this  [intelligence]  ? And  this  being  so,  it  cannot  be  an  object  upon 
which  [the  Self]  operates.’  In  reply  to  this  he  says,  «although  self-depen- 
dent.)^ ^By  serving  the  purpose  of  one-not-itself,S>  by  serving  the  purpose  of 
the  Self,  it  becomes  ^dependent  on  one-not-itself,^  dependent  upon  the  Self. 
The  objector  says,  ‘ This  relation  between  the  power  of  seeing  and  the  power  by 
which  one  sees  must  be  either  natural  or  accidental.  If  it  be  natural,  since  the 
two  terms  of  the  relation  are  permanent,  the  relation  is  one  that  cannot  be  exter- 
minated ; and  this  being  so,  the  round-of-rebirth  would  be  permanent.  But  if  it 
be  accidental,  then  in  so  far  as  hindrances  and  karma  and  its  subconscious-im- 
pressions are  fluctuations  of  the  inner-organ,  the  former  exist  only  so  long  as 
the  inner-organ  exists,  and  if  at  the  same  time  (ca)  the  inner-organ  is  to  have 
these  as  its  cause,  there  would  be  the  fault  of  mutual  interdependence ; and 
[you  could  not  explain  this  fault  away  by  bringing  in  a series  without  begin- 
ning,] because  it  is  impossible  that  there  should  be  anything  from  time-with- 
out-beginning at  the  beginning  of  the  creation,  for  then  the  round-of-rebirth 
would  not  be  produced  at  all.  On  which  point  it  has  been  said,  “ Even  in  the 
opinion  of  those  who  think  that  the  Self  is  not  an  agent,  how  can  the  aspects 
(gund)  bring  about  the  very  first  activity  ? For  then  karma  does  not  yet  exist. 
Neither  is  there  then  an  erroneous  idea  nor  passion  nor  hatred  nor  similar 
[hindrances].  For  all  these  are  fluctuations  of  the  central-organ  and  the  central - 
organ  has  not  been  produced  at  that  time.”  ’ This  doubt  he  removes  by  the 
words,  «The  correlation  of  these  two,  the  power  of  seeing  and  the  power  by 
which  one  sees,  is  from  time-without-beginning  and  is  effected  for  [two] 
purposes.^  It  is  true  that  the  relation  is  not  natural,  but  accidental.  But  it  is 
not  to  be  supposed  that  it  has  a beginning.  For  in  so  far  as  it  is  the  result  of  a 
cause  (nimitta)  which  is  from  time-without-beginning,  it  itself  is  also  from  time- 
without-beginning.  Furthermore  the  uninterrupted  succession  of  hindrances 
and  karma  and  subconscious-impressions  of  these  is  from  time- without-beginning. 


143] 


Return  to  the  state  of  equipoise  [ — ii.  17 

And  although  at  the  time  of  [each]  reversal  of  creation  [this  succession]  has 
been  reduced  to  the  state  of  equipoise  {samya)  in  the  primary  cause,  still  at  the 
beginning  of  a creation  it  becomes  again  as  before,  just  as  some  kinds  of  plants  ‘ 
{udbhijja),  reduced  at  the  end  of  the  rains  to  a state  of  earth,  when  the  rains 
[return],  assume  again  their  proper  form.  More  than  once  this  has  been  made 
known  previously.  In  so  far  as  it  brings  it  to  growth,  undiflferentiated-conscious- 
ness  is  the  cause  of  the  correlation  ; in  so  far  as  it  is  the  reason  for  [its]  stability, 
the  purpose  of  the  Self  is  the  cause.  For  this  [conjunction]  is  stable  by  virtue 
of  this  [purpose  of  the  Self].  It  is  this  that  is  stated  in  the  words,  ^effected  for 
[two]  purposes.»  «And  in  this  sense  it  has  also  been  said»  by  Panca^ikha.^ 
^By  conjunction  with  this»  means  by  conjunction  with  the  thinking-substance. 
This  same  is  the  cause  of  pain.  By  the  avoidance  of  this  [conjunction]  this 
antidote  for  pain  would  be  absolute.  So  what  is  implied  is  [arthdt]  that  pain 
results  from  a failure  to  avoid  it.  In  connexion  with  this  same  point  he  states 
an  extremely  well-known  simile  in  the  words,  <KFor  example. » <LL  foot-pro- 

tector»  is  a sandal.  An  objector  says,  ‘ Let  this  be  granted.  But  if  it  be  said 
that  correlation  with  the  aspects  {guiia)  is  the  cause  of  the  castigation,  then  we 
must  say  that  the  aspects  {gu7ia)  are  castigators.  And  since  the  action  of  casti- 
gating does  not  remain  within  the  agent,  as  is  the  case  in  such  an  [intransitive]  act 
as  being,  we  must  expect  some  other  thing  to  be  castigated.  And  the  Self  is  not 
the  passive  object  of  this  [act]  as  being  something  to  be  castigated,  for  in  so  far  as 
he  is  immutable,  it  is  not  fitting  that  he  should  be  such  as  to  [reap]  the  conse- 
quences which  come  from  actions.  Therefore  we  come  to  the  result  that  the  act 
of  castigating,  which  is  concomitant  with  the  thing  castigated,  ceases  when  [the 
thing  castigated]  also  ceases,  just  as  there  is  absence  of  smoke  when  fire  is  lack- 
ing.’ So  he  says,  <SAnd  to  resume  the  argument  ....  the  castigator.»  It  is 
the  aspects  [gum]  only  that  are  in  the  relation  of  castigated  and  castigator.  Of 
these  [three],  sattva,  because  it  is  soft  like  the  sole  of  the  foot,  is  the  object  to  be 
castigated.  Whereas  rajas,  inasmuch  as  it  is  keen,  is  the  castigator.  This  is 
the  point.  He  asks,  «Why  [so]  ?»  That  is  to  say,  why  is  sattva  alone,  and 
not  the  Self,  the  object  to  be  castigated  ? He  gives  the  answer  in  the  words, 
^the  sattva  as  a passive^  object.»  ‘Is  not  then  the  Self  castigated  at  all?  If 
so,  let  it  be  the  inanimate  sattva  that  receives  the  castigation.  What  does  it 
matter  to  us?’  In  reply  to  this  he  says,  «Since  it  has  objects  shown  to  it.  But 
if  the  sattva  be  under  castigation,  the  Self,  it  appears,  conforming  itself  to  the 
form  of  this  [_sattva'\  is  itself  castigated  along  with  [the  sattvai].'^  The  cause  of  its 
being  castigated  along  with  it  is  that  objects  are  shown  to  it  and  this  has  been 
explained  previously  [i.  4]. 


* The  frog's  body  {mandulca-deha)  is  used  ® 1.  kartar  kantaka  rajas  tapaka 

as  the  simile  in  i.  19,  p.  5P®  (Calc.ed.).  2.  kriya  bheda  abhibhava  tapa 

This  is  the  seventh  in  Garbe’s  collection  3.  karma  padatala  sattva  tapya 

of  Panca9ikha's  fragments,  Festgruss  4.  upaya  padatrana  viveka  parihara 

an  Roth,  p.  79. 


ii.  18 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [144 

He  tells  what  the  object-of-sight  itself  is. 

18.  With  a disposition  to  brightness  and  to  activity  and  to 
inertia,  and  with  the  elements  and  the  organs  as  its  essence, 
and  with  its  purpose  the  experience  and  the  liberation  [of 
the  Self],— [this  is]  the  object-of-sight. 

The  sattva  has  the  disposition  to  brightness ; the  rajas  has  the 
disposition  to  activity ; the  tamas  has  the  disposition  to  inertia. 
These  aspects  {guna)  with  the  [three]  separate  parts  influencing 
each  other, — with  external-aspects  {dharma)  in  conjunction  or  in 
separation, — with  limitations  ^-in-extent  [murti)  brought  about  by 
basing  them  upon  an  interdependence  of  one  upon  another, — 
with  separate  powers,  although  in  subservience  to  each  other, 
still  unconfused, — with  conformations  {anupdtin)  according  to 
various  disparate  and  comparate  powers, — with  their  presence 
manifested  at  the  time  when  they  become  dominant, — with  their 
existence,  although  subordinate  to  the  dominant  [aspects]  yet  from 
their  functional-activity  {vydpara)  inferred  as  included  in  the 
dominant, — with  their  faculties  employed  as  effective  for  the 
purposes  of  the  Self, — with  their  aid  given,  like  that  of  a magnet, 
from  the  mere  fact  of  being  near, — following  without  any  external 
cause  after  a fluctuation  of  any  one  of  themselves — these  aspects 
[guna)  are  denoted  by  the  word  primary-cause.  And  this  is  called 
<the  object-of-sight.>  This  same  object-of-sight  enters  into  muta- 
tion as  elements  and  as  organs, — as  elements  such  as  earth  and 
the  others  in  coarse  ^ and  in  subtile  [form].  It  enters  likewise  into 
mutation  as  organs  such  as  the  organ-of-hearing  {protra).  But  it 
is  not  without  an  impelling  force.  On  the  contrary,  it  acts  only 
by  accepting  an  impelling  force.  For  the  object-of-sight  exists  for 
the  sake  of  the  experience  and  the  liberation  of  the  Self.  Of  these 
[two],  experience  is  the  ascertainment  of  things  with  desirable 
qualities  and  of  things  with  undesirable  qualities  so  long 
as  this  [ascertainment]  does  not  divide  [the  Self  from  the 
thinking-substance].  Liberation  is  the  ascertainment^  of  the 

* Compare  iii.  44,  p.  254’  (Calc.  ed.).  of  Balarama  in  notes  1 and  2 of  p.  144 

’ This  refers  forward  to  the  important  and  (Calc.  ed.). 

peculiardefinitionsofcoarseand  subtile  ^ Compare  drastuh  svarupopalabdhih  so 
in  iii.  44.  See  the  illuminating  words  'yavargah,  ii.  23,  p.  157*  (Calc.  ed.). 


[ — ii.  18 


145] 


False  ohjectijication  of  the  Self 


enjoyer  himself.  Thus  there  is  no  other  process-of-knowing 
in  addition  to  these  two.  And  in  this  sense  it  has  been  saidd 
“ But  he  who  in  the  three  aspects  [guna)  which  are  agents  and  in 
the  Self  which  is  not  an  agent, — but  which  is  of  the  same  kind  in 
some  respects  and  of  a different  kind  in  other  respects, — sees  all 
the  produced  states  presented  to  the  fourth,  the  witness  of  their 
action — he  has  no  suspicion  that  there  is  another  kind  of  know- 
ledge [the  pure  intelligence].”  ‘ How  is  it  that  these  two,  experience 
and  liberation,  made  by  the  thinking-substance  and  existing  in  the 
thinking-substance  only,  are  attributed  to  the  Self?’  Just  as 
a victory  or  a defeat  on  the  part  of  actual  fighters  ^ is  ascribed  to 
their  commander,  for  he  as  we  know  is  the  experiencer  of  the 
result,  so  bondage  and  release,  existing  in  the  thinking-substance 
only,  are  ascribed  to  the  Self.  For  he  as  we  know  has  the 
experience  of  the  results  of  these.  Bondage  is  of  the  thinking- 
substance  only  and  is  the  failure  to  attain  the  purposes  of  the  Self. 
Release  is  the  termination  of  the  purpose  of  the  Self.  Thus  it  is 
that  processes-of-knowing  and  processes-of-retention  and  compre- 
hensions-of-particulars  ^ {uha)  and  removals-of-faults  {apoha)  and 
real-knowledge  and  the  will-to-live,  [all]  existing  in  the  thinking- 
substance,  are  assumed  to  exist  in  the  Self.  For  he  as  we  know 
has  the  experience  of  the  results  of  these. 

He  explains  the  object-of-sight  by  the  sutra  beginning  with  the  word  18.  . . . 
brightness  and  ending  with  the  words  object-of-sight.  Brightness  is  a 
portion  of  the  sattva  ; it  is  influenced  by  dejection  which  is  a quality  of  tamas 
or  by  pain  which  is  a quality  of  rajas.  Similarly  it  must  be  understood  in 
the  case  of  the  quality  of  rajas  and  the  rest.  It  is  this  that  is  stated  in  the 
words  «with  the  [three]  separate  parts  influencing  each  other.»  <5CWith 
external -aspects  {dharma)  in  conjunction  or  in  separation»  with  [or  from]  the 
Self.  As  it  is  written  [^vet.  Up.  iv.  5],  “ One  male  goat  [i.e.,  the  unborn  soul] 
has  pleasure  in  leaping  upon  the  one  female  goat  [i.  e.  primary  matter]  which  is 


* This  is  Garbe’s  eighth  fragment  of  PaSca- 
cikha.  It  is  introduced  to  support  the 
statement  that  experience  consists  in 
determining  the  nature  of  the  gunas 
which  have  been  identified  with  the 
Self.  Although  the  three  gunas  are 
active  agents,  the  indiscriminating 
man  looks  upon  all  things  as  the  deeds 
19  [h.o.s.  17] 


of  the  Self,  who  never  acts,  who  is 
different  in  nature  from  the  gunas,  and 
who  merely  witnesses  their  changes. 
He  does  not  suspect  the  existence  of 
an  intelligence  which  is  an  insight 
discriminated  from  the  gunas. 

“ Compare  i.  24,  p.  55'*  (Calc.  e'd.). 

“ See  Nyaya-sutra  i.  1.  40. 


ii.  18 — ] Booh  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [146 

red  and  white  and  black  and  which  brings  forth  many  offspring  like  herself ; 
while  another  male  goat  deserts  her  after  having  enjoyed  her.” — Limitations-in- 
extent,  such  as  earth,  are  those  which  have  been  brought  about  by  basing  them 
upon  interdependence  of  one  upon  another.  The  objector  says,  ‘ This  may  be 
true.  When  a quiescent  idea  is  to  be  produced  by  sattva,  since  rajas  and  tamas 
also,  in  so  far  as  they  are  accessory  to  sattva,  are  the  causes  of  this  [idea], 
there  is  a power  in  them.  If  this  be  so  [iti),  and  whenever  rajas  or  tamas  might 
be  principal,  then  always  a quiescent  idea  might  arise,  not  a cruel  nor  an 
infatuated  one,  just  as  in  the  case  when  sattva  was  dominant.’  In  reply  to  this 
he  says,  «with  separate  powers,  although  in  subservience  to  each  other,  still 
unconfused.^  Let  it  be  granted,  when  a quiescent  idea  is  to  be  produced,  that 
rajas  and  tamas  are  in  an  accessory  relation,  still  their  powers  are  not  com- 
mingled. For  the  fact  that  their  powers  are  not  commingled  may  be  inferred 
from  the  fact  that  there  is  no  commingling  of  effects.  Whereas  effects  of  the 
quiescent  and  cruel  and  infatuated  forms  are  seen  to  move  actively  forth  in  so  far 
as  their  form  is  uncommingled.  Thus  it  is  established  that  the  powers  are 
unconfused.  The  objector  says,  ‘ Suppose  this  be  granted.  If  the  powers  are 
unconfused,  then  the  aspects  (guna)  cannot  be  supposed  to  work  harmoniously 
together.  Evidently  things  whose  powers  are  different  never  have  effects  that 
are  produced  by  a harmonious  working  together.  Threads,  for  instance,  and 
lumps  of  earth  and  diy  grasses  do  not  work  harmoniously  together  and  produce 
a jar.’  In  reply  to  this  he  says,  ^with  conformations  according  to  various  dis- 
parate and  comparate  powers.^  Although  the  power  of  serving  as  material 
cause  is  in  [a  thing  which  is]  comparate  [with  its  effect],  and  not  elsewhere, 
and  although  the  power  of  serving  as  co-operative  [cause  may  be]  in  disparate 
things,  still  when  it  is  a water-jar  that  is  to  be  generated,  it  is  not  in  the 
power  of  the  dry  grasses  to  serve  even  as  co-operative  [causes],  and  this  being 
so,  these  [grasses]  do  not  work  harmoniously  with  threads.  This  is  the  point. 
— [He  analyses  the  compound.]  Those  are  referred  to  whose  character  it  is 
to  conform  to  certain  kinds  of  powers  with  regard  to  possible  disparates  and 
comparates. — «At  the  time  when  they  become  dominant.»  When  a super- 
normal body  is  to  be  generated,  the  sattva  is  dominant  and  the  rajas  and  tamas 
are  accessory.  Similarly  when  a human  body  is  to  be  generated,  the  rajas 
is  dominant  and  the  sattva  and  tamas  accessory.  Likewise  when  an  animal 
body  is  to  be  generated,  the  tamas  is  dominant  and  the  sattva  and  rajas 
are  accessory.  Thus  these  aspects  [gu7ia)  have  their  presence  manifested  at 
the  time  when  they  become  dominant.  In  other  words,  they  contribute  to 
the  effect  in  proportion  as  they  become  reintensified.  And  the  word 
^dominant»  is  to  be  taken  as  the  abstract  form  of  dominance ' {bhavapradhana). 

* He  wishes  to  exclude  the  other  meaning  this  word  has  the  sense  of  ‘dominant  ’ 

of  pradhana,  that  is,  primary  cause.  and  of  ‘ primary  cause  ’.  See  Pan. 

Just  as  ‘ one  and  two  ’ have  an  iii.  4.  69. 

abstract  and  a particular  sense,  so  also 


[ — ii.  18 


147]  The  aspects  are  foreign  to  the  Self 

Just  as  [in  the  phrase  of  Panini’s  sutra  i.  4.  22,]  “ The  dual  and  singular  are 
used  in  case  of  two  and  one  ”,  [the  words  two  and  one  are]  in  this  case  to  be 
understood  as  twoness  and  oneness ; in  other  cases  [such  as  of  measurable 
numbers],  they  are  to  be  understood  as  two  and  as  one. — An  objector  says, 

‘ At  that  time  [of  dominance],  it  is  possible  to  say  that  the  dominant  exists  in 
so  far  as  it  is  in  its  intense  form.  But  is  there  any  source-of-valid-ideas  [to 
prove]  the  real  existence  of  its  accessories  which  are  not  in  the  intense  form  ? ’ 
In  reply  to  this  he  says,  <5^although  subordinate.^  Although  not  intensified, 
stiU,  because  they  have  no  discrimination  [to  recognize  that  they  are  themselves 
inanimate],  and  [yet]  because  they  do  work  harmoniously  together, — from  the 
mere  fact  of  their  functional-activity  in  so  far  as  there  is  co-operation, 
— their  existence  is  inferred  as  being  included  in  the  primary  cause.  The 
objector  says,  ‘ We  may  grant  that  the  aspects  {guna)  have  faculties  and 
work  harmoniously  together,  but  why  do  they  perform  this  [co-operation]  ? 
For  surely  just  because  one  says  there  is  a faculty,  one  generates  no 
[actual]  effect  on  the  ground  that  there  may  not  be  any  cessation  in  the 
production  of  effects.’  In  reply  to  this  he  says,  ^employed  as  effective  for 
the  purposes  of  the  Self.2>  After  this  [purpose  has  been  effected],  when  all 
the  purposes  of  the  Self  have  been  ended,  the  aspects  [afterwards]  cease  and 
produce  no  effects.  This  is  what  he  means  to  say.  If  it  be  asked,  ' How  can 
a thing  which  does  not  aid  the  Self,  use  impelling  force  as  being  a purpose  of  the 
Self,’  he  replies  «aid  given  merely  by  being  near.:S>  It  is  objected  that  ‘ the 
impeller  of  the  aspects  is  a cause  characterized  only  as  being  merit  and  demerit ; 
but  can  [these  aspects  be  made  to  produce  effects]  when  impelled  by  the  purpose 
of  the  Self?’  In  reply  to  this  objection  he  says,  «without  any  external 
cause.^ — [He  explains  the  phrase.]  ^The  rest^  [of  the  aspects],  even  «with- 
out  any  external-cause  (jpratyaya)y>  [or]  efficient-cause  (nimitta)  such  as  merit, 
^following  the  fluctuation  of  any  one  of  them,»  either  of  sattva  or  of  rajas  or 
of  tamas,  as  dominant  and  as  being  active  towards  the  production  of  its  own 
effect.  In  which  sense  he  will  say  later  [iv.  3],  “The  efficient-cause  gives  no 
impulse,  but  [the  mutation]  follows  when  the  barrier  to  the  evolving-causes 
is  cut,  just  as  in  the  case  of  the  peasant.” — The  construction  of  the  sentence 
is,  these  aspects  (guna)  are  denoted  by  the  word  primary-cause  (j)rad]iana). 
According  to  its  derivation  [the  word  pradhdna]  is  that  by  which  the  universe 
is  produced  (jpradhlyate)  or  put  forth.  ^ This  is  said  to  be  the  object-of-sight. 
— Having  mentioned  the  nature  of  the  aspects  (guna)  he  describes  the  effect 
of  this  disposition  in  the  words,  «this  same.)^  In  order  to  establish  the 
doctrine  of  the  pre-existent  effect  (satMryavada),  he  says  that  a thing  enters 
into  mutation  as  a form  of  that  thing,  whichever  it  may  be,  that  is  its  essence. 
He  makes  clear  that  its  essence  is  elements  and  organs  by  the  words  begin- 
ning, «as  an  element.)^  To  the  words,  <with  its  purpose  the  experience  and 


Compare  ii.  23,  p.  159’  (Calc.  ed.). 


ii.  18 — ] Booh  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Scidhana  [148 

the  liberation, > which  are  a part  of  the  sutra,  he  gives  an  introduction  by 
saying  «not  without  an  impelling- force.»  He  elaborates  the  word  <experience> 
by  saying  «of  these  [two].»  For  pleasure  and  pain  belong  to  the  thinking- 
substance  as  such  in  so  far  as  it  has  three  aspects  (gum).  Because  this  thinking- 
substance  enters  into  mutation  as  being  of  such  a kind  [as  one  that  has  three 
aspects].  There  is  said  to  be  experience  in  so  far  as  there  is  an  ascertainment 
[of  the  things]  as  belonging  to  [these]  qualities.'  Accordingly  he  says,  ^so 
long  as  undivided.»  And  this  has  been  made  known  by  us  more  than  once. — 
He  elaborates  the  word  <liberation>  by  saying  ^of  the  enjoyer.^  Liberation 
is  that  by  which  one  is  liberated  [literally,  wrenched  off].  He  states  that 
there  is  no  other  impelling-force  [than  these  two]  by  saying  ^in  addition  to 
these  two.:^ — «And  in  this  sense  it  has  been  said»  by  Panca^ikha  in  the 
words  «“  But  he  who  An  objection  is  raised,  ‘ As  matters  of  [perceptible] 

reality,  experience  and  liberation  are  made  by  the  thinking-substance.  How 
are  they  attributed  to  the  Self  who  is  neither  their  cause  nor  their  locus?’ 
In  reply  to  this  he  says,  «These  two.»  And  that  the  Self  is  enjoyer  has 
been  explained  and  will  be  stated  later  [iii.  34].  But  in  the  strict  sense  it 
is  as  the  text  says,  «Bondage  is  of  the  thinking-substance  only  and  is  the 
failure  to  attain  the  purposes  of  the  Self.3>  «Thus»  means  in  the  way  that 
experience  and  liberation  are  mentioned  as  being  related  to  the  Self.  [So] 
processes  of-knowing  and  the  rest  are  also  to  be  understood  as  being  related 
to  the  Self.  Of  these,  «the  process-of-knowing)^  is  the  thinking  of  the  intended- 
object  as  it  is  in  itself ; the  process-of-retention  is  memory  with  regard  to  this 
[object]  ; «comprehension-of-particulars  {ulia)'^  is  the  maintaining  {uhana)  of  the 
particulars  belonging  to  a thing  ; ^removal-of-faults  (apoha)'^  is  the  removal  for 
statable  reasons  (yukti)  of  particulars  when  falsely  attributed  ; it  is  by  these  two 
only,  by  comprehension-of-particulars  and  by  removal-of-faults,  that  the  given 
thing  is  determined,  that  is,  that  there  is  real  knowledge  ; and  will-to-live  is 
rejection  or  acceptation  preceded  by  this  determination  of  the  reality. 


This  sutra  is  begun  with  the  intent  of  determining  the  various 
forms  of  the  aspects  [guna),  the  objects-of-sight. 

19.  The  particularized  and  the  unparticularized  [forms]  and 
the  resoluble  only  [into  primary  matter]  and  irresoluble*- 
primary-matter — are  the  divisions  of  the  aspects  {guna). 

Of  these  [four],  the  elements  air  and  wind  and  fire  and  water  and 
earth  are  the  particularized  [forms]  of  the  unparticularized  fine 

The  Varttika  says  istanistagundh  are  three  ‘ aspects  ’ to  the  common  use  of 

sukhaduhkhdtmakdh.  This  illustrates  the  term  as  ‘ quality  ’. 

the  closeness  of  the  term  guna  as  the  ^ Compare  i.  45. 


149]  Successive  developments  of  the  aspects  [ — ii.  19 

elements  {tanmdtra)  sound  and  touch  and  colour  and  taste  and 
smell.  Similarly  the  organs  of  the  thinking-substance  are  ear  and 
skin  and  eye  and  tongue  and  nose,  and  the  organs  of  action,  voice 
and  hands  and  feet  and  organ-of- excretion  and  organ-of-generation. 
And  as  the  eleventh  the  central-organ  which  has  all  kinds  of  things 
as  its  intended  object.  These  are  the  particularized  [forms]  of  the 
unparticularized  [personality-substance]  which  is  characterized  as 
having  the  feeling  of  personality.  This  is  the  sixteen-fold  mutation 
of  the  aspects  {puna).  The  unparticularized  [forms]  are  six, 
namely,  the  fine  element  of  sound  and  the  fine  element  of  touch 
and  the  fine  element  of  colour  and  the  fine  element  of  taste  and 
the  fine  element  of  smell.  Thus,  as  we  know,  sound  and  the  rest 
with  one  or  two  or  three  or  four  or  five  distinguishing-characteristics 
are  five  unparticularized  [forms].  And  the  sixth  is  that  of  which 
we  can  only  say  that  it  is  the  feeling-of-personality.  These  are 
the  six  unparticularized  forms  of  the  Great  thinking-substance  of 
whose  being  we  can  only  say  that  it  exists.  That  which  is  prior  to 
the  unparticularized  [forms]  is  that  of  which  we  can  only  say  that 
it  is  resoluble  [primary-matter],  the  Great' Substance  {mahat-tattva) . 
Remaining  in  this  Great  Being  {dtman)  of  which  all  that  we  can 
say  is  that  it  exists,  these  [six]  unparticularized  [forms]  experience 
the  limit  of  development.  And  reversing  the  process  of  creation 
they  remain  in  that  same  Great  Being  of  which  all  that  we  can  say 
is  that  it  exists,  and  revert  to  that  which  has  neither  existence  nor 
non-existence,  from  which  both  existence  and  non-existence  have 
been  removed,  from  which  non-existence  has  been  removed,  to 
the  unphenomenalized  and  unresoluble  primary-cause.  This  [Great 
Being  of  which  all  that  we  can  say  is  that  it  exists],  is  the  [first] 
mutation  of  these  aspects.  And  that  [Being]  which  has  neither 
existence  nor  non-existence  is  the  mutation  [of  these  aspects]  which 
is  unresoluble  [primary  cause].  So  the  purpose  of  the  Self  is  not 
the  reason  for  the  unresoluble  state.  Since  the  fact  that  the  Self 
has  a purpose  is  not  known  {hhavati)  at  the  beginning  as  the 
cause  of  the  state  unresoluble  [into  primary  matter],  therefore  the 
fact  that  the  Self  has  a purpose  is  not  a cause  ^ of  this  [state]. 

' See  i.  45,  p.  96®  (Calc.  ed.). 


ii.  19 — ] Book  II  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [150 

And  since  that  state  is  not  effected  by  the  purpose  of  the  Self,  it  is 
called  permanent.  But  at  the  beginning  of  the  three  states  that 
are  particularized,  the  fact  that  the  Self  has  a purpose  is  known 
to  be  the  cause.  And  this  purpose  is  known  to  act  as  purpose 
and  as  efficient  cause.  Hence  this  state  is  called  impermanent. 
But  the  aspects,  which  conform  themselves  to  all  kinds  of  external- 
aspects  {dharma),  neither  cease  to  be  nor  come  into  being,  but 
appear  as  if  they  had  the  properties  of  coming  into  existence  and 
of  passing  out  of  existence  by  reason  of  the  [individual]  phenome- 
nalized  forms,  past  and  yet  to  come,  going  and  coming,  inseparably 
connected  with  the  aspects.  As  for  example  we  say,  ‘ Devadatta 
is  poor’.  Why  ? ‘ Because  his  cows  are  dying.’  Since  his  poverty 
is  due  to  the  dying  of  his  cows  and  not  to  his  loss  of  himself,  the 
parallel  [samadhi]  [to  the  going  and  coming  of  the  phenomenalized 
forms  as  affecting  the  aspects  (guna)']  applies  (sama). — That  of 
which  we  can  only  say  that  it  is  resoluble  [into  primary  matter]  is 
next  [in  development]  to  that  which  is  irresoluble  [into  primary 
matter].  Formed  therein  it  becomes  distinguished  from  it  [as  its 
effect],  since  the  order  [of  the  development  of  the  mutations]  is  not 
transgressed.  Likewise  the  six  unparticularized  [forms]  formed  in 
that  of  which  we  can  only  say  that  it  is  resoluble  [into  primary 
matter]  become  distinguished  [from  it].  Because  the  order  of 
mutations  is  fixed.  Similarly  the  elements  and  organs  formed  in 
these  unparticularized  [forms]  become  distinguished  [from  them], 
as  has  been  already  described.  There  is  no  other  entity  (tattva) 
beyond  the  particularized  [forms].  So  there  is  no  mutation  into 
any  other  entity  beyond  the  particularized  [forms].  But  their 
mutation  into  external-aspect  and  time-variation  and  intensity  are 
to  be  explained  [iii.  13]  later. 

«This  sutra  is  begun  with  the  intent  of  determining  the  various  forms  of  the 
aspects  [guna],  the  objects-of-sight.»  The  sutra  begins  with  the  words  19.  The 
particularized  and  ends  with  the  words  divisions  . . . He  mentions  the 
particularized  [forms]  which  are  the  evolved-matter  {vikara)  of  the  unparticula- 
rized [forms]  which  [latter]  are  without  the  serene  and  cruel  and  infatuated 
characteristics — [the  evolved  forms],  but  not  the  [forms]  evolving'  other  entities 
(tattva).  He  describes  the  [forms]  belonging  to  these  [entities]  in  the  words, 
' See  the  discussion  by  Vacaspati  in  Samkbya  Tattva-Kaum.  on  Kar.  iii. 


151]  Mutations  of  primary  substance  real  [ — ii.  19 

«0f  these  [four],  . . . air.2>  The  order  of  explanatory-statement  follows 
exactly  the  order  of  production.  The  organs  of  intelligence  (buddhi)  are  particu- 
larized [forms]  of  the  [personality-substance  {aliamMra)]  which  is  characterized  as 
having  the  feeling-of-personality,  and  which  has  sattva  as  its  dominant  [aspect]. 
But  the  organs  of  action  [are  particularized  forms  of  the  personality-substance] 
which  has  rajas  as  its  dominant  [aspect].  Whereas  the  central-organ  {manas), 
the  essence  of  which  is  of  both  kinds,  must  be  supposed  to  be  the  [particularized 
form  of  the  personality-substance]  which  has  both  kinds  [that  is,  rajas  and 
sattva]  as  its  dominant  [aspects].  And  [there  is  an  inference]  on  this  point,  that 
the  five  fine  elements  have  the  thinking-substance  as  their  cause,  because  they 
are  unparticularized  [forms],  like  the  feeling-of-personality.  Moreover,  being  an 
unparticularized  form  is  [the  same  as]  being  the  cause  of  evolved  matter ; and 
both  in  the  fine  elements  and  in  the  feeling-of-personality  there  is  nothing 
particularized. — After  grouping  them  together  he  enumerates  the  particularized 
[forms]  in  the  words,  «This  ...  of  the  aspects.»  He  numbers  the  unparticu- 
larized [forms]  also  with  the  word  «[six.S>  He  groups  them  together  and  sums 
them  up  with  the  word  «namely.»  Now  the  prior  is  particularized  by  the 
subsequent.  So  smell  itself  [together  with  the  subsequent  four]  has  five' 
characteristics ; taste  itself  [together  with  the  subsequent  three]  has  four 
characteristics ; colour  itself  [together  with  the  subsequent  two]  has  three 
characteristics  ; touch  itself  [with  the  subsequent  sound]  has  two  characteristics  ; 
sound  has  the  characteristic  of  sound  only.  ‘ But  of  what  are  these  six 
unparticularized  [forms]  the  effect?’  In  reply  to  this  he  says  «These  ....  of 
which  we  can  only  say  that  it  exists.^  The  existent  (sat)  is  that  which  is 
capable  of  actions  fulfilling  a purpose ; having  existence  (sattd)  is  the  abstract 
form  of  this.  The  Great  Substance  is  that  which  is  made  of  this.  In  other 
words,  whatever  action  fulfilling  a purpose  there  be,  whether  its  characteristic 
be  enjoyment  [of  various  things]  from  sound  downwards,  or  whether  its 
characteristic  be  the  discernment  of  the  difference  between  the  sattva  and  the 
Self,  it  is  all  of  it  comprehended  in  the  Great  Thinking-substance.  By  saying 
«of  whose  being»  he  shows  what  it  really  is  and  denies  that  it  is  nothing  at 
all  (tuccha).  This  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  this  first  mutation  of  primary 
matter  is  a real  thing,  and  not  an  appearance  (vivartta).  That  which  is  prior  to 
these,  [that  is]  distant  in  time  as  compared  with  the  unparticularized  [forms] 
which  are  near  in  time,  is  that  of  which  we  can  only  say  that  it  is  resoluble 
[primary-matter],  the  Great  Substance  (mahat-tattva).  Eemaining  in  this  Great 
Being  of  which  all  that  we  can  say  is  that  it  exists,  these  six  unparticularized 
[forms], — since  it  is  established  that  the  effect  pre-exists  [in  its  cause], — experi- 
ence [or]  reach  the  limit  of  development.  On  the  other  hand,  of  these  non- 
particularized  which  have  particularized  [forms]  there  are  also  the  mutations  of 
external-aspect  (dharma)  and  of  time-variation  and  of  intensity.  It  is  this  that 
is  the  limit  of  development,  that  is,  the  limit  of  mutation  of  these  particu* 
' See  Garbe  : Samkhya  Philosophie,  p.  236,  note  3. 


ii,  19 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Scidhana  [152 

larized  [forms].  Having  thus  mentioned  the  order  of  growth  he  describes  the 
order  of  dissolution  in  the  words,  «reversing  the  process  of  creation.»  «Ke- 
versing  the  process  of  creation»  [means]  becoming  resolved  [prallyamana) 
[into  primary-matter].  In  other  words  particularized  forms  are  resolved  into 
their  own  form,  that  is,  become  non-particularized.  And  they  remain  [or] 
are  dissolved  {nillya)  in  that  same  Great  Being  of  which  all  that  we  can  say 
is  that  it  exists.  And  then  even  with  the  Great  [Being],  these  unparticu- 
larized [forms]  revert  to  unphenomenalized  [primary-matter],  called  unre- 
soluble because  in  none  (a)  else  are  they  resolved  {li).  This  same 
[unphenomenalized  primary  matter]  is  qualified  by  the  words,  «Cwhich  has 
neither  existence  nor  non-existence.^  Existence  is  that  which  is  capable  of  acts 
fulfilling  a purpose  of  the  Self.  Non-existence  is  worthlessness  {tucchata)  as 
regards  the  purpose  of  the  Self.  That  is  so-described  [as  having  neither 
existence  nor  non-existence]  which  is  beyond-the-range  of  both  existence  and 
non-existence.  What  he  means  to  say  is  this.  The  state  when  sattva  and  rajas 
and  tamas  are  in  equipoise  is  never  of  use  in  fulfilling  a purpose  of  the  Self. 
And  so  it  is  not  existent.  Neither  does  it  have  a worthless  kind  of  existence  like 
the  sky-lotus.  Therefore  it  is  also  not  non-existent.  The  objector  says,  ‘ This 
may  be  so.  Still  in  the  unphenomenalized  state  there  are  the  Great  [Thinking- 
substance]  and  the  other  [entities]  in  so  far  as  these  are  identical  with  this 
[unphenomenalized  state].  For  there  is  no  utter  annihilation  of  the  existent,  or  if 
utterly  annihilated  it  cannot  be  made  to  grow  again.  For  because  one  cannot 
make  the  non-existent  grow,  the  Great  [Thinking-substance]  and  the  other 
[entities]  would  really  exist  [in  the  unphenomenalized  state]  and  therefore  might 
function  as  acts  fulfilling  the  purpose  of  the  Self  [and  so  the  unphenomenalized 
state  might  be  said  to  exist].  Then  how  could  you  say  that  it  has  no  existence  ?’ 
In  reply  to  this  he  says,  «from  which  both  existence  and  non-existence  have 
been  removed. » [The  non-existent]  is  a cause  which  [exists]  beyond  any 
existing  effect.  Although  in  the  causal  state  the  effect  does  exist  as  potential 
being  {gaktydtmana),  still  in  so  far  as  it  does  not  fulfil  its  peculiar  purpose  it  is 
said  to  be  non-existent.  This  cause  does  not  however  have  an  effect  [worthless 
for  the  purpose  of  the  Self]  like  a hare’s  horns.  Accordingly  he  says  ^from 
which  non-existence  has  been  removed. » [A  cause  which  exists]  beyond  an 
effect  that  is  non-existent  or  worthless  [with  regard  to  the  purpose  of  the  Self]. 
For  if  that  were  so,  the  effect  would  not  be  produced  from  this  [cause]  any 
more  than  the  sky-lotus  [would  be  produced  from  this  cause].  This  is  the  point. 
He  brings  the  [topic  of  the]  reversal  of  creation  which  has  been  described  to 
a close  in  the  words,  «This  ...  of  these.^  The  word  ^This»  points  back  to 
that  which  has  been  stated  just  prior  to  that  which  immediately  precedes.  The 
states  beginning  with  that  of  which  we  can  only  say  that  it  is  resoluble  [into 
primary  matter],  since  they  are  effected  by  a purpose  of  the  Self,  are  not 
permanent.  Whereas  the  state  which  is  unresoluble  [into  primary  matter],  since 
it  is  not  effected  by  a purpose  of  the  Self,  is  permanent.  He  gives  the  reason 


153] 


[— ii.  19 


Order  of  development  fixed 

for  this  in  the  words,  ^of  the  state  unresoluble  into  primary  matter. » But  why 
is  the  purpose  of  the  Self  not  a reason  ? In  reply  to  this  he  says,  ^not  ...  of 
the  state  unresoluble.  By  using  the  object  [visaya)  [the  purpose  of  the  Self] 
in  place  of  that  which  contains  the  object  {visayin)  [the  unresoluble  state],  he 
partially  describes  the  knowledge  [in  the  Self  of  this  state].  What  he  means  to 
say  is  this.  For  this  being  so,  it  should  be  known  that  the  purpose  of  the  Self 
acts  as  a cause  in  the  state  unresoluble  [into  primary  matter],  provided  the 
state  unresoluble  [into  primary  matter]  could  produce  [nirvartayeta)  the  enjoy- 
ment of  objects  or  the  discernment  of  the  difference  between  the  sattva 
and  the  Self,  [either  of  which  is]  a purpose  of  the  Self.  When  however  these 
two  are  produced,  there  can  be  no  longer  a state  of  equipoise.  Therefore  this 
[unresoluble  state]  is  not  known  as  a cause  of  the  fact  that  the  Self  has  a pur- 
pose. Thus  the  fact  that  the  Self  has  a purpose  is  not  the  reason  for  this 
[unresoluble  state].  He  concludes  with  the  words,  ^that  . . . not.»  The 
word  iti  is  used  in  the  sense  of  therefore. — He  describes  the  impermanent  state 
in  the  words  <SCof  the  three.^  In  other  words,  that  of  which  we  can  only  say 
that  it  is  unresoluble,  the  unparticularized,  and  the  particularized.  Having 
shown  what  the  divisions  are,  he  tells  what  the  aspects  are  in  the  words,  ^But 
the  aspects. » He  gives  a simile  in  the  words,  <SJust  as  Devadatta.^  In  case  the 
increase  or  decrease  of  the  cows,  which  are  absolutely  distinct  from  Devadatta,  is 
the  reason  for  Devadatta’s  increase  or  decrease,  how  much  more  [in  the  parallel 
case]  of  the  growth  or  decline  of  the  [individual]  phenomalized  [forms],  which 
are  not  different  in  some  respects  and  different  in  other  respects  from  the 
aspects  {gum).  An  objector  asks,  ‘ Is  then  the  order  of  production  not  fixed  ? ’ 
No.  As  he  says  in  the  words,  ^that  of  which  we  can  only  say  that  it 
is  resoluble. For  surely  the  seeds  of  the  Nyagrodha  tree  do  not  in  a single 
day  shoot  forth  the  Nyagrodha  tree,  with  its  dense  mass  of  green  leaves, 
which  has  absorbed  in  its  branches  and  twigs  a multitude  of  the  fierce 
rays  of  the  sun ; but  gradually,  through  contact  with  earth  and  water  and 
warmth,  they  produce  in  succession  sprout  and  leaves  and  stalks  and  stems  and 
the  rest.  So  here  also  an  order ' [of  production]  must  be  accepted  in  that  it  is 
established  by  reasoning  and  by  verbal-communication. — How  are  the  elements 
and  organs  formed  from  unparticularized  [forms]  ? In  reply  to  this  he  says, 
^as  has  been  already  described^  [by  us]  when  explaining  the  first  part  of  this 
very  sutra.  And  if  it  be  asked  why,  in  the  case  of  the  particularized  [forms], 
there  is  no  mutation  into  any  other  entity,  he  replies  «no  . . . the  par- 
ticularized [forms]. So  is  it  true  then  that  the  particularized  [forms]  actually 
enter  into  no  mutations  ? And  if  that  were  so,  would  not  one  have  to  say  that 
they  are  permanent?  In  reply  to  this  he  says,  ^But  their.}^ 


1 For  example,  the  Sarhkhya-sutra  i.  62,  and  Samkhya-karika  xxii. 
20  [h.o.s.  17] 


ii.  20 — ] BooTi  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [154 

The  object-of-sight  has  been  explained.  Now  this  sutra  is  intro- 
duced with  the  intent  of  determining  what  the  Seer  as  such  is. 

20.  The  Seer,  who  is  nothing  but  [the  power  of]  seeing, 
although  undefiled  (guddha),  looks  upon  the  presented-idea. 

<Who  is  nothing  but  [the  power  of]  seeing>  means  who  is  nothing 
but  the  power  of  seeing  untouched  by  any  qualifications.  This 
Self  becomes  conscious-by-reflection  (pratisamvedin)  of  the  think- 
ing-substance. He  is  not  homogeneous  with  the  thinking-substance 
nor  utterly  heterogeneous.  Why  [do  we  say  that  the  Self]  is  not 
even  heterogeneous  [to  the  thinking-substance]  ? Because  the 
thinking-substance  is  something  that  enters  into  mutations,^ 
inasmuch  as  an  object  is  known  or  not  known  [according  as  the 
thinking-substance  has  or  has  not  changed  into  the  form  of  that 
thing].  And  the  fact  that  an  [external]  object,  for  instance,  a cow 
or  a water-jar,  is  sometimes  known  and  sometimes  not  knowm, 
proves  that  the  thinking-substance  is  something  which  enters  into 
mutations.  Whereas  the  fact  that,  in  the  case  of  the  Self,  its 
object  is  always  known,  proves  that  the  Self  does  not  enter  into 
mutations.  Why  [do  we  say  this]  ? Because  it  surely  is  not 
possible  for  the  thinking-substance  to  be  an  object  to  the  Self,  and 
at  the  same  time  be  something  now  comprehended  and  something 
again  not  comprehended  [by  the  Self].  Hence  it  is  proved  that 
the  Self  always  knows  its  object.  And  from  this  it  follows  that 
the  Self  does  not  enter  into  mutations.  Moreover  the  thinking- 
substance  exists  for  the  sake  of  another,  since  it  acts  by  combining  ^ 
causes.  Whereas  the  Self  exists  for  its  own  sake.  Thus  [continuing 
the  argument],  the  thinking-substance  is  a complex  of  the  three 
aspects,  because  it  determines  ® each  thing  (sarva-artha)  [as 
consisting  of  one  or  another  of  the  three  aspects,  that  is,  as 
pleasurable  or  as  painful  or  as  indifferent].  And  since  it  consists 
of  the  three  aspects  [guna),  it  is  inanimate.  The  Self,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  that  which  later  beholds  the  aspects  [by  being 
reflected  in  them].  Hence  it  is  not  homogeneous  with  [the 

’ Compare  ii.  15,  p.  135”;  ii.  18,  p.  152'*;  ^ Compare  Mrcchakapka,  act  10,  verse  59 

iii.  35,  p.  244’ ; iv.  17,  p.  301* ; iv.  22,  and  YS.  iv.  24. 

p.  306*;  iv.  33,  p.  316  (Calc.  ed.).  * The  concept  is  de6ned  in  the 

comments  on  Samkhya-karika  xxiii. 


155]  Presented-ideas  instruments  of  the  Self  [ — ii.  20 

thinking-substance].  ‘ [Very  well]  then,  suppose  the  Self  to  be 
heterogeneous  [to  the  thinking-substance].’  [Still],  it  is  not  utterly 
heterogeneous.  Why  [do  we  say  this]  ? Because  though  pure  '■ 
in  itself,  the  Self  beholds  the  presented-ideas,  that  is  to  say,  it 
beholds  that  [mutation  of  matter  which  the  thinking-substance 
undergoes  when  it  takes  the  form  of  an  object,  and]  which  is  a 
presented-idea  of  thinking-substance  {hauddha).  Looking  [thus] 
upon  this  [change  in  the  thinking-substance]  the  Self  seems  to  be  it 
[the  thinking-substance],  although  it  really  is  not  it  [the  thinking- 
substance].  And  in  this  sense  it  has  been  said,^  “ For  the  power 
of  the  enjoyer  enters  not  into  mutation  nor  unites  [with  objects]. 
Seeming  to  unite  with  a thing  in  mutation  [the  thinking-substance], 
it  conforms  itself  to  the  fluctuation  [which  that  thinking-substance 
undergoes].  And  it  is  commonly  termed  a fluctuation  of  the 
thinking-substance  in  so  far  as  it  resembles  {anukdramdtratayd) 
a fluctuation  of  thinking-substance  that  has  come  under  the 
influence  (upagraha)  of  intelligence  {cditanya)." 

«The  object-of-sight  has  been  explained.  Now  this  sutra  is  introduced  with 
the  intent  of  determining  what  the  Seer  as  such  is.»  20.  The  Seer,  who  is 
nothing  but  [the  power  of]  seeing,  although  undefiled  [ruddJia),  looks 
upon  the  presented-idea.  He  explains  [the  sutra]  by  the  words  «nothing 
but  [the  power  of]  seeing.»  The  qualifications  are  the  properties.  «Un- 
touched»  by  these  in  this  way  shows  the  import  of  the  words  «nothing  but.» 
An  objector  says,  ‘ This  may  be  true.  If  the  power  of  seeing  is  without  all 
qualifications,  then  [the  various  things]  from  sound  downwards  would  not  be 
known.  For  the  object-of-sight  cannot  be  something  out  of  contact  with  the 
seeing.’  In  reply  to  this  he  says,  «This  Self.»  The  union  (samkranti)  of  the 
reflection  of  the  Self  with  the  mirror  of  the  thinking-substance  is  itself  the  Self’s 
consciousness  by  reflection  in  the  thinking-substance.  And  so  the  [various 
things]  from  sound  downwards  become  connected  with  the  thinking-substance 
which  has  been  changed  into  the  likeness  [chaya)  of  the  power  of  sight.  In 
other  words,  [they  become]  objects-of-sight.  The  objector  says,  ‘ This  may  be 
true.  Still  why  is  not  the  unity,  even  in  the  strict  sense,  of  the  thinking- 
substance  and  of  the  Self  to  be  accepted  ? What  is  the  use  of  changing  it  into 
the  likeness  of  this  [Self]  ? ’ In  reply  to  this  he  says,  «It  is  not  homogeneous 
with  the  thinking-substance.)S>  ‘ In  this  case  it  would  be  difficult  for  it  to 
change  into  the  likeness  [of  the  Seer].’  In  reply  to  this  he  says,  «nor 

^ That  is  to  say,  unspecialized. 

“ This  is  Pahcafikha’s  ninth  fragment.  It  is  quoted  again  in  iv.  22. 


ii.  20 — ] Booh  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [156 

utterly  heterogeneous.)^  Of  these  [two],  he  rejects  the  homogeneity  in  the 
words,  «not  even  homogeneous.»  The  reason  [for  this]  he  asks  by  saying 
«why?)S>  For  the  heterogeneity  he  gives  a reason  which  itself  contains  a 
reason,  in  the  words,  «known  or  not  known.2>  Because  the  thinking-substance 
enters  into  mutations,  it  is  heterogeneous.  When,  as  we  know,  this  [thinking- 
substance]  changes  into  the  form  of  [the  various  things  from]  sound  down- 
wards, then  the  object,  having  the  distinguishing  characteristics  of  [the  various 
things  from]  sound  downwards,  becomes  known  to  this  [thinking-substance]  ; 
but  when  not  so  changed  into  the  form  of  these  [things],  the  object  does  not 
become  known  to  it.  And  so  only  occasionally  it  assumes  the  forms  of  these 
[things]  and  enters  into  mutations.  And  the  argument  is  [of  this  kind]  : The 
thinking-substance  enters  into  mutations  ; since  objects  are  [sometimes]  known 
and  [sometimes]  not  known  by  it ; just  as  the  organ  of  hearing  and  other 
organs  [are  sometimes  active  and  sometimes  not].  And  the  Self  proves  to  be 
of  different  properties  to  this,  because  the  middle  term  [that  is,  always-known] 
is  contrary  to  this,  as  he  says,  «always  known.»  The  objector  says,  ‘ This 
may  be  so.  But  if  the  Self  always  has  its  object  known,  then  he  could  not 
be  isolated.’  With  this  in  mind,  he  asks,  ^Why  [do  we  say  this]?»  He 
gives  the  answer  in  the  words,  ^iBecause  surely  . . . not  ...  for  the  thinking- 
substance.:^  In  the  state  of  restriction  the  thinking-substance  may  exist  and 
at  the  same  time  there  may  be  no  process  of  apperception  [by  the  Self]. 
Therefore  in  order  to  indicate  the  contradiction,  it  is  said,  «an  object  to  the 
Self.»  So  the  first  ^and^  {buddhig  ca)  has  an  accumulative  force  and  makes 
the  thinking-substance  an  object;  but  the  two  remaining  «ands»  {visayag  ca 
and  ’grahlta  ca]  are  to  make  the  contradiction  clear.  The  argument,  however, 
is  this.  The  Self  enters  not  into  mutation  ; because  objects  are  always  known 
to  it  in  the  conscious  and  emergent  states ' ; whatever  enters  into  mutation 
does  not  always  have  its  objects  known  ; just  as  the  organ  of  hearing  or  other 
[organs].  This  is  a negative  instance  of  the  middle  term  [sada-jnatavimyatvat]. 
He  gives  another  [instance]  of  difference  in  properties  in  the  words,  «Moreover 
. . . for  the  sake  of  another. For  the  thinking-substance,  in  so  far  as  it  fulfils 
the  purpose  of  the  Self  by  combining  with  hindrances  and  karma  and  sub- 
conscious-impressions and  with  objects  and  organs,  is  for  the  sake  of  another. 
The  argument,  moreover,  is  this : The  thinking-substance  is  for  the  sake  of 

another  ; because  it  acts  by  combining  causes  * ; like  a bed  or  a seat  or  an 
ointment.  But  the  Self  is  not  like  that,  as  he  says  ^the  Self  exists  for  its  own 
sake.:^  Everything  serves  the  purpose  of  the  Self,  but  the  Self  serves  no  other. 
This  is  the  point.  He  gives  yet  another  [instance]  of  difference  in  properties  in 
the  words,  «Thus  . . . each  thing. » The  thinking-substance  determines  all 
things  as  being  serene  or  cruel  or  infatuated  when  it  mutates  into  their  forms. 
And  these  [three]  are  mutations  of  the  sattva  and  rajas  and  tamas  aspects.  Thus 

^ This  excludes  the  state  unconscious  of  objects. 

^ Compare  Samkhya-karika  xvii. 


157] 


All  objects  subordinate  to  Selves  [ — ii.  21 

it  is  established  that  the  thinking-substance  is  a complex  of  the  three  aspects. 
And  again  the  Self  is  not  like  that,  as  he  says,  «The  Self,  on  the  other  hand, 
later  beholds  the  aspects.»  It  beholds  them  in  that  it  is  reflected  in  them,  but 
it  does  not  become  mutated  into  their  form.  He  brings  the  discussion  to  a close 
with  the  word,  ^Hence.)^  «:[Very  well]  then,  suppose  . . . heterogeneous.» 
[But]  it  is  not  utterly  heterogeneous  [to  the  thinking-substance].  Why  [do  we 
say  this]  ? Because  though  pure  in  itself,  it  looks  upon  the  presented-ideas. 
And  that  this  is  so,  is  [also]  stated  in  these  [words  i.  4],  “ At  other  times  it  takes 
the  same  form  as  the  fluctuations  [of  mind-stuif].”  And  in  this  sense  it  has 
been  said  by  Pancafikha  «“  For  the  power  of  the  enjoyer  enters  not  into  muta- 
tion.”»  [The  power,]  in  other  words,  the  self  (atman).  And  therefore  it  does 
not  unite  with  the  thinking-substance.  <SSeeming  to  united  with  the  thinking- 
substance  which  is  in  mutation,  ^it  conforms  itself  to  the  fluctuation»  which  that 
thinking-substance  [undergoes].  An  objector  asks,  ‘ If  it  does  not  unite,  how  is 
it  that  it  seems  to  unite,  or  how  does  it  conform  itself  [to  the  thinking-substance] 
without  [assuming]  a fluctuation  [of  its  own]?’  To  this  he  replies  with  the 
words,  «And  it.»  That  thing  has  come  under  the  influence  of  intelligence 
whose  form  has  been  affected  (uparakta)  [by  intelligence].  What  he  means  to 
say  is  this.  Although  the  moon  does  not  unite  with  the  clear  water,  still  it 
seems  to  unite  [with  it]  in  so  far  as  its  reflection  unites  [with  the  water]. 
Similarly  in  this  case  also,  although  the  power  of  intellect  {citi)  does  not  unite 
[with  the  thinking-substance],  still  it  seems  to  unite  since  its  reflection  has 
united  [with  it].  Thus  the  power  of  intellect,  changed  into  the  essence  of  the 
thinking-substance,  conforms  itself  to  the  fluctuation  which  the  thinking- 
substance  undergoes.  In  this  way  the  word  <Kbeholding^  has  been  explained. 
It  beholds  it  in  the  sense  that  it  sees  [itself]  as  resembling  it. 


21.  The  being  (atman)  of  the  object-of-sight  is  only  for  the 
sake  of  it  [the  Self]. 

Since  the  object-of-sight  is  changed  in  so  far  as  it  becomes  the 
object  of  the  action  of  the  Self  who  is  so  much  (rupa)  seeing  (drgi), 
<the  being  (atman)  of  the  object-of-sight,>  that  is  to  say,  the  object- 
of-sight  itself  (svarupa)  exists  only  for  the  sake  of  the  Self.  But 
inasmuch  as  it  is  itself  only  so  long  as  it  has  acquired  its  being  as 
having  the  form  of  another,  it  is  no  [longer]  seen  by  the  Self  when 
once  it  has  accomplished  the  purpose  of  the  Self,  [of  giving  the 
Self]  experience  and  liberation.  So  by  escaping  from  itself  it 
attains  cessation  ; but  it  does  not  utterly  cease  to  be. 


ii.  21 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [158 

Having  stated  what  the  Seer  and  the  object-of-sight  are,  he  says  that  the  object-of- 
sight  serves  the  purpose  of  the  Self.  [And  this  purpose  is]  based  upon  the  relation 
characterized  as  being  that  of  proprietor  and  property.  21.  The  being  {atman) 
of  the  objeet-of-sight  is  only  for  the  sake  of  it  [the  Self].  He  explains  [the 
sutra]  in  the  words,  «who  is  so  much  [rupa)  seeing  {drfi).2>  Since  the  object-of- 
sight  has  become  the  object-of-action  {karma-rupata),  [that  is]  has  been  changed 
into  the  object-of-experience  by  the  experiencer  [that  is]  the  Self  who  is  so  much 
seeing, — therefore  the  being  of  the  object-of-sight  must  be  only  for  the  sake  of 
the  Seer,  but  not  for  the  sake  of  the  object-of-sight.  The  objector  asks,  ‘ How 
can  the  being  [atma  in  drgyatma]  be  for  the  sake  of  this  [atma  in  tadatma]  [that  is, 
the  Self]  ? ’ In  reply  to  this  he  says,  ^is  itself.»  What  he  means  to  say  is  this : 
The  object-of-experience  is  the  object-of-sight  as  having  pleasure  or  pain.  And 
pleasure  and  pain  being  co-agents  or  counter-agents  persist  as  such  (tattvena) 
only  for  this  purpose  [of  acting  with  or  against  the  Self].  For  the  [various 
things]  from  sound  downwards  as  objects-of-sense  are  co-agents  or  counter-agents 
[for  the  Self]  only  because  they  are  identical  [with  pleasure  and  pain].  And  it 
cannot  be  said  that  they  exist  to  be  co-active  or  to  be  counter-active  to  themselves. 
For  that  would  be  a contradiction  of  a fluctuation  with  itself.  Therefore  by 
a process  of  elimination  it  is  the  power  of  intellect  (citi)  only  for  which  they  are 
co-active  or  counter-active.  Consequently  the  object-of-sight  is  for  this  [Self] 
and  not  for  the  object-of-sight  [itself].  And  therefore  the  <object-of-sight  is 
only  for  the  sake  of  it  [the  Self],>  not  for  the  sake  of  the  object-of-sight. 
Because  (yat)  it  is  itself  as  long  as  the  purpose  of  the  Self  continues.  And  when 
the  purpose  of  the  Self  is  complete  it  is  also  completed.  Accordingly  he  says, 
^But . . . it  . . itself.)^  But  the  object-of-sight  itself  is  inert  {jada),  yet  it  has 
acquired  its  being  [that  is]  it  is  experienced  as  having  the  form  of  another  [that 
is]  the  form  of  the  soul  {atman)  [that  is]  the  intelligence  [caitanya).  When 
experience  and  liberation  have  been  accomplished  it  is  no  [longer]  seen  by  the 
Self.  [This  was]  the  kind-of-experience,*  the  perception  {anubhava)  of  sound 
and  the  other  [perceptible]  things.  Liberation  is  the  perception  {anubhava)  of 
the  difference  between  sattva  and  the  Self.  Both  these  two  kinds  [of  things, 
experience  and  liberation,]  belong  to  the  Self  only  who,  by  reason  of  the  fact 
that  the  likeness  of  the  Self  becomes  changed  by  the  inert  thinking-substance, 
[does  know  them  both].  And  so  when  experience  and  liberation  have  been 
accomplished  for  the  Self,  [the  subservience  of]  the  object-of-sight  to  the  purpose 
of  the  Self  is  finished.  Hence  it  is  said,  «when  once  it  has  accomplished  the 
purpose  of  the  Self.»  Meanwhile  he  raises  an  objection  in  the  words,  «by 
escaping  from  itself. » He  rebuts  [this]  with  the  words,  ^but  it  does  not 
utterly  cease  to  be.» 


* Vijnana  Bhiksu  expands  this  definition 
and  emphasizes  the  fact  that  experience 


is  a fluctuation  of  the  mind  {sukhaduh- 
khdtmakagabdddi  vrttih). 


159]  One  primary  substance  and  many  Selves  [ — ii.  22 

Why  [does  it  not  utterly  cease  to  be]  ? 

22.  Though  it  has  ceased  [to  he  seen]  in  the  case  of  one  whose 
purpose  is  accomplished,  it  has  not  ceased  to  be,  since  it  is 
common  to  others  [besides  himself]. 

Although  the  object-of-sight  has  ceased  in  so  far  as  one  Self  whose 
purpose  has  been  accomplished  is  concerned,  it  has  not  ceased  to  be, 
because  it  is  common  to  others  besides  him.  Although  it  has  ceased 
so  far  as  one  fortunate  man  is  concerned,  [still]  it  has  not  ceased  in 
the  case  of  unfortunate  men,  since  their  purpose  has  not  been  ful- 
filled. So  for  these  persons  it  becomes  the  object-of-the-action  of 
seeing  and  receives  its  form  of  being  as  having  the  form  of  another. 
And  therefore  since  the  power  of  seeing  and  the  power  by  which 
one  sees  are  permanent,  the  conjunction  [of  the  two]  is  said  to  be 
from  time-without-beginning.  And  in  this  sense  it  has  been  said, 
“ The  substances  being  in  correlation  from  time  without  beginning, 
the  external-aspects  in  general  are  also  in  correlation  from  time 
without  beginning.” 

An  objector  says,  ‘ If  [the  object-of-sight]  is  absolutely  inapperceptible,  how  is  it 
that  it  does  not  cease  to  be?’  With  this  in  mind  he  asks,  ^Why  [is  this]?^ 
In  the  sutra  he  tells  the  answer  beginning  with  the  words  22  . . . whose 
purpose  is  accomplished  and  ending  with  the  words  since  it  is  common  to 
others  [besides  himself].  A Self _ whose  purpose  has  been  accomplished  is  of 
such  a kind.  For  him  the  object-of-sight  although  it  has  ceased  [to  be  seen], 
has  not  ceased  [to  be].  Why?  Since  it  is  common  to  all  Selves  fortunate  or 
unfortunate.  He  explains  [the  sutra]  in  the  words,  «one  whose  purpose  has 
been  accomplished.»  Cessation  is  the  absence  of  that  by  which  one  sees.  But 
the  object-of-sight  has  not  ceased  to  be,  since  it  is  common  to  other  Selves. 
Hence  the  nature  {rupa)  of  the  being  {dtman)  who  is  higher  than  the  object- 
of-sight  is  intelligence  (cditanya).  So  {tena)  here  we  have  that  [being]  which  is 
made  known  in  the  Sacred  Word  and  the  Sacred  Tradition  and  in  the  Epics 
and  Puranas,  the  unphenomenalized,  the  whole-without-parts,  the  one,  the 
independent,  all-pervasive,  permanent,  [and]  capable  of  producing-all-effects. 
Although  [the  object-for-sight]  is  not  seen  by  the  fortunate  man,  since  for  him 
its  effect  has  been  accomplished,  it  is  not,  however,  something  not  seen  by  the 
unfortunate  man.  For  because  colour  is  not  seen  by  the  blind  man,  it  does  not 
become  non-existent,  since  it  is  seen  by  the  man  who  has  eyes.  For  the  Self 
is  not,  like  the  primary  cause,  only  one.  Because  its  plurality  is  established ' 
in  so  far  as  there  is  the  orderly  arrangement  of  births  and  deaths,  pleasures  and 


' Compare  Saiiikliya-sutra  i.  149. 


ii.  22 — ] Booh  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [IGO 

pains,  later  kind-of-experience  and  release  and  round-of-existence ; and  because 
the  passages  of  the  Sacred  Word  which  teach  the  unity  [of  the  Self]  and  which 
contradict  the  other  sources-of-valid-ideas,  can  somehow  be  made  consis- 
tent, as  partial  statements,  by  supposing  that  there  is  no  division  * in  place  or  in 
time  ; and  because  the  fact  that  primary  matter  is  one  and  the  Selves  many 
is  expressly  taught  by  the  Sacred  Word’  itself,  “ One  male  goat  [the  unborn 
Soul]  has  pleasure  in  leaping  upon  the  one  female  goat  [primary  matter]  which 
is  red  and  white  and  black  and  which  brings  forth  many  offspring  like  herself, 
while  another  male  goat  deserts  her  after  having  enjoyed  her,”  And  the 
meaning  of  this  same  Sacred  Word  is  said  over  again  by  this  sutra.  Although 
the  object-for-sight  has  ceased  [to  be  seen],  still  so  far  as  another  Self  is 
concerned  it  has  not  ceased  to  be.  Therefore,  since  the  power  of  seeing  and  the 
power  by  which  one  sees  are  permanent,  their  correlation  is  said  to  be  from 
time-without-beginning.  He  states  that  those  who  have  the  tradition  ’ (agamin) 
concur  with  this  teaching,  as  he  says,  «And  in  this  sense  it  has  been  said.^ 
Since  the  correlation  of  substances,  in  other  words,  of  the  aspects  {gum),  with 
the  souls  is  from  time  without  beginning,  [so]  in  the  case  of  the  mere  external 
aspects  {gum),  such  as  the  Great  [thinking-substance],  there  is  a correlation 
from  time  without  beginning.  The  correlation  of  the  Great  [Thinking-substance] 
and  of  the  rest,  one  by  one,  although  from  time  without  beginning,  is  not 
permanent.  Still  it  is  permanent  when  we  regard  the  Great  [thinking- 
substance]  and  the  rest  as  a whole,  since  [these  external  aspects]  are  common  to 
the  other  Selves.  Accordingly  he  says  «the  external-aspects  in  general.»  The 
words  «in  general»  {mdtra)  point  out  the  comprehensive  character  [of  the 
compound].  Hence  what  follows  is  this : Although  the  correlation  of  one 

Great  thinking-substance  has  become  changed  so  that  it  is  past,  still  the 
correlation  of  one  Self‘  with  another  Great  [thinking-substance]  is  not  past. 
So  [the  correlation  is]  said  to  be  permanent. 


The  intent  of  this  sutra  is  to  describe  what  the  correlation  itself  is. 

23.  The  reason  for  the  apperception  of  what  the  power  of 
the  property  and  of  what  the  power  of  the  proprietor  are  is 
correlation. 

The  Self  as  proprietor  becomes  correlated  for  the  purpose  of  sight 


‘ The  Patanjala  Rahasyam  says  that  the 
unity  of  all  souls  is  only  figurative. 
All  Selves  are  permanent  and  all- 
pervasive.  The  unity  is  that  of  a 
collection,  like  that  of  a forest  or  of  an 
army,  in  so  far  as  no  division  is  made 
in  time  or  in  place. 


’ Qvet.  Up.  iv.  5. 

’ The  attribution  of  this  quotation  to 
Pancafikha  rests  upon  the  authority 
of  Vijnana  Bhiksu. 

* ’Rending  puimsantarena  with  the  Bikaner 
MS. 


161] 


Explanations  of  non-sight  of  the  Self  [ — ii.  23 

with  the  object-for-sight  as  property.  That  apperception  of  the 
object-for-sight  which  results  from  this  correlation  is  experience. 
Whereas  the  apperception  of  what  the  Seer  is,  is  liberation.  Since 
the  correlation  lasts  until  sight  is  effected,  sight  is  said  to  be  the 
cause  of  discorrelation.  Since  sight  and  non-sight  are  opposite  to 
each  other,  non-sight  is  said  to  be  the  instrumental  cause  of  corre- 
lation. Sight  in  this  [system]  is  not  the  cause  of  release  ; but  the 
absence  of  bondage  results  from  the  absence  of  non-sight.  This  is 
release.  Where  there  is  sight,  non-sight,  which  is  the  cause  of  bond- 
age, ceases  [to  be  felt].  Thus  the  perception  which  is  sight  is  said 
to  be  the  cause  of  isolation.  And  what  is  this  so-caUed  non-sight  ? 
1.  Is  it  the  authority  [adhihara)  of  the  aspects  [guna)  [over  the 
Self]  ? 2.  Or  is  it  the  case  that,  when  in  [the  equipoised  state  of] 

the  primary-cause,  the  mind-stuff,  by  which  the  objects  are  shown 
to  the  proprietor  in  his  capacity  as  Seer,  fails  to  produce  [effects], 
there  is  non-sight,^  although  the  property,  the  object-for-sight, 
exists  ? 3.  Or  is  it  that  the  aspects  [guna)  possess  the  intended- 

objects  [in  potential  form]  4.  Or  is  undifferentiated-conscious- 
ness  [avidya),  which,  together  with  its  own  mind-stuff,  has  been 
restricted,  the  seed  for  the  production  of  its  peculiar  mind-stuff  ? 
5.  Or  is  it  the  manifestation  of  subliminal-impressions  in  motion 
[gati)  after  the  subliminal-impressions  in  equilibrium  [sthiti)  have 
dwindled  away  ? Of  which  [theory]  this  has  been  said,^  “ The 
primary  cause  if  it  existed,  on  the  one  hand,  in  equilibrium  [sthiti) 
only,  would  be  a non-primary  cause,  because  it  would  not  cause 
any  evolved  effect.  Similarly,  if  on  the  other  hand  it  existed  in 
motion  [gati)  only,  it  would  be  a non-primary  cause,  because  the 
evolved  effects  would  be  permanent.  And  since  it  does  act  ^ in 
both  ways  [equilibrium  and  motion]  it  is  ordinarily  termed  primary 
substance  ; not  otherwise.  Also  with  regard  to  other  supposed 
causes  the  same  reasoning  [applies].”  6.  According  to  some 
non-sight  is  nothing  but  the  power  by  which  one  sees,  as  the 
Sacred  Word  says,  “The  primary  cause  acts  with  the  intent  of 
displaying  itself.”  The  Self  capable  of  illuminating  all  illuminable 

^ Compare  iv.  34. 

^ Udasina  Balarama  attributes  this  to  Panca9ikha.  ^ Reading  vrtti. 

21  [h.o.s.  17] 


ii.  23 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [162 

things  does  not,  before  the  primary  cause  acts,  see.  [On  the  other 
hand],  the  object-for-sight  capable  of  making  all  kinds  of  effects  is 
not  then  [without  the  Self]  seen.  7.  According  to  others  non- 
sight is  a property  of  both  kinds  also.  From  this  point  of  view, 
this  sight,  although  independent  of  the  object-for-sight,  requires 
a presented-idea  [that  is,  the  reflection]  of  the  Self ; and  so  is  a 
property  of  the  object-for-sight.  Similarly  sight,  although  not 
independent  of  the  Self,  still  requires  a presented  idea  in  the  object- 
for-sight  ; and  appears  as  if  it  were  actually  a property  of  the  Self. 
8.  Certain  others  assert  that  non-sight  is  only  the  perception  [of 
things  only]  by  sight.  These  are  the  alternatives  found  in  the 
books  on  this  [topic  of  the  nature  of  non-sight].  These  many  alter- 
natives deal  with  a common  subject-matter,  the  correlation  of  all 
the  Selves  with  the  aspects  (guna). 

Thus  the  serving  the  purpose  [of  the  Self]  as  the  cause  of  correlation  has  been 
stated.  And  as  incidental  [to  this]  the  cause  of  the  permanence  of  the  primary 
cause  and  the  cause  of  the  permanence  of  the  correlation  in  general  have  been 
stated.  With  the  intent  to  describe  what  correlation  itself  is,  in  other  words, 
its  special  particular  [nature],  the  sutra  has  come  into  being.  23.  The 
reason  for  the  apperception  of  what  the  power  of  the  property  and  of 
what  the  power  of  the  proprietor  are  is  correlation.  Because  the  object-for- 
sight  is  for  his  sake,  therefore  the  Self,  accepting  the  aid  rendered  by  this 
[object],  becomes  its  proprietor.  And  the  object-for-sight  becomes  his  property. 
And  the  correlation  of  these  two  which  has  had  a merely  potential  arrangement 
is  the  reason  for  the  apperception  of  what  the  two  are  in  themselves.  This 
same  is  made  clear  in  the  commentary  in  the  words  «The  Self.)5>  The  Self 
as  proprietor  merely  by  [his]  pre-established  harmony  becomes  correlated  with 
the  object-for-sight  as  his  property  for  the  sake  of  sight.  The  rest  is  easy.  An 
objector  says,  ‘ This  may  be  true.  Liberation  may  be  said  to  be  the  apperception 
of  what  the  Seer  himself  may  be,  [that  is,  it  may  be]  that  by  which  he  is 
liberated.  And  moreover  release  is  not  the  effect  of  means.  Should  this  be 
so,  it  would  cease  being  what  could  be  rightly  called  release.’  In  reply  to  this 
he  says,  «until  sight  is  effected.^  Until  sight  is  effected  there  is  a correlation 
of  a particular  Self  with  a particular  thinking-substance.  Thus  sight  is  said  to 
be  the  cause  of  discorrelation.  ‘ But  how  does  correlation  last  until  sight  is 
effected?’  In  reply  to  this  he  says,  ^non-sight.»  Non-sight,  undifferentiated- 
consciousness  {avidya),  is  said  to  be  the  instrumental  cause  of  correlation.  He 
makes  clear  the  meaning  of  what  he  said  before  by  saying,  «in  this  [system]  . . . 
not.»  The  objector  says,  ‘ Sight  may  quite  remove  non-sight,  its  opposite.  But 
how  can  it  remove  bondage  ? ’ In  reply  to  this  he  says,  ^tis  sight.  ^ Kelease  has 


1G3]  The  Self  and  the  aspects  [ — ii.  23 

been  stated  [i.  3]  to  be  the  self’s  [atman)  abiding  in  his  own  form  as  dis- 
criminated from  the  thinking-substance  and  other  [substances].  And  the 
means  for  effecting  this  is  not  only  sight,  but  the  removal  of  non-sight.  This 
is  the  meaning.  — In  order  to  obtain  a particular  kind  of  non-sight  as  the 
special  reason  for  the  correlation  he  puts  forth  the  following  alternatives  with 
respect  to  non-sight  in  the  words,  «And  what  is  this.»  1.  Assuming  that 
[non-sight]  is  some  positive  thing  {^aryudasd)^  [not sight]  he  asks,  «1.  Is  it  the 
authority  of  the  aspects  (guna)  [over  the  Self]  Authority  is  the  competency 
to  initiate  effects.  For  it  is  as  the  result  of  this  that  the  correlation,  which  is  the 
reason  for  the  round-of-existence,  is  produced. — 2.  Assuming  that  [non-sight]  is  a 
negation  where  there  is  a possibility  of  an  affirmation  {prasajya-pratisedha),^  he  puts 
forth  a second  alternative  with  the  word,  «2.  Or.»  [Non-sight]  is  the  failure,  by 
the  mind-stuff  which  shows  objects-of-sense  [to  the  Self],  to  produce  either  the 
[various  things]  from  sound  downwards  or  the  [discrimination  of]  the  difference 
between  sattva  and  the  Self.  It  is  this  that  is  made  clear  by  the  words,  «the 
property.»  The  object-for-sight  is  [both]  the  various  things  from  sound  down- 
wards and  the  difference  between  sattva  and  the  Self.  The  primaiy  cause  is  in 
motion  only  so  long  as  it  has  not  completed  the  two-fold  sight.  But  when  both 
kinds  of  sight  have  been  accomplished,  it  desists  [from  being  further  in  motion]. — 

3.  On  the  assumption  that  [non-sight]  is  some  positive  thing  [not  sight],  he 
puts  forth  the  third  alternative,  «3.  Or  is  it  that  the  aspects  {guna)  possess 
the  intended-objects  [in  potential  form]  ?»  For  if  the  doctrine  of  pre-existent 
causes  {satharya)  is  established,  experience  and  liberation  are  also  yet  to  come 
in  so  far  as  they  are  [at  present]  indeterminable.  This  is  the  meaning. — 

4.  Assuming  that  [non-sight]  is  some  positive  thing  [not  sight],  he  puts  forth  the 
fourth  alternative  and  asks  «4.  Or  is  undifferentiated-consciousness  {avidya) . . .?» 
At  the  time  of  the  reversal  of  creation,  it  is  restricted  together  with  its  peculiar 
mind-stuff  [that  is  to  say]  it  is  reduced  to  the  state  of  equipoise  in  the  primary 
cause,  the  seed  for  the  production  of  its  peculiar  mind-stuff.  To  this  extent  {tend) 
a subconscious-impression  of  undifferentiated-consciousness  is  other  than  sight 
and  is  precisely  what  is  called  non-sight.^ — 5.  Assuming  that  [non-sight]  is 
some  positive  thing  [not  sight],  he  puts  forth  the  fifth  alternative  and  asks, 
^5.  Is  it ...  in  equilibrium?:^  When  the  subliminal-impressions  in  equilibrium, 
[that  is]  existing  in  the  primary  cause,  and  flowing  on  in  a succession  of 
mutations  in  the  equipoised  [state  of  the  primary  cause],  have  dwindled  away, 
there  is  a start  given  to  evolved-effects  {vihara),  such  as  the  Great  [thinking- 
substance]  and  the  rest, — this  is  motion  {gati).  The  reason  for  this  [start  given] 
is  a subliminal-impression  of  the  primary  cause,  the  subliminal-impression 
in  motion.  The  manifestation  of  it  is  its  readiness  to  produce  effects.  He  says 
that  another  theory  admits  the  real  existence  of  subliminal-impressions  of  both 

' Compare  PataSjali : Mahabhasya  (Kiel-  343®*^ ; iii.  35® ; and  elsewhere. 

bom’s  ed.)  i.  93®;  101®;  167®;  183'';  ® Compare  p.  24,  note  2 ; and  p.  113,  note  4. 

216';  319'®;  334< ; 341®;  ii.  338®; 


ii.  23 — ] Booh  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [164 

kinds  in  the  words,  <KOf  which  [theory]  this  has  been  said»  by  those  who  deny 
the  absoluteness  of  either  one.  Primaiy  cause  {pra-dhana)  is  that  by  which  the 
totality  of  evolved  effects  is  put  forth  {pra-dlfiyate)  or  produced.’  If  this  primai-y 
cause  always  remained  in  equilibrium  and  never  in  motion,  then  because  it 
would  not  cause  any  evolved  effect,  it  would  not  put  forth  anything,  and  would 
not  be  a primary  cause  [pra-dhana).  Or  if  it  always  remained  in  motion 
and  never  in  equilibrium,  then  he  says,  «Similarly  ...  in  motion.)^  Else- 
where the  reading  is  ‘ for  the  purpose  of  equilibrium,  for  the  purpose  of 
motion’;  the  dative  is  here  purposive  and  we  must  supply  [drastavyah)  'only’ 
[eva)  after  it.  If  it  did  not  act  for  the  purpose  of  equilibrium,  no  evolved 
effect  would  ever  cease  to  be.  And  this  being  so,  if  a thing  {bhava)  exists  and 
does  not  cease  to  be,  it  could  not  rise  [again].  Thus  there  would  be  a cessation 
of  evolution  of  effects  altogether.  And  there  would  likewise  be  nothing  put 
forth  in  this  case  and  [thus]  it  would  be  a non-primary  cause.  Therefore  its 
activity  must  be  of  both  kinds,  in  equilibrium  and  in  motion,  [and]  it  is 
ordinarily  termed  primary  substance ; «not  otherwise,^  as  when  for  instance 
the  absoluteness  [of  either]  might  be  assumed.  This  reasoning  or  argument 
applies  not  only  to  the  primary  cause,  but  also  to  other  supposed  causes,  to 
the  higher  Brahman  or  to  its  illusion  [mdya)  or  to  atoms  or  to  other 
[causes].  For  these  also  if  they  existed  in  equilibrium  only,  would  not  be 
causes,  since  they  do  not  cause  evolved  effects ; and  if  existing  in  motion  only, 
would  not  be  causes,  since  the  evolved  effects  would  be  permanent.— 6.  Assum- 
ing that  [non-sight]  is  some  positive  thing  [not  sight],  he  puts  forth  a sixth 
alternative  in  the  words,  ^nothing  but  the  power  by  which  one  sees.»  Just  as 
in  the  vow  of  Prajapati  [Manu  iv.  37],  “ One  should  not  look  upon  the  rising 
sun,”  a mental  resolution  [in  positive  form]  closely  related  to  not  looking  is 
understood,  so  in  this  case  also  [of  non-sight],  when  there  is  a negation  of  sight, 
a power  closely  related  to  it  and  based  upon  it  is  described.  And  this  [power] 
in  order  to  give  birth  to  sight  characterized  by  experience  and  so  forth  brings 
about  the  pre-established  harmony  of  the  Seer  with  the  object-for-sight.  On  the 
same  point  he  recites  a [passage  from]  the  Sacred  Word,  <KThe  primary  cause. 
The  objector  says,  ‘This  may  be  true.  But  the  Sacred  Word  says  that  the 
primary  cause  acts  with  the  intent  of  displaying  itself ; yet  it  does  not  say  that 
it  acts  as  the  result^  of  the  power  by  Avhich  one  sees.’  In  reply  to  this  he  says, 
«capable  of  illuminating  all  illuminable  things.^  Because  before  the  primaiy 
substance  acts,  mere  displaying  of  itself  is  not  capacity  as  an  impelling  force  for 
action.  For  there  is  no  ground  for  this  [activity]  in  the  absence  of  capacity  to 
act  as  impelling  force.  Therefore  in  accordance  with  the  Sacred  Word  it  is 
said  that  capacity  is  the  impelling  force  for  action. — The  sixth  alternative 
is  based  upon  the  assumption  that  the  power  by  which  one  sees  is  in  the 
primary  cause. — 7.  The  seventh  alternative  makes  this  same  power  reside  in 
both  kinds  [the  primary  cause  and  the  Self],  as  he  says,  «Non-sight ...  of  both 
’ Compare  ii.  18,  p.  144®  (Calc.  ed.).  ^ Reading  gaknh,  p.  IBO®  (Calc.  ed.). 


165]  Correct  theory  of  the  correlation  [ — ii.  23 

kinds  also.^  Some  say  that  non-sight  belongs  to  both  kinds,  both  to  the  Self 
and  to  the  object-for-sight  and  that  it  is  a power  [or]  a property  of  sight. 
An  objector  says,  ‘ This  may  be  true.  We  may  grant  this  with  regard  to  the 
object-for-sight,  because  it  is  the  repository  of  all  powers ; but  we  could  not 
grant  it  with  regard  to  the  Seer,  because  the  power  of  perception  does  not 
reside  [adliara]  in  him,  for  the  reason  that  perception  does  not  have  the  relation 
to  him  of  part  to  whole  [samavaya).  Should  that  be  so,  he  would  be  subject 
to  mutation.’  To  this  he  replies,  <5CFrom  this  point  of  view,  this.^  That  non- 
sight might  be  included  in  the  object-for-sight  might  be  conceded,  still,  since  the 
object-for-sight  is  unintelligent  {jada),  seeing,  which  is  an  effect  of  a power  residing 
in  this  [object-for-sight],  would  also  be  unintelligent  (jada).  So  sight  cannot  be 
thought  as  a property  of  this  [object-for-sight],  for  an  unintelligent  [thing] 
has  not  illumination  in  itself.  Hence  sight  becomes,  [that  is]  is  known  as, 
a property  of  this  [object-for-sight]  only  as  based  upon  the  presented-idea  of 
the  Seer,  the  self  (atman),  that  is,  upon  a change  into  the  likeness  of  the 
intelligence  (cditanya).  Because  that  which-has-to-do-with-the-object  (visayin) 
[that  is,  the  power  of  seeing]  is  partially  expressed  by  the  object  [that  is,  the 
object-for-sight].  The  objector  says,  ‘ Even  so,  this  perception  becomes  a pro- 
perty of  the  object-for-sight,  but  not  a property  of  the  Self.’  To  this  he  replies, 
«Similarly ...  of  the  Self.»  It  is  true  that  it  is  not  independent  of  the  Self, 
still  it  does  appear  to  become  a property  of  the  Self  as  based  upon  the 
presented-idea  [that  is]  the  likeness  of  the  intelligence  (cditanya)  in  the  sattva 
of  the  thinking-substance  of  the  object-for-sight,  but  it  is  not  actually  a property 
of  the  Self.  What  he  means  to  say  is  this.  In  so  far  as  there  is  no  difference 
between  intelligence  and  the  thinking-substance,  the  external-aspects  (cTharma) 
of  the  thinking-substance  distinctly  appear  (cakdsati)  as  if  they  were  external- 
aspects  of  intelligence,  in  so  far  as  they  receive  the  image  of  intelligence. — 
8.  He  describes  the  eighth  alternative  in  the  words,  ^non-sight  is  only  the 
perception.^  Only  perception  of  the  [various  things]  from  sound  downwards 
is  non-sight ; but  not  the  perception  of  the  difference  between  sattva  and  the 
Self.  So  some  say.  Just  as  the  eye,  although  the  source-of-a-valid-idea  for 
colour,  is  not  the  source-of-a-valid-idea  for  taste  and  the  other  [sensations]. 
What  follows  is  this  : The  perceptions  of  the  [various  things],  of  sounds  and 

so  on,  have  the  forms  of  pleasure  and  other  [forms]  and  imply  the  correlation 
of  the  Seer  and  the  object-for-sight,  in  so  far  as  it  is  necessary  for  the  sake 
of  their  perfection. — Having  thus  put  forth  alternatives,  and  in  order  to  accept 
the  fourth  alternative,  he  points-out-the-flaws  in  the  other  [seven]  alternatives 
mentioned  in  the  Samkhya  system,  on  the  ground  that  they  would  lead  to 
an  absence  of  diversity  in  experience,  since  [non-sight  according  to  the  other 
theories]  is  common  to  all  the  Selves.  So  he  says,  <SThese  . . . are  found  in  the 
books.)^ 


ii.  24 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [166 


But  when  there  is  a correlation  of  an  individual  consciousness  with 
its  own  thinking-substance, 

24.  The  reason  for  this  [correlation]  is  undiflferentiated- 
consciousness  (avidyd). 

In  other  words,  [undifferentiated-consciousness]  is  a subconscious- 
impression  (vdsand)  from  erroneous  thinking.  The  thinking- 
substance  pervaded  {vdsita)  by  subconscious-impressions  from 
erroneous  thinking  does  not  attain  to  the  discernment  of  the  Self, 
which  is  the  goal  of  its  actions,  [and]  returns  again  with  its  task 
yet  unfulfilled.  But  that  [thinking-substance]  which  terminates  in 
the  discernment  of  the  Self  attains  the  goal  of  its  actions,  and,  its 
task  done,  and  its  non-sight  repressed,  does  not,  since  the  cause 
of  its  bondage  no  longer  exists,  return  again.  Some  [heterodox] 
person  ridicules  this  [teaching  of  Isolation]  with  the  anecdote  ^ of  the 
impotent  man,‘  He  is  told  by  his  simple-minded  wife,“  O impotent,  my 
wedded  lord,  my  sister  has  a child  ; for  what  reason  have  not  I ? ” 
He  says  to  her,  “ When  I am  dead,  I will  beget  thee  a son.”  ’ 
Similai'ly,  [the  objector  continues,]  since  this  thinking  [of  the 
discernment],  even  while  existing,  does  not  make  a repression  of 
mind-stulF,  what  expectation  is  there  that  it  will  in  the  future 
make  it  cease  to  be  1 On  this  point  one  who  is  almost  a master 
{dcdryadepya)  says,  “ Is  release  anything  but  the  cessation  of 
the  thinking-substance  ? When  there  is  no  cause  of  non-sight  the 
thinking-substance  ceases.  And  this  non-sight  which  is  the  cause 
of  bondage  ceases  when  there  is  sight.”  Then  release  is  nothing 
but  the  cessation  of  the  thinking-substance.  Why  then  is  there 
this  confusion  of  ideas  of  his  ^ that  is  so  much  out  of  place  ? 

In  order  to  fix  upon  the  fourth  alternative  he  introduces  the  sutra  with  the 
words,  «But  when  there  is  a correlation  of  an  individual  consciousness  with 
its  own  thinking-substance.^  Individual  {praty-anc)  in  the  sense  that  it  turns 


‘ See  Jacob,  Maxims,  II.  28,  2^  ed. 

* Two  interpretations  seem  justified.  1. 
The  whole  passage  to  the  end  of  the 
comment  on  this  sutra  would  be  the 
statement  of  the  acaryadepya.  And 
asya  would  refer  to  the  nastika.  2. 
The  last  two  sentences  would  be  that 
of  the  author  of  the  comment  and  asya 


would  refer  to  the  dcdryadepya.  The 
difference  between  these  two  would 
be  that  the  latter  teaches  that  release 
is  only  a cessation  of  mutations,  where- 
as the  comment  teaches  that  release 
is  resolution  of  the  thinking-substance 
(huddher  vilaya)  into  the  primary 
cause. 


167]  Ending  of  undiffer entiated-consciousness  [ — ii.  24 

{ancati)  [or]  gets  back  {jprati)  [or]  in  the  opposite  direction  {pratipam).  A 
special  correlation  of  each  single  Self  with  each  single  thinking-substance  is  the 
reason  for  the  diversity  between  [individuals].  He  recites  the  sutra  24.  The 
reason  for  this  [correlation]  is  undifferentiated-consciousness  {avidya). 
An  objector  says,  ‘ Undifferentiated-consciousness  is  erroneous  thinking.  And 
the  reason  for  this  is  the  correlation  of  the  Self  with  its  own  thinking-substance, 
just  [as  correlation  is  the  reason]  for  experience  and  for  liberation.  For  unless 
correlated  with  a thinking-substance,  undifferentiated-consciousness  {avidya)  does 
not  arise.  How  then  is  undifferentiated-consciousness  the  reason  for  a particular 
kind  of  correlation  ? ’ In  reply  to  this  he  says,  <Ka  subconscious-impression 
from  erroneous  thinking. » From  undifferentiated-consciousness  {avidya),  even 
when  belonging  to  another  creation  and  restricted  together  with  its  own  mind- 
stuff,  a subconscious-impression  exists  in  the  primary-cause.  And  the  primary- 
cause  pervaded  with  the  subconscious-impression  from  this  [undifferentiated-con- 
sciousness] sends  forth  the  same  kind  of  a thinking-substance  for  the  sake  of 
correlation  with  one  Self  or  another.  Similarly  in  successive  previous  creations. 
And  since  [the  series]  is  from  time  without  beginning,  there  is  no  flaw  in 
the  argument.  For  this  very  reason  the  Self  at  the  time  of  [mundane] 
dissolution  is  not  released,  as  he  says,  <Kerroneous  thinking.»  ^Vhen  [the 
thinking-substance]  reaches  the  goal  of  its  actions  [that  is]  the  discernment  of 
the  Self,  then  since  there  is  no  subconscious-impression  from  erroneous 
thinking,  which  is  the  cause  of  bondage,  the  thinking-substance  does  not  return 
again,  as  he  says,  «:But  that.2>  Some  heterodox  person  makes  fun  of  this 
teaching  with  regard  to  Isolation  by  [telling]  the  anecdote  of  the  impotent  man. 
He  tells  the  anecdote  of  the  impotent  man  by  the  words,  ^simple-minded. » 
The  word  treason  {art/ja)»  in  the  expression  «for  what  reason»  signifles  a 
ground,  because  a motive  is  also  a ground.  He  draws  the  analogy  with  the 
anecdote  of  the  impotent  man  in  the  words,  ^Similarly  since  this.2>  ‘This 
existing  perception  of  the  discernment  of  the  difference  between  the 
aspects  {guna)  and  the  Self  does  not  cause  a repression  of  the  mind-stuff ; 
what  expectation  is  there  that  the  mind-stuff,  when  it  together  with  its 
subliminal-impressions  is  restricted  by  virtue  of  the  higher  passionlessness, 
will  cease  to  be  ? The  point  is  that  a thing  has  an  effect  when  it  exists ; 
and  not,  when  it  does  not  exist.’  With  regard  to  this  he  gives  a rebuttal 
by  means  of  an  opinion  which  partially  [agrees],  ^On  this  point  one 
who  is  almost  a master.^  One  who  is  little  short  ^ of  a master.  A master, 
moreover,  has  his  characteristic  given  in  the  declaration  of  the  Vayu,^  “ One 
who  not  only  collects  {acinoti)  the  meaning  of  the  books,  but  also  makes  the 
people  steadfast  in  good  conduct,  and  observes  {dcarate)  good  conduct  himself,  he 
is  a master  {dcdrya),”  Release  is  nothing  but  the  repression  of  the  thinking- 
substance  which  has  entered  into  mutations  in  the  form  of  experience  and  of 

^ See  Panini  v.  3.  67. 

^ See  Vayu  Parana  Ixix.  2 ; and  Linga  Parana  x.  15-16. 


ii.  24 — ] Booh  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  SadJiana  [168 

discriminative  discernment.  But  there  is  no  repression  of  the  thinking-substance 
as  such.  This  [repression],  moreover,  takes  place  only  after  the  [thinking- 
substance]  is  established  in  the  discriminative  discernment  which  lasts  up  to  the 
Kain-cloud  of  [Knowable]  Things  (dhanna-megJia).  Even  though  the  thinking- 
substance  abides  as  itself  and  nothing  less,  [still  it  does  exist  elsewhere]. 
He  makes  this  clear  by  the  words,  «non-sight.)^  There  is  a repression 
of  the  thinking-substance  when  there  is  no  non-sight  [which  is]  the  cause 
of  bondage.  And  this  non-sight  [which  is]  the  cause  of  bondage  ceases 
as  a result  of  sight.  But  as  for  the  repression  of  sight,  [that]  is  to  be 
effected  by  the  higher  passionlessness.  The  point  is,  although  the  thinking- 
substance  abides  in  itself  and  nothing  less,  there  is  release.  Having  cleared  up 
the  opinion  which  partially  [agrees],  he  states  his  own  opinion  in  the  words, 
«Then  release  is  nothing  but  the  cessation  of  the  thinking-substance. » An 
objector  asks,  ‘ Have  you  not  already*  said  that,  when  seeing  is  repressed,  there 
results  soon  after  a repression  of  the  mind-stuff  itself.  How  then  can  [this 
repression]  be  the  result  of  sight  ? ’ In  reply  to  this  he  says,  ^Why  then  is  there 
this  confusion  of  ideas  of  his  that  is  so  much  out  of  place  The  meaning  is 
this.  If  we  were  to  admit  that  sight  is  the  direct  cause  of  the  repression  of  the 
mindstuff,  then  we  should  be  subject  to  this  rebuke.  But  we  take  our  stand 
upon  the  view  that  discriminative  sight  reaches  its  limit  of  perfection  when  the 
mind-stuff  is  repressed  and  when  it  is  subservient  to  the  abiding  of  the  Self 
in  his  own  form,  according  to  its  degree  of  perfection  in  the  cultivation  of 
restricted  concentration.  How  then  should  we  be  subject  to  this  rebuke  ? 


The  pain  which  is  to  be  escaped  and  the  cause  of  pain,  the  so-called 
correlation,  together  with  their  reasons,  have  been  described. 
Next  the  higher  escape  {hcina)  is  to  be  described. 

25.  Since  this  [non-sight]  does  not  exist,  there  is  no  correla- 
tion. This  is  the  escape,  the  Isolation  of  the  Seer. 

Since  this  non-sight  does  not  exist,  there  is  no  correlation  of  the 
thinking-substance  and  of  the  Self,  in  other  words,  a complete 
ending  of  bondage.  This  is  the  escape,  the  Isolation  of  the  Seer, 
the  unmixed  state  of  the  Self ; in  other  words,  the  state  in  which 
[the  Self]  is  not  again  correlated  with  aspects  [guna).  Upon  the 
repression  of  the  cause  of  pain  there  follows  the  ending  of  pain,  the 
escape.  Then  the  Self  is  said  to  be  grounded  ^ in  his  own  self 

Having  thus  spoken  of  two  divisions,  with  the  intent  to  desciube  the  third 
division,  he  introduces  the  sutra  with  the  words,  ^The  pain  which  is  to  be 

* See  p.  162*  (Calc.  ed.).  MS.  and  the  Anandaframa  ed.  (96*'*). 

* Reading  °hurvTmahi,  with  the  Bikaner  * Compare  i.  3. 


169] 


Means  of  attaining  escape  [ — ii,  26 

escaped.^  25.  Since  this  [non-sight]  does  not  exist,  there  is  no  correlation. 
This  is  the  escape,  the  Isolation  of  the  Seer.  He  explains  the  sutra  in  the 
word,  ^this.»  For  even  in  the  great  mundane  dissolution  there  is  no  correla- 
tion. For  this  reason  he  uses  the  word  «complete.»  The  words  <5Cthe 
ending  of  pain,  the  escaped  show  that  this  is  a fulfilment  of  the  purposes 
of  the  Self.  The  rest  has  nothing  obscure. 


Now  what  is  the  means  of  attaining  escape  1 

26.  The  means  of  attaining  escape  is  unwavering  discrimina- 
tive discernment. 

Discriminative  discernment  ^ of  the  presented-idea  of  the  differ- 
ence between  sattva  and  the  Self.  But  this  discernment  wavers 
when  erroneous  perception  is  not  repressed.  When  erroneous 
perception,  reduced  to  the  condition  of  burned  seed,  fails  to  repro- 
duce itself  [vandhya-prasava),  then  the  flow  of  the  presented-ideas 
of  discrimination — belonging  to  the  sattva,  which  is  cleansed  from 
rajas  belonging  to  the  hindrances,  and  which  continues  in  the 
higher  clearness  [and]  in  the  higher  consciousness  of  being  master 
— becomes  stainless.  This  unwavering  discriminative  discernment 
is  the  means  {updya)  of  escape.  After  this,  erroneous  perception 
tends  to  become  reduced  to  the  condition  of  burned  seed.  And  its 
failure  to  reproduce  itself  is  the  Path  {mdrga)  to  Release,  the 
way-of-approach  i^pdya)  to  escape. 

Wishing  to  denominate  the  fourth  division  as  having  the  distinguishing- 
characteristic  of  the  means  of  escape,  he  introduces  the  sutra  with  the  word 
«CNow.»  26i  The  means  of  attaining  escape  is  unwavering  discrimina- 
tive discernment.  Even  by  verbal  communication  and  by  inference  there  is 
discriminative  discernment.  This  [kind  of  discriminative  discernment]  does 
not,  however,  repress  emergence  or  the  subhminal  impressions  from  emer- 
gence, because  these  two  latter  follow  a man  who  has  both  [the  verbal- 
communication  and  the  inference].  Accordingly  in  order  to  repress  this 
[emergence]  he  says,  ^unwavering.^  Wavering  is  erroneous  perception ; 
[unwavering]  is  free  from  that.  What  he  means  to  say  is  this.  He  obtains 
discrimination  by  perception  derived  from  something  heard ; and  he  makes 
this  logically  tenable  [vyavasthapya)  [by  ideas]  derived  from  reasonings.  The 
discriminative  discernment,  which  in  concentration  has  reached  the  utmost 
perfection  of  cultivation  for  a long  time,  uninterruptedly,  and  with  earnest 

^ Discussed  in  Samkhya  Tattva  Kaumudl  on  Ear.  51. 

22  [h.o.s.  17] 


ii.  26 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [170 

attention,  [and  which]  has  direct  perception  and  has  uprooted  erroneous  per- 
ceptions together  with  their  subconscious  impressions,  [and  which  is  thus] 
unwavering, — this  is  the  means  of  escape.  The  rest  of  the  comment  is  easy. 


27.  For  him  [there  is]  insight  seven-fold  and  advancing  in 
stages  to  the  highest. 

The  words  <for  him>  refer  ^ to  him  ^ in  whom  discernment  is 
re-uprisen.  The  word  <seven-fold>  means  that  the  insight  of  the 
discriminating  [yogin],  after  the  removal  of  the  defilements  from 
the  covering  of  impurity,  when  no  other  kind  of  presented-idea  is 
generated  in  the  mind-stuff,  has  just  seven  forms,  as  follows. 
1.  The  thing  to  be  escaped  has  been  thought  out  ; nor  need  [the 
yogin]  think  it  out  again.  2.  The  reasons  for  the  thing  to  be 
escaped  have  dwindled  away  ; nor  need  they  dwindle  away  again. 

3.  The  escape  is  directly  perceived  ® by  the  concentration  of 
restriction ; [nor  need  anything  beyond  this  be  discovered]. 

4.  The  means  of  escape  in  the  form  of  discriminative  discernment 
has  been  cultivated ; [nor  need  anything  beyond  this  be  culti- 
vated]. So  this  is  the  four-fold  final  release  {vimukti),  belonging  to 
insight,  which  may  be  effected.  But  the  final  release  of  the  mind- 
stuff  is  three-fold  [as  follows].  5.  The  authority  of  the  thinking- 
substance  is  ended.  6.  The  aspects  [guna),  like  rocks  fallen  from 
the  top  of  the  mountain  peak,  without  support,  of  their  own 
accord,  incline  towards  dissolution  and  come  with  this  [thinking- 
substance]  to  rest.  And  when  these  [aspects]  are  quite  dissolved, 
they  do  not  cause  growth  again,  because  there  is  no  impelling- 
cause.  7.  In  this  stage  the  Self  has  passed  out  of  relation  with 
the  aspects  [guna),  and,  enlightened  by  himself  and  nothing  more. 


' See  Nyaya-Kofa,  s.v.  pmtyamnaya 
* TheVarttikainsiststhat<forhim>is  rather 
<for  it,>  and  that  it  refers  to  the  means 
of  escape.  It  denies  that  the  reference 
is  to  the  Self  since  there  is  no  mention 
of  the  Self  in  the  previous  sutra.  Bala- 
rama  replies  that  the  Comment  ex- 
l^ressly  wishes  to  avoid  reference  to 
the  means  of  escape  in  the  previous 


sutra  and  that  it  says  that  <for  him> 
means  ^him  in  whom  discernment  is 
re-uprisen.^  This  explanation  is  cor- 
roborated by  the  use  of  the  words 
vivekino  bhavati. 

® See  i.  3 and  compare  iii.  16,  p.  218^  ; 
iii.  18-19,  pp.  230®  and  231'®;  iii.  26, 
p.  24P;  iii.  51,  p.  266^;  and  iii.  52, 
p.  269®  (Calc.  ed.). 


171] 


[— ii.  27 


Seven  stages  of  insight 

is  stainless  and  isolated. — The  Self  beholding  this  seven-fold  insight 
advancing  in  stages  to  the  highest  is  denominated  fortunate 
[kugala).  Even  when  there  is  also  the  inverted  generation  of  the 
mind-stuif  the  Self  is  said  to  be  released  [and]  fortunate,  because 
he  has  passed  beyond  the  aspects  (guna). 

He  describes  the  goal  as  such  which  belongs  to  discriminative  discernment 
in  the  stitra  27.  For  him  [there  is]  insight  seven-fold  and  advancing  in 
stages  to  the  highest.  He  explains  [the  sutra]  by  saying  ^<for  him.>;^  ^In 
whom  discernment  is  re-uprisen»,  that  is  to  say,  theyogin  in  whom  discernment 
is  present.  The  word  <J^refer»  means  allude.  One  whose  mind-stutf  has 
reached  the  goal  of  discriminative  discernment,  since  the  defilement  of  impurity, 
which  is  the  covering  of  mind-stuff,  has  been  taken  off,  and  because  no  other 
presented-idea  arises,  that  is  to  say,  no  presented-idea  belonging  to  emergence 
of  tamas  or  of  rajas, — in  him  there  is  the  insight  of  just  the  seven  forms 
which  belong  to  the  discriminating.  There  are  different  discernments  according 
to  the  different  objects. — The  compound  [advancing  in  stages  to  the  highest]  means 
those  stages  [or]  states  the  end  of  which  is  perfection.  Complete  perfection  ^ is 
that  higher  than  which  there  is  nothing.  That  insight  [or]  discriminative 
discernment  [is  advancing  by  stages]  whose  stages  are  advancing.  These  seven 
kinds  of  stages  he  takes  up  beginning  with  the  word  «as  follows.2>  Of  these 
[seven],  from  among  the  four  stages  which  may  be  completed  by  a man’s  effort, 
he  takes  up  the  first  with  the  words,  <5Cl.  The  thing  to  be  escaped  has  been 
thought  out.^  Whatever  is  an  effect  of  the  primary-cause,  all  that  is  surely 
nothing  but  pain  by  reason  of  the  pains  due  to  mutations,  to  anxiety,  and  to 
subliminal  impressions,  and  by  reason  of  the  opposition  of  the  fluctuations, — 
and  is  therefore  to  be  escaped.  This  has  been  thought  out. — He  shows  what 
the  advancement  to  the  highest  is  in  the  words  <Snor  need  he  think  it  out 
again.» — 2.  He  describes  the  second  in  the  words  «dwindled  away.^  He 
tells  what  the  advancement  to  the  highest  is  by  saying  ^nor  . . . again.^  — 
3.  He  describes  the  third  in  the  words  <Kdirectly  perceived.^  Even  in  the 
state  conscious  [of  objects]  I have  discovered  by  perception  the  escape  which 
I am  to  perfect  in  the  concentration  of  restriction.  We  need  to  supply  the 
words,  ‘nor  need  anything  beyond  this  be  discovered.’ — 4.  He  describes  the 
fourth  by  saying  ^cultivated. » The  cultivated  is  the  perfected  means  of 
escape  belonging  to  discriminative  discernment.  We  need  to  supply  the  words, 
‘nor  need  anything  beyond  this  be  cultivated.’  This  the  four-fold  final  release 
[or]  completion  may  be  effected.  And  in  so  far  as  it  may  be  effected,  it  is 
shown  to  be  included  within  the  efforts  [of  a man].  Elsewhere  the  reading 
is  Mryavimuldi.  This  would  be  the  final  release  of  insight  with  respect  to 
effects. — He  describes  the  final  release  ^ of  the  mind-stuff  which  is  not  to  be 

' This  word  (sampralcarsa)  does  not  occur  elsewhere  in  the  Comment  nor  elsewhere  in 
Vacaspati’s  Explanation.  - Compare  SEE.  xxi.  p.  31  (Lotus). 


ii,27 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [172 

accomplished  by  effort,  but  which  is  to  be  accomplished  subsequent  to  that 
which  is  to  be  attained  by  effoil  by  saying  «:But  the  final  release  of  the 
mind-stuff  is  three-fold.^ — 6.  He  describes  the  first  [of  these  last  three]  in  the 
words  ^5.  The  authority  ‘ of  the  thinking-substance  is  ended. In  other 
words,  the  two  tasks  [Mrya]  of  experience  and  liberation  have  been  done.  — 
6.  He  describes  the  second  [of  these  last  three]  in  the  words  ^The  aspects.^  — 
He  shows  what  the  advancement  to  the  highest  is  in  the  words  <?[And  . . . they 
do  not.» — 7.  He  describes  the  third  [of  these  last  three]  in  the  words  <Kln  this 
stage.2>  In  this  stage,  even  while  alive,  the  Self  is  called  fortunate  [and] 
released,  since  [this]  is  his  last  body.  Accordingly  he  says,  ^this.2>  He  says 
that  [the  yogin]  is  not  released  in  a figurative  ^ sense  [as  merely  being  free 
from  his  last  body]  in  the  words,  ^inverted  generation.^  Even  when  his 
mind-stuff  is  resolved  into  the  pi'imary  cause,  he  is  said  to  be  released  and 
fortunate,®  because  he  has  passed  beyond^  the  aspects  {gum). 


When  discriminative  discernment  is  perfected  there  is  the  means 
of  escape.  And  there  is  no  perfection  without  the  means  [of 
attaining  it].  So  this  [topic  of  the  means]  is  begun. 

28.  After  the  aids  to  yoga  have  been  followed  up,  when  the 
impurity  has  dwindled,  there  is  an  enlightenment  of  percep- 
tion reaching  up  to  the  discriminative  discernment. 

The  aids  to  yoga  are  the  eight  which  are  about  to  be  enumerated. 
As  the  result  of  following  them  up  there  is  a dwindling  or  cessation 
of  the  five-sectioned  [ii.  3]  misconception.  Upon  the  dwindling  of 
this  follows  the  manifestation  of  focused  thinking.  And  in  pro- 
portion as  the  means  [of  attaining  discriminative  discernment  are 
followed  up],  so  the  impurity  is  reduced  to  a state  of  attenuation. 
And  in  proportion  as  it  dwindles,  the  enlightenment  of  perception 
also,  in  accordance  with  the  degree  of  dwindling,  increases.  Now 
this  same  increase  experiences  a perfection  reaching  up  to  discrimi- 


* Compare  ii.  10,  p.  120® ; ii.  24,  p.  162® ; 
iii.  55,  p.  274®.  The  phrase  carita-arfha 
occurs  iii.  50,  p.  265®  (Calc.  ed.). 

® Compare  aupacdriham  aigvaryam  i.  24, 
p.  59®  (Calc,  ed.) ; and  for  definition  of 
aupacdriham  iii.  55,  p.  274®  (Calc.  ed.). 
See  also  for  use  of  word  iv.  10,  p.  286®. 

® Fortunate  because  he  is  free  from  attach- 
ment to  the  consequences  of  his  own 


actions  which  are  the  cause  [of  bond- 
age]. Because  of  this  he  is  not 
bound,  {hefusu  karmasu  phalasanga- 
rahitatvdn  na  baddho  hhavatiti  ku^a- 
latd.) — This  is  the  suggestion  of  the 
Patanjala  Rahasyam.  For  other  in- 
stances see  i.  24,  p.  54^ ; ii.  9,  p.  119* ; 
iv.  30,  p.  314®  (Calc.  ed.). 

* Compare  Bh.  Gita  xiv.  20. 


The  nine  causes 


[ — ii.  28 


173] 

native  discernment  [or]  up  to  the  perception  [ii.  26]  which  dis- 
tinguishes between  the  aspects  {guna)  as  such  and  the  Self.  The 
following  up  of  the  aids  to  yoga  is  the  cause  of  discorrelation 
[viyoga)  with  impurity,  just  as  an  axe  [is  the  cause  of  the  disjunc- 
tion (yiyoga)  of  a tree]  which  is  to  be  cut  [from  its  root].  Now 
[the  eight  aids]  are  the  cause  of  attaining  discriminative  discern- 
ment, just  as  right-living  {dharma)  is  [the  cause  of  getting]  to 
happiness;  in  other  ways  it  is  not  a cause. — Furthermore  how 
many  of  these  causes,  according  to  the  system,  are  there  ? J ust 
nine,  he  ^ says,  as  follows,  “ Cause  is  nine-fold,  rise  [into  conscious- 
ness] and  permanence  and  manifestation  and  modification  and 
presentation  and  attainment  and  disjunction  and  transformation 
and  sustentation.”  Of  these  [nine],  1.  The  cause  of  rise  [into  con- 
sciousness], [is  for  instance]  the  central-organ  [as  the  cause]  of 
a mental-process  {vijhdna) ; 2.  the  cause  of  permanence : [for 
instance]  the  fact  that  the  Self  has  purposes  [is  the  cause  of  the 
permanence]  of  the  central-organ,  just  as  food  [is  the  cause  of  the 
permanence]  of  the  body  ; 3.  the  cause  of  manifestation  [is  for 
instance]  the  shining  [of  the  Self  upon  a fluctuation  as  the  cause  of 
the  manifestation]  of  colour,  just  as  the  perception  of  colour  [which 
is  in  the  fluctuation,  is  the  cause  which  manifests  the  shining  of  the 
Self]  ; 4.  the  cause  of  modification  [is  for  instance]  another  object- 
of-sense  [which  modifies]  the  central-organ,  just  as  fire  [is  a cause 
which  modifies]  food  to  be  cooked;  5.  the  cause  of  presentation: 
[for  instance]  the  thought  of  smoke  [is  the  cause  of  the  presenta- 
tion] of  the  thought  of  fire ; 6.  the  cause  of  attaining  : [for 

instance]  the  following  up  of  the  aids  to  yoga  [is  the  cause  of 
attaining]  discriminative  discernment ; 7.  the  cause  of  disjunction 
[is  for  instance]  the  same  [following  up  as  the  cause  which  disjoins 
the  Self]  from  impurity  ; 8.  the  cause  of  transformation  is  for 
instance  the  goldsmith  [as  the  cause  which  transforms]  the  gold. 
Similarly  if  a single  presented  idea  of  a woman  has  the  quality  of 
infatuation,  undifferentiated-consciousness  {gvidyd)  [is  the  trans- 
forming cause]  ; if  it  has  the  quality  of  painfulness,  hatred  [is  the 
transforming  cause]  ; if  it  has  the  quality  of  pleasurability,  passion 

‘ Apparently  this  is  a saihgraha^loka.  Vijnana  Bhiksu  says  karikoktcini  nava  kcirandni. 


ii.28 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [174 

[is  the  transforming  cause]  ; if  it  has  the  quality  of  the  detached 
attitude,^  the  recognition  of  the  reality  [is  the  transforming  cause]  ; 
9.  the  cause  of  sustentation  [is  for  instance]  the  body  [as  the  cause 
which  sustains]  the  sense-organs,  and  these  [organs  as  the  cause 
sustaining]  this  [body],  [and  again]  the  great  elements  [as  the 
sustaining  cause]  of  bodies,  and  these  [elements]  reciprocally  of  all 
[elements],  since  human  and  animal  and  supernormal  bodies  depend 
upon  each  other. — So  much  then  for  the  nine  causes.  And  these 
so  far  as  possible  are  also  to  be  applied  to  other  things.  But  as 
for  the  following  up  of  the  aids  to  yoga,  it  comes  into  play  as  cause 
in  two  ways  only,  [as  the  cause  of  disjunction  and  as  the  cause  of 
attainment]. 

So  much  for  the  four  divisions  which  have  been  described.  Since  discriminative 
discernment,  the  means  of  escape,  which  falls  within  these  [four],  cannot  be 
perfected  before  [one  follows  up  the  means],  as  in  the  process  of  milking  a cow  : 
and  since  what  is  not  perfected  cannot  be  a means  [to  something  else],  he 
proceeds  to  describe  the  means  for  its  perfection  in  the  words,  ^When  . . . 
perfected. » At  this  point  the  way  by  which  the  means-of-attainment,  which 
are  about  to  be  mentioned,  serve  as  a means  for  discriminative  discernment 
is  shown  by  the  sutra  which  begins  with  the  word  28.  . . . yoga  and  ends 
with  the  word  discernment.  For  the  aids  to  yoga,  according  to  circumstances, 
by  seen  or  unseen*  methods,  cause  the  impurity  to  dwindle  away.  That 
misconception  has  five  sections  must  be  understood  as  a partial  statement, 
since  merit  and  demerit,  in  so  far  as  they  are  causes  of  birth  and  of  length- 
of-life  and  of  kind-of-enjoyment,  are  also  impure.  The  rest  is  easy.  Since  we 
find  that  causality  is  multiform,  what  kind  of  causality  belongs  to  the  following 
up  of  the  aids  to  yoga  ? In  reply  to  this  he  says,  <After  the  aids  to  yoga  have 
been  followed  up>.  Since  it  disjoins  the  sattva  of  the  thinking-substance  from 
impurity  it  is  the  cause  of  disjunction  from  impurity.  He  gives  a simile  in 
the  words,  ^just  as  an  axe.»  An  axe  disjoins  the  tree  to  be  cut  from  its 
root.  The  sattva  of  the  thinking-substance,  when  disjoined  from  impurity, 
causes  one  to  attain  to  discriminative  discernment,  Just  as  merit  is  [the  cause 
of  attaining]  pleasure,  so  the  following  up  of  the  aids  to  yoga  is  the  cause  of 
attaining  discriminative  discernment.  And  [it  is  a cause]  in  no  other  form. 
So  he  says,  «Now  . . . discriminative  insight.^  Having  heard  the  denial  in  the 
words  ^n  other  ways  . . . not,»  he  asks,  «Furthermore  how  many  of  these 
The  answer  is,  <5CJust  nine.»  He  shows  what  these  are  by  a memorial  verse 
(kdrika),  «as  follows,  “ . . . rise  [into  consciousness ].”»  He  gives  an  illustration 

* Read  the  tale  in  H.  C.  Warren  : Buddhism  * A visible  means  would  be  ^auca ; an  in- 
in  Translations,  p.  298.  visible  means  would  be  svddhyaya. 


175] 


Causes  as  aids  to  yoga  [ — il.  28 

of  this  in  the  words,  ^Of  these  [nine],  1.  The  cause  of  rise  [into  consciousness].» 

1.  The  central  organ  is  the  cause  of  the  origin  of  a mental  process  because  it 
brings  out  a mental  process  from  an  indeterminable  stage  to  the  present  stage. 

2.  The  cause  of  permanence  [is  for  instance]  the  fact  that  the  Self  has  purposes. 
The  central  organ  rising  [into  consciousness]  out  of  the  feeling-of-personality 
lasts  only  so  long  as  the  two-fold  purpose  of  the  Self  is  not  fully  accomplished. 
When  the  two  kinds  of  purposes  of  the  Self  are  accomplished  it  passes  out 
of  permanence.  Therefore  the  fact  that  the  Self  has  purposes  is  the  cause 
of  the  permanence  of  the  central  organ  which  has  risen  [into  consciousness] 
out  of  its  own  cause.  He  gives  a simile  in  the  words,  ^just  as  food  is  of 
the  body.)»  3.  The  eflScient  cause  of  perceptive  thinking,  the  preparation 
(sarhslcriya)  of  an  object  either  of  itself  or  by  a sense-organ,  is  manifestation. 
The  cause  of  this  manifestation  [is  for  instance]  the  shining  [of  the  Self  upon 
a fluctuation  as  the  cause  of  the  manifestation]  of  colour.  4.  The  cause  of 
modification  [is  for  instance]  another  object-of-sense  [which  modifies]  the 
central  organ.  For  just  so  Mrkandu,  whose  central  organ  had  become  con- 
centrated, heard  the  fifth  * note  ripening  upon  the  lute,  and  lifted  up  his  eyes 
and  beheld  the  heavenly-nymph  Umloca  in  the  perfection  of  beauty  and 
loveliness,  so  that  he  lapsed  from  concentration,  and  his  central  organ  became 
attached  to  her.  He  gives  an  instance  bearing  upon  the  same  point  in  the  words 
«just  as  fire.;^  For  just  as  fire  is  the  cause  of  the  modification  of  a thing  to  be 
cooked,  like  rice,  in  such  manner  that  a thing  whose  arrangement  of  parts  was 
compressed  becomes  loosely  conjoined  in  parts.  6.  An  object  which  is  definitely 
existing  is  the  cause  of  presentation  [just  as]  the  thought  of  smoke  [is  the  cause 
of  the  presentation]  of  the  idea  of  fire.  What  he  means  to  say  is  this.  The 
thought  [jriana)  is  that  which  is  thought ; and  the  thought  of  fire  is  fire  and  it  is 
thought  [that  is,  it  is  a descriptive  compound].^  6.  The  cause  of  attainment. 
The  natural  action  of  effects  belonging  to  causes  which  are  independent  is  [what 
he  means  by]  attainment.  Occasionally  there  is  an  exception  to  this  [action  of 
the  effects,  which  is  the]  non-attainment.  Just  so  waters  whose  nature  it  is  to 
flow  down  a slope  [nimna]  are  held  back  by  a dam.  Similarly  also  in  this  case, 
the  sattva  of  the  thinking-substance,  which  is  disposed  to  pleasure  and  bright- 
ness, is  by  its  own  nature  the  producer  of  pleasure  and  of  discriminative  dis- 
cernment. This  is  attainment.  Sometimes  this  [attainment],  because  it  is  held 
back,  by  reason  of  demerit  or  of  tamas,  does  not  follow.  When  by  reason  of 
merit  or  of  following  up  the  aids  to  yoga  this  [holding-back]  is  removed,  then 
as  a reason  merely  of  the  nature  of  the  fluctuations  of  the  thinking-substance’s 
sattva  when  not  held  back  by  this  [demerit  or  famas],  and  in  so  far  as  it  [this  sattva] 
is  the  producer  of  this  [pleasure  and  discernment],  [this  sattva]  attains  [them], 

^ See  Raghuvah9a  ix.  26  and  47  ; Karpura-  ^ Compare  MBh.  i.  4821  = i.  123.  64. 

manjari  i.  16®  (HOS.  vol,  4,  p.  228).  ® The  compound  is  not  a genitive  depen- 

The  seventh  note  of  the  lute  resembles  dent  (sasthTtatpw'nsa) , but  rather  a 

the  cooing  of  the  koil.  descriptive  (karmadMraya). 


ii.  28 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [176 

as*  he  will  [iv.  3]  say,  “The  efficient  cause  gives  no  impulse,  but  [the  muta- 
tion] follows  when  the  barrier  to  the  evolving  causes  is  cut,  just  as  in  the  case 
of  the  peasant.”  Thus  there  is  said  to  be  a cause  of  attainment  only  with 
reference  to  the  effect  characterized  as  discriminative  discernment.  7.  In 
respect  to  anything  subsidiary  [to  discriminative  discernment]  the  same  thing 
would  be  a cause  of  disjunction.  So  he  says,  «7.  the  cause  of  disjunction.^ 
8.  He  describes  the  cause  of  transformation  in  the  words  «the  goldsmith  . . . 
the  gold.»  In  so  far  as  the  emphasis  is  upon  the  difference  with  respect  to  the 
gold,  which  is  both  different  and  not  different  from  the  bracelets  and  ear-rings 
and  anklets,  and  in  so  far  as  the  emphasis  is  upon  the  absence  of  difference 
[in  the  gold],  which  is  not  different  from  the  bracelets  and  other  things,  there 
is  a cause  which  transforms  [the  gold]  from  the  bracelet  [into  something  else]. 
And  the  goldsmith,  who  made  the  bracelet,  in  so  far  as  he  transforms  the  gold, 
which  is  [now]  identical  with  the  ear-ring,  becomes  the  cause  of  transforma- 
tion. Although  fire  [given  as  an  example  of  5.  modification]  is  a cause  of 
transformation  with  respect  to  the  thing  to  be  cooked,  still  since  the  difference 
between  the  substance  “ and  the  property,  the  rice-grains  and  the  lump  of  rice, 
is  not  emphasized,  therefore  even  though  the  properties  come  and  go,  still  the 
substance  persists.  It  is  not  possible  therefore  to  say  that  [the  fire]  is  a cause 
of  transformation.  For  this  reason  it  was  said  that  the  fire  is  a cause  of 
modification.  And  accordingly  there  is  no  cross-division.  Moreover  it  should 
not  be  supposed  that  the  cause  of  transformation  in  the  case  of  the  substance 
is  merely  a difference  in  the  arrangement  of  parts.  For  this  would  be  incon- 
sistent with  the  words  «the  goldsmith.»  Having  made  clear  what  the  cause 
of  outer  transformation  is,  he  illustrates  the  inner  [cause]  in  the  words 
«Similarly  if  a single.^  «Undifferentiated-consciousness  [avidya),'^  that  is,  such 
a thought  as  ‘ This  girl  is  to  be  loved  ’.  The  very  same  presented  idea  of 
a woman  becomes,  in  the  case  of  Chaitra,  in  consequence  of  his  complete 
infatuation,  infatuated,  that  is  to  say,  dejected.  For  he  says  to  himself,  ‘ Alas  ! 
that  jewel  of  a woman  has  come  into  the  hands  of  that  lucky  Maitra,  not  into 
the  hands  of  me,  bereft  {lima)  of  luck.’  Similarly  the  rival  wives’  hatred 
of  her  is  the  cause  of  the  painfulness  of  the  idea  of  [this]  woman.  And  again 
the  passion  of  her  husband  Maitra  for  her  is  [the  cause]  of  the  quality  of 
pleasurability  in  this  same  idea  of  the  woman.  The  recognition  of  the  reality, 
that  the  body  of  the  woman  is  a congeries  of  skin  and  flesh  and  fat  and  bones 
and  marrow,  and  is  impure  because  of  its  [first]  abode®  [and]  because  of  its 
origin  and  the  rest,  becomes,  in  the  case  of  the  discriminating,  the  cause  of  the 
detached  attitude  [that  is  to  say]  passionlessness.  9.  The  cause  of  sustentation 
is  that  which  sustains  the  body  and  organs.  And  in  the  case  of  the  body 
it  is  the  organs.  For  the  five  breaths,  beginning  with  the  vital  air,  are  functions 

* Compare  ii.  18,  p.  144®  (Calc.  ed.). 

* Compare  Patanjali : Mahabhasya,  vol.  I,  p.  7 middle  (Kielhorn’s  ed.). 

® Compare  ii.  5,  p.  111*. 


177] 


[ — ii.  29 


Eight  aids  to  yoga 

of  the  organs  in  general.  For  if  they  were  not,  the  body  would  fall.  Similarly 
in  the  case  of  the  parts  of  the  body,  the  flesh  and  the  other  [parts],  there  is  the 
reciprocal  relation  of  sustained  and  sustainer.  Likewise  the  great  elements, 
that  is,  the  earth  and  the  other  [elements] ; and  these  [elements]  are  in  the 
reciprocal  relation  [of  sustained  and  sustainer]  in  the  case  of  bodies  dwelling 
in  the  worlds  of  human  beings  or  of  Varuna  or  of  the  Sun  or  of  the  Wind 
{gandhavaha)  or  of  the  Moon.  Thus  in  the  case  of  earth,  which  has  the  qualities 
(guna)  of  odour  and  taste  and  colour  and  touch  and  sound,  there  are  five  great 
elements  standing  in  the  reciprocal  relation  of  sustained  and  sustainer  ; in  the 
case  of  water  there  are  four ; in  the  case  of  fire  three ; in  the  case  of  wind  two. 
Furthermore  animal  and  human  and  divine  [bodies]  stand  in  a relation  of 
sustained  and  sustainer.  Some  one  asks,  ‘ How  can  this  [reciprocal  relation  of 
sustained  and  sustainer]  be  so,  if  the  bodies  are  not  in  the  relation  of  holder 
and  held?’  He  replies,  ^ince  human  . . . depend  upon  each  other.»  For  the 
human  body  is  sustained  by  the  use  of  the  bodies  of  tame  animals  and  of  birds 
and  of  wild  animals  and  of  plants.  Similarly  bodies  like  the  tigers  [are 
sustained]  by  the  use  of  the  human  bodies  and  those  of  tame  and  wild  animals 
and  of  others.  And  again  in  the  same  way  the  body  of  the  tame  animal  and  of 
the  bird  and  of  the  wild  animal  [is  sustained]  by  the  use  of  plants  and  similar 
things.  Likewise  the  divine  body  [is  sustained]  by  the  use  of  sacrifices,  of 
goats  and  deer  and  the  flesh  of  grouse  and  ghee  and  baked-rice-cakes  ^ and 
branches  of  mango  {sahakdra)  and  handfuls-of-darbha  grass  (prastara),  offered 
by  human  beings.  In  the  same  way  the  deity  also  sustains  human  beings  and 
the  rest  by  granting  boons  and  showers.  Thus  the  dependence  is  reciprocal. 
This  is  the  meaning. — The  rest  is  easy. 

In  this  [sutra]  the  aids  to  yoga  are  determined. 

29.  Abstentions  and.  observances  and  postures  and  regula- 
tions-of-the-breath  and  withdrawal-of-the-senses  and  fixed 
attention  and  contemplation  and  concentration  are  the  eight 
aids. 

The  following  up  of  these  must  be  performed  in  succession.  And 
what  they  are  we  shall  describe. 

Now  with  the  intent  of  excluding  either  a larger  or  a smaller  number  he 
determines  what  are  the  aids  to  yoga  by  saying  <5Cln  this  [sutra]  the  aids  to 
yoga  are  determined.^  The  sutra  begins  with  the  word  29.  Abstentions  and 
ends  with  the  word  aids.  Practice  and  passionlessness  and  belief  and  energy 
and  the  rest  [i.  20],  both  by  reason  of  their  own  selves  and  in  so  far  as  they 
are  indispensable,  are  also  properly  to  be  included  among  these  same. 

' Their  use  is  described  in  Apastamba-  in  ^atapatba-Brahmana  i.  2.  2.  1 f. 

Yajna-Paribhasa-Sutra  xcix  and  cxxix  And  again  in  Manu  vi.  11  and  vii.  21. 

(SBE.,  vol.  xxx),  and  their  preparation 
23  [ho.s.  17] 


ii.  30 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [178 


Of  these  [eight] — 

30.  Abstinence^  from  injury  and  from  falsehood  and  from 
theft  and  from  incontinence  and  from  acceptance  of  gifts  are 
the  abstentions. 

Of  these  [five]  abstinence  from  injury  means  the  abstinence  from 
malice  towards  all  living  creatures  in  every  way  and  at  all  times. 
And  the  other  abstentions  and  observances  are  rooted  in  it.  In  so 
far  as  their  aim  is  the  perfection  of  it,  they  are  taught  in  order  to 
teach  it.  And  in  this  sense  ^ it  has  been  said,  “ Surely  this  same 
brahman  in  proportion  as  he  desires  to  take  upon  himself  many 
courses-of-action,^  in  this  proportion  refraining  from  heedlessly 
giving  injury,  fulfils  [the  abstention  of]  abstinence  from  injury  in 
order  to  give  it  the  full  character  of  its  spotlessness.”  Abstinence- 
from-falsehood  (satya)  means  speech  and  mind  such  as  correspond  to 
the  object-intended ; and  speech  and  mind  corresponding  to  what 
is  seen  or  inferred  or  heard. ^ If  speech  is  spoken  in  order  that 
one’s  own  knowledge  may  pass  to  some  one  else,  it  should  not  be 
deceitful  or  mistaken  or  barren  of  information  ; [then  it  would  be 
abstinence  from  falsehood].  It  should  be  used  for  the  service  of 
all  ; not  for  the  ruin  of  creatures.  And  even  when  used  thus, 
should  it  be  only  for  the  ruin  of  creatures,  it  would  not  be  an 
abstinence  from  falsehood  ; it  would  be  nothing  less  than  wrong. 
In  so  far  as  there  would  be  a false  kind  of  merit  [and]  a resemblance 
of  merit,  it  would  become  the  worst  of  evils.  Therefore  let  [the 
yogin]  consider  [first]  what  is  good  ® for  all  creatures  and  [then] 
speak  with  abstinence-from-falsehood. — Theft  ® is  the  unauthorized 
(afdstrapurvaka)  appropriation  of  things-of-value  from  another. 
While  abstinence-from-theft,  when  free  from  coveting,  is  the  refusal 
to  do  this. — Continence  is  control  of  the  hidden  organ  of  genera- 
tion.— Abstinence -from -acceptance -of- gifts  is  abstinence -from - 
appropriating  objects,  because  one  sees  the  disadvantages  in  acquir- 


* This  sutra  and  the  following  are  quoted 

in  Gaudapada’s  Bhasya  on  Samkhya- 
karika  xxiii. 

* Similar  plans  of  life  in  Bhag.  Pur.  xi, 

second  half. 

* JAOS.  Proceedings,  xi.  229. 

* Compare  Linga  Purana  viii.  13. 


® The  principle  would  seem  to  be  that 
a speech  which  does  not  harm  any  one 
and  which  does  some  good,  although 
untrae,  must  be  regarded  as  true.  See 
Manu  iv.  138  and  viii.  138. 

® Compare  Linga  Purana  viii.  15. 


Five  ahstentions 


179] 


[ — ii.  30 


ing  them  or  keeping  them  or  losing  them  or  in  being  attached  to 
them  or  in  harming  them.  These  then  are  the  abstentions. 

Having  announced  the  aids  [to  yoga]  of  which  the  first  are  the  abstentions  and 
the  observances,  he  introduces  a sutra  which  specifies  the  abstentions  by  saying 
«of  these  [eight]. » The  sutra  begins  with  the  words  30.  Abstinence  from 
injury  and  ends  with  the  word  abstentions.  He  describes  the  aid  to  yoga  [called] 
abstinence  from  injury  by  saying,  <5Cin  every  way.^  He  praises  such  abstinence- 
from-injury  with  the  words,  «And  the  other.^  ^Kooted  in  it»  would  mean 
that,  even  if  these  are  performed  without  observing  abstinence  from  injury,  they 
are  as  if  they  had  not  been  performed,  since  they  are  quite  fruitless.  This  is 
the  meaning.  The  following  up  of  them  has  nothing  as  its  aim  but  the  perfec- 
tion of  this  [abstinence-from-killing].  ‘ If  abstinence-from-killing  has  the  others 
rooted  in  it,  how  can  it  be  that  they  aim  at  the  perfection  of  the  abstinence- 
from-injury  ? ’ To  this  he  replies,  «in  order  to  teach  it.^  «Perfection»  [in  other 
words]  the  rise  into  consciousness  of  a thought.  An  objector  asks,  ‘ This  may  be 
true.  But  if  the  others  exist  for  the  sake  of  knowing  abstinence  from  injury, 
what  need  of  them,  since  this  thought  comes  from  the  other  source?’  In  reply 
he  says,  ^its  spotlessness.»  If  the  others  were  not  followed  up,  abstinence-from- 
injury  would  be  defiled  by  falsehood  and  other  [vices].  With  reference  to  this 
same  point  he  tells  of  a concurrent  opinion  of  those-who-have-the-tradition 
(agamika)  in  the  words,  ^And  in  this  sense  it  has  been  said.»  Easy. — He  gives 
the  distinguishing  characteristic  of  abstinence-from-falsehood  in  the  words, 
«speech  and  mind  such  as  correspond  to  the  object-intended.^  The  word  such 
{yatha)  raises  an  expectation  which  is  fulfilled  by  the  words  ^corresponding  to 
what  is  seen.»  He  brings  this  into  connexion  with  the  correlated  word 
«corresponding-to  {tathd)'^  in  the  expression  ^speech  and  mind  corresponding 
to.»  [This  should  be,]  whenever  there  is  a desire  to  say  [something].  [If  spoken] 
otherwise  [than  as  seen],  it  is  not  abstinence-from-falsehood.  This  is  stated  with 
an  explanation  in  the  words  «to  some  other  person.»  In  order  that  knowledge 
thereof  may  pass  to  some  one  else,  speech  is  spoken  [or]  uttered  to  produce  know- 
ledge similar  to  one’s  own  knowledge.  If  it  is  not  deceitful  [or]  the  cause  of 
deceit,  [it  is  abstinence-from-falsehood].  Just  as  when  Drona  the  Master  [MBh. 
vii.  chap.  190]  asked  Yudhisthira  [the  king]  with  regard  to  the  death  of  his  own 
son  Afvatthaman,  ‘Venerable  sir  [dyusman),  thou  who  art  rich  in  truth,  has 
Afvatthaman  been  slain  ? ’ And  he  having  in  mind  the  elephant  who  had 
the  corresponding  name  said,  ‘It  is  true,  Afvatthaman  is  slain.’  This  is  an 
answer  which  does  not  make  Yudhisthira’s  own  knowledge  pass  to  [the  other 
person].  For  his  own  knowledge  derived  from  the  sense-organ'  had  as  its 
object  the  slaying  of  the  elephant  and  this  [knowledge]  was  not  passed  [to 
Drona].  But  quite  another  knowledge,  that  of  the  slaying  of  the  latter’s  son, 
was  formed  [in  Drona’s  mind]. — «Or  mistaken»  means  due  to  a mistake,  either 

' Reading  indriya-janmd  with  the  Bikaner  MS.  and  the  Bombay  and  Poona  editions. 


ii.  30 — ] Booh  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [180 

at  the  time  when  one  desires  to  say  something,  or  at  the  time  of  determining 
what  the  object-to-he-perceived  is. — «Barren  of  information»  is  barren  as  regards 
information,  as  for  instance  an  outlandish  tongue  is  barren  of  information  to 
Aryans ; or  it  might  be  purposeless,  as  for  instance  speech  the  utterance  of 
which  is  not  meant  to  be  uttered.  For  in  this  [latter  case],  although  one’s  own 
knowledge  does  pass  to  the  other  person,  still  it  is  exactly  the  opposite  of  making 
[knowledge]  pass  [to  another],  because  it  was  not  purposed.'  An  abstinence- 
from-falsehood  even  when  it  has  these  distinguishing  characteristics,  if  it  results 
in  injury  to  another,  would  be  a false  kind  of  abstinence-from-falsehood,  but 
would  not  be  abstinence-from-falsehood,  as  he  says  in  the  words,  ^f  it.^  For 
example,  one  who  practises  austerities  in  abstinence-from-falsehood,  when  asked 
by  robbers  which  way  the  rich  merchant  had  gone,  told  the  way  the  rich  merchant 
had  gone.  «:It  should  be  used,»  that  is,  uttered.  The  rest  is  easy. — Since  an 
[explanatory]  negative  idea  depends  on  that  of  the  positive  he  explains  the 
distinguishing  characteristic  of  theft  by  saying,  <5CTheft  is  the  unauthorized.)^ 
Here  the  generic  idea  is  characterized  by  a qualification.  This  is  the  meaning. 
Since  verbal  and  bodily  operations  are  preceded  by  mental  operations,  it  is  the 
operation  of  mind,  because  it  is  dominant,  that  is  mentioned  in  the  words, 
^free  from  coveting.» — He  tells  what  continence  is  in  the  word  <Khidden.^ 
For  even  if  his  organ  of  generation  is  held  in  control,  still  if  he  become  attached 
at  the  sight  of  a woman  or  upon  [hearing]  her  talk  or  upon  touching  her  limbs 
which  are  the  seats  of  Kandarpa,  he  has  no  continence.  So  to  exclude  this  case 
he  says,  ^the  hidden  organ.)^  Other  organs  also  that  are  very  ardent  for  this 
[woman]  are  to  be  watched. — He  tells  what  abstinence-from-acceptance-of-gifts 
is  by  saying,  ^objects.»  He  mentions  the  disadvantage  due  to  attachment  to 
these  [objects]  in  the  words  [ii.  15],  “ Since  passions  increase  because  of  applica- 
tion to  enjoyments,  and  the  skill  of  the  organs  also  increases.”  The  disadvantage 
which  is  characteristic  of  injury  is  also  expressed  by  the  words,“  “Enjoyment  is 
impossible  unless  one  hasharmed  some  living  creatures.”  Although  obtained  with- 
out effort,  objects  if  unauthorized  have  disadvantages  when  one  acquires  them, 
since  the  acquisition  of  such  things  is  censured.  And  even  authorized  objects, 
when  acquired,  are  evidently  disadvantageous,  in  that  they  must  be  kept  and  so  on. 
Therefore  abstinence-from-acceptance-of-gifts  is  the  refusal  to  appropriate  them. 


Now  as  for  these  [five  abstentions] — 

31.  When  they  are  unqualified  by  species  or  place  or  time 
or  exigency  and  when  [covering]  all  [these]  classes— [under 
these  circumstances  exists]  the  Great  Course-of-conduct. 

Of  these  [five],  abstinence-from-injury  is  qualified  in  respect  of 
species  as  follows,  a catcher  of  fish  does  injury  to  fishes  only  and 
' Mrcchak.  (Nirn.  Sag.  edition),  p.  238®.  “ Compare  ii.  15,  p.  132®  (Calc.  ed.). 


181] 


Five  observances 


[ — ii.  32 


to  nothing  else. — The  same  is  qualified  in  respect  of  place,  as  when 
one  says,  ‘ I will  not  slay  in  a holy  place.’ — The  same  is  qualified 
in  respect  of  time,  as  when  one  says,  ‘ I will  not  slay  on  the 
fourteenth  day  [of  the  lunar  fortnight]  nor  on  a day  of  good  omen. 
— The  same,  in  the  case  of  one  who  refrains  from  [these]  three  is 
qualified  in  respect  of  exigency,  as  when  one  says,  ‘ For  the  sake  of 
gods  and  brahmans  and  not  otherwise  I will  slay.’  Likewise  also 
in  the  case  of  the  warrior  who  says,  ‘ In  battle  only  [I  will  do] 
injury,  and  nowhere  else.’  Abstinence-from-injury  and  the  other 
[abstinences]  unqualified  by  these  species  or  times  or  places  or 
exigencies  must  be  kept  when  [covering]  no  less  than  all  [these] 
cases.  <In  all  [these]  classes>  means  with  regard  to  all  [these] 
objects.  Without  exceptions  in  no  less  than  all  [these]  classes — 
this  is  what  is  meant  by  speaking  of  the  Great  Course-of-conduct^ 
when  [covering]  all  [these]  stages. 

«Now  as  for  these.»  The  sutra  begins  with  the  words  31  ...  by  species  and 
ends  with  the  words  Great  Course-of-conduct.  <When  [covering]  all  [these] 
classes)  means  of  those  which  are  found  in  all  [these]  stages  which  are  charac- 
terized as  being  species  and  the  other  [three  stages].  The  words  <KAbstinence- 
from-injury  and  the  other  [abstinences]!^  mean  that  the  definition  [of  the  Great 
Course-of-conduct]  must  be  asserted  in  the  case  of  the  other  abstentions  also. 
The  Comment  is  easy. 


32.  Cleanliness  and  contentment  and  self-castigation  and 
study  and  devotion  to  the  l9vara  are  the  observances. 

Of  these  [five],  cleanliness  is  produced  by  earth  or  by  water  or  the 
like,  and  by  the  consumption  and  other  [requirements]  with  regard 
to  pure  sacrificial  food.  This  is  outer.  Inner  [cleanliness]  is  the 
washing  away  of  the  blemishes  of  the  mind-stuff. — [To  practise]  con- 
tentment means  not  to  covet  more  than  the  means  at  hand. — Self- 
castigation is  the  bearing  of  extremes,  hunger  and  thirst,  cold  and 
heat,  standing  and  sitting,  stock-stillness  and  formal  stillness, 
and,  according  to  usage,  courses-of-conduct  such  as  mortifications 
(J^rcchra)  ^ and  lunar  fasts  ^ and  rigid  penances.'* — Study  is  the 

* Compare  Manu  xii.  1-6.  ® Manu  vi.  20,  &c. 

Manu  xi.  106,  &c.  ^ Manu  xi.  213,  &c. 


il.  32 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [182 

recital  of  books  that  treat  of  release  or  the  repetition  of  the 
syllable  of  adoration  [pranava). — Devotion  to  the  I§vara^  is  the 
oflering  up  of  all  actions  to  the  Supreme  Teacher.  “ He  who  rests 
in  himself,  for  whom  the  network  of  perverse-considerations 
[vitarka)  has  been  destroyed,  whether  resting  upon  a bed  or  on 
a seat,  or  wandering  upon  a road,  would  behold  the  destruction  of 
the  seed  of  the  round-of-rebirths,  would  be  permanently  released, 
would  participate  in  deathless  delights.”  With  regard  to  which 
this  has  been  said,  [i.  29],  “ Thereafter  comes  the  right  knowledge 
of  him  who  thinks  in  an  inverse  waj,  and  the  removal  of 
obstacles.” 

He  expounds  cleanliness  and  the  other  observances.  The  sutra  begins  with  the 
word  32.  Cleanliness  and  ends  with  the  word  observances.  He  explains  [the 
sutra]  by  saying  «cleanliness.»  The  words  «or  the  like»  are  meant  to  include 
cow-dung  and  such  things.  Pure  sacrificial  food  is  the  barley  [mixed  with] 
cow’s  urine  and  the  rest  [eaten  at  the  ^ravanl  festival].  There  is  a consumption 
and  other  [requirements]  with  regard  to  this  [food].  «The  other  require- 
ments)^ are  meant  to  cover  regulation  of  the  dimensions  and  of  the  number  of 
these  morsels.  Instead  of  saying  ‘ produced  by  the  consumption  and  other 
requirements  with  regard  to  pure  sacrificial  food  ’ he  says  «and  by  the  consump- 
tion and  other  [requirements]  with  regard  to  pure  sacrificial  food.)^  For  in  the 
effect  the  cause  is  supposed  figuratively  to  exist. — The  ^stains  of  the  mind- 
stuff»  such  as  arrogance  and  pride  and  jealousy  ; the  removal  of  this  is  cleanli- 
ness of  the  central-organ. — ^Contentment)^  is  the  desire  to  take  no  more  than  is 
necessary  for  the  general  maintenance  of  life,  because  it  follows  the  renunciation 
of  what  had  been  before  one’s  own  property.  This  is  its  distinction  [from 
abstinence-from-acceptance-of-gifts]. — ^Stock-stillness^  is  the  absence  of  any 
indication  of  one’s  intention  even  by  signs;  «formal  stillness»  is  merely  refraining 
from  speech. — In  the  phrase  ^for  whom  the  network  of  perverse-considerations 
has  been  destroyedS>  the  words  «perverse-considerations»  will  be  [later  ii.  33] 
described.  And  doubts  and  misconceptions  should  be  added  [as  parts  of  the 
network].  To  this  extent  his  intention  is  said  to  be  pure. — These  abstentions 
and  observances  are  also  described  in  the  Vishnu  Purana  [vi.  7.  36-371,®  “ Wish- 
ing to  reduce  the  mind  to  its  jDroper  state  he  should  resort  to  abstinence  from 
incontinence  and  from  injury  and  from  falsehood  and  from  theft  and  from 
acceptance-of-gifts.  A man  whose  self  is  curbed  should  practise  study  and 
cleanliness  and  contentment  and  self-castigation.  He  should  also  make  his 
mind  incline  towards  the  higher  Brahman.  These  abstentions  together  with 

^ Compare  ii.  1,  p.  106®  (Calc.  ed.).  ® Illustrated  in  Chand.  Up.  i.  10.  1-11. 

® See  also  Naradlya  Purana  xlvii.  12-14. 


183] 


Inhibition  of  abstentions  and  observances  [ii.  34 

the  observances  are  declared  to  be  five  each.  They  give  a special  result  when 
they  are  approached  with  a desire  [for  some  special  thing],  and  in  the  case  of 
persons  free  from  all  desires  they  yield  final  release.” 


As  for  these  abstentions  and  observances, 

33.  If  there  be  inhibition  by  perverse-considerations  (vitai'ka), 
there  should  be  cultivation  of  the  opposites. 

Whenever  [in  the  mind]  of  this  brahman  [practising  the  absten- 
tions and  observances]  injuries  and  similar  [faults]  arise  as 
perverse-considerations,  such  as  for  instance,  ‘ I will  kill  him  who 
hurts  me  ; I will  also  lie  ; I will  also  appropriate  his  money  ; and 
I will  commit  adultery  with  his  wife  ; and  I will  also  make  myself 
master  of  his  property.’  Thus  inhibited  by  the  blazing  fever  of 
perverse-considerations,  let  him  cultivate  the  opposites  of  these. 
Let  him  ponder,  ‘ Baked  upon  the  pitiless  coals  of  the  round-of- 
rebirths,  I take  my  refuge  in  the  rules  {dharma)  for  yoga  by 
giving  protection  ^ to  every  living  creature.  I myself  after  ridding 
myself  of  perverse-considerations  am  betaking  myself  to  them  once 
more,  like  a dog.  As  a dog  to  his  vomit,  even  so  I betake  myself 
to  that  of  which  I had  rid  myself’  Other  similar  [inhibitions  of 
perverse-considerations]  should  be  applied  in  the  other  sutras  also 
[upon  the  aids  to  yoga]. 

Since  “ good  things^  are  full  of  difficulties  ”,  he  introduces  a sutra  whose  object 
is  to  give  advice  which  will  prevent  the  possibility  of  exceptions  to  these  [absten- 
tions and  observances].  So  he  says,  ^As  for  these  abstentions  and  obser- 
vanees.»  The  sutra,  33.  If  there  be  inhibition  by  perverse-considerations, 
there  should  be  cultivation  of  the  opposites.  In  the  Comment  upon  perverse- 
considerations  there  is  nothing  at  all  that  seems  obscure. 


34.  Since  perverse-considerations  sucb  as  injuries,  whether 
done  or  caused  to  be  done  or  approved,  whether  ensuing 
upon  greed  or  anger  or  infatuation,  whether  mild  or  moderate 
or  vehement,  find  their  unending  consequences  in  pain  and 
in  lack  of  thinking,  there  should  be  the  cultivation  of  their 
opposites. 


^ This  phrase  occurs  in  Manu  viii.  303. 

“ Compare  aho  vighnavatyah  prartliitdrtha- 


siddhayah,  ^akuntala.  Act  iii,  near  end; 
and  xaXfird  TO  KoXd  Repub.  435  c,  497  d. 


ii.  34 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Scidhana  [184 

Of  these  [considerations],  first  of  all,  injury,  since  it  is  done  or  caused 
to  be  done  or  approved,  is  three-fold.  Moreover,  each  of  these 
is  three-fold,  in  so  far  as  there  is  greed  [such  as]  desire  for  the 
meat  or  for  the  skin,  or  in  so  far  as  there  is  anger  as  when  a man 
thinks  he  has  been  ‘ hurt  by  that  man  ’,  or  in  so  far  as  there 
is  infatuation  as  when  a man  thinks  [that  what  he  is  doing]  ‘ will 
be  merit  for  me  Again,  since  greed  and  anger  and  infatuation  are 
three-fold  as  being  mild  and  moderate  and  vehement,  there  are 
thus  seven-and-twenty  varieties  of  injuries.  Yet  again,  since 
[these  are]  gentle  and  moderate  and  extreme  [these  are]  three- 
fold as  follows,  gently  mild  and  moderately  mild  and  keenly  mild  ; 
similarly,  gently  moderate  and  moderately  moderate  and  keenly 
moderate ; likewise,  gently  keen  and  moderately  keen  and  vehe- 
mently keen.  Thus  injury  is  of  one-and-eighty  varieties.  It  is, 
however,  innumerable  because  of  the  varieties  due  to  specifications 
{niyama)  and  to  options  (yikalpa)  and  to  aggregations  (samuccaya), 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  varieties  ^ of  those-who-breathe-the-breath- 
of-life  are  innumerable.  In  the  same  manner  [the  classification]  is 
to  be  applied  to  falsehood  and  to  the  other  [crimes].  Now  since 
these  perverse  considerations  have  endless  consequences  in  pain 
and  in  lack  of  thinking,  one  should  cultivate  their  opposites.  [In 
other  words],  there  is  a cultivation  of  those  things  the  endless 
consequences  of  which  are  pain  and  a lack  of  thinking. — And  to 
continue,  he  who  commits  an  injury  first  of  all  reduces  the  strength 
of  the  victim,  then  causes  him  pain  by  falling  upon  him  with 
a knife  or  something  of  the  kind,  [and]  afterwards  even  deprives 
him  of  life.  When  once  he  has  taken  away  [the  victim’s]  strength, 
his  own  animate  or  inanimate  aids  ^ begin  to  have  their  strength 
dwindle  away.  As  a result  of  causing  pain,  he  himself  experiences 
pain  in  hells  and  in  [the  bodies  of]  animals  and  of  departed  spirits 
and  in  other  [forms].  As  a result  of  uprooting  [the  victim]  from 
life,  he  himself  continues  from  moment  to  moment  at  the  very 
point  of  departure  from  life.  And  even  while  wishing  for  death  he 

^ RaghavanandainthePatanjala-Rahasyam  with  a change  in  the  order  of  words, 

attributes  this  quotation  to  Paksila-  by  the  Udyotakara  in  the  Nyaya- 

svamin.  It  is  found  in  Yatsyayana’s  Yarttika  (Bibl.  Ind.p.  9'®;. 

Bhasya  (Vizian.  ed.  p.  P) ; and  quoted,  * See  Vacaspati  on  ii.  15,  p.  114®  (Calc,  ed.). 


185]  Varieties  of  injuries  [ — ii.  35 

pants  laboriously  since  the  fruition^  of  pain  is  to  be  felt  in  a 
fruition  which  has^  a limit  [in  time].  Furthermore,  even  if  [the 
effects  of]  injury  could  be  somehow  done  away^  by  merit,  even 
then,  if  he  obtained  happiness,  it  would  be  [on  condition 
that]  his  length-of-life  be  short. — In  the  same  way,  so  far  as 
possible,  [the  classification]  is  to  be  applied  to  lying  and  to  the 
other  [violations  of  the  abstentions].  Thus  pondering  on  that 
same  [painful  consequence]  of  perverse  considerations,  which  is 
inevitable  {anugata)  and  undesired,  the  yogin  should  not  devote 
his  central  organ  to  perverse  considerations.  As  a result  of  the 
cultivation  of  the  opposites,  the  perverse  considerations  become 
things  that  may  be  escaped. 

With  the  intent  to  describe  what  the  cultivation  of  the  opposites  is,  he  states 
the  different  natures  and  kinds  and  causes  and  properties  and  results  of  the  con- 
trary-considerations, as  well  as  the  objects  for  the  meditation  on  the  opposites  in 
the  sutra  which  begins  with  the  words  34.  . . . perverse-eonsiderations  and  ends 
with  the  words  cultivation  of  their  opposites.  He  explains  [the  sutra]  with 
the  words,  «Of  these  . . . injury.^  Because  the  varieties  of  those-who-breathe- 
the-breath-of-life  are  innumerable,  specifications  and  options  and  aggregations 
are  possible  with  regard  to  injuries  and  the  other  [crimes].  In  this  situation, 
because  there  is  a preponderance  of  tamas,  as  a result  of  wrong  living,  a lack  of 
thinking  also  arises  characterized  by  the  four  kinds  of  misconception  [ii.  5].  So 
it  is  that  these  perverse-considerations  also  result  in  lack  of  thinking  [as  well  as 
arise  out  of  undifferentiated-consciousness].  For  the  cultivation  of  their  oppo- 
sites is  precisely  [the  thought  of]  the  endless  consequences  in  pain  and  in  lack 
of  thinking.  By  virtue  of  this  there  is  a revulsion  from  these.  This  same  culti- 
vation of  the  opposites  he  makes  clear  by  the  words,  «:of  the  victim.»  The 
victim  is  some  tame  animal.  ^Strength2>  is  the  energy  which  is  the  cause  of  the 
functional  activity  of  the  body.  [This]  he  first  reduces  by  tying  him  to  a sacri- 
ficial post.  For  in  this  way  the  animal  loses  his  spirit.  The  rest  is  very  clear. 


When  [the  perverse  considerations]  become  for  this  [yogin]  unsuit- 
able for  generation,  then  the  power  caused  by  this  fact  becomes 
indicative  of  the  yogin’s  perfection.  For  example. 


* The  word  vipaka  is  omitted  in  the  Bikaner 

and  the  two  Kashmir  and  several  other 
good  MSS. 

* Compare  the  discussion  in  ii.  13,  especially 

p.  127  (Calc.  ed.). 

24  [h.o.s.  n] 


® The  better  reading  is  ampagata.  In  this 
case,  the  injury  would  not  be  inde- 
pendent fruit  since  it  would  be  cast 
away  as  a portion  of  the  sacrifice. 


ii.  35 — ] Booh  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Scidhana  [186 

35.  As  soon  as  he  is  grounded  in  abstinence  from  injury,  his 
presence  begets  a suspension  of  enmity. 

[This]  occurs  on  the  part  of  all  living  creatures.^ 

The  abstentions  and  observances  have  been  described,  and  the  escape  from  the 
exceptions  to  these,  the  perverse  considerations,  as  a result  of  the  cultivation  of 
the  opposites  has  been  described.  Now  he  makes  clear  the  signs  indicative  of 
thorough  knowledge  of  perfection  in  these  various  abstentions  and  observances 
which  results  from  practice  in  these  [latter].  By  a thorough  knowledge  of 
which  signs  [the  yogin]  accomplishes  what  is  to  be  done  in  each  particular  case 
and  acts  with  reference  to  what  is  yet  to  be  done,  as  he  says,  «When  . . . for 
this  [yogin]. » 35.  As  soon  as  he  is  grounded  in  abstinence  from  injury, 

his  presence  begets  a suspension  of  enmity.  Even  [enemies]  whose  hostility 
is  everlasting^  like  horse  and  buffalo,  mouse  and  cat,  snake  and  mongoos,  in 
the  presence  of  the  Exalted  [yogin]  who  is  grounded  in  abstinence  from  injury, 
conform  themselves  to  his  mind-stuff  and  renounce  altogether  their  hostility. 


36.  As  soon  as  he  is  grounded  in  abstinence  from  falsehood, 
actions  and  consequences  depend  upon  him. 

If  [the  yogin]  says  to  a man  {iti),  ‘ Be  ^ thou  right-living,’  the  man 
becomes  right-living.  If  he  expresses  the  wish  iiti)  ‘ Attain  thou 
heaven,’  the  man  attains  heaven.  What  he  says  (yah)  comes  true. 
35.  As  soon  as  he  is  grounded  in  abstinence  from  falsehood,  actions  and 
consequences  have  their  residence  [in  him].  Actions  mean  right-living  and 
wrong-living ; and  consequences  of  these  are  such  things  as  heaven  and  hell. 
Dependence  upon  the  sense  that  these  same  depend  upon  him.  Having  depen- 
dence upon  him  is  the  abstract  state  of  this  [dependence].  Since  such  a thing 
happens  in  the  case  of  the  Exalted  One’s  speech,  [the  Comment]  says  that  actions 
depend  upon  him  by  saying  ^right-living.»  He  says  that  consequences  depend 
upon  him  by  saying  ^heaven.»  ^Comes  true»  signifies  that  it  is  not  prevented. 


37.  As  soon  as  he  is  grounded  in  abstinence  from  theft,  all 
jewels  approach  him. 

From  all  directions  jewels  approach  to  be  his. 

37.  As  soon  as  he  is  grounded  in  abstinence  from  theft,  all  jewels  approach 
him.  Easily  understood. 


* Compare  RaghuvaSfa  ii.  55,  xiii.  50,  xiv. 
79  and  Kirata  iii.  2. 

® See  Panini  ii.  4.  9 with  the  illustrations 
fromtheKafikavrtti  and  theSiddhanta- 


kaumudl.  Compare  also  Bana’s  Ka- 
dambarl  p.  93®  (Parab’s  ed.)  and  ^akun- 
tala  (Nir.  Sag.  ed.)  p.  23,  two  lines  up. 

® Whitney  : Grammar  924. 


187]  Results  of  ahste^itions  [ — ii.  39 

38.  As  soon  as  he  is  grounded  in  abstinence  from  incon- 
tinence, he  acquires  energy. 

By  the  acquisition  of  which  the  yogin  increases  [his]  unhindered  ^ 
qualities.  And  when  he  is  perfected  he  is  able  to  transfer  [his] 
thinking  to  [his]  pupils. 

38.  As  soon  as  tie  is  grounded  in  abstinence  from  incontinence,  he  acquires 
energy.  Energy  [that  is]  power.  By  the  acquisition  of  which  he  increases 
[or]  accumulates  qualities,  such  as  minuteness,  which  are  unhindered  [that  is] 
which  have  not  been  hindered.  And  when  perfected  he  is  endowed  with  the 
eight  perfections  of  which  the  first  is  [called]  tara  ^ and  also  by  other  names 
such  as  Eeasoning  {uha).  He  is  able  to  transfer  his  thinking  which  relates  to 
the  aids  to  yoga  to  his  pupils  [or]  disciples. 


39.  As  soon  as  he  is  established  in  abstinence-from-accept- 
ance-of-gifts,  a thorough  illumination  upon  the  conditions  of 
birth— 

— Becomes  his.  ‘ Who  w'as  I ? How  was  I ? Or  what  [can]  this 
birth  be  ? Or  how  [can]  this  [birth]  be  ? Or  what  shall  we 
become  ? Or  how  shall  we  become  ? ’ Such  a desire  to  know  his 
own  condition  in  former  and  later  and  intermediate  times  becomes 
of  itself  fulfilled  ^ for  him.  These  when  he  is  established  in  the 
abstentions  are  the  perfections. 

39.  As  soon  as  he  is  established  in  abstinence-from-acceptance-of-gifts,  a 
thorough  illumination  upon  the  conditions  of  birth.  Birth  is  [coming  into] 
relation  with  a body  and  with  sense-organs  and  the  rest  which  are  particularized 
as  belonging  to  some  class  [of  beings].  There  is  a thorough  illumination,  a 
direct  perception  of  the  conditions  [of  birth]  [or]  of  what  kinds  [of  birth].  That 
is  to  say,  a thorough  knowledge  of  a quiescent  or  uprisen  or  indeterminable 
birth  together  with  its  form  [of  experience].  He  desires  to  know  the  past  in 
the  words,  Who  was  I ? ’»  He  desires  to  know  the  different  details  as  to 
origin  and  persistence  of  this  same  [birth]  in  the  words,  <K‘  How  was  I ? ’»  He 
desires  to  know  what  the  present  birth  itself  is  in  the  words,  Or  what  ? ’» 
Is  the  body  made  directly  of  elements,  or  is  it  nothing  but  an  aggregation  of 
elements,  or  is  it  other  than  these  ? Here  also  the  words  ‘ Or  how  ’ might  be 
supplied.^  Elsewhere  this  is  the  actual  reading.  He  desires  to  know  the  future 
in  the  words,  Or  what  shall  we  become  ? ’»  Here  again  the  words  ‘ Or  how  ’ 
are  [to  be]  supplied.^  ^Such  . . . for  him.»  The  former  [time]  is  past  time ; 

^ See  Manu  xii.  28.  * Samkhya-karika  li.  ® The  Vart.  says  vicistd  bhavati. 

^ In  the  text  of  Vacaspati  katham  vd  apparently  was  lacking. 


ii.  39 — ] Booh  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [188 

the  later  is  future  ; the  intermediate  is  the  present.  The  existence  of  the  self 
in  these  is  a relation  with  a body  and  the  rest.  There  is  a desire  to  know  this 
and  from  desire  comes  knowledge  according  to  the  maxim,  “ He  who  desires 
anything,  does  that  same  thing.” 


We  will  speak  with  regard  to  observances. 

40.  As  a result  of  cleanliness  there  is  disgust  at  one’s  own 
body  and  no  intercourse  with  others. 

As  soon  as  there  is  disgust  with  his  own  body,  he  has  begun 
cleanliness.  Seeing  the  offensiveness  of  the  body,^  he  is  no  longer 
attached  to  the  body  and  becomes  an  ascetic  (yati).  Moreover 
there  is  no  intercourse  with  others.  Perceiving  the  true  nature  of 
the  body,  desirous  of  escaping  ^ even  his  own  body,  even  after 
he  has  washed  it  with  earth  and  water  and  other  [substances],  not 
seeing  any  purity  in  the  body,  how  could  he  have  intercourse  with 
the  bodies  of  others  absolutely  unhallowed  as  they  are  ? 

40.  As  a result  of  cleanliness,  there  is  disgust  at  one’s  own  body  and  no 
intercourse  with  others.  By  this  [sutra]  it  is  told  what  is  indicative  of  per- 
fection in  outer  cleanliness. 


Furthermore  [as  other  results], 

41.  Purity  of  sattva  and  gentleness  and  singleness-of-intent 
and  subjugation  of  the  senses  and  fitness  for  the  sight  of  the 
self— 

The  word  ‘ arise  ’ completes  the  sentence.  As  a result  of  cleanli- 
ness there  is  purity  of  sattva  ; therefrom  [it  acquires]  gentleness  ; 
from  this  [it  acquires]  singleness-of-intent ; therefrom  [it  acquires] 
subjugation  of  the  senses  ; and  from  this  fitness  for  the  sight  of  the 
self  is  acquired  by  the  sattva  of  the  thinking-substance.  So  to 
this  [last]  there  is  access,  as  a result  of  his  being  established  in 
cleanliness. 

He  tells  what  is  indicative  of  inner  perfection  by  saying  ^Furthermore.^  41. 
Purity  of  sattva  and  gentleness  and  singleness-of-intent  and  subjugation 
of  the  senses  and  fitness  for  the  sight  of  the  self.  When  the  defilements  of 


‘ Compare  ii.  5,  p.  113*  (Calc.  ed.). 


* See  Linga  Pur.  viii.  32-33. 


[ — ii.  43 


189]  Results  of  ohservances 

mind-stuff  are  washed  away,  the  mind-stuff  comes-forth-to-sight  undefiled.  And 
as  a result  of  freedom  from  defilement  there  is  gentleness  [or]  transparency  of 
sattva.  In  the  transparent  [sattva]  there  is  singleness-of-intent.  Therefrom, 
by  the  subdual  of  the  central-organ,  there  results  the  subdual  of  the  sense- 
organs  which  are  dependent  on  the  central-organ.  After  that  the  sattva  of  the 
thinking-substance  becomes  fit  for  the  sight  of  the  self. 


42.  As  a result  of  contentment  there  is  an  acquisition  of 
superlative  pleasure. 

And  in  this  sense  it  has  been  said,^  “What  constitutes  the 
pleasure  of  love  in  this  world  and  what  the  supreme  pleasure  of 
heaven  are  both  not  to  be  compared  with  the  sixteenth  part  of  the 
pleasure  of  dwindled  craving  {trsnd)” 

42.  As  a result  of  contentment  there  is  an  acquisition  of  superlative 
pleasure.  Superlative  is  that  beyond  which  nothing  more  excellent  exists.  As 
was  said  by  Yayati  “ w’hen  he  conferred  youth  upon  his  [father]  Puru,  “ The 
wise  man,  casting  entirely  away  that  craving  which  is  hard  for  the  strong- 
willed  to  cast  off  and  which  even  in  the  aged  ages  not,  is  filled  quite  full 
with  pleasure  and  nothing  else.”  This  same  he  shows  by  the  words  beginning 
^What  constitutes  the  pleasure  of  love.» 


43.  Perfection  in  the  body  and  in  the  organs  after  impurity 
has  dwindled  as  a result  of  self-castigation. 

Self-castigation  in  the  very  act  of  completing  itself  destroys  the 
defilement  from  the  covering  of  impurity.  As  a result  of  the 
removal  of  the  defilement  of  the  covering  of  this  [impurity]  there 
is  perfection  of  the  body,  such  as  atomization  [hi.  45]  ; likewise  per- 
fection of  the  organs,  such  as  hearing  and  seeing  at  a distance  [that 
is,  telepathy]. 

He  tells  what  is  indicative  of  perfection  of  self-castigation.  43.  Perfection 
in  the  body  and  in  the  organs  after  impurity  has  dwindled  as  a result 
of  self-castigation.  Whatever  covering  has  the  characteristics  of  impurity,  has 
the  qualities  and  so  on  which  are  effects  of  the  tamas.  «Such  as  atomization» 
would  be  greatness  or  lightness  or  getting  [to  any  place].  Easy. 


^ MBh.  9^utiparvan  174.  46  and  Yayu  Pur.  * Yisnu  Pur.  iv.  10.  12  and  Yayu  Pur. 
xciii.  101  and  Linga  Pur.  Ixvii.  23.  xciii.  99  and  Linga  Pur.  Ixvii.  20. 

Compare  Bhartrhari  Yair.  ^at.  49  and  Compare  also  MBh.  i.  89-91  = 3577  ff. 

Dhvanyaloka,  p.  176  (Kavyamala  ed.). 


ii.  44 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [190 

44.  As  a result  of  study  there  is  communion  with  the  chosen 
deity. 

Gods  and  sages  and  perfected  men  come  within  the  range  of  vision 
of  [the  yogin]  who  has  the  disposition  to  study ; and  are  helpful 
to  his  work. 

He  tells  what  is  indicative  of  perfection  in  study.  44.  As  a result  of  study 
there  is  communion  with  the  chosen  deity.  Easy. 


45.  Perfection  of  concentration  as  a result  of  devotion  to  the 
l9vara. 

One  whose  whole  nature  is  surrendered  ^ to  the  l9vara  has  perfec- 
tion of  concentration.  By  which  [concentration]  he  knows  as  the 
thing  really  is  {avitatham)  all  that  he  desires  to  know,  in  other 
places  and  in  other  bodies  and  in  other  times.  Thereafter  his 
insight  sees  into  things  as  they  are  [yathahkutarn). 

45.  Perfection  of  concentration  ...  of  devotion  to  the  iQvara.  And  it 
should  not  be  urged  that  if,  only  as  a result  of  devotion  to  the  Ifvara,  concentra- 
tion conscious  [of  objects]  has  its  perfection,  there  is  no  need  of  the  seven  [other] 
aids.  Because  these  [seven]  by  subsidiary  activity,  both  seen  and  unseen,  are 
of  service  to  the  perfection  of  devotion  to  the  Ifvara,  and  at  the  same  time 
to  perfection  of  concentration  conscious  [of  objects].  Just  as  by  a separation 
of  correlations  * curds  fulfil  the  pui-poses  of  the  sacrifice  and  also  fulfil  the 
purposes  of  men.  Thus  if  this  is  so,  [one  should  not  say]  that  fixed-attention 
and  contemplation  and  concentration  are  not  the  immediate’  aids  [to  yoga]. 
Because  it  is  clear  that  these  [three]  {asya)  are  immediate  aids,  in  so  far  as 
for  the  perfection  of  [concentration]  conscious  [of  an  object]  these  [three] 
have  the  same  object  as  [concentration]  conscious  [of  an  object],  whereas  the 
other  aids  [which  have  the  l9vara  as  object]  have  an  object  which  is  not  this. 
For  the  devotion  to  the  Ifvara  has  also  the  Ifvara  as  its  object,  and  has 
not  as  its  object  that  wdiicli  is  to  be  consciously  known.  Accordingly  this  is 
a mediate  aid.  Thus  all  is  cleared  up. — The  words  «sees  into)^  are  intended 
to  show  the  etymology  of  the  word  «insight.» 


* See  ii.  1. 

* See  Jaimini  Mlmansa-sutra  iv.  3.  5.  2. 

’ Balarama  defines  antaranga  by  the  words 
‘ whatever  happens  immediately  next 


to  a thing  is  the  antaranga  of  it  ’.  Thus 
devotion  to  the  l9vara  is  the  last  cause 
of  the  effect  (antarangasadhana)  of 
concentration  conscious  of  an  object. 


191] 


[ — ii.  46 


Varieties  of  postures 

The  abstentions  and  observances  together  with  their  perfections 
have  been  described.  We  have  the  following  to  say  of  the  postures  ^ 
and  the  other  [aids  to  yoga].  In  this  [sutra,  it  is  said] — 

46.  Stable-and-easy  posture. 

For  example,  the  lotus-posture  and  the  hero-posture  and  the  decent- 
posture  and  the  mystic-diagram  and  the  staff-posture  and  [the 
posture]  with  the  rest  and  the  bedstead,  the  seated  curlew  and  the 
seated  elephant  and  the  seated  camel,  the  even  arrangement,  the 
stable-and-easy- — also  called,  as-is-easiest — and  others  of  the  same 
kind. 

He  introduces  the  next  sutra  with  the  words  «The  abstentions  and  observances 
have  been  described.  We  have  the  following  to  say  of  the  postures  and  the 
other  [aids  to  yoga].»  In  this  [sutra,  it  is  said]  46.  Stable-and-easy  posture. 
Stable  naeans  motionless.  That  posture  which  is  easy,  which  brings  ease  is 
the  one  intended  by  the  sutra.  The  word  asana  means  either  that  whereon 
a man  sits  [that  is,  a seat]  or  the  manner  in  which  he  sits  [that  is,  a posture]. 
The  lotus-posture  is  well  known.*® — A man  settled  down  {sthitasya)  rests  one 
foot  on  the  ground  and  the  other  is  placed  over  the  partially  contracted  knee, 
— this  is  hero-posture.  — Bringing  the  soles  of  his  feet  near  to  each  other 
close  to  the  scrotum,  he  should  make  a hollow  of  his  hands  and  place  them 
over  it  in  the  shape  of  a tortoise, — this  is  the  decent-posture. — Inserting 
the  contracted  left  foot  into  the  space  between  the  right  shin  and  thigh  and 
inserting  the  contracted  right  foot  into  the  space  between  the  left 
shin  and  thigh, — that  is  the  mystic  diagram. — Sitting  down  with  the  great- 
toes  placed  together  and  with  ankles  placed  together  and  stretching  out  upon 
the  ground  shins  and  thighs  and  feet  placed  together,  let  him  practise  the 
staff-posture. — Because  there  is  a use  of  the  yogic  table  ® (yoga-pattaka),  this  is 
[the  posture]  with  the  rest. — Lying  down  with  the  arms  stretched  around  the 
knees  is  the  bedstead. — The  curlew  and  the  other  seats  may  be  understood  by 
actually  seeing  a curlew  and  the  other  animals  seated.  — The  two  feet  are 
contracted  and  pressed  against  each  other  at  the  heels  and  at  the  tips  of 


® Linga  Pur.  viii.  87-90. 

*®  An  illustration  of  this  by  a native  hand 
is  given  in  Richard  Schmidt’s  Fakire 
und  Fakirthum,  to  face  p.  12 ; hero- 
posture  faces  p.  28 ; decent-posture 
faces  p.  16,  but  diverges  from  this  de- 
scription in  its  details ; mystic-diagram 
faces  p.  24.  The  order  of  the  illustra- 
tions does  not  correspond  to  the  order 


of  this  book,  and  there  is  a vast 
number  of  fantastic  and  repellent 
additions. 

® Balarama  says  that  this  yogic  table  is 
a special  kind  of  support  for  the  arms 
of  a yogin  who  is  about  to  practise 
concentration.  It  is  made  of  wood 
and  is  well  known  among  nddsin  by 
the  name  of  ‘ changan  ’. 


ii.  46 — ] Booh  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [192 


the  feet, — this  is  the  even  arrangement.  — That  arrangement  in  which  one 
finds  entire  {sidliyati)  stability  and  ease, — this  is  the  posture  that  is  stable-and- 
easy.  This  is  the  one  from  among  these  [postures]  which  is  approved  by  the 
Exalted  Author  of  the  sutras.  An  elaboration  of  this  is  given  in  the  words, 
«as-is-easiest.» 


47.  By  relaxation  of  effort  or  by  a [mental]  state-of-balance 
with  reference  to  Ananta — 

— [A  posture]  results.  With  these  words  the  sentence  is  com- 
pleted. When  efforts  cease  the  posture  is  completed,  so  that  there 
is  no  agitation  of  the  body.  Or  the  mind-stuff  comes  into  a 
balanced-state  with  reference  to  Ananta  ^ and  produces  the 
posture. 

Having  stated  what  the  postures  are,  he  tells  what  are  the  means  of  attaining 
them.  47.  By  relaxation  of  effort  or  by  a [mental]  state-of-balance  with 
reference  to  Ananta.  A natural  effort  sustaining  the  body  is  not  the  cause 
of  this  kind  of  posture  which  is  to  be  taught  as  an  aid  to  yoga.  For  if  its 
cause  were  such,  the  preaching  of  it  would  be  purposeless  in  that  it  could 
be  naturally  perfected.  Therefore  this  natural  effort  does  not  accomplish  this 
kind  of  posture  which  is  to  be  taught  and  is  contrary  [to  it].  For  in  so  far 
as  this  [natural  posture]  is  the  cause  of  an  arbitrarily  chosen  posture  it  is 
the  destroyer  of  the  specific  kind  of  posture.  Consequently  a man,  practising 
the  specific  posture  as  taught,  should  resort  to  an  effort  which  consists  in  the 
relaxation  of  the  natural  effort.  Otherwise  the  posture  taught  cannot  be 
accomplished. — «Or  . . . with  Ananta,:^  the  Chief  of  Serpents,  who  upholds 
the  globe  of  the  earth  upon  his  thousand  very  steadfast  hoods, — [with  him] 
the  mind-stuff  comes  into  a balanced  state  and  produces  the  posture. 


48.  Thereafter  he  is  unassailed  by  extremes. 

As  a result  of  mastering  the  postures  he  is  not  overcome  by  the 
extremes,  by  cold  and  heat  and  by  the  other  [extremes]. 

He  tells  what  is  indicative  of  complete  mastery  of  postures  by  saying  48.  There- 
after he  is  unassailed  by  extremes.  The  Comment  explains  itself  by  a mere 
reading.  Posture  is  also  described  in  the  Vishnu  Purana  [vi.  7.  39],  “ Having 
assumed  a posture  so  as  to  possess  the  excellences  of  the  decent-posture  and 
the  other  [postures].” 


* Compare  Bh.  Gita  x.  28.  Ananta  is  Vasuki,  the  Lord  of  Serpents.  See  also  MBh. 
i.  3.5.  5 tf. 


193]  Varieties  of  restraint  of  breath  [ — ii.  50 

49.  When  there  is  this  [stability  of  posture],  the  restraint  of 
breath  cutting  off  the  flow  of  inspiration  and  expiration 
[follows]. 

After  the  mastery^  of  posture  [follows  the  restraint  of  the 
breath].  Inspiration  is  the  sipping  in  of  the  outer  wind  ; expira- 
tion is  the  expulsion  of  the  abdominal  wind.  Restraint  of  the 
breath  is  the  cutting  off  of  the  flow  of  these  two,  the  absence  of 
both  kinds. 

After  describing  [postures],  be  shows  that  these  precede  restraint  of  the  breath 
and  tells  the  distinguishing  characteristic  of  this  [restraint  of  the  breath]. 
49.  When  there  is  this  [stability  of  posture],  the  restraint  of  breath  cutting 
off  the  flow  of  inspiration  and  expiration  [follows].  In  the  case  of  emission 
{recaka)  and  inhalation  {p€iraka)  and  suspension  {ktmihalca),  the  words  ^the  cut- 
ting off  of  the  flow  of  inspiration  and  expiration^  give  the  general  character- 
istic of  restraint  of  the  breath.  To  explain  : when  in  inhalation  the  outer  wind 
sipped  in  is  held  inside,  there  is  a break  in  the  flow  of  inspiration  and  expiration ; 
again  when  in  emission  the  abdominal  wind  forced  out  is  held  outside,  there  is 
also  a break  in  the  flow  of  inspuation  and  expiration.  Similarly  in  the  case  of 
suspension  also.  This  same  is  said  by  the  Comment  in  the  words  ^CAfter  the 
subjugation  of  posture.^ 


But  this  [restraint  of  breath]  is, 

50.  External  or  internal  or  suppressed  in  fluctuation  and  is 
regulated  ^ in  place  and  time  and  number  and  is  protracted 
and  subtile. 

It  is  external  in  case  there  is  no  flow  [of  breath]  after  expiration ; 
it  is  internal  in  case  there  is  no  flow  [of  breath]  after  inspiration ; 
it  is  the  third  [or]  suppressed  in  fluctuation  in  case  there  is  no 
[flow]  of  either  kind  [neither  of  expiration  nor  inspiration],  as  the 
result  of  a single  effort  [to  suppress  both],  just  as  water  dropped 
upon  a very-hot  stone  shrivels  up  wherever  it  falls,  so  both  at  once 
cease  to  be.  And  each  of  these  three  is  regulated  in  space ; [each] 
deals  with  a certain  amount  of  space.  [Each]  is  regulated  in  time  ; 
in  other  words,  defined  by  a limitation  to  a certain  number  of 
moments.  [Each]  is  regulated  in  number  ; the  first  rising  up  [of 
the  vital  current  from  the  navel  to  the  palate  is  measured]  by  so 

^ Many  MSS.  omit  this  wordjaye  and  read  saty  asane. 

* The  Varttika  snja  ^andrsta.nivnttQ  niyamiio. 

25  [h.o.b.  17] 


ii.  50 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [194 


many  inspirations  and  expirations.  In  the  same  manner,  the 
second  rising  up  of  the  checked  [vital  current]  is  measured  by  so 
many  inspirations  and  expirations.  Likewise  the  third.  Similarly 
it  is  gentle  [in  method] ; similarly  it  is  moderate  ; similarly  it  is 
keen.  Thus  it  is  regulated  by  number.  So  then,  practised  in 
these  ways,  [it  becomes]  protracted  and  subtile. 

He  introduces  the  sQtra  which  gives  the  characteristics  of  the  three  particular 
restraints  of  the  breath  by  saying,  «CBut  this.»  The  sOtra  begins  with  the  word 
60.  External  and  ends  with  the  word  subtile.  The  words  <Kin  fluctuation^ 
are  connected  with  each  [of  the  three].  He  refers  to  emission  (recalca)  when  he 
says  «In  case  . . . expiration.^  He  refers  to  inhalation  {puraka)  when  he  says 
«In  case  . . . inspiration.^  He  refers  to  suspension  (kumbhaka)  when  he  says 
«the  third.^  This  same  he  makes  clear  when  he  says  «in  case  ...  of  either 
kind.»  When  by  only  one  effort  of  retention  there  results  an  absence  of  both 
inspiration  and  expiration,  and  when  there  is  not,  as  before,  an  effort  to  prolong 
a long  stream  of  efforts  of  emission  ; but,  on  the  other  hand,  just  as  water  thrown 
upon  a very-hot  stone  dries  altogether  and  shrivels  up  wherever  it  falls,  so  this 
wind,  whose  nature  it  is  to  flow,  when  its  action  is  restricted  by  a mighty  effort 
of  retention,  becomes  subtilized  and  remains  in  the  body.  [Suspension]  does 
not  inhale  and  so  is  not  inhalation  ; does  not  emit  and  so  is  not  emission.  The 
words  «deals  with  a certain  amount  of  space)^  means  as  measured  by  a span,  [the 
space  between  the  outstretched  tips  of  the  thumb  and  the  foreflnger],  by  a vitasti 
[from  the  extended  thumb  to  the  tip  of  the  little  finger],  or  by  a hand.  And 
it  is  inferred  as  being  external  [in  so  far  as  it  causes]  motion  in  a blade  of  grass 
or  a piece  of  cotton  in  a windless  spot.  Similarly  if  internal,  it  begins  at  the 
sole  of  the  foot  and  extends  to  the  head.  And  it  is  inferred  by  [an  internal] 
touch  light  as  that  of  an  ant  [moving  on  the  body].  A moment  is  one  quarter 
of  the  time  required  for  the  act  of  winking.  [The  wind]  is  defined  by  the  limi- 
tation of  a certain  number  of  these  [moments].  An  instant  (matra)  is  the  time 
limited  by  snapping  thumb  and  forefinger  after  having  three  times  rubbed  one’s 
own  knee-pan  with  the  hand.  The  first  rising  up  {udghata)  measured  by  thirty- 
six  such  instants  is  called  slow.  The  same  [udghata]  when  doubled  is  moderate. 
The  same  tripled,  called  the  third,  is  keen.  This  same  restraint  of  the  breath 
he  describes  as  being  regulated  by  number  in  the  words  ^by  number.»  The 
time  for  snapping  thumb  and  forefinger  as  described  is  equal  to  the  time  defined 
by  the  action  of  inhalation  and  exhalation  of  a man  in  good  health.'  The  rising 
up  which  has  been  made  the  object  of  the  action  of  the  first  rising-up  is  con- 
quered [and]  mastered  [and]  checked.  It  is  intended  [by  these  measures  of 

* The  meaning  of  the  word  svastha  might  elaborated  at  length  in  most  of  the 

also  be  ‘ at  ease  ’ or  ‘ motionless  ’.  later  books  of  decadent  yoga.  Com- 

* See  Kurma  Pur.  ii.  11.  This  process  is  pare  also  Vayu  Pur.  v.  79-81. 


195] 


Fourth  restraint  of  hreath 


[ — ii.  51 


instants  to  indicate]  the  time  of  a certain  number  of  moments.  [And  this  time 
is  equal  to]  a certain  number  of  inspirations  and  expirations.  Thus  there  is  a 
slight  difference  [between  the  two  kinds  of  measures,  between  the  matra  and  the 
inspirations  and  expirations].  This  same  [restraint  of  breath]  when  practised 
day  by  day,  [increasing  gradually]  by  a day  [at  a time]  or  by  a fortnight  or  by 
a month  becomes,  in  so  far  as  it  is  made  to  cover  an  increasing  number  of  places 
or  of  times,  protracted.  And  in  so  far  as  it  is  reached  by  a concentration  of  the 
most  extreme  delicacy  it  is  said  to  be  subtile,  but  not  in  so  far  as  it  is  weak. 


61.  The  fourth  [restraint  of  the  hreath]  transcends  the  ex- 
ternal and  the  internal  object. 

The  external  object  regulated  in  place  and  time  and  number  is 
transcended ; the  internal  object  regulated  in  the  same  way  is 
transcended ; in  both  kinds  of  cases  [restraint]  is  protracted  and 
subtile.  Following  after  these  there  is  no  flow  of  either  kind. 
This  is  the  fourth  restraint  of  breath.  Now  the  third  restraint  of 
breath  is  without  regard  to  objects,  has  no  flow  [of  breath],  is 
begun  once  only,  is  regulated  in  place  and  time  and  number,  and 
is  protracted  and  subtile.  But  the  fourth,^  because,  in  consequence 
of  its  mastery  of  the  stages  in  order,  it  has  made  out  the  objects 
of  both  expiration  and  inspiration,  after  transcending  both  [ex- 
ternal and  internal  objects],  is  without  flow  and  is  the  <fourth> 
restraint  of  breath.  This  is  the  distinction. 

Thus  the  three  particular  restraints  of  breath  have  been  characterized.  The 
fourth  he  characterizes  with  the  words  51.  The  fourth  [restraint  of  the  breath] 
transcends  the  external  and  the  internal  object.  [The  Comment]  explains 
[the  sutra]  in  the  words  «place  and  time  and  number.!^  Transcended  means 
cast  down  because  its  form  has  been  mastered  by  practice.  It  is  also  protracted 
and  subtile.  Similarly,  «Follovving  after  these)^  means  the  restraint  of  breath 
which  has  external  and  internal  objects  and  which  follows  after  knowledge  of 
place  and  time  and  number.  The  fourth  does  not,  like  the  third,  arise  by  a 
single  effort  and  instantly.  But  while  in  practice  and  after  having  reached  the 
various  stages  according  as  it  succeeds  in  one  stage  after  another  it  proceeds  as 
he  says  ^inconsequence  of  its  mastery  of  the  stages. It  is  objected,  ‘In  the 
repressed  fluctuation  also  there  is  no  flow  of  either.  What  then  is  [its]  dis- 
tinction from  this  [fourth]?’  In  reply  he  says,  ^the  third. » The  third  does 
not  follow  after  any  regard  paid  to  [objects]  and  is  completed  by  a single  effort. 


^ See  Linga  Pur.  viii.  111. 


ii.  51 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [196 

But  the  fourth  is  preceded  by  the  regard  paid  to  objects  and  has  to  be  completed 
by  many  efforts.  This  is  the  distinction.  The  object  of  these  two,  the  inhala- 
tion and  the  emission,  is  not  considered  ; but  this  [object]  is  regarded  in  respect 
of  place  and  time  and  number.  This  is  the  meaning. 

52.  As  a result  of  this  the  covering  of  the  light  dwindles 
away. 

In  the  case  of  the  yogin  who  is  practising  restraints  of  breath,  the 
karma  capable  of  covering  discriminative  thinking  dwindles  away. 
What  this  is  they  tell  in  the  words,  “ Having  covered  the  sattva 
which  is  disposed  to  light  with  delusion  {indrajala)  made  of  infatu- 
ation, [undifferentiated-consciousness]  assigns  the  same  [obscured 
form]  to  deeds  which  are  not  to  be  dona”  Therefore  by  practising 
restraint  of  breath  his  karma  which  covers  the  light,  together  with 
its  bondage  to  the  round-of-rebirth,  becomes  powerless.  And  from 
moment  to  moment  it  dwindles  away.  And  in  this  sense  it  has 
been  said,  “ There  is  no  self-castigation  higher  than  restraint  of 
breath  ; from  it  comes  purity  from  defilement  and  the  clear  shining 
of  thought.” 

He  describes  the  subsidiary  purpose  [served  by]  restraint  of  breath.  52.  As  a 
result  of  this  the  covering  of  the  light  dwindles  away.  The  covering  is  that  by 
which  the  sattva  of  the  thinking-substance  is  covered,  in  other  words,  hindrances 
and  evil.  He  explains  [the  sutra]  in  the  words  Restraints  of  breath.»  Thinking 
ijnana)  is  that  by  which  anything  is  thought.  It  is  the  light  of  the  sattva  of  the 
thinking-substance.  Discriminative  thinking  is  the  thinking  of  discrimination. 
For  this  [hindrance],  since  it  covers  discriminative  thinking,  is  called  the  coverer 
{dvaramya)  according  [to  the  sutra  of  Panini  iii.  4.  68  which  says  that]  hhavya 
and  geya  and  pravacanlya  and  similar  forms  have  been  shown  to  be  used  as 
exceptional  forms  in  the  sense  of  agent,  just  as  for  instance  the  words  kopanlya 
and  ranjanlya.  So  here  also  the  affix  of  the  future  passive  participle  is  used  to 
denote  the  agent.  The  word  «karma»  connotes  the  merit  which  results  from  it 
and  the  hindrance  which  is  the  cause  of  it.  On  this  same  point  he  states  that 
there  is  a concurrence  of  opinion  with  those  who  have  the  tradition  {dgamin) 
in  the  words  «What  this  is  they  tell.^  Extreme  infatuation  is  passion. 
Undifferentiated-consciousness  (avidya)  too,  which  is  inseparable  from  it,  is  also 
to  be  understood  by  this  word.  A deed  ^not  to  be  done»  is  wrong-living.  An 
objector  asks,  ‘If  restiaint  of  the  breath  causes  evil  to  dwindle,  what  need  is 
there  of  self-castigation?’  In  reply  to  this  he  says  «becomes  powerless.^ 
It  does  not  dwindle  away  entirely.  Therefore  to  make  it  dwindle  away  altogether 
self-castigation  is  needed.  On  this  point  also  he  states  that  there  is  a concurrence 
of  opinion  with  those  who  have  the  tradition  {dgamin)  by  saying  «And  in  this 


197]  Fixed  attention  and  withdrawal  of  the  senses  [ — ii.  54 

sense  it  has  been  said.»  Manu  also  [vi.  72]  says,  “By  restraints  of  breath  one 
should  burn  up  defects.”  And  that  restraint  of  breath  is  also  an  aid  to  yoga 
is  also  stated'  by  the  Vishnu  Purana  [vi.  7.  40-1],  “But  restraint  of  breath 
which  masters  by  practice  the,  wind  called  breath  is  to  be  recognized  as  being 
seeded  and  as  seedless.  When  the  two  winds,  breath  {prana)  and  out-breath 
(apdna)  have  overcome  each  other,  that  is  two-fold.  The  third  is  the  result  of 
a subdual  of  these  two.” 


Furthermore, 

63.  For  fixed  attentions  also  the  central  organ  becomes  fit. 

Merely  in  consequence  of  practice  in  restraint  of  breath  [the 
central  organ  becomes  fit  for  fixed  attentions]  in  accordance  with 
the  statement  [i.  31],  “ Or  [he  gains  stability]  by  expulsion  and 
retention  of  breath.” 

Furthermore,  53.  For  fixed  attentions  also  the  central  organ  becomes  fit. 
For  restraint  of  breath  steadies  the  central  organ  and  makes  it  fit  for  fixed 
attentions. 


Now  what  is  the  withdrawal  of  the  senses  ? 

54.  The  withdrawal  of  the  senses  is  as  it  were  the  imitation 
of  the  mind-stufi*  itself  on  the  part  of  the  organs  by  dis- 
joining themselves  from  their  objects. 

When  there  is  no  conjunction  with  their  own  objects,  the  organs 
in  imitation  of  the  mind-stuff,  as  it  is  in  itself,  become,  as  it  were, 
restricted.  When  the  mind-stuff  is  restricted,  like  the  mind-stuff 
they  become  restricted ; and  do  not,  like  the  subjugation  of  the 
senses,  require  any  further  aid.  Just  as  when  the  king-bee  ^ flies 
up,  the  bees  fly  up  after  him ; and  when  he  settles  down,  they 
settle  down  after  him.  So  when  the  mind-stuff  is  restricted,  the 
organs  are  restricted.  This  then  is  the  withdrawal  of  the  senses. 
The  [yogin]  being  refined  in  this  way  by  means  of  abstentions  and  other 
[aids],  begins,  for  the  sake  [of  attaining]  constraint,  the  withdrawal  of  the 
senses.  In  order  to  introduce  the  sutra  giving  its  distinguishing  characteristic 
he  asks  the  question,  «:Now  The  sutra  begins  with  the  word  54.  . . . them- 
selves and  ends  with  the  words  withdrawal  of  the  senses.  The  mind-stuff 
also  is  not  in  contact  with  the  [various  kinds  of  things],  sounds  and  so  forth, 

' Compare  Naradlya  Pur.  xlvii.  16-17. 

’ Compare  Pra9ua  Up.  ii.  4.  Repeated  below  iii.  38.  This  is  what  we  call  queen-bee. 


ii.  54 — ] Book  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [198 

■which  bring  about  infatuation  and  attachment  and  anger.  And  because  it  is  not 
in  contact  with  them,  the  eye  and  the  other  organs  are  not  in  contact.  This  is 
what  is  called  the  imitation  of  the  mind-stuff  by  the  senses.  Because,  as  the 
mind-stuff  settles  down  upon  an  entity,  the  organs  of  this  [mind-stuff]  cannot  he 
said  to  imitate  the  mind,  since  their  object  is  always  external, — therefore  he 
says  «in  imitation  ...  as  it  were.^  [In  the  compound  beginning]  with  the 
word  «their  own  (sva)^  he  shows  by  the  locative  case  [in  the  word  abMve\  that 
the  reason  why  the  mind-stuff  is  imitated  is  because  of  the  property  common  [to 
the  mind-stuff  and  to  the  organs],  namely,  the  disjunction  from  their  o'wn  objects 
of  sense.  He  elaborates  [the  meaning  of]  the  imitation  by  saying  ^when  the 
mind-stuff  is  restricted.^  The  similarity  is  that  the  effort  which  causes  the 
restriction  of  both  is  similar.  Here  he  gives  a simile ' by  saying  «Just  as  when 
the  king-bee.^  He  applies  [the  simile]  to  the  thing  illustrated  by  saying  ^So.^ 
On  this  point  also  [he  quotes]  a sentence  from  the  Vishnu  Purana  ^ [vi.  7.  43], 
“A  man  skilled  in  yoga,  having  restrained  the  organs  attached  to  [the  various 
things],  sound  and  so  forth,  should  make  them  imitate  the  mind-stuff,  in  that 
he  is  intent  upon  the  withdrawal  of  the  senses.”  And  the  motive  for  this  is 
shown  in  the  same  place  [vi.  7.  44],  “ In  the  case  of  men  who  have  become 
motionless,  the  result  of  that  [withdrawal]  is  perfect  mastery  of  the  organs.  A 
yogin  with  unmastered  [organs]  cannot  accomplish  yoga.” 


55.  As  a result  of  this  [withdrawal]  there  is  complete  mastery 
of  the  organs. 

There  are  some  "who  think  1.  that  the  mastery  of  the  organs  is 
a lack  of  desire  for  the  various  things  sounds  and  so  forth. 
Longing  ivyasana)  is  attachment  in  the  sense  that  it  puts  him 
a long  way  from  (vy-asyati)  a good.  2.  [Others  think  that]  unfor- 
bidden experience  is  legitimate.  3.  Others,  that  there  may  be 
conjunction  [of  the  organs]  with  the  [various  things]  sounds  and 
so  forth  as  one  desires.  4.  Others  think  that  there  is  a subjuga- 
tion of  the  senses  when  there  is  no  passion  or  aversion  after  the 
thinking  of  the  various  things  is  without  pleasure  or  pain.  5.  Jaigi- 
savya  thinks  that  it  is  refusal  to  perceive  [the  various  things 
beginning  with  sound]  as  a result  of  the  mind-stuff’s  singleness-of- 
intent.  And  as  a result  of  this,  when  [the  yogin’s]  mind-stuff  is 
restricted,  the  organs  are  restricted,  [and]  there  is  not  as  in  the 
case  of  the  subjugation  of  the  other  organs,  any  further  need  of 


* Compare  iii.  38. 


- See  also  Naradiya  Pur.  Ixvii.  19-20. 


199]  Complete  mastery  of  the  organs  [ — ii.  55 

means  performed  with  effort.  But  this  mastery  which  is  this 
singleness-of-intent  is  the  complete  [mastery]. 

The  sQtra  is  explanatory  of  this  [mastery].  55.  As  a result  of  this  [with- 
drawal] there  is  complete  mastery  of  the  organs.  An  objector  asks,  ‘Are 
there  other  and  incomplete  masteries  in  comparison  with  which  this  may  be 
called  complete?  ’ Undoubtedly,  [he  says  in  reply].  He  shows  what  these  are 
in  the  words  ^the  various  things  beginning  with  sound.^  He  elaborates  the 
same  by  saying  ^desire. » Desire  is  passion,  attachment.  According  to  what 
derivation  ? It  is  that  which  rejects  him  [or]  throws  him  away  from  a good. 
When  there  is  none  of  this,  there  is  absence  of  desire,  in  other  words,  mastery. 
2.  He  describes  yet  another  [incomplete]  mastery  in  the  words  «unforbidden.» 
That  devotion  to  things  which  is  not  forbidden  by  the  Sacred  Word  and  other 
[authorities],  and  the  absence  of  sense  activity  with  regard  to  those  things  which 
are  forbidden  by  these.  Such  is  legitimate  because  it  does  not  depart  from  the 
law.  3.  He  describes  yet  another  [incomplete]  mastery  in  the  words  ^contact 
[of  the  senses]  with  the  [various  things]  beginning  with  sound.»  Contact  of 
the  organs  with  the  [various  things],  sounds  and  so  forth,  as  one  desires.  The 
meaning  is  that  with  regard  to  matters  of  enjoyment  he  is  independent  and  not 
dependent  on  enjoyment.  4.  He  describes  yet  another  [incomplete]  mastery  in 
the  words,  «no  passion  and  no  hatred.^  Some  say  that  it  is  a thinking  with- 
out pleasure  or  pain,  of  the  [various  things],  soimds  and  so  forth,  by  a detached 
observer.  5.  He  describes  that  masteiy  which  is  approved  by  the  author  of  the 
sQtras  and  is  also  approved  by  the  Supreme  Sage,  as  he  says,  ^as  a result  of  the 
mind-stuff’s  singleness-of-intent.;^  Jaigisavya  says  that  when  the  mind-stuff 
together  with  the  organs  is  single-in-intent,  there  is  no  sense-activity  with 
regard  to  [various  things]  beginning  with  sound.  The  [commentator]  says  that 
this  is  the  complete  mastery  in  the  words,  ^But . . . the  complete.^  The  word 
^but^  distinguishes  it  from  other  masteries.  For  the  other  masteries,  in  so 
far  as  they  are  in  contact  with  the  poisonous  snake  * (a^visa)  of  objects-of-sense 
{visaya),  do  not  escape  the  possibility  of  contact  with  the  poison  of  the  hindrances. 
For  even  a man  who  knows  the  lore  of  poisons  and  who  is  a perfect  master  of 
serpents  does  not  take  a serpent  on  his  lap  and  quietly  go  to  sleep.  This 
mastery,  on  the  other  hand,  from  which  all  intermixture  with  objects  has  been 
removed,  since  [in  it]  there  is  no  distrust,  is  called  complete,  as  he  says,  ^ot 
as  in  the  case  of  the  subjugation  of  the  other  organs.^  Although,  in  the  case  of 
consciousness  of  endeavour  [ii.  15],  when  one  organ  is  subdued  there  is  still 
need  of  another  effort  to  conquer  the  other  organs,  yet,  when  the  mind-stuff  is 
restricted,  there  is  no  such  need  of  further  exertion  in  order  to  restrict  the 
other  senses.  This  is  the  meaning. 


* ‘ One  in  which  poison  is  lying  ’ according  to  the  Gana  on  Panini  vi.  3.  109. 


ii.  55]  Booh  II.  Means  of  Attainment  or  Sadhana  [200 

Here  in  this  Book  he  has  taught  the  yoga  of  action  and  the  hindrances  to  karma 
and  the  fruitions  of  karma ; the  painfulness  of  these  [karmas]  and  also  the 
[four]  divisions : a group  of  five  subjects  appertaining  to  yoga. 


Of  Patanjali’s  [Yoga- treatise]  the  Second  Book,  entitled  Specifi- 
cation of  the  Means  of  Attainment. 


Of  the  Explanation  of  the  Comment  on  Patanjali’s  [Yoga-treatise],  whose 
Explanation  is  entitled  Clarification  of  the  Entities  {Tattva-Vdigaradl),  and 
which  was  composed  by  the  Venerable  Vacaspatimi^ra,  the  Second  Book, 
called  Specification  of  the  Means  of  Attainment,  is  finished. 


BOOK  THIED 

SUPERNORMAL  POWERS 


26  ["o  »•  '■»] 


BOOK  THIBD 


SUPERNORMAL  POWERS 

The  five  indirect  aids  [to  yoga]  have  been  described.  Fixed 
attention  ^ is  [now]  to  be  described. 

1.  Binding  the  mind-stuff  to  a place  is  fixed-attention. 

Binding  of  the  mind-stuff,  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  a fluctuation,  to 
the  navel  or  to  the  heart-lotus  or  to  the  light  within  the  head  or 
to  the  tip  of  the  nose  or  to  the  tip  of  the  tongue  or  to  other  ^ places 
of  the  same  kind  or  to  an  external  object, — this  is  fixed-attention. 
The  First  and  Second  Books  described  Concentration  and  the  means  thereto.  In 
the  Third  Book  the  supernormal  powers  are  to  be  described  which  are  reasons 
for  propagation  of  belief  and  which  are  favourable  to  this  [concentration  and 
its  means].  These  supernormal  powers  are  to  be  accomplished  by  constraints 
isamyama).  And  constraint  is  the  combination  of  fixed-attention  and  of  con- 
templation and  of  concentration.  So  inasmuch  as  these  [three]  are  the  means  of 
accomplishing  the  supernormal  powers,  we  have  here  a mention  of  these  three, 
in  order  to  make  known  the  particular  quality  of  each  as  being  direct  aids  to 
yoga  and  as  contrasted  with  the  five  which  are  indirect  aids.  And  with 
regard  to  these  [three],  fixed-attention  and  contemplation  and  concentration 
are  in  the  relation  of  cause  to  effect,  and  the  serial  order®  [of  causes  and 
effects]  is  specified.  Therefore  this  order  is  followed  in  the  order  of  the  state- 
ments. Accordingly,  fixed-attention  is  the  first  to  be  characterized.  So  he  says 
1.  Binding  the  mind-stuff  to  a place  is  fixed-attention.  He  describes  a 
place  belonging  to  one’s  self  by  the  words  <3Cto  the  navel.^  By  the  words 
«other  places  of  the  same  kind»  we  must  understand  the  palate  and  so  forth. 
The  binding  is  a relation.  He  describes  an  external  place  by  the  words  ^or 
to  an  external. » And  with  an  external  object  the  mind-stuff  as  such  cannot 
have  a relation.  So  it  is  said,  ^only  in  so  far  as  it  is  a fluctuation,S>  in  other 
words,  only  so  far  as  it  is  a perception.  On  this  point  also  there  is  a Purana,^ 
“ Having  mastered  his  breath  by  restraint  of  breath  and  his  organs  by  with- 

1 See  also  ii.  29  and  53.  I.  356  (Kielhom’s  ed.)  and  frequently. 

“ Compare  Maitrl  Upan.  vi.  20  and  Garuda  * Vishnu  Pur.  vi.  7.  45  and  Naradlya  Pur. 

Pur.  ccxxvi.  21.  Ixvii.  21. 

® Compare  Patanjali : Mahabhasya  I.  225® ; 


ii.  1 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vibhuti  [204 

drawal  of  the  senses,  he  should  make  a localization  of  the  mind-stuff  upon  some 
auspicious  support.”  Auspicious  supports  are  external,  Hiranyagarbba  and 
Vasava  and  Prajapati  and  so  forth.  And  this  has  also  been  said,'  “The  incarnate 
form  of  the  Exalted  One  leaves  one  without  desire  for  any  [other]  support. 
This  should  be  understood  to  be  fixed-attention,  when  the  mind-stuff  is  fixed 
upon  this  form.  And  what  this  incarnate  form  of  Hari,  on  which  one  should 
ponder,  let  that  be  heard  by  thee,  O Euler  of  Men.  Fixed-attention  is  not 
possible  without  something  on  which  to  fix  it.  His  face  is  calm,  his  eye  like  the 
lovely  lotus  petal,  his  cheek  is  beautiful,  the  expanse  of  his  broad  forehead  is 
resplendent  [with  the  light  of  thought],  the  charming  ornament  of  the  ear-ring 
is  placed  under  the  lobes  of  his  ears  which  are  equal  in  size,  his  neck  is  [marked 
with  three  lines]  like  a shell  of  the  sea,  his  great  broad  chest  is  marked  with 
the  (^rlvatsa,  his  belly  has  a deep  navel  and  broken  folds,  he  has  eight  long 
arms  or,  as  Vishnu,  four  arms,  his  thighs  and  legs  are  evenly  placed,  his  excel- 
lent ^ lotus  feet  [are  arranged]  as  a mystic  diagram.  He  is  like  Brahma  with  a 
stainless  yellow  garment,  and  is  adorned  with  a diadem  and  with  charming 
ai'mlets  and  bracelets  ; he  has  ^arnga  [Vishnu’s  bow]  and  the  discus  and  the 
mace  and  the  sword  and  the  conch  and  the  rosary — upon  him,  Vishnu,  let 
the  yogin  ponder ; and,  lost  in  him,  concentrate  his  own  mind  until, 
O King,  the  fixed-attention  becomes  firmly  fixed  upon  him  only.  While  per- 
forming this  or  while  doing,  as  he  wills,  some  other  action  wherein  his  mind 
does  not  wander,  he  should  then  deem  this  [fixed-attention]  to  be  perfected.” 


2.  Focusedness  of  tlie  presented  idea  upon  that  place  is 
contemplation. 

The  focusedness  of  the  presented  idea  upon  the  object  to  be 
contemplated^  in  that  place,  in  other  words, the  stream  [of  presented 
ideas]  of  like  quality  unaffected  by  any  other  presented  idea. 

He  characterizes  the  contemplation  which  is  to  be  effected  by  fixed-attention. 

2.  Focusedness  of  the  presented  idea  upon  that  place  is  contemplation. 
Focusedness  is  singleness-of-intent.  The  Comment  is  easy.  On  this  point 
also  there  is  a Purana,'  “An  uninterrupted  succession  of  presented-ideas  single- 
in-intent  upon  His  form  without  desire  for  anything  else,  that,  O King,  is 
contemplation.  It  is  brought  about  by  the  first  six  aids  [to  yoga].” 

3.  This  same  [contemplation],  shining  forth  [in  conscious- 
ness] as  the  intended  object  and  nothing  more,  and,  as  it 
were,  emptied  of  itself,  is  concentration. 

When  the  contemplation  only  shines  forth  [in  consciousness]  in  the 

' Vishnu  Pur.  vi.  7.  77-85  and  Naradiya  ® See  Garuda  Pur.  ccxxxv.  28.  29. 

Pur.  Ixvii.  54-62.  * Vishnu  Pur.  vi.  7.  89. 

® Reading  vara,  not  kara. 


205]  Contemplation  and  concentration  [ — iii.  4 

form  of  the  object-to-be-contemplated  and  [so]  is,  as  it  were,  empty 
of  itself,  in  so  far  as  it  becomes  identical  with  the  presented-idea 
as  such,  then,  by  fusing  [itself]  with  the  nature  of  the  object-to- 
be-contemplated,  it  is  said  to  be  concentration. 

He  gives  the  characteristic  of  concentration  which  is  to  be  attained  by  concen- 
tration [in  the  sutra]  3.  This  same  [contemplation]  ....  concentration. 
He  explains  [the  sutra]  in  the  words,  ^the  contemplation  only.^  The  words 
^shines  forth  [in  consciousness]  in  the  form  of  the  object-to-be-contem- 
plated»  signify  that  it  shines  forth  in  the  form  of  the  object-to-be-contemplated 
and  not  in  the  form  of  the  contemplation.  That  is  why  he  says,  <Kempty.» 
An  objector  asks,  ‘ If  it  be  empty,  how  could  the  object-to-be-contemplated 
appear  ? ’ In  reply  he  says,  «as  it  were.^  He  gives  the  reason  for  the  same 
in  the  words,  ^by  fusing  [itself]  with  the  nature  of  the  object-to-be-con- 
templated.» On  this  point  also  there  is  a Purana,^  “The  knowing  of  this 
same  [Vishnu]  as  he  is  when  free  from  two-termed-relations  {kaljoana)  is  a 
completion  of  the  contemplation  by  the  central-organ, — this  is  termed  con- 
centration.” A two-termed-relation  (Tcalpana)  is  a distinction  between  the 
contemplation  and  the  object-to-be-contemplated.  Concentration  is  free  from 
this.  This  is  the  meaning.  Kefidhvaja  after  having  described  to  Khandikya 
the  eight  aids  to  yoga,  sums  them  up  by  saying,'*  “The  soul  {ksetrajna)  has 
the  means.  Thinking  is  the  means.  It  is  inanimate.  When  [thinking]  has 
completed  its  task  of  release,  it  has  done  what  it  had  to  do  and  ceases.” 


These  same  three,  fixed-attention  and  contemplation  and  con- 
centration, in  one  are  constraint. 

4.  The  three  in  one  are  constraint. 

When  having  a single  object  the  three  means  are  called  constraint. 
So  the  technical  term  [now  laid  down]  in  this  system  for  these 
three  is  constraint. 

These  three,  fixed-attention  and  contemplation  and  concentration,  are  used  in 
many  places  [as  one].  It  would  be  laboured  to  enunciate  [each  time]  their 
respective  technical  terms.  So  for  brevity’s  sake  he  introduces  a sUtra 
which  [lays  down]  a technical  term  {paribhasa-sutra)  by  saying  «These  same.)» 
4.  The  three  in  one  are  constraint.  He  explains  [the  sutra]  by  sajdng  ^When 
having  a single  object.^  He  removes  a doubt  as  to  whether  [these  three] 
are  the  [naturally]  expressed  meaning  [of  the  word  constraint]  by  saying 
4Cfor  these  three. » The  system  {tantra)  is  that  authoritative-book  (gdstra) 
by  which  yoga  is  systematized  or  expounded.  ^In  this  system)^  means  in 

^ Vishnu  Pur.  vi.  7.  90  and  NaradTya  Pur.  Ixvii.  67. 

^ Vishnu  Pur.  vi.  7.  92  and  Naradlya  Pur.  Ixvii.  69. 


iii.  4 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vihhuti  [20G 

what  belongs  to  this  [system].  And  the  passages  [where  the  word]  constraint 
[is  used]  are  such  as  [iii.  16],  “As  a result  of  constraint  upon  the  three 
mutations.” 


5.  As  a result  of  mastering  this  constraint,  there  follows 
the  shining  forth  of  insight. 

As  a result  of  mastering  this  constraint  there  follows  the  shining 
forth  of  concentrated  insight.^  Just  in  proportion  as  constraint 
enters  the  stable  state,  in  that  proportion  the  concentrated  insight 
becomes  clear. 

He  mentions  the  result  of  success  in  constraint,  for  which  the  means-of- 
attainment  is  practice,  by  saying,  6.  As  a result  of  mastering  this  con- 
straint, there  follows  the  shining  forth  of  insight.  The  shining  forth  of 
insight  is  due  to  the  fact  that  it  remains  in  the  clear  stream  of  [the  yogin  who 
is]  not  overcome  by  other  ideas.  The  Comment  is  easy. 


6.  Its  application  is  by  stages. 

The  application  ^ of  it,  that  is,  the  constraint  is  to  that  stage  which 
is  next  the  stage  already  mastered.  For  by  overleaping  the  next 
stage  without  having  first  mastered  the  lower  stage,  [the  yogin] 
does  not  gain  constraint  in  the  highest  ^ stages.  If  he  did  not 
[gain  that  constraint],  how  could  he  gain  the  shining  forth  of 
insight?  Again,  the  constraint  of  one  who  by  the  grace  of  the 
l9vara  has  gained  a higher  stage  does  not  apply  to  such  things  as 
the  mind-stuff’s  thinking  ^ in  other  persons  who  are  on  the  lower 
stages.  Why  is  this  ? Since  the  purpose  of  this  has  been  obtained 
from  elsewhere.  Yoga  is  itself  the  only  spiritual  guide  [which  can 
show]  that  this  stage  is  next  to  that  stage.  How  is  this  ? Because 
it  has  been  said  to  be  thus. 

By  yoga,  yoga  must  be  known, 

Yoga  increaseth  yoga’s  store. 

He  who  for  yoga  care  hath  shown 
In  yoga  rests  for  evermore. 

» See  also  i.  35,  p.  80^ ; i.  42,  p.  88^* ; i.  44,  “A  good  illustration  is  found  in  Bhag. 
p.  94= ; i.  49-51,  pp.  100'',  10P>®,  102=,  Pur.  ii.  2,  in  which  Visnu  is  adored 

103=;  iv.  23,  p.  308®.  In  this  systempra-  from  his  feet  up  to  his  smile. 

yT((i  is  psychological  rather  than  ethical.  ® Compare  ii.  27.  ^ See  iii.  19. 


207] 


[ — iii.  7 


Stages  of  concentration 

But  when  applied,  in  what  cases  can  this  constraint  have  these  results  ? In 
reply  he  says,  6.  Its  application  is  by  stages.  The  author  oi  the  Comment 
particularizes  [the  meaning  of  the  word]  stage  by  saying,  <5Cof  it.»  Its  appli- 
cation is  to  that  state  as  yet  unmastered  which  is  next  to  the  stage  [already] 
mastered.  When  the  reflective  concentration,  whose  object  is  coarse,  is 
mastered  by  constraint,  the  [next]  application  of  constraint  is  to  super-reflective 
concentration  which  has  not  yet  been  mastered.  When  this  too  is  mastered, 
the  application  [of  the  restraint]  is  to  deliberative  [concentration].  Similarly, 
[when  this  is  mastered],  the  application  is  to  super-deliberative  [concentration]. 
Hence  in  the  Purana,^  when  the  balanced-state  the  object  of  which  is  coarse  is 
perfected,  then  there  is  later  introduced  that  concentration  the  object  of  which  is 
subtile,  in  that  the  various  weapons  and  ornaments  are  removed ; “ Then  the 
wise  man  should  ponder  upon  the  serene  form  of  the  Exalted  One,  without  its 
conch-shell  and  mace  and  discus  and  parnga,  but  having  its  string  of  beads. 
When  the  fixed-attention  has  become  stable  upon  this  form,  then  he  should  keep 
in  mind  the  form  without  the  ornaments,  especially  the  diadem  and  the  armlets. 
The  wise  man  should  make  the  god  to  have  only  one  limb  and  [should  think] 
‘ I am  he  Then  after  that  he  should  devote  himself  to  thought  of  ‘ I But 
why  after  having  mastered  a lower  stage  does  he  master  a higher  stage? 
[And]  why  is  there  not  a reverse  process  ? In  reply  to  this  he  says,  ^without 
having  first  subjugated  the  lower  stage,  [the  yogin]  does  not.)^  For  a man  pro- 
ceeding to  the  Ganges  from  Qilahrada  does  not  reach  the  Ganges  unless  he  first 
get  to  the  Meghavana.  ^Again  of  one  who  by  the  grace  of  the  Ifvara  has  gained 
a higher  staged — why  does  he  say  this  ? Because  the  purpose  of  this,  the 
success  in  the  higher  stage  which  comes  next,  has  been  obtained  from  elsewhere, 
that  is,  from  the  devotion  to  the  Ifvara.  For  when  an  act  has  its  action  finished, 
then  a means-of-attaining,  which  does  not  produce  anything  in  particular,  falls 
outside  the  function  of  [what  can  be  called]  a means.  The  objector  says,  ‘ This 
may  be  true.  It  is  known  in  a general  way  {dgamatah)  what  the  different 
subordinated  stages  are.  But  how  is  there  a knowledge  of  which  comes  after 
the  other?’  In  reply  to  this  he  says,  ^this  stage.»  Yoga  which  has  been 
previously  mastered  is  the  reason  for  proceeding  to  the  thinking  of  the  yoga 
which  comes  after.  This  passage  is  to  be  understood  by  supposing  that  a state 
is  equivalent  to  [a  yoga  which]  contains  a state. 


7.  The  three  are  direct  aids  in  comparison  with  the  previous 
[five]. 

The  same  three,  fixed-attention  and  contemplation  and  concentra- 
tion, are  direct  aids  to  conscious  concentration  in  comparison  with 
the  previous  means,  the  five  ^ beginning  with  the  abstentions. 

^ Vishnu  Pur.  vi.  7.  86-88  and  Naradlya  Pur.  Ixvii.  63-65. 

* Reading  yamddibhyah  pancabhyah. 


iii.  7 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vihhuti  [208 

But  why  is  constraint  applied  in  various  places,  and  not  the  other  five  aids 
to  yoga,  although  all  without  distinction  are  aids  to  yoga  ? In  reply  he  says, 
7.  The  three  are  direct  aids  in  comparison  with  the  previous  [five].  These 
three  means-of-attainment,  inasmuch  as  their  object  is  the  same  as  [the  object  of 
the  yoga]  to  be  accomplished,  are  direct  aids.  But  abstentions  and  the  other 
[four]  are  not  so.  They  are  therefore  indirect  aids.  These  three  means-of- 
attainment  are  direct  aids  only  with  reference  to  [yoga]  conscious  [of  objects], 
but  not  to  [yoga]  not  conscious  [of  an  object].  For  since  [yoga]  not  conscious 
[of  an  object]  is  seedless  [and  has  no  object],  it  does  not  have  the  same  object  as 
these  [three].  And  since  after  these  have  been  restricted  for  a long  time,  [uncon- 
scious yoga]  arises  subsequent  to  the  higher  passionlessness  consisting  in  the 
undisturbed  calm  of  perception,  another  name  of  which  is  the  higher  limit  of 
conscious  [yoga].  So  he  says,  ^The  same  three.» 


8.  Even  these  [three]  are  indirect  aids  to  seedless  [concen- 
tration]. 

Even  these,  the  three  direct  means-of-attainment,  are  indirect  aids  to 
seedless  yoga.  Why  is  this  ? Since  this  latter  occurs  even  when 
these  are  absent. 

8.  Even  these  [three]  are  indirect  aids  to  seedless  [concentration].  Hence 
that  which  determines  the  relation  of  direct  aid  to  this  is  sameness  of  objects  and 
not  a mere  sequence.  For  this  [sequence]  in  so  far  as  it  might  exist  in  the  case  of 
devotion  to  the  Ifvara,  which  is  an  indirect  aid,  would  make  the  application  [of 
direct  aid]  too  wide  (vydbhicdra).  If  this  is  established,  even  this  over-wideness 
of  the  characterization  which  would  include  mere  sequence  could  not  apply  to  this 
[constraint].  Therefore  it  is  still  less  probable  that  [this]  constraint  would  be  a 
direct  aid  to  [concentration]  not  conscious  [of  an  object].  To  show  that  this  is 
so  it  is  said,  ^Since  this  latter  occurs  even  when  these  are  absent.^ 


Now  since  during  the  restricted  moments  of  the  mind-stuff  the 
changes  of  the  aspects  (guna)  are  unstable,^  of  what  sort  at  those 
times  is  the  mutation  of  the  mind-stuff? 

9.  When  there  is  a becoming  invisible  of  the  subliminal- 
impression  of  emergence’^  and  a becoming  visible  of  the 


^ This  again  is  apparently  a portion  of  the 
fragment  of  Pancafikha  quoted  in 
ii.  15  (p.  135^^  of  theCalcutta  text),  to 
be  placed  before  fragment  1 1 of  Garbe. 
The  phrase  is  also  found  at  ii.  15, 


p.  135'i;  iii.l3,p.204» ; iv.  15,  p.  298h 
Compare  for  use  of  word  vrtta  in  the 
sense  of  ‘ behaviour  ’ ii.  33,  p.  177® 
(Calc.  ed.). 

® Reading  abhibhat'apradurbhavdu. 


209] 


Alternation  of  emergence  and  restriction  [ — iii.  9 

subliminal-impression  of  restriction,  the  mutation  of  re- 
striction is  inseparably  connected  with  mind-stuff  in  its 
period  of  restriction. 

The  subliminal-impressions  of  emergence  are  external-aspects 
[dharma)  of  mind-stuff ; since  they  do  not  consist  of  presented- 
ideas  they  are  not  restricted  when  presented-ideas  are  restricted. 
The  subliminal-impressions  of  restriction  are  also  external-aspects  of 
mind-stuff.  <When  these  two  [states  of  mind-stuff  ] become  visible 
or  become  in  visible, > [that  is  when]  the  subliminal-impressions  of 
emergence  are  withdrawing  and  the  subliminal-impressions  of  re- 
striction are  being  brought  into  place.  The  period  of  restriction  is 
inseparably  connected  with  the  mind-stuff.  Accordingly  the  muta- 
tion of  restriction  is  this  periodic  alteration  of  subliminal-impressions 
of  a single  mind-stuff,  because  then  the  mind-stuff  has  nothing  but 
subliminal-impressions,  as  has  been  explained  [i.  18]  with  reference 
to  the  concentration  of  restriction. 

With  the  intent  to  give  information  here  about  the  three  mutations  which  are  to 
be  made  use  of  in  the  sutra  [iii.  16],  “As  a result  of  constraint  upon  the  three 
mutations,”  he  asks,  incidentally  to  the  topic  of  seedless  [concentration],  <$CNow 
In  the  case  of  emergence  and  of  yoga  conscious  [of  objects],  since  there  is  an  ex- 
perience of  an  accumulation  of  various  very  clear  mutations,  there  has  been  no 
introduction  of  the  question.  But  in  the  case  of  restriction  the  mutation  is  not 
experienced.  Furthermore  it  cannot  be  said  that  because  it  is  not  experienced 
it  does  not  exist.  For  inasmuch  as  mind-stuff  is  made  up  of  three  aspects 
(guna),  and  since  also  the  changes  of  the  aspects  are  unstable,  an  absence  of 
mutation  even  for  a moment  is  impossible.  The  answer  to  the  question  is  the 
sutra  9.  . . . emergence  ....  mutation  of  restriction  ....  In  comparison  with 
concentration  unconscious  [of  any  object]  conscious  concentration  is  emergence. 
Kestriction  is  that  which  restricts.  It  is  the  undisturbed  calm  ^ of  perception 
[and  it  is  also]  the  higher  passionlessness.  There  is  a becoming  visible  and  a 
becoming  invisible  of  these  two  subliminal  impressions  of  emergence  and  the 
subliminal  impression  of  restriction,  that  is  to  say,  the  becoming  invisible  of  the 
subliminal-impression  of  emergence  and  the  becoming  visible  of  the  subliminal- 
impression  of  restriction.  The  mind-stuff  which  is  the  substance  in  the  period 
of  restriction,  that  is,  on  the  occasion  of  restriction,  is  inseparably  connected  with 


^ This  does  not  refer  to  samadhi  in  general, 
but  only  to  the  concentrated  insight 
(prajhd)  described  in  i.  47-48,  which 
is  without  influence  from  objects  and 
27  [h.o.s.  17] 


is  an  undisturbed  succession  of  clarifled 
samskara.  See  also  i.  18,  p.  47® ; ii.  27, 
p.  166®  (Calc,  ed.)  ; also  i.  51  and  the 
sutras  iii.  9-15. 


[210 


iii.  9 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vihhiiti 

both  of  these  states.  For  the  mind-stuff  as  substance,  whether  in  the  conscious 
or  unconscious  state,  does  not  differ  in  itself  in  so  far  as  subliminal  impres- 
sions become  visible  or  become  invisible  [within  it].  An  objector  says,  ‘Just  as 
later  hindrances  based  upon  undifferentiated-consciousness  (avidyd)  cease  when 
undifferentiated-consciousness  ceases,  and  consequently  there  is  no  need  of  further 
special  effort  to  repress  them,  so  the  subliminal-impressions  based  upon  ideas  of 
emergence  may  cease  at  the  very  moment  of  the  cessation  of  the  emergence.  And 
therefore  for  the  repression  of  them  there  should  be  no  need  of  the  subliminal- 
impressions  of  restriction.’  With  this  in  view  he  says,  «The  subliminal-impres- 
sions of  emergence.)^  The  cessation  of  a cause  in  general  is  not  a reason  for  the 
cessation  of  the  effect.  So  that  even  if  the  weaver  cease  to  be,  there  need  be  no 
cessation  of  the  cloth.  But  with  the  cessation  of  that  cause  which  is  constitutive 
of  the  nature  of  the  effect,  there  is  a cessation  of  the  effect.  Now  the  other 
hindrances  have  been  said  to  consist  of  undifferentiated-consciousness  [avidya). 
So  with  the  cessation  of  that  undifferentiated-consciousness  it  is  right  that  these 
[hindrances]  should  cease.  But  the  subliminal-impressions  whose  essence  is 
presented-ideas  are  not  such.  For  even  if  the  idea  be  restricted  for  a long  time, 
we  observe  a connecting  recollection  at  the  present  time.  Therefore  even  if  the 
presented-ideas  are  repressed  [nivrtti],  still  an  accumulation  of  subliminal-impres- 
sions of  restriction  must  be  resorted  to  in  order  to  repress  these  [subliminal- 
impressions  from  presented-ideas].  This  is  the  meaning.  The  rest  is  easy. 


10.  This^  [mind-stuff]  flows  peacefully  by  reason  of  the 
subliminal-impression. 

By  reason  of  the  subliminal-impression  of  restriction,  the  peaceful 
flow  of  the  mind-stuff  requires  dexterity  in  the  application  of  the 
subliminal-impressions  of  restriction.  When  these  ^ subliminal- 
impressions  become  weak,  the  subliminal-impression  which  has 
external  aspects  of  restriction  is  overwhelmed  by  the  subliminal- 
impression  which  has  external  aspects  of  emergence. 

But  if  there  be  an  overwhelming  (abhibhava)  of  the  emergent  subliminal-impres- 
sions in  all  respects,  of  what  sort  is  the  mutation  with  a powerful  subliminal- 
impression  of  restriction  ? In  reply  to  this  he  says,  10.  This  [mind-stuff] 
flows  peacefully  by  reason  of  the  subliminal-impression.  Calm  flowing  is  a 
flowing  of  a succession  of  restrictions  only  undefiled  by  the  subliminal  impres- 
sions of  emergence.  Why  is  dexterity  of  subliminal  impressions  needed,  but 
not  ordinary  subliminal-impressions  ? In  answer  to  this  he  says,  «When  these 

^ The  sutra  is  an  instance  of  dharma-  nirodha.  If  the  variant  nabhihhuyate 

parindma,  as  explained  in  the  Com-  be  accepted,  tat  must  refer,  as  Vaca- 

ment  on  iii.  13.  spati  points  out,  to  vyutthdna. 

* In  the  text  as  received,  tat  refers  to 


211]  Substantial  and  temporal  sing  leness-of -intent  [ — iii.  12 

subliminal -impressions  become  weak.»  The  word  ^these  refers  back  to 

restriction.  But  those  who  have  the  reading  ‘ are  not  overwhelmed  ’ would 
refer  by  the  word  <SCthese  {tad-a)^  to  emergence. 


11.  The^  mutation  of  concentration  is  the  dwindling  of 
dispersiveness  and  the  uprisal  of  singleness-of-intent 
belonging  to  the  mind-stuff. 

Dispersiveness  ^ is  an  external-aspect  of  the  mind-stuff.  Single- 
ness-of-intent is  an  external-aspect  of  the  mind-stuff.  The 
dwindling  of  dispersiveness  means  that  it  disappears  ; the  uprisal 
of  singleness-of-intent  means  that  it  becomes  apparent.  The 
mind-stuff  is  inseparably  connected  with  both  of  these  as  the 
substance  [in  which  they  inhere].  This  same  mind-stuff  being 
inseparably  connected  with  these  two  external-aspects  which 
belong  to  itself, — the  passing  away  [of  the  distributiveness]  and 
the  coming  forth  [of  the  singleness-of-intent], — becomes  concen- 
trated. This  is  the  mutation  of  concentration. 

He  shows  what  the  state  of  the  mind-stuff  is  in  the  mutation  of  concentration 
conscious  [of  objects].  11.  . . . dispersiveness  ....  mutation  of  concentration. 
Dispersiveness  is  distractedness.  Being  existent  ® it  does  not  {san  na)  cease  to 
be.  Dwindling  is  disappearing.  Because  a non-existent  does  not  arise  [in  con- 
sciousness], an  uprisal  is  a becoming  apparent.  The  mind-stuff  which  is  insepar- 
ably connected  with  the  passing  away  of  dispersiveness  and  the  coming  forth 
of  singleness-of-intent,  which  are  its  external-aspects — the  dispersiveness  having 
the  passing  away  and  the  singleness-of-intent  having  the  coming  forth — this 
mind-stuff  is  concentrating  itself,  that  is,  is  becoming  qualified  as  having  a 
concentration  which  is  to  be  attained  in  successive  steps. 


12.  Then^  again  when  the  quiescent  and  the  uprisen  pre- 
sented ideas  are  similar®  [in  respect  of  having  a single 
object],  the  mind-stuff  has  a mutation  single-in-intent. 

The  quiescent  is  a previous  presented  idea  of  one  whose  mind-stuff 
is  concentrated ; the  uprisen  is  a later  presented-idea  of  the  same 


^ The  sutra  is  an  instance  of  laJcsana-  * According  to  the  scheme  of  iii.  13  this 
parinama,  as  explained  in  iii.  13.  would  appear  to  be  an  instance  of 

* See  iv.  23.  avasthd-joarindma. 

If  the  reading  be  sd  na,  the  translation  ® The  Maniprabha  explains  the  word  ‘ alike’ 
would  be  simpler,  ‘ It  does  not  cease  {tulya)  by  adding  ekavisayatvena, 

to  be.’ 


iii.  12 — ] Booh  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vihhuti  [212 

kind  as  this  [previous  presented-idea].  But  the  mind-stufF  of 
concentration  is  likewise  inseparably  connected  with  both.  This 
is  so  until  the  breaking  down  of  the  concentration.  This  same 
mutation  of  singleness-in-intent  belongs  to  the  mind-stuff  in  which 
it  resides  [dharminah). 

12.  Then  ...  a mutation  , . . Then  again,  that  is,  when  the  serial  order  of 
the  states  of  concentration  is  completed,  the  quiescent  and  the  uprisen  [that  is] 
the  past  and  the  present  are  similar-presented-ideas,  that  is,  similar  and  presented- 
ideas.  But  the  similarity  is  a result  of  the  singleness-in-intent.  The  words 
«of  one  whose  mind-stuff  is  concentrated)^  indicate  that  the  concentration  is 
completed.  The  words  «This  is  so)^  mean  that  it  is  single-in-intent.  He  tells 
what  the  limit  of  this  is  by  saying  «until  the  breaking  down  of  the  concentra- 
tion)^ [that  is]  until  there  is  a falling  [of  the  concentration]. 


13.  Thus,  with  regard  to  elements  and  to  organs,  mutations 
of  external-aspect  and  of  time-variation  and  of  intensity- 
have  been  enumerated. 

<Thus,>  by  the  already  (iii.  9)  described  mutations  of  mind-stufF  in 
external-aspect  and  in  time-variation  and  in  intensity.  The  muta- 
tion of  external-aspect  in  elements  and  organs,  the  mutation  of 
time-variation  and  the  mutation  of  intensity  are  to  be  understood 
as  having  been  described.  Of  these  [three]  the  mutation  of  ex- 
ternal-aspect takes  place  in  the  substance  and  is  the  becoming 
invisible  of  the  external  aspect  of  emergence  and  the  becoming 
visible  of  the  external  aspect  of  restriction.  And  the  mutation 
of  time- variation  is  the  restriction  having  the  three  time-variations, 
[that  is,]  connected  with  the  three  time-forms  [adhvan).  This 
[restriction],  one  may  say,  puts  aside  the  first  time-form  whose 
time-variation  is  yet  to  come,  and  passes  into  the  present  time- 
variation,  without  however  passing  out  of  its  state  as  external- 
aspect.  But  in  this  [condition]  it  becomes  manifest  as  being  what 
it  is.  This  is  its  second  time-form.  And  it  is  not  completely 
severed  from  past  or  from  future  time-variations. — Likewise 
emergence  has  the  three  time-variations  ; it  is  connected  with  the 
three  time-forms.  Having  put  aside  the  present  time-variation  it 
passes  over  into  the  past  time-variation,  without  however  passing 
out  of  its  state  as  external-aspect.  This  is  its  third  time-form. 


[ — iii,  13 


213]  Three  types  of  mutation 

And  it  is  not  completely  severed  from  the  future  and  the  present 
time- variations.  In  the  same  manner,  emergence,  completing  itself 
again  [as  a phenomenalized  form],  having  put  aside  the  future  time- 
variation,  and  not  having  passed  out  of  its  state  as  external-aspect, 
passes  into  the  present  time-variation.  In  which  [time],  since  this 
[emergence]  manifests  itself  as  it  is,  it  obtains  its  functional 
activity.  This  is  the  second  time-form  of  this  [emergence].  And 
it  is  not  completely  released  from  past  and  future  time-variations. 
— In  the  same  way  it  continues,  now  restriction,  now  emergence. — 
Similarly  the  mutation  of  intensity  [is  described].  In  it,  during 
the  moments  of  restriction,  the  subliminal-impressions  of  restriction 
become  powerful  and  the  subliminal-impressions  of  emergence 
become  weak.  This  then  is  the  external-aspects’  mutation  of 
intensity.  In  these  cases  the  substance  has  a mutation  in  its 
external-aspects  ; the  external-aspects  have  mutation  in  time-varia- 
tions ; and  the  time-variations  also  have  mutation  in  intensities. 
Consequently  the  changes  of  the  aspects  {guna)  do  not  remain, 
even  for  a moment,  devoid  of  mutations  of  external-aspect  and  of 
time-variation  and  of  intensity.  For  (ca)  the  changes  of  the  aspects 
{guna)  are  unstable.^  And  we  say  [hereafter  in  this  sutra]  that  it 
is  of  the  very  nature  of  the  aspects  to  cause  activity. — Thus  we 
have  to  understand  the  three-fold  mutation  [of  external-aspect  and 
of  time-variation  and  of  intensity]  in  the  case  of  elements  and 
organs,  because  there  is  the  distinction  between  the  substance  and 
the  external-aspects.  But  in  the  strict  sense  there  is  but  a single 
mutation.  For  the  external-aspect  is  nothing  more  than  the  sub- 
stance itself.  Since  it  is  merely  an  evolved  form  of  the  substance 
amplified  in  the  form  of  an  external-aspect.  In  such  cases  there 
is  within  the  substance  an  alteration  of  the  condition  of  the  present 
external-aspect  with  regard  to  past  and  future  and  present  time- 
forms.  There  is  no  alteration  of  the  matter.  Just  as  by  dividing 
a plate  of  gold  there  is  an  alteration  of  its  condition,  in  so  far  as  it 
is  altered  ; [but]  there  is  no  alteration  of  the  gold.  An  opponent 
objects  as  follows,  ‘A  substance  is  nothing  over  and  above  the 

* Once  more  this  appears  to  be  quoted  from  fragment  11  of  Panca9ikha  in  its  completer 
form.  Compare  above,  p.  134,  note,  and  p.  208,  note. 


[214 


iii.  13 — ] Booh  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vihhuti 

external -aspects  [which  as  properties  depend  upon  it].  For  [a  sub- 
stance] cannot  pass  beyond  its  [own]  previous  existence.  If,  again, 
[substance]  were  a something  present  in  all  its  external-aspects,  but 
different  from  them,  then  it  would  come  to  be  known  ^ [viparivarteta) 
as  a something  itself  absolutely  unchanged,  although  connected^ 
with  a series  of  changes  [in  the  external-aspects].’  But  this,  [he 
replies,  involves]  no  weakness  [in  our  position].  [And]  why  [not]  ? 
Because  we  do  not  maintain  an  absolute  ^ unity.  [The  fact  is  that 
all]  this  world  passes  out  of  the  state  of  a phenomenalized 
[individual]  form.^  And  this  we  say  because  [we  are  bound  to] 
deny  that  [the  world]  is  permanent  [in  the  sense  of  not  entering 
into  mutations].  Again  [the  world  of  things]  continues  to  exist 
even  after  it  has  passed  out  [of  phenomenalized  individual  existence]. 
For  [we  are  obliged]  to  deny  its  annihilation.  On  being  refunded 
[into  its  primary  cause  by  the  dissolution  of  the  coarse  elements,]  it 
[the  world  takes  on]  a subtile  form.  And  by  reason  of  this  subtile 
form  it  becomes  unapperceived.  An  external-aspect  ® in  the 
mutation  of  time- variation  exists  really  in  [all  three]  time-forms. 
[It  is  said  to  be]  past  [that  is]  having  the  past  time- variation, 
though  not  completely  severed  from  future  and  present  time- 
variations.  [So  too  it  is  said  to  be]  future  [that  is]  having  the 
future  time-variation,  though  not  completely  severed  from  present 
and  past  time-variations.  [So  also  it  is  said  to  be]  present  [that 
is]  having  a present  time-variation,  though  not  completely  severed 
from  past  and  future  time-variations.  Take  the  case  of  a man 
enamoured  of  one  particular  woman — he  has  not  thereby  lost  his 
sexual  feeling  for  the  rest  of  women-folk.  Here  the  difficulty  is 


' Compare  ahhidhana-^akti-pariirtta  iii.  17, 
p.  223'  (Calc.  ed.). 

® The  "word  mparivarteta  implies  a series 
of  changes  in  some  subordinate  and 
additional  thing,  or  some  added  pro- 
perty in  the  unchanged  thing.  Compare 
parivartanam  in  Sarva-darfana-sam- 
graha  (Anandaframa  Sanskrit  Series), 
page  8,  line  8 from  below. 

* This  word  is  discussed  in  Patanjali : 


Mahabhasya  I.  180’,  207'®,  266’’  (Kiel- 
horn). 

* This  vyakti  is  the  condition  of  the  thing 
when  so  changed  as  to  be  manifest  to 
our  consciousness,  that  is,  when  we 
can  observe  the  effects  it  brings  about. 

® In  the  Yoga  system  the  dharma  is  real ; 
in  the  Vedanta  it  is  unreal  (vivarta). 
The  dhanna  is  constantly  changing 
into  another  thing ; but  involves  the 
concept  of  permanence. 


215]  External-aspect,  time-variation,  intensity  [ — iii.  13 

brought  forward  by  others  ‘ that  since  all  three  time- variations  are 
[thus  said  to  be]  connected  with  everything  that  is  in  the  mutation 
of  time-variation,  it  must  follow  [prdpnoti)  that  the  time-forms  are 
confounded.’  We  meet  this  objection  thus  (tasya  parihdra).  What 
is  termed  the  common  nature  of  things  as  external-aspects  cannot 
be  brought  into  existence  [at  our  pleasure].  The  common  nature 
[as  external  aspect]  exists  [independently]  and  therefore  in  regard 
to  it  the  distinctions  of  time-variations  must  be  maintained.  Thus 
it  must  not  be  said  that  the  common  nature  of  this  or  that  thing 
exists  only  in  the  present  time.  Because  if  this  were  so,  the  mind- 
stuff  could  never  become  subject  to  passion  [for  a certain  object]. 
For  anger  [against  some  other  object  being  by  supposition  now 
present  in  the  mind-stuff],  desire  would  not  move  actively  forth. 
Moreover  it  is  not  possible  for  the  three  time-variations  to  belong 
simultaneously  to  one  and  the  same  [individual]  phenomenalized 
form.  But  what  is  possible  is  the  presentation  {bhdva)  in  successive 
times  of  its  phenomenal  ^ [form]  by  the  operation  of  the  conditions- 
which-phenomenalize  (vyanjaka)  it.  Thus  it  has  been  said,^  “ The 
[outer]  forms  [when  developed  to]  a high  degree  and  the  [inner] 
fluctuations  [when  developed  to]  a high  degree  oppose  each  other  ; 
but  the  generic  forms  co-operate  with  [these  when  developed  to] 
a high  degree.”  Hence  [time-variations]  are  not  confounded.  To 
take  an  example.  When  we  say  absolutely  {eva)  that  passion  for 
a certain  thing  has  shown  itself,  [we  do  not  mean]  that  at  that 
time  [passion]  for  another  object  is  non-existent ; [but  we  mean 
that  passion  for  another  object]  continues  to  be  present  [in  the 
mind-stuff]  though  in  a generic  [unphenomenalized]  form.  Hence  it 
[the  passion]  for  that  [other  object]  exists  at  that  time  {tadd  tatra 
tasya  bhdva).  A similar  [explanation  can  be  given]  in  the  case  of 
time-variation  [also].  The  three  time-forms  do  not  belong  to  the 
substance  but  to  the  external-aspects.  These  [external-aspects] 
have  a time-variation  or  do  not  have  a time-variation.  And  as 
entering  into  various  intensities  are  known  by  different  names 
[which  imply]  an  alteration  of  intensity  but  not  of  matter.  Thus 

' Compare  i.  11,  p.  37*  (Calc.  ed.). 

* Compare  ii.  15,  p.  136'  (Calc,  ed.)  and  the  parallels  given  there. 


[216 


iii.  13 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vihliidi 

the  same  stroke  is  termed  one  ^ in  the  unit-place  and  ten  in  the 
ten’s  place  and  a hundred  in  the  hundred’s  place.  So  too  the  same 
woman  is  called  a mother  and  a daughter  and  a sister.  Some 
persons  have  objected  ‘ that  in  the  case  of  a thing  which  mutates  in 
intensity  [the  substance  of  the  thing]  must  logically  be  held  to  be 
(prasanga)  absolutely  permanent.  How  is  this  ? On  the  ground 
that  it  is  functional  activity  ^ of  the  thing  which  determines  the 
[special]  time-form  of  the  thing.  Thus  a thing  is  said  to  be  a future 
thing  when  it  is  not  exerting  its  own  activity,  and  a present  thing 
when  it  is  thus  active,  and  a past  thing  when  it  has  ceased  from 
activity.  Hence,  say  these  persons,  it  follows  that  substance  and 
external-aspect  and  time-variation  and  intensity  are  all  absolutely 
permanent.’  But  that  [alleged]  weakness,  [we  say],  does  not  exist 
[in  our  position] ; for  we  hold  that  although  a substrate  (gunin)  is 
permanent,  its  aspects  (guna)  suffer  a variety  of  antagonisms. 
Just  as  any  arrangement  of  parts,  [samsthdna)  [which  are  coarse 
elements,]  is  only  an  external-aspect  of  the  imperishable  subtile 
elements,  sound  and  the  rest,  and  has  a beginning  and  an  end,  so 
the  resoluble  [into  primary  matter]  is  only  an  external-aspect  of 
the  imperishable  aspects  [guna),  the  sattva  and  the  others,  and 
has  a beginning  and  an  end,  and  to  it  [and  to  the  rest]  the  term 
evolved-form  [vikdra)  is  applied.  The  following  serves  as  an 
illustration.  1 . The  substance  clay  passes  from  its  external-aspect 
in  the  form  of  a round  lump  of  clay  into  another  external-aspect. 
And  thus  as  an  external-aspect  enters  into  mutation  in  the 
form  of  a water-jar.  2.  The  water-jar-form  putting  aside  its  future 
time- variation  assumes  its  present  time-variation ; here  is  the 
mutation  as  time- variation.  3.  The  water-jar  is  every  moment 
undergoing  oldness  and  newness  [in  its  parts]  and  thus  passes 
through  mutations  of  intensity.  Thus  the  substance  also  has 
another  external-aspect,  which  is,  the  intensity ; and  the  external- 

‘ Contrary  to  Mr.  G.  R.  Kaye’s  opinion  the  Mihira  (born  505  near  Ujjain)  in  his 

folio  wing  passages  show  that  the  place-  Pancasiddhantika  (ed.  Thibaut,  1889), 

system  of  decimals  was  known  as  early  p.  xxx. 

as  the  sixth  century  A.D.  See  Aryabhata  ^ The  point  is  that  the  thing  is  neither 
(born  476  a.d.)  in  his  Aryabhatiya  produced  nor  destroyed,  but  is  its 

(ed.  Kern,  1874),  p.  x and  ; Varaha  activity. 


217] 


One  ultimate  type  of  mutation  [ — iii.  13 


aspect  has  also  another  time-variation,  which  is,  the  intensity. 
There  is  therefore  only  one  [kind  of  a]  mutation  of  matter,  though 
variously  described  [by  us].  The  same  explanation  is  applicable 
to  other  things  ^ also.  The  mutations  of  external-aspect  and  of 
time- variation  and  of  intensity  [as  here  described]  do  not  transcend 
the  substance  ^ as  such.  Hence  there  is  only  one  kind  of  a muta- 
tion which  includes  all  those  varieties  we  have  described.^  What 
then  is  a mutation  ? It  is  the  rise  of  another  external-aspect  in 
a permanent  matter  after  an  earlier  external-aspect  has  been 
repressed. 

As  being  relevant  to  the  discussion  and  as  being  useful  to  further  discussion 
he  gives  the  divisions  of  the  mutations  of  elements  and  of  organs  in  the  sQtra 
13.  Thus  . . . enumerated.  He  explains  [the  sutra]  by  saying  ^Thus.^  An 
objector  asks,  ‘It  is  only  the  mind-stuff  that  has  been  described  as  being  in 
mutation,  not  its  various  kinds,  the  mutation  of  external-aspect  and  of  time- 
variation  and  of  intensity.  So  how  can  this  [that  has  been  said]  be  extended 
by  analogy  * to  these  latter  ? ’ In  reply  to  this  he  says,  ^of  emergence  and  of 
restriction. » Although  the  words  external-aspect  and  time-variation  and  inten- 
sity have  not  been  previously  mentioned,  it  is  not  however  true  that  the  mutations 
of  external-aspect  and  of  time-variation  and  of  intensity  have  not  been  described. 
This  is  the  point  in  brief. — To  continue.  The  mutation  of  external-aspect  has 
been  described  in  the  words  of  this  sutra  [iii.  9],  “subliminal-impression 
of  emergence  . . . subliminal-impression  of  restriction.”  And  in  showing  this 
mutation  of  external-aspect,  he  has  at  the  same  time  indicated  the  mutation  of 
time-variation,  which  has  its  locus  in  the  external-aspect,  as  he  says  in  the 
words,  «the  mutation  of  time-variation.^  A time-variation  {laksana)  is  that 
by  which  a kind  of  time  is  characterized.  Tor,  characterized  by  this,  a thing  is 
distinguished  from  other  things  with  other  times  connected  with  them.  The 
expression,  «the  restriction  having  three  time-variations»  has  its  explanation 
in  the  words  ^connected  with  the  three  time-forms.)^  The  word  ^time-form)^ 
is  an  expression  for  time.  ^This  [restriction],  one  may  say,  puts  aside  the  first 
time-form  whose  time-variation  is  yet  to  come.)^  Does  it  then  go  beyond  its 
state  as  an  external-aspect  possessing  a time-form?  No,  he  says.  ^Without 
however  passing  out  of  its  state  as  external -aspect.^  That  very  mutation  which 
was  yet  to  come  is  now  present ; but  the  restriction  [which  was  yet  to  come] 


* This  would  apply  to  the  whole  (cdo-poy. 

* The  mutations  do  not  differ  from  the 

substance,  but  are  the  conditions  for 
the  self-identity  of  the  substance. 

® For  the  reason  that  all  change  depends 

28  [h.o.s.  17] 


upon  the  dharmin  which  remains  un- 
changed amid  change. 

* The  words  aiidega,  amidega,  and  ddega  are 
discussed  in  Patanjali’s  Mahabhasya 
on  i.  1.  56,  vart.  1,  p.  133  foot  (Kiel- 
horn’s  ed.). 


[218 


iii.  13 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vibhuti 

does  not  [now]  cease  to  be  a restriction.  This  is  the  meaning. — Now  comes  his 
explanation  of  the  present  in  the  words  «in  which  condition  it  becomes  manifest 
as  being  what  it  is)^  in  other  words,  in  its  nature  ^ as  producing  certain  effects 
peculiar  to  it.  «A  manifestation»  is  a moving  actively  forth.  This  is  its 
second  time-form  as  compared  to  its  first  time-form  which  was  yet  to  come. 
An  objector  says,  ‘ This  may  be  so.  But  if  one  has  reached  the  present  after 
having  put  aside  the  future  time-form,  and  after  having  put  aside  this  [present]  he 
is  to  reach  the  past,  then  Sir,  there  would  be  a creation  and  destruction  of  [these] 
time-forms.  And  this  is  not  a desired  result.  For  nothing  is  made  to  grow  out 
of  a non-existent,  nor  is  an  existent  ever  destroyed.’  In  reply  to  this  he  says 
« And  it  is  not.)^  The  meaning  is  that  he  is  not  disconnected  from  the  future 
and  the  past  time-forms,  inasmuch  as  they  persist  in  their  generic  form.  Having 
shown  that  the  future  restriction  has  a present  time-variation,  he  shows  that  the 
present  emergence  has  a past,  its  third  form,  by  saying,  «In  the  same  way, 
emergence.^  So  then  is  the  restriction  alone  future,  and  is  the  emergence  not 
[future]  ? No.  As  he  says,  «In  the  same  manner,  now  emergence.^  So  there 
is  a re-existence  as  regards  the  generic  form  of  emergence,  but  not  as  regards  the 
[individual]  phenomenalized  form.  For  the  past  does  not  exist  again. — Manifesta- 
tion of  itself,  as  it  is,  is  the  same  as  the  fact  that  that  which  is  able  to  produce 
effects  becomes  visible.  This  mutation  of  time-variation,  as  described,  recurs  again 
and  again  in  things  of  this  kind,  as  he  says,  «In  the  same  way  . . now.^ — He 
describes  the  mutation  of  intensity,  which  has  only  been  pointed  out  by  the 
mutation  of  external -aspect,  by  saying,  ^Similarly, . . . intensity. » In  the  case 
of  external-aspects,  the  time-form  of  which  is  present,  the  intensity  is  equiva- 
lent to  the  presence  or  absence  of  power.  And  the  mutation  is  the  gradation  of 
this  [intensity]  from  moment  to  moment.  He  concludes  this  discussion  by 
the  words  «In  these  cases.^  He  specifies  the  various  mutations  as  having  a 
variety  of  relations  “ in  accordance  ® with  the  teaching  of  the  system,  as  he  says 
«In  these  cases  the  substance.^  Then  is  this  mutation  of  the  aspects  {gum) 
occasional?  The  reply  is,  No.  As  he  says  «Consequently.»  But  why  is  this 
mutation  perpetual?  In  reply  he  says  «For  (ca)  . . . unstable.»  The  word 
«For  (ca)»  is  in  the  sense  of  cause.  The  «changes»  are  the  behaviour  (pracdra). 
Why  is  it  just  so  ? In  reply  he  says  «that  which  constitutes  the  aspects  (guna).'^ 
«Is  said  to  be»  later  in  this  same  [sutra]. — So  this  three-fold  mutation  of  mind- 
stuff  also  is  expounded  by  the  author  of  the  sutras  with  regard  to  elements  and 
organs  as  he  says  ^Thus.»  This  three-fold  mutation  is  the  result  of  the  distinc- 
tion between  substance  and  external-aspects  ; it  is  based  upon  the  distinction 
between  the  substance  and  the  external-aspects.  So  we  have  {tatra)  a mutation 

‘ The  thing  is  what  it  is  (ro5f  ri)  because  is  a thing  in  relation. 

the  mutation  is  fulfilling  a purpose.  * Referring  to  the  Pancacikha’s  calath  ca 
This  is  the  essence  of  any  individual  gunavrttam,  which  is  not,  however, 

form.  here  expressly  attributed  to  him.  Com- 

* ksambandha  is  a relation;  d, sambandhin  pare  p.  213,  note  1. 


219]  Substances  and  external-aspects  contrasted  [ — iii.  13 

such  as  a cow  or  a water-jar  as  an  external-aspect  of  the  substances  earth  and 
other  elements.  And  the  external-aspects  have  mutations  of  time-variation  such 
as  past  and  future  and  present.  Again  the  cow  or  other  [animal]  changed  into 
its  present  time-variation  has  mutations  of  intensity,  such  as  childhood  and  boy- 
hood and  youth  and  old  age.  And  the  water-jar  or  other  [thing]  has  its  mutation  of 
intensity,  such  as  newness  or  oldness. — Similarly  organs,  which  are  substances, 
have  external  aspects,  which  are  the  seeing  of  blue  or  of  other  colours.  The 
external  aspect  has  the  present  and  the  other  time-variations.  The  time-variation 
which  has  the  seeing  of  a jewel  or  some  other  [thing]  has  a mutation  of  intensity, 
such  as  the  clearness  or  lack  of  clearness  [of  the  seeing].  This  mutation,  thus 
described,  of  elements  and  of  organs,  is  to  be  understood  as  being  based  upon 
the  distinction  between  the  substance  and  its  external-aspects  and  time-variations 
and  intensities.  But  as  referring  to  the  lack  of  distinction  between  them,  it  is 
mentioned  when  he  says  ^But  in  the  strict  sense.»  The  word  ^but»  differen- 
tiates this  from  the  view  that  they  are  distinct.  The  absolute  reality  of  this 
[mutation]  is  asserted,  but  [the  absolute  reality]  of  the  other  [three-fold]  muta- 
tion is  not  denied.  Why  ? ^For  the  external-aspect  is  nothing  more  than  the 
substance  itself.^  An  objector  says,  ‘ If  the  external-aspect  is  merely  an  evolved 
form  of  the  substance,  how  then  should  the  idea  prevail  in  the  world  that  there 
is  no  confusion  in  the  case  of  these  [three]  mutations  ? ’ In  reply  to  this  he  says, 
^n  the  form  of  an  external-aspect.^  The  word  «external-aspect»  is  here  equiva- 
lent to  external-aspect  and  to  time-variation  and  to  intensity.  It  is  the  substance 
that  enters  into  evolved-forms  through  the  medium  of  these.  So  the  [evolved- 
form]  is  one  and  is  also  not  confused  with  [another].  Because  [the 
external-aspects]  the  medium  of  this  [substance],  although  not  distinct  from  the 
substance,  are  not  confused  with  each  other.  An  objector  says,  ‘ If  the  external- 
aspects  are  not  distinct  from  the  substance,  and  if  the  time-forms  of  the  substance 
are  distinct,  then  since  the  external-aspects  are  not  different  from  the  substance, 
the  external-aspects  would  be  like  a substance.’  To  which  he  replies,  ^In 
such  cases  ...  of  the  . . . external-aspect.»  The  ^tate^  means  a particular 
arrangement-of-parts.^  Just  as  a plate  of  gold^  or  of  some  other  substance 
may  receive  a particular  name  and  [be  called]  a necklace  or  a svastika,  [so]  there 
is  an  alteration  only  as  [concerns  the  form  of  the  ornaments],  but  the  matter 
gold  does  not  become  something  not  gold,  because  there  is  no  absolute  distinction 
[between  the  substance  and  the  external-aspect].  This  is  the  intention  of  what 
he  is  about  to  say.  He  brings  forward  a Buddhist,  who  holds  the  doctrine  of 
the  absolute  unity  [of  substance  and  of  external-aspect],  by  saying,  «An  opponent 
objects  as  follows.^  ‘ For  the  necklace  and  other  things  thus  coming  into 
existence  are  external-aspects  only  and  are  real  in  the  strict  sense.  But  there  is 
no  such  thing  called  “gold”,  some  one  thing  present  in  many  external -aspects  [and 
yet  different  from  them].  But  if  it  be  assumed  that  the  matter  persists  even  in 

^ Compare  i.  43,  p.  90^  (Calc,  ed.)  and  the  parallels  given  there. 

’ See  ii.  28,  p.  170’’  (Calc.  ed.). 


iii.  13 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vibhuti  [220 

the  external-aspects  which  are  ceasing  to  be,  then  [the  matter],  like  the  Power 
of  Intellect  {citi),  would  not  enter  into  mutations,  but  would  continue  existing 
absolutely  unchanged.  The  continued  existence  in  another  form  means  the 
throwing  away  of  its  own  form  as  consisting  of  mutations  and  the  exchange  of 
this  for  another,  the  absolutely  changeless.  Just  as  the  Power  of  Intellect  [citi), 
although  the  aspects  divide  themselves  into  one  alteration  after  another,  does 
not  relapse  from  its  own  self  and  remains  absolutely  unchanged,  so  likewise 
gold,  &c.,  would  remain  absolutely  unchanged, — a proposition  which  you  do  not 
admit.  So  matter  is  something  not  different  from  its  external-aspects.’  This  ob- 
jection he  refutes  by  saying  «this,  [he  replies,  involves]  no  weakness.:^  «Why?» 
^Because  we  do  not  maintain  an  absolute  unity.)^  Had  we  to  admit  the  absolute 
permanence  of  matter,  as  of  the  Power  of  Intellect ' {citi),  then  we  should  have 
lain  open  to  this  taunt.  We,  however,  do  not  take  our  stand  upon  the  doctrine 
of  absolute  permanence.  On  the  contrary,  we  say  that  all  these  three  worlds, 
and  not  merely  matter,  pass  out  of  their  phenomenalized  individual  forms,  as  pro- 
ducing effects  fulfilling  a purpose.  Why  ? «For  [we  are  bound  to]  deny  that 
[the  world]  is  permanent,»  on  the  ground  of  a source-of-valid-ideas.  For  if  the 
water-jar  were  not  to  pass  out  of  its  [individual]  phenomenalized  form,  then  even 
though  reduced  to  the  condition  of  potsherds  or  of  broken  bits,  it  would  be  as 
before  clearly  apperceived  as  a water-jar  and  it  would  have  to  fulfil  the  purposes 
[of  a water-jar].  [But  this  cannot  be.]  Consequently  the  three  worlds  are  not 
permanent.  ‘ Very  well  then,  suppose  that  [the  jar]  does  not  exist  permanently 
in  so  far  as  it  is  not  apperceived  and  does  not  fulfil  the  purposes  of  a water-jar, 
because  like  the  sky-lotus  it  is  illusory  (tuccha).’  In  reply  to  this  he  says,  4Ceven 
after  it  has  passed  out.)^  It  is  not  absolutely  illusory  existence,  so  that  it  would 
be  absolutely  impermanent.  Why?  Because  [we  are  obliged]  to  deny  its 
annihilation,  on  the  ground  of  a source-of-valid-ideas.  To  explain.  Whatever  is 
illusory  existence,  cannot  be  apperceived  or  produce  effects,  quite  as  in  the  case 
of  the  sky-lotus.  Whereas  these  three  worlds  are  from  time  to  time  apperceived 
and  do  produce  effects,  [and  so  are  not  absolutely  illusory  existences].  Similarly 
we  should  cite  as  illustrations  proving  existence  (sattvahetu)  (a)  capacity  for  rising 
into  consciousness,  (b)  materiality,  (c)  fitness  for  external-aspects  and  time-varia- 
tions and  intensities  and  others,  [which  proofs]  are  wanting  in  the  case  of  the 
sky-lotus  or  the  man’s  horns,  which  are  absolutely  illusory  existences.  Similarly 
[the  jar]  is  not  absolutely  permanent  so  that  it  would  be  absolutely  permanent  like 
the  Power  of  Intellect  (citi),  but  on  the  contrary  it  is  [only]  in  some  respects 
permanent.  And  thus  it  is  established  that  it  enters  into  mutations.  So  we 
must  understand  that,  in  the  states  of  the  lump  of  clay  and  of  the  following 
states,  the  effects  such  as  the  water-jar,  which  are  yet  to  come,  have  an  existence. 
The  objector  says,  ‘ This  may  be  true.  But  if  an  effect  even  after  it  has  passed 
out  [of  individual  phenomenalized  existence]  exists,  why  is  it  not  apperceived  ? 
The  reply  is,  ^On  being  refunded.^  «Kefunded;^  [that  is]  resolved  into  its  own 

• Reading  citi^akter. 


221]  Simultaneity  of  contrary  qualities  [ — iii.  13 

cause.  subtile  form^  [that  is]  one  not  capable  of  being  seen.  And  hence 
there  is  no  apperception  of  it. — Having  thus  substantiated  the  mutation  of 
externa] -aspect,  he  substantiates  the  mutation  of  time-variation  also,  in  so  far  as 
they  are  inseparably  connected  with  each  other,  by  saying,  ^in  the  mutation  of 
time-variation. » The  meaning  is  that  each  time-variation  is  inseparably  con- 
nected with  the  two  others.  The  objector  says,  ‘ When  one  time-variation  is  in 
connexion,  other  time-variations  are  not  perceived.  How  then  [are  these]  connected 
with  the  former  ? ’ In  reply  he  says,  ^Take  the  case  of  a man.^  For  an  absence 
of  experience  does  not  do  away  with  that  which  is  established  by  the  source-of-a- 
valid-idea.  For  the  very  fact  that  this  [time -variation]  has  been  made  to  rise 
[in  consciousness],  is  the  source-of-the-valid-idea  for  the  real  existence  of  these 
[other  time-variations],  because  a non-existent  thing,  such  as  a man’s  horns, 
cannot  be  made  to  rise  in  consciousness.  He  sets  up  the  objection  uttered  by 
another  when  he  says,  ^Here  ...  in  the  mutation  of  time- variation.  ‘ If  when 
an  external-aspect  is  present,  it  is  at  the  same  time  past  and  future,  then  all  the 
three  time-forms  would  be  confounded.  And  if  the  time-forms  ai’e  to  be  in 
successive  times,  then  it  would  follow  that  the  production  of  the  non-existent 
[becomes  possible].’  He  meets  the  objection  with  the  words,  ^We  meet  this 
objection  thus.)^  For  the  existence  of  external-aspects  in  the  present  only 
is  established  by  experience.  From  this  it  follows  that  [external-aspects  are] 
in  relation  to  earlier  and  to  later  time.  [Why  does  it  follow?]  Because  of 
course  a non-existent  does  not  come  into  being,  nor  is  an  existent  annihilated, 
as  he  says,  ^Because  if  this  were  so,  the  mind-stuff  could  never.  ^ For  the 
mind-stuff  at  a time  following  after  anger,  is  experienced  as  having  the  external- 
aspect  of  passion.  And  if  passion  did  not  exist  at  the  time  of  anger,  in  so  far  as 
[passion]  was  [at  that  time]  future,  how  then  could  [passion]  rise  into  conscious- 
ness ? And  if  it  should  not  rise  in  consciousness,  how  could  it  be  experienced  ? 
[The  objector  continues,]  ‘ Even  if  this  be  granted,  why  would  there  not  still  be 
confusion  of  time-forms  ? ’ The  question  is  [contained  in  the  phrase,]  «Moreover 
it  is  not  possible.^  ‘ What  {kim)  cause  is  there  for  not  confounding  [the  time- 
forms]  ? ’ And  (ca)  is  used  in  the  sense  of  ‘ but  ’.  The  answer  is  given  in  the 
words,  «the  three. » The  three  time-variations  cannot  possibly  exist  simul- 
taneously. In  what?  In  one  fluctuation  of  mind-stuff.  But  in  successive 
times  it  is  possible  for  each  one  of  the  time-variations  to  exist  in  its  phenomenal 
[form]  by  the  operation  of  the  conditions  which  phenomenalize  it  [the  time- 
variation].  Since  the  discussion  of  the  time-variations  depends  upon  the  things- 
which-have-time-variations,  therefore  the  time-variations,  in  so  far  as  they  have 
the  form  of  the  things-which-have-time-variations,  belong  to  [or  have  the  same 
nature  as  {tad-vattay\  these,  that  is,  the  things-which-have-time-variations. 
On  this  same  point  he  states  his  concurrence  of  opinion  with  Pancafikha 
the  Master  by  saying  ^t  has  been  said.»  This  has  been  explained^  before. 
He  brings  the  discussion  to  a close  by  the  word  «:Hence.»  The  time-forms  are 

* ii.  15,  p.  135’^  (Calc.  ed.). 


iii.  13 — ] Book  III.  Suipernormal  Powers  or  Vibhuti  [222 

not  confounded  in  so  far  as  external-aspects  which  are  opposed  to  each  other,  for 
instance,  those  that  have  become  visible  and  those  that  have  become  invisible, 
are  refunded  into  [their  own  causes].  He  gives  an  illustration  in  the  words  «To 
take  an  example. » Previously  it  was  shown  that  anger  must  be  thought  to  be 
in  relation  with  passion.  Now  a passion  referring  to  one  object  is  shown  to 
be  in  relation  to  a passion  referring  to  another  object.  He  takes  up  the  subject 
referred  to  in  the  illustration  by  saying,  similar  [explanation]  in  the  case  of 
time-variation. » An  objector  says,  ‘ Even  when  it  is  assumed  that  [the  mutations] 
are  not  absolutely  distinct,  the  distinction  may  yet  exist.  So  when  the  external- 
aspect  or  the  time-variation  or  the  intensity  alters,  the  substance,  in  that  it  is  not 
distinct  from  them,  should  also  alter.  And  it  is  just  this  that  we  do  not  accept, 
because  it  is  contrary  to  the  experience  that  the  [permanent]  substance  is  in- 
separably connected  [with  its  own  states  which  are  impermanent].’  In  reply  to 
this  he  says,  <SThe  three  time-forms  do  not  belong  to  the  substance.»  Because  it 
is  the  external-aspects,  which  are  distinct  from  it,  that  have  the  three  time-forms. 
That  it  is  the  external-aspects  which  are  connected  with  the  three  time-forms  is 
made  clear  by  the  words,  «These  [external -aspects].^  ^Have  a time-variation» 
means  manifested  [that  is]  present.  ^Do  not  have  a time-variation»  means  un- 
manifested [that  is]  future  or  past.  Of  these  [two],  those-that-have-a-time-varia- 
tion,  when  they  attain  to  the  various  intensities,  either  to  powerfulness  or  to 
weakness,  are  referred  to  as  being  different ' from  other  intensities,  but  not  from 
other  matter.  The  word  ^intensity»  is  here  used  in  the  sense  of  external- 
aspect  and  of  time-variation  and  of  intensity.  What  he  means  to  say  is  this  : 
Now  it  is  experience  alone  which  determines  the  difference  or  the  absence  of 
difference  between  the  substance  and  the  external-aspects  and  the  other  [muta- 
tions]. Since  the  external-aspects  and  the  rest  are  not  absolutely  identical  with 
the  substance,  to  the  extent  that  the  common  nature  of  the  external-aspect  and 
of  the  other  [mutations]  should  have  the  form  of  the  substance.  Nor  is  there 
absolute  difference,  to  the  extent  that  the  common  nature  of  external-aspects 
should  be  [as  different  as]  horses  and  cows.  Experience  moreover  although 
not  establishing  the  fact  that  there  is  absolute  [identity  or  difference],  does 
show  the  substance  as  one  * and  as  persisting  in  the  external-aspects  and  other 
[mutations]  which  have  the  quality  of  coming  into  and  of  passing  out  of  experience, 
and  it  does  exclude  the  external-aspects  from  each  other.  [All]  this  is  experienced 
by  every  one.  So  we  conform  ourselves  to  this  experience.  We  are  not  at 
liberty  to  throw  it  away,  and  to  dispose  of  the  experiences  of  the  external-aspects 
as  we  like.  On  this  same  point  he  gives  an  example  from  ordinary  life  in  the 
words,  ^Thus  the  same  stroke.^  Just  as  the  stroke,  which  in  itself  is  precisely 
the  same,  in  relation  to  the  various  positions  is  called  a hundred  and  other 
names,  so  the  substance,  which  in  itself  is  precisely  the  same,  is  repeatedly 
given  a name  in  accordance  with  the  alteration  of  its  external-aspect  and  its 

^ Reading  anyatvena. 

^ Thus  the  hauddha  theory  p.  205^  (Calc,  ed.)  is  partially  conceded. 


223]  The  Self  does  not  pass  through  mutations  [ — iii.  13 

time-variation  and  its  intensity.  This  is  the  meaning.  To  illustrate  the  matter 
he  gives  another  simile  in  the  words,  ^So  too  the  same  woman.:^  At  this  point 
he  raises  an  objection,  made  by  an  opponent,  by  saying,  «intensity.3>  When 
there  is  a mutation  of  intensity,  [that  is]  a mutation  of  external-aspect  and  of 
time-variation  and  of  intensity,  one  would  be  involved  in  a fault  with  regard  to 
the  absolute  [permanence]  of  the  substance  and  of  the  external-aspect  and  of  the 
time-variation  and  of  the  intensity.  He  asks,  «:How  ?»  [The  objector]  gives  the 
answer  in  the  woi'ds,  ^On  the  ground  that  the  functional-activity  . . . the  time- 
form.^  For  we  can  see  that  the  functional-activity  of  that  which  is  future  in  its 
time-form  as  belonging  to  curds  is  present  as  belonging  to  milk,  because  [the 
functional  activity  of  the  future]  is  shut  off  by  this  [functional-activity  of  the 
present].  For  this  reason  when  the  external-aspect  which  has  the  time-variation 
{laksana)  of  the  curds,  although  existent  in  the  milk,  does  not  exert  its  own 
functional-activity,  then  the  undertaking  of  the  business  [of  the  effects  to  be 
accomplished]  by  curdling  and  the  other  [changes],  is  called  future.  And  it  is 
called  present  when  it  is  thus  active  ; and  past  when  it  has  done  the  business 
of  curdling  and  the  other  [changes]  and  stopped.  To  this  extent  then  it 
must  follow  that  the  substance  and  the  external-aspects  and  the  time-variations 
and  the  intensities,  although  persisting  in  all  three  times,  are  absolutely  [per- 
manent]. For  permanence  is  existence  at  all  times.  And  in  [these]  four  cases, 
whether  they  exist  at  all  times  or  do  not  exist  [at  all  times],  there  is  no  produc- 
tion.^ This  much  only  is  the  time-variation  {laksana)  of  the  absolutely  permanent. 
And  in  the  case  of  the  Power  of  Intellect  [citi-gakti)  also,  which  is  absolutely 
permanent,  there  is  no  other  special  feature.  This  is  the  point.  He  meets  the 
objection  in  the  words  ^But  that  [alleged]  weakness  does  not  exist.)^  There  is 
no  weakness  there.  Why  ? Because  although  the  substrate  {gunin)  is  permanent, 
the  aspects  [guna)  suffer  antagonisms,®  the  one  of  [the  aspects]  being  capable  of 
being  overcome  and  the  others  of  overcoming.  This  is  their  variety.  What  he 
means  to  say  is  this : Although  there  is  existence  at  all  times  in  the  case  of  all 
four,  still,  in  so  far  as  there  is  a variety  in  the  antagonisms  of  the  aspects  {guna), 
in  that  the  various  evolved-forms  of  which  this  [variety]  consists  become  visible 
or  invisible,  and  in  so  far  as  they  enter  into  mutations,  there  is  no  absolute 
[permanence].  Whereas  in  the  case  of  the  Power  of  Intellect  {citi-gakti)  there  is 
no  becoming  visible  or  becoming  invisible  of  evolved-forms  which  belong  to  itself. 
Thus  [this]  is  absolutely  permanent.  As  they  say,®  “ The  learned  call  that  perma- 
nent the  nature  of  which  does  not  perish.”  That  this  variety  of  antagonisms  is 
the  cause  of  the  variety  of  the  evolved  forms  in  the  case  of  both  the  evolving- 
substance  and  the  evolved-substance  is  shown  by  the  words,  ^Just  as.^  Just 

® If  it  is  to  exist  at  all  times,  then,  like  the  ® This  word  vimarda  occurs  once  only  in  the 
it  could  not  be  produced.  Or  Bhasya.  But  Vacaspati  uses  it  four 

if  it  is  not  to  exist  at  any  time,  then,  times  besides  this,  i.  2,  p.  IP;  iii.  13, 

like  the  horns  of  a man,  it  could  not  pp.  209'®,  210®>*  (Calc.  ed.). 

be  produced.  This  is  Balarama’s  gloss.  ® Compare  MBh.  xii.  318.  102  (=  11826). 


iii.  13 — ] Booh  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vihhuti  [224 

as  the  arrangement  of  parts,'  as  distinguished  {lalcsana)  by  being  a mutation  of 
earth  and  of  other  [coarse  elements],  is  itself  merely  an  external  aspect  and  has  a 
beginning  and  an  end,  in  that  it  becomes  invisible, — [so]  «soundand  the  rest,^ 
the  subtile  elements  sound  and  touch  and  colour  and  taste  and  smell,  are  not 
perishable  as  compared  with  their  own  products,  and  do  not,  like  them,  become 
invisible.  He  shows  how  this  is  in  the  case  of  the  evolving-matter  by  the 
words,  €so  the  resoluble.)^  <KTo  it  the  term  evolved-form  (vikdra)  is  applied.^ 
But  the  Power  of  Thought  {citi-^alcti)  is  not  subject  to  this  kind  of  evolution  of 
form.  This  is  the  point. — Having  thus  taken  up  by  way  of  illustration  both 
the  evolved-matter  and  the  evolving-cause,  which  are  well  enough  known  to 
thinking  persons,  he  takes  up  in  the  case  of  the  evolved-matter  only,  which  is 
well  enough  known  to  the  popular  [mindl,  the  variety  of  the  antagonisms  of  the 
aspects  (guna)  which  leads  to  variety  in  the  mutations  of  external-aspect  and  of 
time-variation  and  of  intensity,  by  saying,  «The  following  serves  as  an  illustra- 
tion.)^ There  is  no  necessity  that  the  mutation  of  intensity  should  belong  to 
time-variations  only.  For  all  [three],  external-aspect  and  time-variation  and 
intensity,  are  expressed  by  the  word  ‘ intensity  ’.  Therefore  the  one  [kind  of] 
mutation  is  intensity  which  is  common  to  all.  Accordingly  he  says,  «Thus  the 
substance  only.»  He  gives  the  distinguishing-characteristic  of  the  mutation 
which  includes  [all]  by  saying,  ^in  a permanent.;^  The  word  ‘external-aspect’ 
is  an  expression  for  external-aspect  and  for  time-variation  and  for  intensity,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  that  in  which  they  inhere. 


Among  these  [mutations], 

14.  A substance  conforms  itself  to  quiescent  and  uprisen 
and  indeterminable  external-aspects. 

An  external  aspect  ^ is  [to  speak  precisely]  only  a power  of  the 
substance  as  limited  by  its  pre-established  harmony  ® [with  regard 
to  effects].  And  it  is  known  as  an  actual  existence,  of  which  the 
existence  is  inferred  by  the  kind  of  effect  which  it  generates,  as 

* Vacaspati  uses  samsthdna  as  the  equiva- 
lent to  samnive^a  iii.  26,  p.  238'',  and  iv. 

13,  p.  291*.  It  is  applied  only  to  collec- 
tions of  mahdbhuta  ; and  is  sometimes 
not  different  from  external  form  {murti), 
iii.  53,  p.  272',  and  iii.  13,  p.  210* ; or 
again,  the  parts  of  grains,  iii.  13, 
p.  205‘,  iii.  15,  p.  216* ; or  the  parts  of 
words,  iii.  17,  p.  222'* ; or  of  the  limbs 
of  birds,  ii.  46,  p.  185'“.  See  also  ii.  28, 
p.  170",  and  iii.  26,  p.  239*  (Calc.  ed.). 


* The  same  entity,  regarded  from  the  side 

of  permanence,  is  a mutation  {pari- 
ndma) ; from  the  side  of  change  is  an 
external  aspect. 

* The  word  yogyata  is  used  in  the  sutra 

ii.  53.  The  word  yogyatva  is  in  the 
sutra  ii.  41  and  in  the  Bhasya,  p.  182" 
(Calc.  ed.).  Vacaspati  uses  it  five 
times:  ii.  6,  p.  116*;  ii.  23,  p.  157®; 
ii.  32,  p.  176'“;  iii.  14,  p.  211'*  **. 


225]  The  three  states  of  substance  [ — iii.  14 

one  or  another  [form]  of  the  single  [substance].  Of  these  [forms] 
that  is  called  present,  if  it  be  that  the  external-aspect  is  passing 
through  [the  state]  of  its  peculiar  functional-activity.  This  is  different 
from  the  other  external-aspects  both  the  quiescent  and  the  indeter- 
minable [states].  But  when  it  has  rejoined  its  general  [or  latent] 
form,  then  how  could  that  external-aspect  be  distinguished  from 
any  other,  since  it  is  then  of  the  very  nature  of  the  substance  itself  ? 
There  are,  as  every  one  knows,  three  of  these  external-aspects 
within  the  substance,  the  quiescent  and  the  uprisen  and  the  indeter- 
minable. Of  these  the  quiescent  are  those  that  have  come  to  rest  by 
finishing  their  functional-activity.  The  uprisen  are  those  in  active 
function ; and  these  [uprisen]  are  immediately-contiguous  {sam- 
anantara)  to  the  future  time-variation.  While  the  past  come  after 
the  present.  Why  do  not  the  present  come  after  the  past  ? Because 
there  is  no  relation  of  antecedent  and  consequent  [between  them]. 
The  relation  of  antecedent  and  consequent  in  the  case  of  the  future 
and  the  present  ^ is  not  the  same  as  [this  relation]  in  the  case  of  the 
past  ^ [and  of  the  present].  Therefore  there  is  [no  later  external- 
aspect]  immediately  contiguous  to  the  past.  Consequently  the 
future  only  is  immediately  contiguous  [as  being  antecedent]  to  the 
present. — Now  the  indeterminable  [external-aspects],  what  are 
they  ? Everything  containing  the  essence  of  everything.  Upon 
which  it  has  been  said,  “ That  which  in  the  various  forms  ® of  taste 
and  other  [subtile  elements]  contains  the  mutations  of  [the  coarse 
elements  ot]  water  and  of  earth  is  found  in  plants  ; likewise  [that 
w'hich  is  mutable]  in  plants  is  found  in  animals,  and  of  animals  in 
plants.”  In  this  sense,  in  so  far  as  the  common  nature  is  not 
destroyed,  we  use  the  term  ‘ everything  contains  the  essence  of 
everything.’  Still,  because  of  connexion  with  place  and  time  and 
form^  and  cause,  the  external-aspects  do  not  of  course  manifest 
themselves  at  the  same  time.®  That  which  passes  through  a 

^ The  Varttika  says  that  this  is crimination  is  made.  The  contrast 
^ In  this  case  there  is  pragdhvansa.  between  the  two  is  similar  to  the 

* Compare  Vacaspati  s quotation  iv.  13,  Cartesian  use  of  ‘ clear  ’ and  ‘ distinct.’ 

p.  291®  from  the  Vayu  Pur. ; and  also  ® The  Bikaner  MS.  and  the  text  of  Bodas 

Yogavasista,  Utpattiprakarana  78.  (Bom.  Sanskrit  Ser.),  p.  134®,  both  read 

* The  word  rupa  is  used  for  colour  and  form  ; upabandhdt. 

the  word  dkdra  for  form  when  a dis- 
29  [h.o.s.  17] 


iii.  14 — ] Booh  III.  Swpernormal  Powers  or  Vihhuti  [226 

succession  of  these  external-aspects,  whether  manifested  or  unmani- 
fested, and  which  has  as  its  essence  the  generic  form  and  the 
particular,^  and  which  is  present-in-all-but-different-from-them  ^ 
{anvayin), — that  is  a substance.  But  the  [Yogacara]  who  holds 
that  this  world  is  nothing  but  external-aspects  without  [a  sub- 
stance] present-in-all-but-different-from-them, — for  him  there  would 
be  no  experience.  Why  would  this  be  so  ? [The  reply  is,]  how 
could  one  consciousness  of  a subject-of-experience  [bhohrtvena)  be 
held  responsible  for  a deed  done  by  another  consciousness  ? And 
there  would  also  be  no  memory  of  this  [consciousness].  For  there  is 
no  such  thing  as  recollection  by  one  consciousness  of  something  seen 
by  another  [consciousness].  And  it  is  the  substance  permanently 
present-in-all-but-diflPerent-from-them  which,  upon  the  recognition 
of  a thing  is  recognized  as  participating  in  the  alteration  of  the 
external-aspect.  Consequently  it  is  not  true  that  [this  world]  is 
nothing  more  than  external-aspects  without  [a  substance]  present- 
in-all-but-different-from-them. 

He  gives  the  distinguishing-characteristic  of  this  substance  to  which  the  three- 
fold mutation  belongs  by  the  sutra.  14.  Among  these  [mutations]  a substance 
conforms  itself  to  quiescent  and  uprisen  and  indeterminable  external- 
aspects.  A substance  {dharmin)  is  a thing  that  has  external-aspects  [dliarma). 
And  because,  unless  one  knows  the  external-aspects,  one  cannot  know  the 
substance,  he  makes  known  what  the  external-aspect  is  in  the  word  ^pre- 
established-harmony.»  «The  substance^  means  a material  object  such  as  clay. 
«Only  a power2>  [that  is]  the  power  of  producing  the  dust  and  the  lump  of 
clay  and  the  water-jar.  This  is  the  external-aspect,^  in  so  far  as  these  are 
contained  in  this  [substance]  in  an  unphenomenalized  state.  This  is  the  point. 
An  objector  says,  ‘ In  so  far  as  these  exist  therein  in  an  unphenomenalized  state 
they  may  become  visible  from  within  it,  but  how  can  the  capacity  to  fetch 
water  [in  the  jar]  and  similar  [purposeful  acts],  which  could  not  have  been  got  out 
of  their  cause  [the  clay],  be  obtained  by  them  [that  is,  the  finished  products]  ? ’ 
In  reply  to  this  he  says,  ^as  limited  by  its  pre-established-harmony.2>  The 
power  to  produce  the  water-jar  is  defined  as  being  pre-established-harmony  for 
things  which  fetch  water.  Hence  the  power  to  fetch  water  and  the  other 
[purposeful]  acts  are  also  obtained  by  the  w'ater-jars  and  other  things  from  their 
own  cause  only.  Thus  [the  capacity  to  fetch  water]  is  not  accidental  [with 

* Compare  i.  7,  p.  21*,  and  iii.  44,  p.  257'“  See  also  i.  45,  p.  96*;  iii.  13,  p.  205®; 

(Calc.  ed.).  iii.  44,  p.  257®  (Calc.  ed.j. 

® Reading  dharmah. 


227] 


[ — iii.  14 


Past  and  present  and  future 

regal’d  to  the  substance].  This  is  the  point. — There  is  another  intei-pretation. 
One  might  be  asked,  ‘ What  are  substances?  ’ The  reply  is,  ^of  the  substance 
as  limited  by  its  pre-established-harmony.»  One  might  be  asked,  ‘ What  is 
an  external-aspect  ? ’ The  reply  is,  «An  external-aspect  is  only  a power.'» 
The  meaning  is  that  an  external-aspect  is  only  a pre-established-harmony 
belonging  to  these  [substances].  Hence  it  is  proven  that  the  thing  which  has 
this  [external-aspect]  is  the  substance.  Thus  it  becomes  clear. — He  describes 
the  source-of-the-valid-idea  [which  proves]  the  real  existence  of  these  [external, 
aspects]  in  the  words,  ^And  it  ...  is  inferred  by  the  kind  of  effect  which  it 
generates.»  Of  the  single  substance  in  one  or  another  form  as  dust  or  as  a 
lump  of  clay  or  as  a water-jar.  This  is  the  meaning.  And  it  differs  because 
there  are  evidently  different  effects.  This  is  another  way  of  putting  it  [iti 
yavat).  It  is  observed  [or]  apperceived.  With  regard  to  these  [external-aspects] 
he  describes  the  difference  between  the  lump  of  clay,  which  strikes  upon  [the 
thinking  substance  of]  experience  and  is  present,  and  the  quiescent  state  of  the 
clay  as  dust,  and  the  indeterminable  state  of  the  clay  as  water-jar  by  saying  «Of 
these  [forms]  that  is  called  present.»  If  there  be  no  difference,  then  the  dust 
and  the  water-jar  would  have  their  functional-activity  co-extensive  with  that  of 
the  lump  of  clay.  This  is  the  point.  But  in  the  case  of  the  unphenomenalized 
lump  of  clay,  the  establishment  of  the  difference,  as  stated  above,  is  impossible. 
[This]  he  says  in  the  words,  ^But  when.^  What  [then]  is  this  [difference]  ? 
By  establishment  of  what  difference  will  there  be  a differentiation  ? Having 
thus  mentioned  that  there  is  [this]  establishment  of  a difference  between  the 
external-aspects,  he  analyses  this  difference  in  the  words,  <KThere  are,  as  every 
one  knows.»  The  word  ^uprisen»  means  present.  He  now  deduces  the 
priority  and  the  sequence  of  the  time-forms  in  the  words,  «:And  these.  ^ A 
question  is  raised  in  the  words,  <S:Why  does  not  ?2>  ‘ For  what  reason  does  not 

the  present  come  after  the  past  ? ’ This  is  the  meaning.  The  reason  is,  ^There 
is  no  relation  of  antecedent  and  consequent  [between  them].2>  By  speaking  of 
the  object  [that  is,  absence  of  antecedence  and  consequence]  he  indicates  that 
which  contains  as  its  object  [the  absence  of  antecedence  and  consequence], 
that  is  to  say,  the  non-apperception  [of  this  object].  He  shows  what  this  same 
non-apperception  is,  in  so  far  as  its  properties  are  opposite  to  those  of  appercep- 
tion, in  the  words,  <5Cin  the  case  of  the  future  and  the  present.^  He  brings  the 
discussion  to  a close  with  the  word,  ^Consequently.»  Consequently  [tat) 
means  for  this  reason.  The  future  only  is  immediately  contiguous  as  being 
antecedent  to  the  present ; but  the  past  is  not.  The  present  is  immediately 
contiguous  to  the  past  as  being  antecedent  to  it ; but  the  indeterminable  is  not. 
Therefore  it  is  established  that  the  youngest  of  the  time-forms  is  the  past.  An 
objector  says,  “ This  may  be  true.  The  uprisen  and  the  past  may  be  surmised 

^ Compare  the  passage  at  the  end  of  the  intensified.  It  is  an  external-aspect  of 

Explanation  of  iii.  15,  “Power  also  is  the  mind  and  it  is  inferred  only  by  the 

a subtile  state  of  effects  that  are  experience  of  its  coarse  effects.” 


iii.  14 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vibhuti 


[228 


to  be  those  external-aspects  which  are  in  experience  and  those  which  have  been 
experienced.  But  external-states  which  are  indeterminable  cannot,  in  so  far  as 
they  are  indeterminable,  be  surmised.”  With  this  in  mind  he  asks,  <KNow  . . . ?» 
What  are  the  indeterminables  ? In  what  things  do  we  look  ‘ for  them  ? To 
this  the  answer  is  in  the  words  «Everything  containing  the  essence  of  every- 
thing. Upon  which  it  has  been  said.»  This  is  made  consistent  in  the  words, 
«...  of  water  and  of  earth. For,  in  the  case  of  water  which  contains  [the 
subtile  elements  of]  taste  and  colour  and  touch  and  sound,  and  in  the  case  of 
earth  which  contains  odour  and  taste  and  colour  and  touch  and  sound,  various 
forms  containing  the  mutations  are  observed  as  perceived  in  the  taste  and  other 
[subtile  elements]  which  are  found  in  the  root  and  fruit  and  blossoms  and  foliage 
and  in  the  other  parts  of  trees  and  creepers  and  shrubs.  This  cannot  be  a 
mutation  of  earth  which  is  not  of  a similar  essence,  or  of  water  which  is  not  of  a 
like  kind.  For,  as  it  has  already  ^ been  consistently  stated,  there  can  be  no  pro- 
duction of  that  which  does  not  already  exist.  Similarly  in  the  case  of  animals, 
human  beings  and  beasts  tame  or  wild,  various  tastes,  &c.,  are  observed  coming 
from  mutations  of  plants.  For  these  [human  beings  and  other  animals]  in  eating 
the  fruits  [and  leaves]  and  so  on  acquire  a rich  variety  of  forms,  &c.  In  the  same 
way,  plants  are  observed  to  have  a variety  of  forms  coming  from  the  mutations  of 
animals.  For  it  is  known  that  pomegranates  become  as  large  as  coco-nuts  when 
sprinkled  with  blood.  He  brings  the  discussion  to  a close  with  the  words, 
«In  this  sense.S>  Thus  everything,  earth  and  water  and  all,  contains  all  tastes 
and  other  [subtile  elements].  He  gives  the  reason  for  this  in  the  words,  «in  so 
far  as  the  common  nature  is  not  destroyed.»  Because,  in  so  far  it  is 
recognized  everywhere,  that-which-is-asserted  [jati)  of  the  common  nature  of 
earth  and  of  water  is  not  destroyed.  An  objector  says,  ‘ If  everything 
contains  the  essence  of  everything,  then.  Sir,  since  everything  everywhere  is 
always  in  every  part  close  at  hand,  there  would  be  a manifestation  of  all  existences 
whatsoever  at  one  and  the  same  time.  For  an  effect  vA'hose  cause,  lacking  nothing, 
is  close  at  hand,  ought  not  long  to  delay.’  With  this  in  mind  he  says,  «with  place 
and  time.»  Although  eveiything  containing  the  essence  of  everything  is  a cause 
[of  everything],  still  there  has  to  be  [a  manifestation]  1.  of  that  [particular] 
place  which  belongs  to  a [particular]  effect  [of  this  cause].  For  instance, 
Kashmir  is  the  place  of  the  saffron-plant.  Because  although  these  [causes] 
exist  in  Pahcala  and  other  countries,  there  is  no  coming  actively  forth  ® [of  the 
plant].  Accordingly  there  is  no  manifestation  of  the  saffron-plant  in  a place 
such  as  Pahcala.  2.  Likewise  during  the  hot  season,  since  no  rain  moves 
actively  forth,  there  is  no  manifestation  of  rice-plants.  3.  Similarly  a doe 
* Reading  sanuksamahe.  si^ati  it  is  the  equivalent  of  ahhivyakti 

2 Compare  ii.  19,  p.  149® ; iii.  11,  p.  20P ; and  occurs  ii.  4,  p.  IIP ; iii.  13,  p.  203' ; 

iii.  13,  pp.  206",  207^;  and  asato  iii.  14,  p.  214^h  Balarama  glosses  the 

'nupajanandt,  ii.  15,  p.  132®.  word  vhlyamdnatd  dvirbhdva  iti,  p.  214, 

® The  word  samudacara  occurs  once  only  in  note  3 (Calc.  ed.). 

the  Bhasya  iii.  13,  p.  207®.  In  Vaca- 


229] 


Reason  for  the  order  of  mutations  [ — Hi,  15 

does  not  give  birth  to  a human  being,  because  in  her  the  human  form  does  not 
develop,  4,  In  the  same  way,  a non-meritorious  person  does  not  experience 
anything  like  pleasure,  because  in  him  no  meritorious  cause  moves  actively 
forth.  Therefore  because  of  connexion  [or]  separation  by  place  or  time  or 
form  or  cause,  things  [that  is]  forms  of  being  do  not  manifest  themselves  ^ 
at  the  same  time, — Having  thus  given  a classification  to  the  external-aspects, 
he  shows  that  the  substance  is  present-in-all-but-different-from-them  by  saying, 
« . . which  , , , of  these  . . ^ The  generic-form  is  the  substance  as  such  ; the 
particular  is  the  external-aspect.  The  meaning  is  that  its  essence  is  of  both 
these  kinds, — Having  thus  shown  that  the  substance  which  is  established  by 
experience  is  present-in-all-but-different-from-them,  he  reminds  the  Annihila- 
tionist  {vainaqika),  who  does  not  assent  to  this  and  who  assents  to  the  theory 
of  a momentary  mind-stuff  made  of  consciousness  only,  of  the  undesired 
contingency  previously  [i.  32]  mentioned,  and  he  does  so  in  the  words,  «But 
the  [Yogacara],»  [Also  in  the  words,]  ^And  , , , upon  the  recognition  of  a 
thing,^  For  a thing  observed  by  Devadatta  is  not  recognized  by  Yajnadatta, 
Accordingly  it  is  he  who  experiences  that  also  recognizes. 


15.  The  order  of  the  sequence  (krama)  is  the  reason  for  the 
order  of  the  mutations. 


If  it  be  possible  ^ that  a single  substance  has  only  a single  muta- 
tion, then  the  order  of  the  sequence  is  the  cause  of  the  order  of  the 
mutation.  One  finds,  for  example,  clay  in  the  form  of  dust,  clay 
in  the  form  of  a lump,  clay  in  the  form  of  a water-jar,  clay  in  the 
form  of  potsherds  [and]  clay  in  the  form  of  small  bits.  It  is  in  this 
sense  that  there  is  a sequence,  1.  Whenever  one  external-aspect  is 
immediately-contiguous  to  another  external-aspect,  it  is  [then  in] 
sequence  with  it.  The  lump  of  [clay]  falls  away  and  the  water-jar 
comes  into  existence.  It  is  in  such  cases  that  a sequence  in  the 
mutation  of  external-aspects  occurs.  2.  There  is  a sequence  in  the 
mutation  of  time- variations.  By  reason  of  there  being  a future  [time- 
variation]  of  the  water-jar,  there  is  a sequence  [to  it  in  the]  present 
[time-variation].  Likewise  by  reason  of  there  being  a present  [time- 
variation]  of  the  lump  [of  clay],  there  is  a sequence  [to  it  in  the] 


* Reading  with  Bikaner  MS.  dtmandm. 

® Reading  prasakte,  which  represents  this 
system.  But  if  the  reading  be  pra- 
sakteh  (Kashmir  MS.  and  Gangadhara 
Shastri’s  MS.),  then  the  word  would 
be  used  as  indicating  that  this  is  not 


possible.  The  form  would  be  used  as 
equivalent  to  a verbal  form  in  -ya 
according  to  Pan.  i.  4.  31  with  Siddh. 
Kaum.  (Nir.  Sag.,  ed.  1904),  p.  144,  last 
line. 


iii.  15 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Poicers  or  Vibhiiti  [230 

past  [time-variation].  There  is  no  sequence  for  the  past.  Why  is 
this  ? When  there  is  a relation  of  antecedent  and  sequent  there 
is  an  immediate  contiguity.  But  this  relation  does  not  occur  in 
the  case  of  the  past.  Consequently  there  is  a sequence  for  two 
time-variations  only.  3.  There  is  none  the  less  a sequence  in  the 
mutations  of  intensity,  as  when  the  oldness  of  a brand-new  water- 
jar  becomes  evident  first  on  its  rim  ^ [])rdnte),  and  then  manifesting 
itself  in  a sequence  which  conforms  to  the  succession  of  moments, 
[finally]  reaches  a complete  [individual]  phenomenal  [form].  This 
then  is  the  third  mutation  and  it  is  other  than  the  external-aspect 
and  the  time-variation.  These  same  sequences  become  what  they  are, 
so  long  as  the  distinction  between  the  substance  and  the  external- 
aspect  holds.  For  the  external-aspect  as  such  also  can  become  the 
substance  in  so  far  as  another  external-aspect  is  concerned.  But 
since,  strictly  speaking,  this  same  substance  can  be  named  external- 
aspect  by  virtue  of  attributing  to  it  an  identity  with  the  substance, 
therefore  this  sequence  shines  forth  in  consciousness  as  a unit  only. 
The  external-aspects  of  the  mind-stuff  are  of  two  kinds,  those 
that  are  perceived  and  those  that  are  unperceived.  Of  these 
two,  the  perceived  have  as  their  essence  presented-ideas  ; those 
that  are  unperceived  have  as  their  essence  real-things  (vastu)  only. 
These  latter  are  moreover  just  seven ; by  inference  the  existence 
of  [these  external-aspects]  as  real  things  only  is  brought  within 
reach.  “ Bestriction  - and  right-living  and  subliminal-impressions 
and  mutations  and  vitality  and  movement  and  power  are  external- 
aspects  of  mind-stuff  excluded  from  sight.” 

15.  The  order  of  the  sequence  (krama)  is  the  reason  for  the  order  of  the 
mutations.  [A  question  is  stated  for  discussion.]  ‘ Does  one  substance  have  only 
one  mutation  characterized  (lahmm)  by  external-aspect  and  time-variation  (laksana) 
and  intensity  ? Or  does  it  have  many  mutations  characterized  by  external- 
aspect  and  time-variation  and  intensity  ? Of  these  two  which  seems  plausible  ? 
[The  answer  of  the  objector  is,]  because  the  substance  is  one,  the  mutation  is 
only  one.  For  from  a cause,  which  as  such  is  one,  there  ought  not  to  be  a diversity 
of  effects,  because  that  diversity  would  have  to  be  the  result  of  chance.’  If  this 
be  taken  so,  the  reply  is  given.  As  a result  of  the  order  of  the  sequence 

' In  making  a jar  the  rim  is  moulded  first.  the  author  of  the  Comment.  Compare 

- This  seems  to  he  a mnemonic  verse  hy  iii.  18,  p.  230^  (Calc.  ed.). 


231]  Continuity  of  successive  mutatioyis  [ — iii.  15 

there  is  an  order  of  the  mutations.  Both  ordinary  men  and  men  of  trained 
minds  search  out  with  their  own  eyes,  in  clay  which  is  one,  a sequential 
succession  of  mutating  form  of  dust  and  lump  and  water-jar  and  potsherds  and 
small  bits.  And  the  immediate  succession  between  the  dust  and  the  lump  is 
one  thing ; and  that  between  the  lump  and  the  water-jar  is  another ; and 
that  between  the  water-jar  and  the  potsherds  is  another  ; and  that  between  the 
potsherds  and  the  small  bits  is  another.  Whatever  is  sequent  with  respect 
to  the  one  is  antecedent  with  respect  to  the  other.  This  same  difference  of 
sequences,  since  it  does  not  correspond  to  a single  mutation,  leads  one  to 
conclude  that  there  are  different  mutations.  Moreover  the  clay,  although  a 
single  substance,  undergoes  a succession  of  mutations  in  sequences  following 
the  sequence  of  contact  [samavadJiana]  with  various  co-operating  causes  which 
fall  one  after  another  into  the  sequence,  and  does  not  leave  it  [the  succession 
of  mutations]  to  chance.  And  as  in  the  case  of  the  order  of  the  mutation  of 
the  external-aspects,  so  the  reason  for  the  order  of  the  mutation  of  time-variations 
and  for  the  order  of  the  mutation  of  intensities  is  of  the  same  kind  as  the  order 
of  the  sequence.  All  this  is  made  luminous  in  the  words  of  the  Comment,  <Ka 
single  substance.2>  On  the  assumption  that  there  is  an  identity  between  the 
sequence  and  that  which  is  in  the  sequence,  it  is  said  that  this  is  its  sequence,  in 
the  words,  «There  is  none  the  less  a sequence  in  the  mutations  of  intensity.S> 
For  it  is  thus  when  rice-grains,  carefully  guarded  in  a granary  by  a miser,  after 
very  many  years  become  reduced  to  atoms,  in  that  the  arrangement  of  the  parts 
[of  the  grain]  is  likely  to  crumble  even  at  a touch  of  the  hand.  Such  a 
[condition]  would  not  result  so  suddenly  (akasmat)  in  the  case  of  brand-new 
rice-grains.  Therefore  in  the  sequence  of  successive  moments  this  fact  [that  they 
are  reduced  to  atoms]  is  seen  to  characterize  those  [grains]  which  have  gotten 
into  the  sequence  of  very  large  and  less  large  and  large  and  minute  and  more 
minute  and  very  minute.  This  same  order  in  the  sequence  does  depend  upon  the 
distinction  between  the  substance  and  the  external-aspects,  as  he  says,  ^These 
same  sequences. » Extended  from  the  evolved- effect  and  up  to  resoluble  [primary 
matter]  there  is  this  contingent  relation  of  substance  and  external-aspects. 
Even  [coarse  elements]  such  as  earth  are  external-aspects  as  compared  with 
subtile  elements,  as  he  says,  «the  external-aspect  also.^  Because  unresoluble 
[primary  matter]  is,  strictly  speaking,  the  only  substance,  it  is  usual  to 
attribute  identity  to  it.  ^By  virtue  of  {taddvarena)'^  [that  is]  by  virtue  of 
having  a common  locus  the  substance  would  itself  be  an  external-aspect.  For 
this  very  reason  there  would  be  only  one  mutation,  that  of  the  substance,  since 
external-aspects  and  time-variations  and  intensities  have  entered  into  the  sub- 
stance itself.  If  this  is  so,  it  is  almost  equivalent  to  saying  that  the  substance 
is  far-removed  from  being  absolutely  permanent. — While  discussing  the  mutations 
of  the  external-aspects  he  also  states  the  diversity  in  the  kinds  of  external- 
aspects  of  the  mind-stuff  by  saying  «of  the  mind-stuff.»  «Perceived»  means 
direct  perceptions  ; ^unperceived^  means  indirect  perceptions.  Of  these  two, 


iii.  15 — ] Booh  III.  Supernormal  Poivers  or  Vihhidi  [232 

those  whose  essence  is  presented-ideas  are  sources-of-valid-ideas  and  passions 
and  the  like.  By  the  words  «real  things  only»  he  refers  to  the  non-illuminating 
character  [of  things].  An  objector  says,  ‘ This  may  be  so.  But  if  unperceived, 
they  surely  do  not  exist.’  In  reply  to  this  he  says  «by  inference.^  These 
[external  aspects]  are  so  described  whose  existence  as  real  things  only  is  brought 
within  reach  by  inference.  The  word  inference  {anu-mana)  means  the  proof  [mana) 
which  comes  after  [anu),  and,  as  having  the  same  nature,  verbal-communication 
is  also  [included  in  the  term].  He  brings  together  in  a memorial-verse  the 
seven  unperceived  external-aspects  by  saying,  «Kestriction.)^  1.  The  restriction 
of  fluctuations  is  the  unconscious  stage  [i.  51]  of  the  mind-stuff.  We  come 
to  a knowledge  of  it  by  verbal-communication  and  by  inference  as  being  a 
state  in  which  subliminal-impi’essions  alone  remain.  2.  The  word  «right- 
livingS>  is  meant  to  include  merit  and  demerit.  Elsewhere  the  reading  is  ‘ karma’. 
In  this  case  also  merit  and  demerit  produced  by  this  [right-living]  would  have  to 
be  understood.  And  these  are  known  either  by  verbal-communication  or  by 
inference  based  upon  a knowledge  from  an  experience  of  pleasure  or  of  pain. 
3.  But  «subliminal-impression»  is  inferred  from  memory.  4.  Likewise, 
since  the  aspects  {guna)  are  thi-ee,  the  changes  of  the  aspects  of  the  mind- 
stuff  are  unstable,  and  so  ^mutation»  from  moment  to  moment  is  inferred. 
5.  Similarly  €vitality)5>  which  is  a kind  of  effort  to  sustain  the  breath.  And 
since  it  is  not  known  [to  the  mind],  this  external-aspect  is  inferred  from 
expiration  and  inspiration.  6.  Likewise  <Kmovement)^  of  the  mind  {cetas)  is 
activity,  in  accordance  with  its  activity  in  connexion  with  the  various  senses 
and  portions  of  the  body,  and  this  [activity]  also  is  inferred  from  the 
connexion  with  it  [that  is,  the  mind].  7.  Similarly  «power)^'  also  is  a 
subtile  state  of  effects  that  are  intensified.  It  is  an  external-aspect  of  the 
mind  and  it  is  inferred  only  by  experience  of  its  coarse  effects. 


From  here  on  the  field-of-operation  for  the  constraint  [reached]  by 
the  yogin  who  has  acquired  all  the  means  for  the  attainment  of 
the  desired  object  is  discussed. 

16.  As  a result  of  constraint  upon  the  three  mutations  [there 
follows]  the  knowledge  of  the  past  and  the  future. 

Yogins  acquire  knowledge  of  the  past  and  of  the  future  as  a result 
of  constraint  upon  the  mutations  of  external-aspects  and  of  time- 
variations  and  of  intensities.  Fixed-attention  and  contemplation 
and  concentration,  three  in  one,  has  been  called  [iii.  4]  constraint. 
By  this  [constraint]  the  three  mutations  directly  experienced 

^ Compare  ii.  14,  p.  21  (Calc.  ed.). 


233]  Words  and  objects  and  ideas  [ — iii.  17 

produce  knowledge  of  the  past  and  of  the  future  in  these  [three 
mutations]. 

From  this  point  up  to  the  end  of  the  [third]  Book  the  field-of-operation  for  the 
constraint  and  the  supernormal  powers  indicative  of  the  mastery  over  objects 
will  be  described.  Here  we  have  first  discussed  as  the  field-of-operation  for 
constraint,  for  that  yogin  who  has  appropriated  to  himself  all  the  aids  to 
yoga,  just  those  three  mutations  which  have  been  described  in  detail.  This 
is  in  the  words,  16.  As  a result  of  constraint  upon  the  three  mutations 
there  follows  the  knowledge  of  the  past  and  of  the  future.  An  objector 
asks,  ‘ Direct-experience  occurs  only  where  there  is  constraint.  How  then 
can  constraint  upon  the  three  mutations  directly-experience  the  past  and  the 
future?’  In  reply  to  this  he  says,  ^By  this  [constraint  ].»  When  the  three 
mutations  are  brought  under  direct-experience  by  this  [constraint],  those  [time- 
variations]  of  the  past  and  the  future,  inseparably-connected-with-the-muta- 
tions-yet-different-from-them,  become  the  objects  of  [intuitive]  knowledge.  And 
the  direct-experience  of  the  three  mutations  itself  has  as  its  essence  the  direct- 
experience  of  the  past  and  the  future  which  are  included  in  [the  three 
mutations].  Thus  there  is  no  difference  of  objects  in  the  two  cases  of  the 
constraint  and  of  the  direct-experience. 


17.  Word  and  intended-object  and  presented-idea  are  con- 
fused because  they  are  erroneously  identified  with  each 
other.  By  constraint  upon  the  distinctions  between  them 
[there  arises  the  intuitive]  knowledge  {jndna)  of  the  cries  of 
all  living  beings. 

With  regard  to  these  [three,]  voice  has  its  function  [in  uttering] 
only  the  [sounds  of]  syllables.  And  the  organ-of-hearing  has  as  its 
object  only  that  [emission  of  air]  which  has  been  mutated  into 
a sound  [by  a contact  with  the  eight  places  of  articulation  belong- 
ing to  the  vocal  organ].  But  it  is  a mental-process  (buddhi)  that 
grasps  the  word  [as  significant  sound]  by  seizing  ^ the  letter-sounds 
each  in  turn  and  binding  them  together  [into  one  word].  Sounds- 
of-syllahles  (varna)  do  not  naturally  ^ aid  each  other,  for  they 


* This  same  point  is  much  more  elaborately 

discussed  by  Vacaspati  in  his  Tattva- 
bindu  (Benares,  1892),  on  page  10  at 
the  top,  and  also  p.  3®. 

* The  question  is  whether  the  sounds  one 

by  one  or  collectively  make  the  proto- 
type (sphota)  manifest.  The  reply  seems 
to  be  that  just  as  the  full  knowledge 
30  [h.o.s.  jv] 


of  the  real  jewel  does  not  shine  out  clear 
at  the  first  sight,  but  shines  out  in  its 
fullness  in  the  final  idea,  the  resultant 
of  several  impressions, — so  the  sounds 
singly  do  make  the  prototype  manifest, 
but  do  not  immediately  make  the  pro- 
totype in  its  perfection  manifest. 


iii.  17 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vibhuti  [234 

cannot  coexist  at  the  same  time.  Not  having  attained-to-the- 
iinity-of  a word  and  not  having  [conveyed  a definite  meaning],  they 
become  audible  [avis)  and  they  become  inaudible  [tiras).  Hence  it 
is  said  that  individually  [letter-sounds]  lack  the  nature  of  a word. 
On  the  other  hand  the  [sounds  of  the]  syllables  one  by  one  may 
be  said  to  have  the  essence  of  a word  ^ as  being  filled  [pracita)  with 
the  power  to  furnish  expressions  for  everything  through  their  asso- 
ciation with  other  [sounds  of]  syllables  which  also  co-operate  [in  this 
result].  And  so  they  seem  to  pass  into  a multiplicity  ^ of  [word]- 
forms.  A preceding  [sound  of  a syllable]  is  mentally  determined 
by  the  following  and  the  following  by  the  preceding  to  become-a- 
distinct-and-separate  word.  Thus  a group  of  [sounds  of]  syllables 
follows  in  a sequence  [of  utterance]  and  is  assigned  by  conventional 
usage  to  a [single]  intended-object  [artha).  Hence  though  com- 
petent to  indicate  a great-number-of-things  (sarva),  a certain 
number  of  these  [sounds  of  syllables],  whatever  that  number  may 
be,  makes  [but  the  one]  object  clear  [to  consciousness].  For  example, 
g-o-li  indicate  [only  that]  thing  [known  as  ‘ cow  ’]  with  its  dewlap 
and  other  specific  features.  Hence  [also]  the  unity,  which  the 
mental-process  makes  known  out  of  these  [many  sounds  of 
syllables],  determined  as  these  are  by  conventional-usage  by  a 
single  intended-object  and  seized  and  bound  together  into  a fixed 
sequence  of  sounds,  is  the  word.  This  unity  [termed]  a word  is 
in  every  case  the  object  of  a single®  mental-process  and  requires 
a single  [distinct]  effort  [of  the  organs  of  articulation].  It  is  a 
thing  not  having  parts,  and  not  having  a sequence  ^ [of  parts]. 
It  does  not  consist  of  [sounds  of]  syllables.  It  is  a thing  of  the 
mind,  and  is  brought  into  its  function  hy  means  of  the  presented- 
idea  [which  we  retain]  of  the  final  syllable-sound  [in  a group  of  these 
sounds].  If  a man  wish  to  convey  information  to  another,  he  must 
express  himself  by  these  same  syllable-sounds  to  which  the  others 
must  listen.  This  use  of  speech  to  which  no  beginning  [can  be 

* Compare  Tattva  Bindu,  p.  6^  (Ben.  ed.).  ® That  is,  a separate  and  distinct  mental 

“ A universe  of  meanings  attached  to  one  process. 

word.  The  concept  vdigvarupyani  is  * Compare  Patanjali  Mahabh.  (Kielhom), 
approached  by  Viicaspatimifra  in  i.  6’®;  i.  7“ ; i.  75® ; i.  ii.  123*,  and 

Saihk.  Tatt.  Kaum.  on  Kiirika  xv.  elsewhere. 


235]  Doctrine  of  the  ivord-prototype  [ — iii.  17 

assigned]  permeates  the  thinking-substance  of  the  ordinary  man  with 
subconscious-impressions  [which  come  from  the  syllable-sounds]. 
Thus  as  a result  of  common  understanding  (sampratipatti)  [the 
word]  is  thought  to  be  something  real  in  itself.  It  is  owing  to  our 
knowing  what  this  [word]  means  in  accordance  with  conventional- 
usage  that  we  attempt  to  divide  it  [into  sounds  of  syllables].  Thus 
we  say  that  the  seizing-in-turn-and-binding-together  of  this  or 
that  number  of  [sounds  of]  syllables  in  some  such  kind  [of  fixed 
sequence]  is  a word  expressive  of  a single  intended-object.  But 
conventional-usage  is  essentially  [what  has  been  handed  down]  by 
the  memory  [of  man].  It  is  a kind  of  erroneous  identification 
of  the  word  and  the  thing  signified.  So  that  there  is  a confusion 
of  the  word  with  the  intended-object,  and  of  the  intended-object 
with  the  word.  Here  we  see  how  conventional  usage  is  a 
kind  of  erroneous  identification  of  each  with  the  other  based 
upon  memory.  Thus  it  is  that  these  [three],  the  word  ‘ cow  ’ and 
the  intended-object  ‘ cow  ’ and  the  presented-idea  ‘ cow  ’,  get  con- 
fused, because  erroneously  identified  with  one  another.  But  he 
who  recognizes  these  three  as  quite  distinct  is  the  knower  of  all. 
Furthermore,  every  word  has  the  power  ^ to  express  a [complete] 
sentence.  Thus  when  we  utter  the  word  ‘ tree  we  imply  that  it 
exists.  For  no  intended-object  of  a word  can  lack  existence. 
Similarly  no  action  expressed  [by  a verb]  is  possible  without  the 
means-of-attaining  [the  action].  And  so  wdien  we  utter  the  word 
‘ cook-s’,  certain  relations  which  are  later  expressly  mentioned ^ are 
supplied  to  specify  the  meaning  [by  excluding  other  relations]. 
Thus  we  mention  the  man  Chaitra  as  the  agent,^  rice  as  the  object,^ 
and  fire  as  the  means  ® of  the  action  [expressed  by  the  verb  ‘ cook  ’]. 
We  observe  also  that  words  are  so  constructed  as  to  give  the 
meaning  of  the  sentence  ; thus  a ‘ Header  ’ ® is  ‘ one  who  recites 
Vedas  ’ ; thus  if  we  say  ‘ lives  ’,  we  mean  [that  he]  ‘ keeps  the  breath 
of  life.’  [And  conversely]  in  this  sentence  there  is  a manifestation 


* The  vakyagahti  is  discussed  in  the  Tattva 
Bindu,  p.  16  (Benares  ed.). 

® Inaccordance  with  Patanjali  Mahabhasya 
on  i.  2.  45,  vart.  4 ; Kielhorn,  i.  218*. 


® Pan.  i.  4.  54  hartr. 

* Pan.  i.  4.  49  karma. 
® Pan.  i.  4.  42  harana. 
® Pan.  V.  2.  84. 


iii.  17 — ] Booh  III.  Supernormal  Poiuers  or  Vibhuti  [236 

of  the  meaning  of  words.  But  to  determine  whether  a particular 
word  denotes  an  action  [described  by  a verb]  or  some  relation 
[therewith,  we  must  withdraw  it  from  the  sentence]  and  analyse 
its  formation  by  making  distinctions.  Without  such  an  [analysis] 
many  a word  such  as  hhavati  or  agvah  or  ajdpayah  ^ would  remain 
ambiguous,  because  as  regards  its  outer  form  it  might  be  analysed 
either  as  a noun  or  as  a verb  {dhhydta).  There  is  a distinction 
between  these  words  and  intended-objects  and  presented-ideas. 
To  illustrate  this  [distinction],  ‘ The  palace  whitens  ’ ; here  the 
action  [of  a verb]  is  meant,  ‘ The  white  palace  ’ ; here  a relation  is 
meant,  [that  of  the  quality  white  with  the  action  or  process  which 
produced  it].  The  word  is  in  essence  both  an  action  [denoted 
by  a verb]  and  a relation,  and  the  termination  [at  the  end  of  the 
word]  conveys  these  meanings  of  [action  and  of  relation].  But  why 
is  this  so  ? Because  this  [process  of  whitening]  is  identified  with 
that,  [its  result,  the  quality  white]  ; so  that  in  conventional-usage 
the  presented-idea  [of  these  objects  seems  to  be]  one  and  the  same. 
But  the  white  intended-object  is  that  which  becomes  the  thing 
upon  which  the  word  and  the  presented-idea  depend.  For  this 
[intended-object]  by  reason  of  its  own  intensities  passes-through- 
evolved-forms  and  does  not  correspond  to  the  word  nor  to  the  mental- 
process  [which  are  unchanging  in  themselves].  Similarly  the  word 
and  similarly  the  presented-idea  do  not  correspond  the  one  with 
the  other.  The  word  [changes]  in  one  way ; the  intended-object 
in  another  way  ; and  the  presented-idea  in  another  way.  Thus 
there  is  a distinction.  And  so  it  happens  that  by  constraint  upon 
this  distinction  a yogin  attains  [intuitive]  knowledge  of  the  cries 
of  all  creatures. 

Here  is  another  field-of-operation  for  constraint  stated  in  sutia  17,  Word  . , , 
knowledge  , . , In  this  [sutra]  while  his  intention  is  to  explain  a word  as  an 
expression  of  meaning,  he  describes  first  of  all  the  object  of  the  functional- 
activity  of  the  vocal-organ  by  saying  <5Cln  this  [sutra],»  The  «voice»  is  the 
organ  of  voice  ; it  is  that  which  phenomenalizes  [the  sounds  of  the]  syllables 
and  it  has  eight  places  of  articulation.  As  is  said  [in  the  ^iksa  13],  “ There 
are  eight  places  of  articulation  of  the  [sounds  of  the]  syllables,  the  chest  and  the 
throat  and  the  head  and  the  root  of  the  tongue  and  the  teeth  and  the  nose  and 

^ Whitney : Grammar,  2nd  ed.,  1042,  1. 


237] 


Sounds  and  ivords 


[ — iii.  17 


the  lips  and  the  palate,”  This  vocal  organ  has  its  function  only  in  [uttering  the 
sounds  of  the]  syllables  as  they  are  known  to  ordinary  sense-perception,  and  not 
as  expressive  of  meanings.  He  explains  the  object  of  the  functional-activity  of 
the  organ  of  hearing  in  the  words  <Kthe  organ-of-hearing.»  The  organ-of-hearing, 
however,  has  that  only  as  its  object  which  is  mutated  in  the  form  of  a particular 
[sound  of  a]  syllable,  which  has  as  its  essence  a particular  mutation  of  an 
emission-of-air  {udana)  subjected-to-contact  [abhigliatin)  with  [the  various  places- 
of-articulation]  belonging  to  the  vocal  organ.  But  its  object  is  not  a word- 
expressing-a-meaning.  This  is  what  he  wishes-to-say  [ity  artha).  He  distinguishes 
the  word-expressing-a-meaning  from  the  [sounds  of  the]  syllables  as  known  to 
ordinary  sense-perception,  by  saying  ^the  word  [as  significant  sound],»  But  it 
is  the  mental-process  that  grasps  the  word  as  expressing-meaning  by  seizing  the 
letter-sounds  each  in  turn  [anu)  and  binding  them  together  [into  one  word  ]. 
Having  grasped  the  letter-sounds  [nada]  as  [the  sounds  of]  syllables  {mrna)  one 
by  one  as  they  are  known  in  sense-perception,  it  binds  them  in  turn  [that  is] 
afterwards  so  that  they  are  made  to  change  into  a unity  and  we  can  say  g-o-h 
[that  is  to  say]  one  word.  By  this  [mental-process]  the  word  is  grasped. 
Although  each  of  the  preceding  mental-processes  [by  stages]  brings  each  word, 
[so  long  as  it]  has  the  form  of  the  [sounds  of]  syllables,  into  consciousness, 
still  the  word  [expressing  meaning]  does  not  clearly  lie  [before  us].  But  at  the 
last  mental-act  (vijfiana)  it  becomes  clear.  Thus  it  is  said  <Ka  mental-process 
ihuddhi)  grasps  the  word  [as  significant  sound]  by  seizing  the  letter-sounds  each 
in  turn  and  binding  them  together  [into  one  word].:^  To  [the  Mimahsaka]  who 
maintains  that  the  [sounds  of  the]  syllables  in  themselves  express  a meaning,  in 
that  a word  cannot  be  discerned  as  one  because  the  [sounds]  are  heterogeneous, 
he  replies  ^the  [sounds  of  the]  syllables.^  Now  these  [sounds  of  the]  syllables 
must  either  1.  each  singly  {pratyeka)  arouse  the  idea  {dlfi)  having  a word  expressing 
meaning  as  its  content,  like  a row  of  pegs ' upon  which  a bag-of-netted-cords  is 
hung  ; or  2.  in  combination  {samhata)  like  the  stones  which  when  together  hold 
the  pot.  Not,  in  any  case,  1.  the  first  alternative,  because  from  the  single  [sound 
of  a syllable]  the  sense-perception  of  the  thing  does  not  x’ise  in  consciousness  ; 
or  because  if  it  did  proceed  from  a single  one,  the  second  and  the  third  need  not 
have  been  uttered.  For  when  an  action  is  completed,  a means-of-attaining  [that 
action]  which  adds  nothing  new  cannot  be  counted  as  {nyayatipdta)  a means-of- 
attaining.  Therefore  2.  the  second  [alternative]  remains.  For  the  stones  in  com- 
bination can  hold  up  the  pot,  because  they  are  there  at  the  same  time.  But  the 
[sounds  of  the]  syllables  cannot  be  simultaneous.  Accordingly,  since  it  cannot 
be  that  aid  is  reciprocally  given  and  received,  they  cannot  by  being  together 
arouse  the  idea  of  the  meaning.  These  [sounds  of  syllables]  not  attaining  by 
themselves  to  a single  special  word  and  therefore  not  conveying  [the  meaning], 
become  now  audible  (am)  and  now  inaudible  {tiras).  Like  the  iron  rods  [of  a 


* This  phrase  in  almost  the  same  words  occurs  in  Vacaspati’s  Tattva  Hindu,  p.  5'^. 


iii.  17 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vihhuti  [238 


tripod  which  co-operate  to  hold  a vessel]  they  are  not,  as  being  each  by  itself, 
termed  a word.  If,  however,  the  [sounds  of  the]  syllables  were  to  attain  to  a 
word  as  a unit  by  being  [each  by  itself]  identical  with  the  word,  then  the  defect 
mentioned  before  would  not  apply,  as  he  says  <KOn  the  other  hand  the  [sounds  of 
the]  syllables  one  by  onemaybe  said  to  have  theessence  of  aword.^ — «Being  filled 
with  the  power  to  furnish  expressions  for  everything^  [means]  having  an  accumu- 
lation of  a great  number  of  powers  to  indicate  [things].  For  the  letter  ‘ g ’ occurs 
in  words  like  gau  and  gana  and  gaura  and  naga  expressing  various  meanings  such 
as,  for  instance,  the  common-nature-of-cows.  Thus  [this  letter]  has  the  power  to 
express  this  or  that  [meaning].  Likewise  the  letter  ‘ o ’ occurs  in  words  like 
somah  and  ^ocih  in  words  denoting  the  Ifvara  as  the  object-intended.  This  is  to  be 
s&id  mutatis  mutandis  with,  vegavdi  to  all  [the  letters].  Furthermore  the  [sound  of 
a]  syllable  such  as  ‘g  ’ which  co-operates'  [in  one  set  of  cases],  is  the  very  same 
which  is  associated  [and]  connected  with  [the  sound  of]  another  syllable  such  as 
‘o’.  These  [sounds  of  the]  syllables  which  have  been  so  described  are  a general 
condition  {bJidva)  or  state.  Therefore  they  seem  to  pass  into  a multiplicity  of  forms 
[or]  a plurality.  But  it  does  not  actually  pass  into  a plurality  just  because  of 
[its  own  peculiar]  state. — The  ^preceding^  [sound  of  a]  syllable,  the  letter  ‘g’ 
by  association  with  the  following  letter  ‘ o ’ is  thus  distinguished  from  words  like 
gana  ; and  the  following  letter  ‘ o ’ by  association  with  the  letter  ‘ g ’ is  dis- 
tinguished from  words  like  ^ocik  and  thus  becomes  determined  in  the  mental- 
process  which  seizes  each  in  turn  and  binds  them  together  to  become  a distinct- 
and-separate  word-expressive-of-the-meaning  [vdcaka)  of  the  common-nature-of- 
the-cow,  [to  become]  the  word-prototype  of  the  word  ‘ cow  ’.  The  connexion  of 
ideas  is  this.  [This  happens  in  this  way]  because  the  presented-idea  of  the  thing 
cannot  be  effected  by  successive  [sounds  of]  syllables  which  do  not  occur  [in  a word] 
in  a fixed  sequence.  Nor,  when  heaven  or  the  highest  sacrificial-merit  [apurca) 
is  to  be  brought  to  pass,  is  it  proper  to  say  that  just  as  sacrifices  such  as  the 
Agneya“  co-operate  [sdliitya)  by  means  of  purifications  [samskara],  so  the  [sounds 
of  the]  syllables  [by  means  of  subliminal-impressions  [sa7hskdra)\  co-operate  in  the 
production  of  the  mental-process  of  the  thing.  [It  is  not  proper  to  say  this,]  because 
the  argument  breaks  down  when  we  apply  the  method  of  alternatives  {vikalpa). 
Surely  this  subliminal-impression  (samskara)  produced  by  the  experience  of  [the 
sounds  of  the]  syllables  is  either  the  one  which  generates  memory,  or  it  is  the 
other,  which  is  called  sacrificial-merit  ® (apurva)  and  is  likened  to  the  purification 
(samskara)  by  the  Agneya  and  similar  [sacrifices].  Now  first  of  all  the  second 


' Discussed  at  length  on  p.  6"  of  the  Tattva 
Bindu  (Benares  ed.). 

* Six  sacrifices  are  performed  in  two  groups, 
three  without  a break  in  the  groups. 
Three  on  the  first  day  after  the  full 
moon,  the  Agneya,  the  Upangu,  the 
Agnistoma  ; three  gaga  on  the  first  day 


after  the  new  moon.  All  six  have  the 
name  of  dargapnrnamdsagaga, 

^ Compare  the  discussion  of  the  sphotn  as 
analogous  to  the  sacrifice  in  ^astra 
Dipika  i.  1.  5,  p.  68  ; i.  2.  10,  p.  127. 
See  also  Tattva  Bindu,  p.  6'®.  On  the 
intermixture  of  apia-va  see  ^ast.  Dip. 
ii.  1.  5,  p.  200. 


239] 


[ — iii.  17 


The  sphota 

[of  these  altei’natives]  cannot  [be  admitted],  because  of  the  difficulties  in  the 
assumption.  It  must  be  assumed  that  this  [purification]  is  the  very  same  as 
that  which  follows  {purva)  sacrificial-merit.  Whereas  this  [word-type]  which  is 
one  cannot  be  produced  by  experiences  of  [sounds  of]  syllables  in  sequences. 
Since  we  should  have  to  assume  [the  existence]  of  many  subsidiary  purifications 
{samsMra)  each  of  the  same  kind  [as  the  others].  It  is  this  that  is  the  difficulty. 
Furthermore  so  long  as  we  do  not  know  that  this  purification  serves  as  a cause 
to  make  the  intended-object  known,  it  cannot  be  accepted  as  serving  to  produce 
this  [meaning].  For  a relation  which  is  not  known  to  serve  the  purpose  of  pre- 
senting the  intended-object,  cannot  be  accepted  as  serving  [that  purpose].  And, 
as  for  the  subliminal-impression  which  is  inferred  from  the  memory  which  is  its 
result,  it  is  restricted  [i.  11]  to  that  object,  namely,  the  experience  which  was 
its  cause.  And  it  is  therefore  not  in  a position  to  arouse  a subliminal-impres- 
sion which  has  something  else,  [namely,  the  presentation  of  the  intended-object  of 
that  experience]  as  its  object.  For  if  this  w^ere  so,  any  one  having  experienced 
any  one  object,  would  be  able  to  know  any  [other]  object.  And  it  is  not  right  to 
say  that  [sounds  of]  syllables  which  arise  in  the  mirror  of  such  a memory  as  takes 
its  origin  in  the  sum-total  {pinda)  of  subliminal-impressions — produced  by  the 
experience  of  each  syllable  singly — can  express  meaning  [because  the  sounds  of 
the  syllables]  are  recognized  as  belonging  together.  For  that  would  involve-the- 
conclusion  that  the  idea  of  the  intended  object  could  be  produced  indiscriminately 
{avigesena),  whether  the  [sounds  of  the  syllables]  be  experienced  in  a sequence  or 
out  of  a sequence  or  in  reversed  sequence.  And  it  cannot  be  that  this  knowledge 
from  memory  can  bring  before  itself  (gocarayitum)  that  succession  of  sounds  of 
syllables  which  was  active  in  the  previous  experience.  Hence  in  so  far  as  it  is 
not  possible  from  the  [sounds  of  the]  syllables  to  have  the  presentation  of  the 
intended-object,  it  must  be  supposed  that  there  is  an  experience^  of  the  word  as 
being  single  which  could  give  rise  to  [the  presentation  of  the  intended-object^]. 
The  same  objection,  moreover,  does  not  apply  with  reference  to  the  word.  For 
the  word  is  phenomenalized  by  [sounds  of]  syllables  only  when  single  and  differ- 
ing according  to  the  difference  “ in  the  effort  [of  articulation].  And  inasmuch 
as  the  words  are  alike  in  so  far  as  they  are  produced  through  the  action  of  the 
like  places  [of  articulation]  by  sounds  which  are  the  conditions-which-pheno- 
menalize  the  various  words  each  unlike  the  other,  [the  sounds]  do  make  a word 
similar  [to  other  words].  This  word  [go']  is  similar  to  other  words  which  have 
the  ‘ g ’ sound,  but  in  other  respects  it  is  dissimilar,  since  their  dissimilarities 
are  diffei’ent  in  so  far  as  the  various  other  [syllables]  are  associated  [with  this 
syllable].  Because  of  [this]  peculiarity  of  this  [word],  although  it  is  one,  and 

^ So  his  position  is  this.  The  sphota  is  a “ The  word  sva  evidently  refers  to  the 
subliminal-impression  in  the  luddhi.  bracketed  phrase. 

The  buddhi  forms  the  intended-object  * See  Patanjali : Mahabhasya  on  i.  1.  9, 
under  the  influence  of  the  sphota.  vart.  2,  vol.  i,  p.  61 ; also  on  viii.  4. 

48,  vol.  iii,  p.  466  (Kielhorn). 


ili.  17 — ] Book  III.  Su'pernormal  Bowers  or  Vibhiiti  [240 

altogether  a unit  [anavayava),  still  the  sounds-of-the-syllables  make  it  appear  as 
a coliection  {savayava)  and  not  as  a unit.  Just  as  a face,  although  it  is  one,  with 
a definite  colour  and  dimension  and  look,  is  made  to  appear,  by  [reflection  in]  a 
gem  ^ or  a sword-blade  or  a mirror,  to  be  more  than  one  and  as  having  more 
than  one  colour  and  dimension  and  look.  But  this  is  not  so  in  the  strict 
sense.  Whereas  the  [sounds  of  the]  syllables  are  parts  of  the  partless  word  and 
are  formed  of  the  similarities  and  peculiarities. 

Therefore  the  mental-process  {buddhi)  of  this  [word],  in  the  case  of  a particular 
word,  supports  itself  upon  the  word-prototype  [spliota)  which  is  undivided  and 
partless,  although  it  seems  to  be  divided  and  seems  to  have  parts.  Therefore 
a part,  the  letter  ‘ g ’,  of  one  particular  word-prototype,  the  word  ‘ go  ’ cannot 
cause  that  [namely,  the  partless  prototype]  of  which  it  [the  ‘ g ’]  is  part  to  come 
forth,  because  of  the  similarity  of  this  word-prototype  \vith  that  of  words  like 
gaura.  Therefore  when  made  special-and-distinct  by  the  letter  ‘o’,  it  is  able  to 
cause  that  of  which  it  is  a part,  [namely  the  word-prototype  ‘ go  ’,]  to  come  forth. 
Similarly  the  pai't  which  is  the  letter  ‘o’  is  also  not  able,  because  of  its  similarity 
with  words  like  to  cause  that  of  which  it  is  a part,  namely  the  word-prototype 
‘go’,  to  come  forth.  So  when  made  special-and-distinct  by  the  letter  ‘g’,  it  is 
able  to  cause  [its  own  prototype]  to  come  forth.  And  although  [these  two  ‘ g ’ 
and  ‘o’]  do  not  naturally  belong  together,  still  through  [their]  subliminal- 
impressions  they  do  belong  together.  And  thus  it  is  consistent  to  have  the 
relation  of  qualified  and  qualifier  between  them.  Nor  can  it  be  said  that  the 
two  subliminal-impressions  have  each  a different  object,  since  the  experiences 
whose  objects  were  the  two  parts,  and  also  the  two  subliminal-impressions 
which  result  from  the  experiences,  have  one  word  as  their  object.  The  word 
moreover  is  not  distinctly  [avyahta]  experienced  when  only  part  of  it  is  experienced. 
Whereas  it  is  perceived  distinctly  by  the  idea  which  seizes  the  [sounds  of  the] 
syllables  in  turn  and  binds  them  together, — [the  idea]  which  is  produced  by  the 
subliminal-impressions  which  arise  from  the  experience  of  the  parts.  This  is 
the  difference.  And  we  find  that  the  first  indistinct  experience  does  produce 
a distinct  experience  by  arousing  subliminal-impressions  in  a sequence  [of 
degrees  of  distinctness],  just  as  the  presented-idea  that  the  tree  when  seen  from  a 
distance  is  green  ^ {harita),  although  indistinct,  leads  to  the  distinct  presented-idea 
of  the  tree.  But  this  kind  [of  an  idea]  is  impossible  in  an  experience  wherein 
the  [sounds  of  the]  syllables  should  represent  intended-objects.  For  surely  one 
cannot  say  that  the  [sounds  of  the]  syllables  do  each  singly  give  rise  to  an  indistinct 
presented-idea  of  the  intended-object,  and  ultimately  to  a distinct  idea.  For 
distinctness  and  indistinctness  are  restricted  to  cases  of  perceptive  thinking. 
But  [in  this  case]  the  presentation  of  the  intended-object  is  to  be  aroused  by  the 

' The  illustration  and  discussion  are  given  passage  in  the  Tattva  Bindu  [p.  5’]  by 

more  fully  in  the  Tattva  Bindu,  p.  6®.  the  same’  author  seems  preferable  to 

“ This  reading  given  in  the  analogous  the  reading  of  ‘ elephant  ’ {hasti). 


241]  Word-'p'ototy'pe  and  syllables  [ — iii.  17 

syllables,  and  is  not  a perception.  So  if  this  [unperceived  presentation  of  the 
intended-object]  is  produced  by  the  [sounds  of  the]  syllables,  it  would  be 
produced  quite  clear  {sphuta)  or  it  would  not  be  produced  at  all.  But  it  could 
not  be  unclear.  Whereas  for  the  word-prototype  you  have  to  assume  a clear 
or  an  unclear  form  in  that  there  is  a perception  of  it  made  distinct  by  sounds. 
So  the  case  is  not  analogous  [in  that  the  word  cannot  be  perceived  unless  the 
sounds  be  distinct,  whereas  the  sounds  can  be  distinctly  perceived].  Thus 
the  [sounds  of  the]  syllables  combined  in  the  mental-process  which  seizes  them 
in  turn  and  binds  them  together,  and  which  has  its  origin  in  the  organ-of-hearing, 
— in  this,  together  with  the  subliminal-impressions  generated  by  experience  of 
the  [sounds  of  the]  syllables,  one  by  one,  become  the  word-prototype  of  a single 
word.  If  there  should  be  an  alteration  of  the  sequence,  [then],  in  so  far  as  there 
might  not  be  any  special-and-distinct  effort  [of  the  organ-of-voice],  giving  heed 
to  the  fixed  order,^  which  would  set  in  operation  the  special-and-distinct 
effort  that  alone  can  make  this  [word-prototype]  manifest,  it  would  follow  that 
there  would  be  no  manifestation  of  it  at  aU.  In  so  far  as  the  [sounds  of 
the]  syllables  conform  to  [this]  sequence  and  are  determined  by  being  the 
conventional-usage  for  an  intended-object  they  display  as  their  object  a word 
as-it-is-usually-understood  as  having  parts  and  as  having  its  determination  by 
conventional-usage  only. — <&Whatever  that  number  might  be)^  means  two  or 
three,  three  or  four,  five  or  six.  Though  competent  to  indicate  a great  number 
of  things,  a certain  number  of  these  [sounds  of]  syllables  makes  but  the  one 
intended-object  clear  [to  consciousness,  for  example]  g-o-h  [makes  clear  to 
consciousness  only  the  one  object  known  as  ‘ cow  ’]  having  its  dewlap  [and 
other  specific  features].  It  might  then  be  said  that  the  [sounds  of  the] 
syllables  only,  in  so  far  as  they  accord  with  conventional-usage,  have  ex- 
pressive power,  and  accordingly  there  is  no  so-called  word  which  is  a unit. 
In  reply  to  this  he  says,  ^Hence  ...  of  these.» — <Klnto  a fixed  sequence  of 
sounds^  means  a sequence  caused  by  sounds. — ^Seized  and  bound  together^ 
are  those  in  whose  case  the  sequence  of  sounds  is  of  that  kind. — ^Which  the 
mental-process  makes  known)^  in  the  sense  that  it  is  made  known  or  becomes 
clear  by  reason  of  the  mental-process.  It  has  been  said,  in  harmony  with  the 
view  of  persons  of  not  very  fine  insight,  that  the  ‘g’  and  ‘o’  and  ‘h’  are 
determined  by  conventional-usage  [as  denoting  the  thing  termed  ‘cow’].  And 
this  is  so  because,  in  so  far  as  the  ‘ g ’ and  the  other  [sounds  of  syllables]  are 
parts  of  this  [word],  they  are  identical  with  it  and  so  express  its  meaning. 
But  we  are  of  opinion,  that,  as  any  one  can  see,  it  is  a unity  that  is  called  a w'ord 
which  expresses  a meaning.  This  he  makes  clear  by  saying  ^This  unity.^ 
The  connexion  [of  ideas]  is  that  this  unity  [termed]  a word  is  by  an  ordinary 
mental-process  believed  [to  be  made  of  sounds  of  syllables].  Why  should  it  be 
a unit?  In  reply  to  this  he  says  ^object  of  a single  mental-process.)^  It  is 

^ Precisely  as  there  is  a fixed  sequence  without  break  of  the  several  sacrifices. 

31  [h.O.S.  17] 


iii.  17 — ] Booh  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vihhuti  [242 

a unit  since  it  is  the  object  of  that  mental-process  which  is  a unit  in  form  so 
that  one  says  ‘ g-o-h  ’ [that  is]  one  word.  He  shows  what  it  is  that  makes  this 
distinct  by  saying  ^requires  a single  [distinct]  effort.^  The  effort  [of  articulation] 
which  makes  the  word  r-a-s-a  distinct  is  different  in  character  from  that  which 
makes  the  word  s-a-r-a  distinct  {vyahjalca).  This  [effort]  moreover  is  determined 
by  the  result  in  the  form  of  the  manifestation  of  the  word  s-a-r-a  in  that  ’ it 
begins  [differently]  ; it  has  a definite  succession  [of  sounds]  ; and  this  is  the  single 
[and  distinct  effort].  This  it  was  which  was  required.  ^It  is  a thing  without 
parts^  because  in  reality  it  has  no  part.s.  These  we  only  assume  because  of 
certain  similarities  and  dissimilarities.  Hence  also  it  is  ^without  a sequence 
of  parts»  because  there  it  has  no  definite  succession.  An  objector  says,  ‘ The 
[sounds  of  the]  syllables  have  a definite  succession,  and  they  are  parts  of  this 
[word].  How  then  can  the  word  be  without  parts,  and  without  a sequence  of 
parts  ? ’ In  reply  to  this  he  says  «It  does  not  consist  of  [sounds  of]  syllables.^ 
For  it  does  not  have  the  [sounds  of  the]  syllables  as  its  parts.  On  the  contrary 
the  word  itself,  because  of  certain  similarities  and  dissimilarities,  is  generally 
assumed  to  have  the  form  of  this  or  that  [sound]  and  [so]  appears  in  what  is 
not  its  real  form.  For  the  faces  as  reflected  in  a jewel  or  a sword-blade  or 
a mirror  are  not  parts  of  the  real  face.  <5Clt  is  a thing  of  the  mind»  made  known 
by  the  mental-process  which  seizes  in  turn  and  binds  together  [the  sounds  of 
the  syllables].  «It  is  brought  before  [us]»  [or]  made  an  object  by  the  operation 
{vyapara)  of  the  presented-idea  of  the  final  [sound  of  the]  syllable, — [by  the 
operation,  that  is,  of]  the  subliminal-impression  [of  the  final  syllable]  together 
with  the  subliminal-impressions  generated  by  the  experience  of  [sounds  of]  the  pre- 
vious syllables.  For  it  has  already  [adliastat]  been  explained  that  the  experience 
of  the  syllables  and  of  the  subliminal-impressions  arising  from  them  are  the 
object  of  the  word.  The  objector  says,  ‘ This  may  be  so.  But  if  the  word-as- 
such  ipada-fattva)  has  no  parts  or  sequence  or  [sounds  of]  syllables,  why  is  it  not 
generally  assumed  to  be  of  such  a kind  ? For  a bead  of  crystal,  when  overlaid 
with  a coating  of  red-dye,  does  not,  when  that  coating  is  removed,  cease  to  be 
perceived  as  transparent  and  white.  Therefore  the  [sounds  of  the]  syllables  are 
real  [i>arts  of  the  word].’  In  reply  to  this  he  says  ^to  another.)^  If  a man  wish 
to  convey  information  he  must  express  himself  by,  he  must  utter,  the  very 
[sounds  of  the]  syllables  to  which  the  hearers  must  listen.  This  use  of  speech, 
to  which  no  beginning  [can  be  assigned],  depends  upon  words  consisting  of 
distinct  syllables.  And  the  subconscious-impression  produced  by  it  has  also  no 
beginning.  The  mental-process  of  the  ordinary  man  (loka)  is  permeated  [and] 
pervaded  [vdsita]  by  this  [subconscious-impression]  and  has  to  do  with  a word 
constinicted  of  separate  [sounds  of]  syllables.  Thus  as  a result  of  usage,  by  the 
consensus  of  the  elders,  this  word  is  thought  of  as  something  real  in  itself, 
as  having  reality  in  the  strict  sense.  What  he  means  to  say  is  this  : There  is 
a certain  thing,  the  limiting-condition,  which  is  in  correlation  with  the  thing- 
^ Does  upakramatas  mean  ‘ which  is  under  consideration  ’ ? 


243] 


The  real  word 


[ — iii.  17 


to-be-exposed-to-limiting-conditions  (upadheya)  and  which  is  sometimes  in 
correlation  and  sometimes  out  of  correlation  with  it.  Such  a thing  is  red-dye. 
Now  when  this  is  out  of  correlation,  the  crystal  shines  forth  in  its  natural  trans- 
parent and  white  form.  And  it  is  quite  proper  [that  the  crystal  should  then 
shine  forth].  But  the  presented-idea  of  the  word, — because  it  is  not  brought  into 
[consciousness]  [anutpada)  by  anything  other  than  the  particular  sound  brought 
about  by  the  particular  effort  [of  articulation],  and  in  so  far  as  this  [presented- 
idea]  is  always  turbid  with  flaws  of  dissimilarity, — can  generate  the  presented- 
idea  [of  the  word]  only  as  being  in  essence  [sounds  of]  syllables.  So  how  can 
there  be  the  ordinary  knowledge  of  a word  when  divested  of  its  limiting 
conditions?  As  they ^ say,  “Sounds  because  in  themselves  alike  bring  about 
false  notions ; that  which  makes  these  [sounds]  apperceived  is  the  cause  of  this 
false  notion.  And  for  those  whose  knowledge  of  words  is  made  known  by  the 
means  [which  produce  it,  that  is,  the  sounds  of  the  syllables]  there  is  an 
inevitable  false  notion.  This  results  in  an  overthrow  {badha)  of  [all]  knowledge 
and  would  cause  an  unfailing  confusion  of  [all  dealings]  in  the  world.” 
Because  the  essence  of  a word  shines  out  turbid  with  separate  [sounds  of]  syllables, 
for  this  reason  persons  of  not  very  fine  insight,  deeming  the  syllables  themselves 
to  be  the  word,  use  conventionally  these  very  [sounds  of]  syllables,  which  have 
taken  certain  forms,  with  certain  intended-objects,  as  he  says  <Sof  this.S>  This 
word,  although  by  nature  (ajanatas)  a unity,  is  separated  on  the  basis  of  the  know- 
ledge of  the  conventional-usage  [of  this  word]  to  suit  the  purposes  of  persons 
whose  insight  is  not  very  fine,  as  if  its  essence  were  separate  [sounds  of]  syllables. 
He  describes  this  separation  of  the  word  into  [sounds  of]  syllables  by  saying 
^this  or  that  number.»  Of  this  or  that  number  [that  is]  neither  more  nor  less. 
^In  some  such  kind)^  means  a particular  continuous  sequence.  <3CThe  seizing  in 
turn  and  binding  together)5>  means  under  the  influence  of  a single  mental-process. 
[This  is]  a word  expressive  of  a single  intended-object,  such  as  a cow.  The 
objector  says,  ‘If  conventional-usage  is  such  a word  expressive  of  a single 
intended-object  only,  then,  Sir,  there  would  be  an  erroneous  identification  of 
word  and  intended-object.’  In  reply  to  this  he  says  <SBut  conventional-usage.» 
^Essentially  . . . memory^  is  that  which  in  itself  is  memory.  For  conventional- 
usage,  merely  because  you  can  say  that  it  prevails  {krta),  is  not  sufficient  to  define 
the  intended-object ; but  it  must  also  be  remembered.  What  he  means  to  say 
is  this.  In  a conventional-usage  which  makes  no  difference  a difference  is 
somehow  imagined.  [And  therefore]  the  genitive  case  is  used  [to  denote  the 
distinction  between  the  word  and  the  thing]. — When  one  who  knows  the 


^ Professor  Ganganath  Jha  has  found  a 
reference  to  these  same  verses  in  the 
Nyayaratnakara,  a commentary  on  the 
^lokavarttika  (Chaukhambha  Sans. 
Series,  p.  880).  Herein  we  find  them 
referred  to  as  vaiyalcaranair  iiktam. 


Consequently  they  are  not  from  any 
Mimahsa  work.  Possibly  they  may  be 
found  in  the  unpublished  portions  of 
the  Vakyapadiya.  I have  not  found 
them  in  the  printed  fascicles. 


iii.  17 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vihhuti  [244 

distinction  between  these  [three]  performs  constraint  upon  this  [distinction] 
he  becomes  the  knower  of  all, — has  an  [intuitive]  knowledge  of  the  cries 
of  all  living  beings. — Thus  having  analysed  that  unit,  the  word,  which  is 
without  parts,  although  the  parts  are  assumed  to  be  in  the  [sounds  of  the] 
syllables,  he  says,  with  the  intent  to  analyse  the  sentence,  which  has  an 
imaginary  division  into  parts,  but  which  is  a unit  and  has  no  parts  ^Further- 
more, every  word  has  the  power  to  express  a [complete]  sentence.^  The 
connexion  [of  ideas]  is  this.  A word  is  used  to  convey  information  to  another. 
And  the  other  should  have  precisely  that  information  conveyed  to  him  which 
the  words  are  intended  to  convey.  And  these  [words]  are  also  capable  of  giving 
that  same  information  which  deals  with  acceptance  or  [rejection  {liana)  or 
indifference  {upeksa)\  And  they  do  not  deal  [tadgocara)  with  the  meaning  {artha) 
of  the  word  only,  but  with  the  meaning  of  the  sentence.  So  all  words  must 
subserve  the  meaning  of  the  sentence.  And  accordingly  the  meaning  of  the 
sentence  is  that  of  these  [words]  also.  And  it  is  for  this  reason  that  whenever 
a word  is  used  alone,  it  is  always  associated  with  another  word,  and  the  sense 
follows  from  that  word,  but  not  from  the  [first]  word  used  alone.  Why? 
Because  by  itself  (tanmatrasga)  it  has  no  capacity.  Thus  it  is  the  sentence  that 
in  all  cases  expresses  the  words  ; but  the  words  do  not.  However,  as  forming 
parts  of  this  [that  is,  the  sentence],  the  words  also  have  expressive  power  mth 
respect  to  the  sense  of  the  sentence,  just  as  with  respect  to  the  word  the  [sounds 
of  the]  syllables  as  constituting  it  have  also  expressive  power.  Thus  then  just 
as  each  single  [sound  of  a]  syllable  embraces  the  power  to  express  all  intended- 
objects  of  words,  so  also  each  single  word  embraces  the  power  to  express  the 
meaning  of  all  sentences.  This  is  what  is  expressed  by  the  words  ^Furthermore, 
every  word  has  the  power  to  express  a [complete]  sentence.  Thus  when  we 
utter  the  word  ‘tree ’,  we  imply  that  it  exists.2>  The  meaning  is  that  the  word 
‘ tree  ’ in  conjunction  with  the  implied  word  ‘ is  ’ leads  to  the  meaning  of  the 
sentence.  Therefore  as  forming  part  of  the  sentence,  the  word  ‘ tree  ’ produces 
that  meaning  {tatra  variate).  But  if  it  be  asked  why  the  word  ‘ is  ’ is  implied, 
the  reply  is  «No  intended-object  can  lack  existence.^  For  the  means  for 
defining  the  meanings  of  words  is  popular-usage’  {loka).  And  this  popular- 
usage  combines  the  meaning  of  the  word  as  it  is  alone  with  the  meaning  ‘ is  ’ 
and  in  all  such  cases  makes  the  meaning  of  a sentence.  This  same  [popular- 
usage]  is  the  meaning  of  a word  which  cannot  lack  existence.  Hence  those  ^ 
who  know  the  functions  of  words  have  [this]  agreement-of-usage  [vyavahara), 
“Wherever  there  is  no  other  verb,  ‘is’  in  the  sense  of  being  should  be  used.” 
— Having  stated  that  a nominal-base  ^ never  lacks  its  action  [expressed  by  a verb], 
he  shows  that  any  particular  verb  is  never  without  a relation  by  saying  «And  so 

’ Compare  PataSjali  Mahabhasya  i.  2.  1,  bhasya  on  v.  2.  94. 

vart.  2 (Kielhorn's  ed.,  vol.  i,  p.  217  ).  ® Discussed  in  Patanjali  Mahabhasya  on 

^ See  also  for  comparison  Patanjali  Mahil-  i.  2.  4^. 


245] 


[ — iii.  17 


The  unity  of  the  word 


when  we  utter.^  Tor  when  we  utter  the  word  'cook-s  all  relations  which  are 
suitable  for  association  with  it  are  implied.  For  this  reason  there  is  an  express 
statement  of  the  special  relations  of  this  [verb],  and  the  purpose  [of  this  statement] 
is  to  exclude  other  [relations].  Thus  the  meaning  of  the  sentence  consists  in 
nothing  but  the  specializing  [of  the  relations].  Similarly  although  out  of  all 
relations,  a word  is  found  to  stand  for  the  meaning  of  the  sentence ; and  the 
sentence  is  still  more  potential  in  the  words.  So  he  says  ^We  observe.»  But 
this  does  not  mean  that  words  like  Reader,  which  are  complete  in  themselves, 
can  present  a meaning  so  long  as  they  are  not  combined  wnth  words  like  ‘ is  ’. 
So  even  in  the  case  of  this  word  [Reader,  as  complete  in  itself],  the  meaning  is  to 
be  assumed  only  in  so  far  as  it  forms  part  of  a sentence.  This  is  the  point.  [An 
objector]  says,  ‘ This  may  be  true.  But  if  the  words  by  themselves  have  the 
expressive  power  of  the  sentence,  then  there  is  no  further  need  of  the  sentence, 
since  its  meaning  can  be  ascertained  from  them.’  In  reply  to  this  he  says 
«[And  conversely]  in  this  sentence.^)  It  has  been  said  already  that  if  there  be 
a desire  on  the  part  of  the  speaker  to  convey  information,  the  meaning  of  [his] 
words  is  not  understood  from  the  words  alone,  so  long  as  these  words  are  not 
brought  into  combination  with  other  words.  So  then  supposing  the  words 
to  be  separated  from  the  sentence,  a part  of  it,  the  relation  or  the  verb,  is  to  be 
explained  by  analysing  [and]  enumerating  these  [words],  by  allotting  the  shares 
to  this  word,  the  bases  {pratyaya)  and  so  on.  ‘ But  why  is  so  much  trouble  taken 
to  go  through  this  account  [of  the  analysis  of  words]  ? ’ In  reply  to  this  he  says 
^Without  such  [an  analysis]. Because  of  the  similarity  of  noun  and  verb  in 
such  cases'  as,  ‘A  water-jar  is  (Mavati)  there’  and  ‘0  IislUj  (hhavati),  give  an 
alms  ’ and  ‘ While  Your  Honour  {bhavati)  is  standing  ’ ' ; or  similarly  in  such  cases 
as  ‘ Thou  didst  go  ® (a^vas)  ’ and  ‘ The  horse  {agvas)  walks  ’ ; or  similarly  in  such 
cases  as  ‘Goat’s  mi\k{aja-payas)  drink  thou  ’ and  ‘Thou  didst  conquer  (ajdpayas)  the 
foes,’ — because  there  is  a likeness  [in  the  form]  of  the  verb  and  of  the  noun,  it 
is  ambiguous  whether  the  words  might  be  analysed  as  nouns  or  as  verbs.  And 
when  there  is  no  such  accounting  [for  the  form  of  the  word,  and  because]  w'hen 
withdrawn  [from  the  sentence]  it  cannot  be  known  [whether  it  is  a noun  or 
a verb],  how  can  it  be  analysed  as  a noun  or  as  a verb  ? * Therefore  the  words 
should  be  withdrawn  from  the  sentence  and  analysed.  But  by  a mere  accounting 
[for  the  form  of  the  word]  there  is  not  strictly  speaking  a distinction  of  the 
words  [from  the  intended-objects  and  the  presented-ideas].  Having  thus  treated 
the  [different]  kinds  of  words  etymologically,  he  has  the  intention  of  telling 
that  [in  reality]  there  is  no  confusion  between  words  and  intended-objects  and 


* It  would  appear  that  Vacaspatimijra  is 

referring  to  Qloka-varttika  iv.  191. 

^ Or  possibly,  ‘ Something  is  standing  upon 
Your  Honour  (bhavati)’ 

® Or  ‘ swell  ’,  from  root  gvi  or  cva. 

* This  whole  subject  is  discussed  with  much 


greater  elaboration  in  another  work 
by  Vacaspatimi^ra  called  Tattvabindu 
(Benares,  reprinted  from  the  Pandit, 
1893).  This  particular  passage  occurs 
on  p.  15  of  that  text. 


iii.  17 — ] Bool-  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vihhiiti  [24G 

presented -ideas  which  had  got  into  confusion  as  a result  of  conventional-usage 
[which  erroneously  identifies  one  with  the  other],  and  proceeds  to  say  ^There  is 
a distinction  between  these  words  and  intended-objects  and  presented-ideas.^ 
«To  illustrate  this  [distinction].  ‘ The  palace  whitens ' ; here  [the  Avord  *] 
means  the  action  [of  a verb].»  For  here  it  is  quite  clear  that  this  action 
‘ grows  white  which  is  of  a kind  j-et  to  be  completed  and  which  takes  place 
by  a succession  [of  acts],  is  different  from  the  action  ‘white’,  which  is  of  the 
completed  kind.  And  even  in  those  cases  where  both  the  word  and  the  in- 
tended-object are  of  a completed  kind,  there  also  the  word  is  different  from  the 
intended-object,  as  he  says  ^‘The  white  palace’;  here  a relation  is  meant. » 
Here°  there  is  no  case-ending  expressing  relation  because  this  is  expressed  [by 
the  nominative  case  according  to  Panini  ii.  3.  1]. — He  makes  the  distinction 
between  the  intended-object  [and  the  word]  by  saying,  ^in  essence  both  an  action 
[denoted  by  a verb]  and  a relation  . . . tlie  intended-object  of  which.)^  The 
meaning  is  that  the  intended-object  of  both  these  words  is  in  essence  an  action 
[denoted  b}*  a verb]  and  it  is  in  essence  a relation. — He  makes  the  distinction 
between  the  presented-idea  [and  the  word]  by  saj'ing  ^and  the  presented-idea.)^ 
The  word  «and»  shows  that  the  words  «the  intended-object  of  which  is  this  [the 
action  and  relation]^  are  to  be  supplied.  The  word  «^this)^  is  to  be  understood 
{samba<Uiyate)  as  in  subordination  to  another  word  [in  a possessive  compound].  It 
is  so-described  as  being  that  of  which  the  intended-object  is  in  essence  an  action 
[denoted  bj’^  a verb]  and  a relation  because  they  are  understood  as  alike.  An 
objector  asks  ‘ Since  words  and  intended-objects  and  presented-ideas  are  confused, 
how  can  there  be  any  distinction  between  them  ? ’ With  this  in  mind  he  asks 
«But  why  is  this  so  ?2>  He  gives  the  answer  by  saying  <SCBecause  this  [process] 
is  identified  with  that,  [its  result,  the  quality  white].»  The  presented-idea 
which  identifies  them  is  limited  by  conventional-usage  [which  erroneously 
identifies  them  with  each  other].  But  this  presented-idea  has  no  basis  in 
fact.  The  word  conventional-usage  is  in  the  locative  case.  This  sIioavs  that 
conventional-usage  is  the  cause  [of  the  presented-idea  which  fails  to  distinguish 
the  act  of  whitening  and  the  quality  white].  He  states  what  the  real  fact  is 
in  the  words  «But  the  white  intended-object  is  that  which.»  Intensity  such 
as  newness  or  oldness.  ^Correspond;^  [that  is]  be  confused.  Thus  by  the  yogin’s 
constraint  upon  the  distinctions  [he  knows]  the  cries  of  all  HA’ing  beings,  tame 
and  Avild  animals,  creeping  things,  bii-ds  and  the  rest,  eA’en  the  unphenomenalized 
speech  among  them  and  the  intended-objects  [denoted  by  these  cries]  and 
the  presented-ideas  of  them.  So  in  this  case  constraint  performed  upon  the 
presented-ideas  of  the  things-expressed  by  the  utterances  of  human  beings  is 
performed  upon  these  [objects  and  Avords]  also,  since  they  are  comparate.  Thus 

' Vacaspatimi9ra  seems  to  have  read  ^abdah  belonging  to  Gangadhara  Shastri. 

in  his  test  of  the  Comment.  And  this  * Compare  the  phrase  cvtto  \vo  in  Tattva 
reading  is  also  in  the  excellent  MS.  Bindu,  p.  16'% 


247]  JCiig'isavya  and  Avatya  [ — iii.  18 

it  is  established  that  the  yogin  has  [intuitive]  knowledge  of  these  cries  and  of 
the  objects  intended  by  them  and  of  the  presented-idea  of  them. 


18.  As  a result  of  direct-perception  of  subliminal  impressions 
there  is  [intuitive]  knowledge  of  previous  births. 

Those  subliminal-impressions  are  of  course  of  two  kinds.  1.  The 
causes  of  memory  and  of  the  hindrances  in  the  form  of  subconscious 
impressions  ; 2.  the  causes  of  fruition  in  the  form  of  right-living 
and  wrong-living.  These  subliminal-impressions  formed  in  previous 
births  are,  like  mutation  and  movement  and  restriction  and  power 
and  vitality  and  right-living,  unperceived  external-aspects  of  mind- 
stuff  [iii.  15].  Constraint  upon  these  is  sufficient  for  direct-perception 
of  subliminal-impressions.  Moreover  there  is  no  direct  experience  of 
these,  unless  there  be  experience  of  place  and  time  and  cause.  It  is 
thus,  therefore,  as  a result  of  [intuitive]  knowledge  of  subliminal- 
impressions  that  the  knowledge  of  previous  births  arises  [in  the 
mind]  of  the  yogin.  Precisely  as  in  other  cases  there  is  also,  as 
a result  of  the  direct-perception  of  subliminal-impressions,  a con- 
sciousness [samvedana)  of  the  births  of  others.  On  this  point  this 
tale  is  handed  down.  “ To  the  Exalted  Jaigisavya,  who  as  a result 
of  direct-perception  of  subliminal-impressions  beheld  the  sequence  of 
his  birth-mutations  in  ten  great  creative-periods,  the  knowledge  born 
of  discrimination  became  visible.  Then  to  him  spake  the  Exalted 
Avatya  who  had  assumed  a [coarse]  body  [for  the  purposes  of  this 
speech].  ‘In  ten  great  creative-periods,  forasmuch  as  the  sattva 
of  [thy]  thinking-substance  is  unsuppressed  [by  rajas  and  lamas']  in 
consequence  of  spotlessness,  thou  beholdest  the  pain  caused  by 
birth  in  hells  and  in  the  bodies  of  brutes  ; coming  into  existence 
over  and  over  again  among  gods  and  human  beings,  which  hast 
thou  apperceived  to  be  more,  pleasure  or  pain  ? ’ Jaigisavya  ^ 
spake  to  the  Exalted  Avatya.  ‘ In  ten  great  creative-periods, 
forasmuch  as  the  sattva  of  [my]  thinking-substance  is  unsuppressed 
[by  rajas  and  tamas]  in  consequence  of  spotlessness,  I behold  the 


^ See  also  ii.  55,  p.  192\  and  Afvaghosa’s 
Buddhacarita  xii.  Compare  Garbe: 


Mondscbein  d.  Sankbya-Wahrbeit, 
p.  35 ; and  Garbe ; Aniruddha,  p.  vii. 


iii.  18 — ] Book  III.  Svpernovmal  Poivers  or  Vihhfiti  [248 

pain  caused  by  birth  in  hells  and  in  the  bodies  of  brutes ; coming 
into  existence  over  and  over  again  among  gods  and  human  beings 
this  I trow.  Whatever  [pleasure]  I have  passed  through,  alP  this  is 
nothing  but  pain.’  The  Exalted  Avatya  spake  thus.  ‘ Are  Your 
Worship’s  mastery^  over  the  primary-cause  and  the  pleasure  of 
bliss  ineffable, — are  these  also  to  be  counted  as  pain  ? ’ The  Exalted 
Jaigisavya  spake  : ‘ This  can  be  called  the  pleasure  of  bliss  ineffable 
only  in  comparison  ^ with  pleasure  from  objects  of  sense  ; but  it  is 
nothing  but  pain  in  comparison  with  Isolation.  Because  this  [bliss 
ineffable]  is  an  external-aspect  of  the  sattva  of  the  thinking- 
substance  and  [so]  has  the  three  aspects  [guna),  and  because  a pre- 
sented-idea  of  anything  having  the  three  aspects  is  counted  as 
something  to  be  thrown  aside,  the  thread  of  desire  [in  the  bliss 
ineffable]  is  of  the  nature  of  pain.  But  by  the  removal  of  the 
anguish  of  the  pain  of  desire,  this  pleasure  [of  bliss  ineffable]  is 
undisturbed-calm,^  uninhibited,  favourable  in  the  eyes  of  all.’  ” 

18.  As  a result  of  direct-perception  of  subliminal-impressions  there  is 
[intuitive]  knowledge  of  previous  births. 

For  the  subliminal-impressions  which  are  produced  by  knowledge  are  the  causes 
of  memory,  whereas  the  subliminal-impressions  produced  by  undifferentiated- 
consciousness  are  the  causes  of  the  hindrances  which  begin  with  undifferentiated- 
consciousness.  As  to  the  causes  of  fruition.  Fruition  is  [ii.  13]  birth  and 
length-of-life  and  kind-of-enjoyment.  The  causes  of  it  are  the  kinds  of  right- 
living and  wrong-living.  The  subliminal-impressions  put  together  in  previous 
births  are  completed  by  their  own  peculiar  causes.  Just  as  a curiy  (vyahjana)  is  put 
together  (samsAr/a) [by combining  manyundistinguished  things]so  it  follows  that  it 
has  been  made.  Mutation  and  movement  and  restriction  and  power  and  vitality 
are  external -aspects  of  the  mind-stuff.  Likewise,  the  unperceived  [subliminal-im- 
pressions] are  external-aspects  of  the  mind-stuff.  Constraint  upon  these  together 
with  their  attachments  [of  place  and  time  and  cause],  whether  they  are  some- 
thing heard  or  inferred,  is  adequate  to  bring  to  pass  direct  perception  of  both 
kinds  of  subliminal  impressions.  And  if  it  be  asked  how  there  can  be  direct  per- 
ception of  previous  births,  even  if  it  be  possible  to  have  direct  perception  of  these 
[subliminal-impressions  in  place,  time  and  cause]  through  constraint,  he  replies 
^Moreover  there  is  no  ...  of  place.3>  «Cause»  is  the  previous  body,  the  organs 
and  the  rest.  Direct-perception  of  subliminal-impressions,  with  their  adjuncts,® 
* Compare  ii.  15.  * See  iv.  29,  p.  313®  (Calc.  ed.). 

See  Aniruddha  on  Samkhya-sutra  v.  82.  ® Balarama  mentions  as  instances  of  at- 

® Compare  Aniruddha  on  Samkhya-sutra  tachments,  mother  and  father  or  birth 

p.  3®.  or  countiy  or  city  or  time. 


249] 


Specimens  of  intuitive  hiowledge  [ — ill.  20 

necessarily  involves  the  direct-perception  of  such  things  as  births.  This 
is  the  meaning.  The  constraint  with  respect  to  one’s  own  subliminal- 
impressions  he  extends  by  analogy  to  those  of  others  also  in  the  words  «Precisely 
as  in  other  cases  also.^  With  this  in  view  he  introduces  as  an  aid  to  faith  the 
dialogue  between  Jaigisavya  and  Avatya,  who  had  passed  through  the  experience, 
by  saying  ^On  this  point  this  tale  is  handed  down.»  A great  creative-period  is 
a great  mundane  cycle.  By  the  words  «who  had  assumed  a [coarse]  body)^  the 
perfection  of  a created  body  ^ is  described.  Spotless  is  brilliant ; that  from  which 
the  stains  of  rajas  and  tamas  have  been  removed.  Mastery  over  the  primary 
cause  means  power.  By  having  this  [power]  and  by  creating  movements  in  the 
primary-cause  he  gives  to  any  one  that  kind  of  perfection  of  body  or  of  organs 
which  he  wishes  to  confer  upon  him  ; and  further  having  created  his  own  bodies 
and  organs  by  thousands  he  roves  through  air  and  sky  and  earth  at  will.  Bliss 
{santosa)  is  the  dwindling  of  desire  and  the  external-aspect  of  undisturbed  calm 
belonging  to  the  sattva  of  the  thinking-substance. 


19.  [As  a result  of  constraint]  upon  a presented-idea  [there 
arises  intuitive]  knowledge  of  the  mind-stuff  of  another. 

As  a result  of  constraint  upon  a presented-idea,  in  consequence  of 
the  direct-perception  of  the  presented-idea,  there  arises  the  [in- 
tuitive] knowledge  of  the  mind-stuff  of  another. 

19.  [As  a result  of  constraint]  upon  a presented-idea  [there  arises  intuitive] 
knowledge  of  the  mind-stuff  of  another. 

«As  a result  of^  direct-perception  of  the  presented-idea,  [that  is]  of  mind-stulf 
in  general  of  another. 


20.^  But  [the  intuitive  knowledge  of  the  presented-idea  of 
another]  does  not  have  that  [Idea]  together  with  that  upon 
which  it  depends  [as  its  object],  since  that  upon  which  it 
depends  is  not-in-the-fleld  [of  consciousness]. 

The  yogin  knows  that  the  presented-idea  is  affected.  But  he  does 
not  know  that  it  is  affected  in  dependence  upon  [this  or]  that 
[object].  When  the  presented-idea  of  another  [person]  is  in  de- 
pendence upon  something,  this  [object]  does  not  become  something 
upon  which  the  mind-stuff  of  the  yogin  depends.  But  it  is  the 
other’s  presented-idea  only  upon  which  the  yogin’s  mind-stuff 
comes  to  depend. 

^ For  the  word  nirmana  see  Garbe : and  consequently  the  numbering  of 

Festgruss  an  Roth,  p.  78h  the  remaining  sutras  of  the  third  part 

® This  sutra  is  omitted  by  Vijnana  Bhiksu  of  Yoga-varttika  is  at  fault. 

32  [h.o.s.  17] 


iii.  20 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vibhuti  [250 

Just  as  the  direct-perception  of  subliminal-impressions  implies  the  direct-percep- 
tion of  previous  births  and  of  the  adjuncts  to  these,  so  the  direct-perception  of 
another’s  mind-stuff  might  imply  the  direct-perception  of  that  upon  which  that 
[mind-stuff]  depends.  To  this  conclusion  {prapta)  he  says  20.  But  [the  intuitive 
knowledge  of  the  presented-idea  of  another]  does  not  have  that  [idea] 
together  with  that  upon  which  it  depends  [as  its  object],  since  that  upon 
which  it  depends  is  not-in-the-fleld  [of  consciousness].  That  constraint 
[ii.  19]  has  for  its  object  the  subliminal-impressions  with  their  adjuncts  ' ; but 
this  has  as  its  object  the  other’s  mind-stuff  and  nothing  more.  This  is  what  he 
means  to  say. 

21.  As  a result  of  constraint  upon  the  [outer]  form  of  the 
body,  when  its  power  to  be  known  is  stopped,  then  as  a con- 
sequence of  the  disjunction  of  the  light  and  of  the  eye  there 
follows  indiscernibility  [of  the  yogin’s  body]. 

As  a result  of  constraint  upon  the  form  of  the  body,  [the  yogin] 
inhibits  that  [imperceptible]  power  by  which  [the  coarse  and 
external]  is  known.  When  its  power  to  be  known  is  stopped,  as 
a consequence  of  the  disjunction  of  the  light  [that  is,  of  the  other 
person,  the  observer]  and  of  the  eye  [that  is,  the  organ],  in- 
discernibility of  the  yogin  is  produced.  In  this  way  it  must  be 
understood  that  indiscernibility  to  sound  and  to  other  objects  of 
sense  has  also  been  described. 

21.  . . . body  . . . indiscernibility. 

A body  has  its  essence  in  the  five  [coarse  elements].  And  as  having  form  it 
comes  under  the  eye.  For  as  having  form  the  body  and  the  colour  of  the  body 
pass  through  the  experience  of  being  the  object-of-the-action  of  the  process-of- 
knowing  by  the  eye.  Thus  when  the  yogin  performs  a special  kind  of  con- 
straint upon  the  [external]  form,  then  the  power  of  being  known,  which  belongs 
to  the  colour  and  which  is  the  source  of  the  direct-perception  of  a body  having 
form,  is  stopped.  Therefore  when  the  power  to  be  known  is  stopped,  the  yogin 
becomes  indiscernible.  In  other  words,  the  body  of  the  yogin  does  not  become 
the  object  of  the  thinking  [coming  from]  the  eye.  The  meaning  is  that  when 
this  is  done,  indiscernibility  is  the  cause. — «In  this  way.»  When  as  a result 
of  constraint  upon  sound  or  touch  or  taste  or  smell  with  reference  to  the  body 
the  power  of  these  [four  objects  of  sense]  to  be  known  is  stopped,  and  when  there 
is  no  connexion  between  the  light  [that  is,  of  the  other  person,  the  observer]  and 
the  [other’s]  organ-of-hearing  or  of  touch  or  of  taste  or  of  smell, — then  [the  yogin] 
becomes  indiscernible  to  these  [organs].  Such,  mutatis  mutandis,  is  the  mean- 
ing of  the  Sutra. 


* These  Balarama  has  defined  in  his  note  (5)  on  p.  230''  (Calc.  ed.). 


251]  Fast  and  sloiv  development  oj  karma  [ — iii.  22 

22.  Advancing  and  not-advancing  is  karma;  as  a result  of 
constraint  upon  this  [two-fold  karma]  or  from  the  signs  of 
death  [there  arises  an  intuitive]  knowledge  of  the  latter  end. 

Karma  having  its  fruition  in  length-of-life  is  of  two  kinds,  the 
advancing^  and  the  not-advancing.  Of  the  two,  1.  just  as  a wet 
cloth  spread-out  dries  in  a shorter  time,  so  is  advancing  karma  ; 
2.  and  just  as  the  same  [cloth]  rolled  into  a ball  becomes  dry 
a long  time  after,  so  is  not-advancing  [karma].  1.  Advancing 
karma  is  also  like  fire  set  in  dry  ^ grass,  which  spreads  on  all  sides 
with  the  breeze,  and  burns  in  the  briefest  time.  2.  And  just  as 
the  same  fire,  put  bit  by  bit  into  a pile  of  grass,  burns  a long  time 
after,  so  is  not-advancing  [karma].  This  is  the  karma  having  [its 
limit  in]  a single  existence  and  causing  the  length-of-life,  of  two 
kinds,  the  advancing  and  the  not-advancing.  As  a result  of 
constraint  upon  this  there  is  [intuitive]  knowledge  of  the  latter 
end,  of  the  decease. — <0r  from  the  signs  of  death  [there  arises  an 
intuitive]  knowledge  of  the  latter  end.>  A sign-of-death  ^ is  of 
three  kinds,  that  pertaining  to  self  and  that  pertaining  to  [other] 
creatures  and  that  pertaining  to  divine  beings.  Of  these  [three], 
a sign-of-death  1.  pertaining  to  one’s  self  [would  occur  when]  one 
with  stopped^  ears  does  not  hear  the  sound  [of  the  vital  spirits] 
within  one’s  own  body ; or  when  one  with  closed  eyes  does  not  see 
the  inner  light.  Likewise  2.  a sign  pertaining  to  other  creatures 
[would  occur  when]  one  sees  the  Men  of  Yama,  [or]  when  one  sees 
unexpectedly  the  Fathers,  the  Departed.  Similarly  3.  [a  sign] 
pertaining  to  divine  beings  [would  occur  when]  one  sees  heaven  or 
the  Siddhas  unexpectedly,  or  when  everything  is  reversed.  By 
this  [sign]  also  he  perceives  that  the  latter  end  is  near  at  hand. 

22.  Advancing  . . . or  . . . And  karma  having  its  fruition  in  length-of-life 
is  of  two  kinds,  the  advancing  and  the  not-advancing.  Now  that  karma  which 
has  [its  limit]  in  a single  existence  and  which  is  the  source  of  birth  and  of 
length-of-life  and  of  kind-of-enjoyment  has  a fruition  in  length-of-life.  1.  And 
this  is  ready  to  afford  the  kind-of-enjoyment  without  the  delay  of  even  a very 


^ This  word  occurs  here  only  in  the  Bhasya  ^ Compare  Markandeya  Pur.  xl.  1 fF. 

and  in  Vacaspati.  Linga  Pur.  xci.  1-36. 

^ Umasvati’s  Tattvadhigama-sutra  ii.  52.  Mahabharata  xii.  317-18  If. 


iii.  22 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vihhuti  [252 

short  time.  It  has  afforded  much  of  the  kind-of-enjoyment  and  only  a little  of 
its  fruit  remains.  Its  functional-activity  continues  only  because  it  is  impossible 
for  it  to  have  its  fruition  suddenly  in  one  body ; therefore  it  delays.  This  is 
advancing  [karma].  The  advance  is  the  functional-activity  ; the  [karma]  is  con- 
nected with  this  [functional-activity].  2.  The  same  karma,  when  it  affords  little 
fruit  and  requires  time  for  this,  and  when,  engaged  in  affording  fruit,  its  functional- 
activity  is  intermittent  and  slow,  is  not-advancing.  This  same  is  made  clear  in 
two  similes  with  the  words  <KOf  these  1.  just  as.»  On  the  same  point  for  greater 
clearness  he  gives  another  simile  in  the  words  «2.  Or  just  as  fire.)^ — The  final- 
end  is  the  great  mundane-dissolution.  As  compared  with  this,  death  is  the  latter 
end.  As  a result  of  constraint  upon  the  right-living  and  wrong-living  in  that 
karma,  [there  follows  intuitive]  knowledge  of  the  latter  end.  And  as  a result 
of  this  the  yogin,  knowing  his  own  karma  which  is  advancing,  and  having 
created  many  bodies  for  himself,  experiences  suddenly  the  fruit  [of  karma]  and 
dies  when  he  wills.  Incidentally  [the  author]  says  «Or  [the  intuitive  knowledge 
of  the  latter  end]  is  the  result  of  the  signs-of-death.»  Signs- of-death  {arista)  are 
things  which  terrify  such  as  the  enemy  (ari).  The  indications  of  death  are  of 
three  kinds. — ^Or  when  everything  is  reversed)^  [that  is]  even  when  there  is  no 
jugglery,  villages  and  cities  he  deems  to  be  heaven,  and  the  world  of  only  human 
beings  to  be  a world  of  divine  beings. 


23.  [As  a result  of  constraint]  upon  friendliness  and  other 
[sentiments  there  arises]  powers  [of  friendliness]. 

Friendliness^  and  compassion  and  joy  are  the  three  sentiments. 
As  to  these  [three],  by  feeling  friendliness  for  living  beings  who 
are  in  happiness  he  discovers  the  power  of  friendliness  ; by  feeling 
compassion  for  those  in  pain  he  discovers  the  power  of  compassion  ; 
by  feeling  joy  for  those  who  are  disposed  to  merit  he  discovers  the 
power  of  joy.  As  a result  of  the  sentiments  there  arises  the  con- 
straint which  is  concentration,  and  from  it  there  arise  powers  of 
unfailing  energy.  Indifference,  however,  for  those  disposed  to  evil 
is  not  one  [of  these  practised]  sentiments.  And  therefore  there  is 
no  concentration  upon  it.  For  this  reason,  since  it  is  impossible 
to  perform  constraint  upon  it,  there  is  no  power  resulting  from 
indifference. 

23.  [As  a result  of  constraint]  upon  friendliness  and  other  [sentiments 
there  arise]  powers  [of  friendliness]. 

By  constraint  upon  friendliness  and  other  [sentiments]  he  gains  powers  of 
friendliness  and  other  powers.  Of  these  three  as  a result  of  the  sentiment 

' Sec  i.  33. 


253]  Cultivation  of  sentiments  [ — iii.  25 

of  friendliness  there  arises  [in  him]  that  kind  of  power  by  which  he  makes 
everybody  happy.  As  a result  of  this  he  is  kindly  to  all.  Similarly  through 
the  power  resulting  from  compassion  he  delivers  living  beings  from  pain  and 
from  the  causes  of  pain.  Likewise  through  the  power  of  joy  he  imparts  the 
detached-attitude  to  everybody.  He  states  what  will  be  of  assistance  in  what 
will  be  said,  namely,  that  sentiments  cause  concentration,  as  he  says  «As  a result 
of  the  sentiments  there  arises  the  constraint  which  is  concentration.^  Although 
constraint  is  the  three,  fixed -attention  and  contemplation  and  concentration  and 
not  concentration  alone,  still  since  constraint  follows  as  an  effect  after  concentra- 
tion, and  since  concentration  is  the  dominant  of  the  three,  concentration  is 
figuratively  used  for  constraint. — Some  manuscripts  read  ‘ The  sentiments  are 
concentration.’  In  this  case  we  must  suppose  that  the  sentiments  and  concentra- 
tion, as  being  parts  of  the  whole  which  is  constraint,  serve  as  causes  of  the 
constraint.  ^Energy)^  is  exertion.  By  its  means  a man  who  has  the  powers  of 
friendliness,  &c.,  towards  persons  in  happiness,  &c.,  becomes  unfailing  in  his 
exertion  when  things  are  to  be  done  for  others.  Indifference  is  the  detached 
attitude.  In  this  case  there  is  no  sentiment.  Nor  is  there  anything  that  might 
arise  [out  of  it]  as  in  the  case  of  those  who  are  in  happiness. 


24.  [As  a result  of  constraint]  upon  powers  [there  arise] 
powers  like  those  of  an  elephant. 

As  a result  of  constraint  upon  the  power  of  an  elephant  one  has 
the  power  of  an  elephant.  As  a result  of  constraint  upon  the 
power  of  Vainateya  [the  Garuda  bird]  one  has  the  power  of 
Vainateya.  As  a result  of  constraint  upon  the  power  of  the  wind 
one  has  the  power  of  the  wind.  And  so  forth  in  the  same  way. 

24.  [As  a result  of  constraint]  upon  powers  [there  arise]  powers  like  those 
of  an  elephant.  He  gains  the  power  of  that  upon  which  [he  exercises] 
constraint. 


25.  As  a result  of  casting  the  light  of  a sense-activity  [there 
arises  the  intuitive]  knowledge  of  the  subtile  and  the  con- 
cealed and  the  obscure. 

The  yogin  by  casting  the  light  of  that  sense-activity  of  the  central 
organ  which  is  called  luminous  [i.  36]  upon  an  object  whether 
subtile  ^ or  concealed  or  obscure  has  access  to  that  object. 

25.  . . . Sense-activity  . . . intuitive  knowledge.  Casting  [his  mind]  with 
constraint  upon  a subtile  or  concealed  or  obscure  intended-object  he  has  access 
to  that  intended-object. 


Compare  Samkliya-karika  vii. 


iii.  26 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Poivers  or  Vihhuti  [254 

26.  As  a result  of  constraint  upon  the  sun  [there  arises  the 
intuitive]  knowledge  of  the  cosmic-spaces  {hhuvana). 

The  enumeration  of  these  [cosmic-spaces] ; there  are  seven  worlds. 
Among  them,  1.  starting  from  the  Avici  [nadir]  and  extending  up 
to  the  summit  of  Meru  is  the  Earth-worid  (bhu-loka)  ; 2.  beginning 
from  the  summit  of  Meru  and  going  as  far  as  the  Pole-star 
(dhruva),  the  world  of  Intermediate  Space  diversified  by  planets 
and  asterisms  and  stars.  Beyond  that  is  the  five-fold  Heaven- 
world  [svar-loka)  : 3.  the  world  of  Mahendra,  the  third  world ; 
4.  the  Mahar  world  of  Prajapati,  the  fourth  world ; the  three-fold 
world  of  Brahma,  that  is,  5.  the  Jana-world  and  6.  the  Tapas- 
world  and  7.  the  Satya-world.^ 

“ The  world-of-Brahma  in  its  three  stages. 

Below  it  the  world-of-Prajapati,  the  Great  [world]. 

And  [below  it]  Mahendra’s  [world]  ; [these  five]  are  called 
Heaven  {svar). 

In  the  sky  [of  Intermediate-Space]  are  the  stars ; on  earth, 
the  creatures.” 

Thus  saith  the  Summary-Stanza.^  Rising  in  a series  above  Avici 
there  are  six  regions  [hhumi)  of  the  Great-Hell  {mahd-naraka),  sup- 
ported [respectively]  by  solid-matter,  by  water,  by  fire,  by  wind, 
by  air,  and  by  darkness,  namely,  the  Mahakala,  the  Ambarisa,  the 
Raurava,  the  Maharaurava,  the  Kalasutra,  and  the  Andhatamisra, 
wherein  living  creatures,  having  been  allotted  a long  and  grievous 
length-of-life,  feeling  the  misery  incurred  as  the  result  of  their 
own  karma,  are  born.  Next,  the  seven  lower-worlds  {pdtdla),  with 
the  names  Mahatala,  Rasatala,  Atala,  Sutala,  Vitala,  Talatala,  and 
Patala,  and  as  the  eighth  this  earth  ^ with  its  seven  lands  (dvipa), 
and  in  the  midst  of  it,  the  golden  King  of  Mountains,  Sumeru. 
Its  peaks  on  the  four  sides  are  made  of  gems  of  silver,  of  lapis 


{[7.  Satya 
Brahma]  6.  Tapas 
[5.  Jana 

4.  Mahar  Prajapatya 
3.  Mahendra 
2.  Antariksa 
1.  Bhu 


^ Compare  VP.  ii.  4.  97. 

“ For  a very  valuable  collection  of  parallel 
material  in  the  Epic  see  Hopkins : 
Mythological  Aspects,  JAOS,  1910. 


255]  Intuitive  hnoivledge  of  cosmic  spaces  [ — iii.  2G 

lazuli,  of  crystal,  and  of  gold.  By  reason  [of  the  reflection]  of 
the  brilliant  colour  of  the  lapis  lazuli,  the  southern  quarter 
of  the  sky  is  the  deep  blue  of  the  petal  of  the  blue-lotus ; the 
eastern  is  white  ; the  western  is  translucent ; the  northern  is  like 
the  golden  amaranth.  And  on  its  southern  slope  is  the  Bose- Apple 
tree,  from  which  this  land  is  called  the  Land  of  the  Bose-Apple. 
As  the  sun  moves  forward,  day  and  night, ^ as  it  were  fast  bound  to 
him,^  revolve  ^ [about  Sumeru].  North  of  this  [Sumeru]  are  three 
mountains,  blue-and- white-peaked,  two  thousand  yojanas  in  extent. 
Between  these,  three  zones  (varsa),  nine  thousand  yojanas  each, 
called  1.  Bamanaka,  2.  Hiranmaya,  and  3.  the  Northern^  Kurus. 
On  the  south,  the  [mountains]  of  Nisadha,  of  the  Goldhorn,  and 
of  the  Snow-crags,  two  thousand  yojanas  in  extent.  Between 
these,  three  zones  of  nine  thousand  [yojanas]  each,  called  4.  the 
Harivarsha,  5.  Kirhpurusa,  6.  Bharata.  On  the  East  of  Sumeru, 
[the  countries  of]  7.  Bhadra9va,  bounded  by  the  Malyavat 
[mountains]  ; on  the  West,  [the  countries  of]  8.  Ketumala,  bounded 
by  the  Gandhamadana  [mountains].  In  the  middle,  the  zone  of 
9.  Ilavrta. — This  same  [Land  of  the  Bose-Apple],  a hundred 
thousand  yojanas  in  extent,  stretches  in  each  direction  from 
Sumeru  for  half  this  distance.  Now  the  Land  of  the  Bose-Apple, 
a hundred  thousand  yojanas  in  extent,  is  encompassed  by  a girdle- 
shaped sea  of  salt  the  double  thereof.  And  then  [there  are]  the 
lands  of  QakajKuga,  Kraunca,  Qalmala,  Magadha,  and  Puskara,  each 
double  the  preceding,  fringed  with  marvellous  hills,  and  the  Seven 
Seas,  [flat]  like  a pile  of  mustard  seeds,  with  their  waters  of  Sugar- 
cane-juice, of  Spirits,  of  Butter,  of  Curds,  of  Cream,  of  Milk,  and  of 
Treacle.  [These  lands]  encompassed  by  the  Seven  Seas  and  girdle- 
shaped and  encircled  by  the  Lokaloka  Mountains  [are]  estimated 
at  five  hundred  millions  of  yojanas  [in  extent].  This  whole  well- 
founded  configuration  stretches  out  in  the  midmost  part  of  the 
[World]  Egg.  And  the  Egg  is  a minute  fragment  of  the  primary- 
cause,  like  a firefly  in  the  sky.  1.  Here,  in  the  lower  world,  in 

1 Siddhanta  KaumudI  on  v.  4.  77  (Nir.  Sag.  vi.  7.  1 fp.  and  discussed  by  Jacobi  in 

ed.,  1904,  p.  203®).  the  article  on  the  Abode  of  the  Blest 

® Just  so  Raghuvan9a  vii.  24.  (Hastings  : Cyclopaedia  of  Rel.  and 

® Described  in  Ram.  iv.  43  and  Maba  Bh.  Ethics,  II.  698®'). 


iii.  26 — ] Booh  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vihhuti  [25G 


the  sea,  in  these  mountains,  groups  of  gods  have  their  abode, 
Asuras,  Gandharvas,  Kinnaras,  Kimpurusas,  Yaksas,  Raksasas, 
Bhutas,  Pretas,  Pi9acas,  Apasmarakas,  Apsarases,  Brahmaraksasas, 
Kusmandas,  Vinayakas.  In  all  the  lands  meritorious  gods  and 
human  beings  [have  their  abode].  Suineru  is  the  pleasure-ground 
of  the  thirty -[three]  [gods].  In  it  are  the  pleasure-grounds,  Mijra- 
vana,  Nandana,  Caitraratha,  and  Sumanasa.  Sudharma  is  the  gods’ 
assembly-hall.  Sudargana  is  their  castle.  Vaijayanta  is  their  palace. 
2.  The  planets  and  asterisms  and  stars,  fastened  to  the  pole-star, 
have  their  courses  ^ regulated  by  the  steady  impulsion  of  the  wind, 
and  arranged  at  different  points  above  ^ Sumeru  move  round  about 
it.  3.  They  who  dwell  in  [the  world  of]  Mahendra  are  six  groups 
of  gods,  the  Thirty-three,  the  Agnisvattas,  the  Yamyas,  the  Tusitas, 
the  Aparinirmita-va9a-vartins,  and  the  Parinirmita-va9a-vartins. 
All  [these]  fulfil  their  desires  and  are  endowed  with  atomization  and 
the  other  powers.  They  live  for  a mundane  period  ; they  are  goodly 
to  behold  and  they  delight  in  love.  Their  bodies  are  not  caused 
[by  parents].  Their  retinue  is  made  of  incomparable  and  not 
prudish  Apsarases.  4.  In  the  Great  world  of  Prajapati  there  is 
a five-fold  group  of  gods,  the  Kumudas,  the  Rbhus,  the  Pratar- 
danas,  the  Ahjanabhas,  and  the  Pracitabhas.  These  have  the 
mastery  over  the  great  elements ; their  food  is  contemplation  ; 
their  lives  are  for  a thousand  mundane  periods.  5.  In  the  first  of 
the  worlds-of-Brahma,  in  the  Jana  ^ world,  there  is  a four-fold 
group  of  gods,  the  Brahmapurohitas,  the  Brahmakayikas,  the 
Brahmamahakayikas,  and  the  Amaras.  These  have  the  mastery 
over  the  elements  and  the  organs.  6.  In  the  second  [of  the 
worlds-of-Brahma],  in  the  Tapas-world,  there  is  a three-fold  group 
of  gods,  the  Abhasvaras,^  the  Mahabhasvaras,  and  the  Satyama- 
habhasvaras.  These  have  the  mastery  over  the  elements  and  the 


* They  are  driven  by  the  wind,  as  cows  are 
driven  by  the  ploughman  in  a circle 
around  the  threshing-post.  Fastened 
by  wind-ropes  to  the  pole-star,  accord- 
ing to  Maitri  Up.  i.  4.  For  the  astro- 
nomy see  SOrya  Siddhanta  ii.  1 ; for  the 
simile,  see  Qakuntala  vii.  6,  and  G.  A. 
Grierson  : Behar  Peasant  Life,  § 889, 
with  the  illustration. 


Compare  Visn.  Pur.  ii.  12  and  Umasvati 
Tattvadhig.  Sut.  iv.  14. 

® Vijfiana  Bhiksu  reads  Janar. 

^ Reading  abhas°.  The  name  indicates 
that  they  are  self-luminous.  An  in- 
structive article  upon  them  by  Pro- 
fessor Jacobi  is  found  in  Hastings ; 
Cycl.  of  Rel.  and  Ethics,  I.  202^ 


257]  Seven  worlds  of  Brahma  [ — iii.  26 

organs  and  evolving-matter.  Each  lives  twice  as  long  as  the 
previous  [group] ; their  food  is  contemplation ; their  lives  are 
chaste  {urdhvaretas).  Upwards  there  is  no  impediment  to  their 
thinking  and  in  regions  below  there  is  no  object  obscure  to  their 
thought.  7.  In  the  third  [world]  of  Brahma,  in  the  Satya-world, 
there  are  four  groups  of  gods,  the  Acyutas,  the  Quddhanivasas,  the 
Satyabhas,  and  the  Samjnasaihjnins.  By  them  no  laying  down 
foundations  for  a dwelling  is  made  ; they  are  grounded  in  them- 
selves and  placed  one  above  the  other ; they  have  the  mastery  over 
the  primary  cause  and  live  as  long  as  there  are  creations.  Of 
these  [four]  the  Acyutas  delight  in  deliberative  contemplation  ; 
the  Quddhanivasas  delight  in  reflective  contemplation ; the  Satya- 
bhas delight  in  contemplation  where  there  is  nothing  but  joy; 
and  the  Saihjnasamjnins  delight  in  contemplation  where  there  is 
the  feeling  of  personality  and  nothing  more.  These  also  remain  in 
the  three  worlds.^  These  seven  worlds  are  all  without  exceptions 
worlds  of  the  Brahman.  But  the  discarnate  and  those  [whose 
bodies]  are  resolved  into  primary  matter  exist  in  the  state  of 
release  and  are  not  placed  in  the  worlds.  By  performing  constraint 
upon  the  door  of  the  sun  ^ the  yogin  should  dnectly  perceive  [all] 
this.  Then  also  upon  other  [objects  than  upon  the  sun].  Thus  to 
this  extent  he  should  practise,  until  all  this  is  seen. 

26.  As  a result  of  constraint  upon  the  sun  [there  arises  the  intuitive] 
knowledge  of  the  cosmic-spaces  {hhuvana). 

Up  to  the  pole-star  from  the  summit  of  Meru  in  this  world.  Thus  in  this  way 
from  here  up  to  the  end  of  the  Summary-Stanza  {sarhgraha-gloka)  the  seven  worlds  * 
are  briefly  described.  He  describes  them  in  detail  in  the  words  ^Among  them . . . 
above  Avici.»  The  word  ^solid-matter;^  means  earth.  [The  word]  «region» 
means  a place  [but  not  a hell].  These  great  hells  must  be  understood  to  be 
accompanied  by  several  lesser  hells.  These  same  are  brought  together  under 
other  names  in  the  words,  ^Mahakala.)^  As  the  sun  moves  forward,  day  and 
night,  revolve  [about  Sumeru],  as  it  were  fast  bound  to  him.  The  meaning  is 
that  night  is  in  that  part  of  it  which  the  sun  leaves  ; and  day  is  in  that  part  which 
the  sun  shines  upon.  He  gives  the  extent  of  the  whole  Land  of  the  Eose- Apple 

' In  the  World-Egg.  They  are  not  released.  ® On  this  whole  subject  see  Jacobi’s  article 
* This  seems  to  be  the  entrance  to  the  on  the  Abode  of  the  Blest  in  Hastings : 

world  of  Brahma.  Compare  Maitri  Up.  Cyclopaedia  of  Religion  and  Ethics, 

vi.  30  (sduram  dvaram)  and  Mundaka  vol.  II,  p.  698®. 

Up.  i.  2. 11  and  Chandog.  Up.  v.  10.  2. 

33  [b.o.s.  n] 


iii.  26 — ] Book  III.  Superiwrmal  Powers  or  Vihhuti  [258 

in  thewords  «This  same[Land  of  the  Rose- Apple],  a hundred  thousand  yojanas.» 
What  kind  of  a hundred  thousand  yojanas  ? In  reply  he  says  «It  stretches  out 
in  each  direction  from  Sumeru  for  half  this  distance.:^  «For  half»  would  be 
fifty  thousand  yojanas.  «It  stretches  out)^  [amounts  to]  is  comprehended,  in- 
asmuch as  Sumeru  occupies  the  middle  of  it.  The  Seven  Seas,  each  like  piles 
of  mustard  seeds,  are  each  double  [the  preceding].  This  is  the  connexion  [of 
the  sentence].  Just  as  a pile  of  mustard -seed  is  not  heaped  like  a pile  of  rice- 
grains,  nor  quite  [flat]  like  the  earth,  so  are  those  seas.  This  is  the  meaning. 
Islands  are  fringed  with  marvellous  hills,  so  that  one  could  say  that  they  seem 
to  have  fringes  of  marvellous  hills.  All  this  circuit  of  the  earth,  encompassed 
by  garlands  of  lands  and  forests  and  mountains  and  cities  and  oceans,  and 
encircled  by  the  Lokaloka  Mountains,  extends,  is  comprehended,  in  the  midst  of 
the  Egg  of  Brahma.  ^This  well-founded  configuration»  means  that  it  is  that 
whose  arrangement  [is  well-founded].  He  now  tells  who  they  are  that  dwell 
there  in  the  words  «Here,  in  the  lower-world. » He  describes  the  arrangement 
of  Sumeru  in  the  words,  «Sumeru  is» — Thus  having  described  the  Earth- 
world  specifically,  he  describes  specifically  the  world  of  Intermediate  Space  with 
the  words  <KThe  planets.:^  The  <KimpulsionS>  is  the  functional  activity. — Heshows 
the  Heaven-world  in  thewords  ^They  who  dwell  [in  the  world  of]  Mahendra.» 
3.  <SCGroups  of  gods^  are  kinds  of  gods.  He  also  describes  the  perfection  of  the 
form  of  the  six  gx'oups  of  gods  by  saying  «A11  [these]  fulfil  their  desires.»  All 
objects  yield  to  them  even  at  nothing  more  than  a desire.  ^Goodly  to  behold» 
[that  is]  to  be  worshipped.  They  delight  in  love  [that  is]  are  fond  of  sexual 
pleasure.  Their  bodies  are  not  caused  by  parents,  [but]  quite  without  cause, 
without  union  of  parents,  they  obtain  a supernal  body  from  atoms  thoroughly 
purified  ^ by  peculiar  merit.  4.  He  describes  the  Mahar-world  in  the  words,  ^In 
the  Great.»  These  have  the  mastery  over  the  great  elements.  Whatever  they 
like  the  great  elements  confer  upon  them.  And  the  great  elements  remain  in 
this  or  that  arrangement  as  they  desire.  ^Their  food  is  contemplation^  means 
that  they  are  sated  with  contemplation' merely  and  are  nourished  [thereby].  5.  He 
describes  the  Jana-world  with  the  words  «In  the  first.»  In  accordance  with  the 
Older  of  the  worlds  as  described  «they  have  the  mastery  over  the  elements  and 
the  organs. » Earth  and  the  other  elements,  and  the  organ-of-hearing  and 
the  other  organs  are  employed  just  as  they  choose  to  employ  them.  6.  He 
describes,  in  accordance  with  the  order  already  described,  the  second  [world]  of 
Brahma  in  the  words  ^In  the  second.»  ^These  have  the  mastery  over  the 
elements  and  the  organs  and  evolving-matter.»  Evolving-matter  (prakrti)  is  the 
five  fine  elements.  Over  these  they  have  the  masteiy . For  at  their  wish  the  subtile 


* This  is  an  allusion  to  the  story  of  Dadhici, 
whose  body  was  the  very  essence  of 
knowledge  and  of  courses  of  austerities 
(Bhag.  Pur.  vi.  9.  51-54).  'While  ab- 
sorbed in  yoga  he  was  unaware  that 


Indra  took  his  body  and  made  it  into 
a thunderbolt  (vi.  10.  12).  The 
thunderbolt  becomes  energized  with 
the  sage’s  austerities  (Dadhices  tapasd 
iejitah  vi.  11.  20). 


259]  Cosmical  and  'physical  correspondences  [ — iii.  26 

elements  actually  enter  into  mutations  in  the  form  of  bodies.  So  say  those  who 
have  the  tradition.  «Twice  as  long  as  the  previous. » The  Mahabhasvaras  have 
double  as  long  a life  as  the  Abhasvaras ; and  the  Satyamahabhasvaras  have 
double  as  long  a life  as  these  latter.  ^Upwards.)^  Upwards  in  the  Satya-world 
there  is  no  impediment  to  their  thinking.  But  from  Avici  right  up  to  the 
Tapas-world  they  discern  all  subtile  and  concealed  or  other  things.  This  is  the 
meaning.  7.  He  describes  the  third  world  of  Brahma  in  the  words  ^In  the 
third. » They  are  so  described  by  whom  the  laying  down  of  a dwelling  or 
house  has  not  been  made.  Just  because  they  have  nothing  to  hold  them,  they 
are  grounded  in  themselves.  They  are  such  as  are  grounded  in  their  own  bodies. 
They  have  the  mastery  over  the  primary  cause ; at  their  wish  the  sattva  and 
rajas  and  tamas  come  into  activity.  ^They  live  as  long  as  the  creation,^  as 
it  is  handed  down  in  the  Sacred  Word,^  “All  these  having  perfected  their 
souls,  together  with  Brahma  enter,  when  the  reversal-of-creation  {pratisamcara) 
is  reached  at  the  end  of  the  highest  [world],  into  the  highest  state.”  Having 
thus  stated  the  common  qualities  of  these  four  groups  of  gods,  he  describes 
their  special  qualities  by  taking  them  up  in  detail  with  the  words,  <KOf  these 
[four].)^  The  gods  called  Acyuta  take  delight  in  contemplation  upon  coarse 
objects.  With  this  they  are  satisfied.  The  gods  called  ^uddhanivasa  take 
delight  in  contemplation  upon  subtile  objects.  With  this  they  are  satisfied. 
The  gods  called  Satyabhas  take  delight  in  contemplation  upon  the  organs  ® as 
objects.  With  this  they  are  satisfied.  The  gods  called  Samjnasaihjnins  take 
delight  in  contemplation  upon  the  feeling  of  personality  and  nothing  more. 
With  this  they  are  satisfied.  All  these  have  recourse  to  concentration  conscious 
[of  objects].  And  if  it  be  asked  why  there  is  no  mention  here,  among  [these] 
worlds,  of  those  who  have  given  themselves  to  concentration  not  conscious  [of 
an  object],  those  namely  who  are  discarnate  and  those  [whose  bodies]  are  resolved 
into  primary  matter,  the  reply  is  «But  the  discarnate  and  those  [whose  bodies] 
are  resolved  into  primary  matter.^  For  those  whose  thinking-substance  is  in 
fluctuation,  and  to  whom  objects  are  shown,  carry  on  worldly  affairs  and  remain 
in  the  world.  But  the  discarnate^  and  those  [whose  bodies]  are  resolved  into 
primary  matter,  although  they  have  a task  to  perform,  do  not  so  remain. 
This  is  the  meaning. — All  this,  with  the  exception  of  the  Satya-world  and  as 
far  [down]  as  to  Avici,  is  directly  perceptible  to  the  yogin.  ■^Upon  the  door 
of  the  sun»  means  upon  the  tube  called  Susumna.  And  inasmuch  as,  even 
with  such  an  extent  [of  constraint],  direct  perception  of  [all]  this  does  not 
occur,  he  says  «Then.)»  Then  also  upon  other  [objects],  that  is,  also  upon 
objects  other  than  the  Susumna  taught  by  the  professor  of  yoga,  until  all  this 
world  is  seen.  For  the  sattva  of  the  thinking-substance  is  by  its  own  nature 
capable  of  illumining  the  whole  [world].  But  when  covered  by  the  defilement 

* Contrast  with  Vayu  Purana  ci.  85.  anenanandanugatamiAl  ofVacaspati’s 

* Compare  Bh.  Gita  viii.  16.  comment,  p.  86”  (Calc.  ed.). 

* Com^dt,xQhahihkaranamivdpannamiti,tcid  * See  i.  19. 


iii.  26 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vihhuti  [260 

of  tamas  it  illumines  only  that  portion  which  is  laid  bare  by  rajas.  It  illumines 
the  cosmic  space  laid  bare  by  the  constraint  upon  the  door  of  the  sun.  But 
this  does  not  apply  similarly^ in  other  cases  also.  Since  constraint  upon  this 
[cosmic  space]  has  power  to  lay  only  so  much  hare.  Thus  all  is  cleared  up. 


27.  [As  a result  of  constraint]  upon  the  moon  [there  arises 
the  intuitive]  knowledge  of  the  arrangement  of  the  stars. 

By  performing  constraint  upon  the  moon  he  would  discern  the 
arrangement  of  the  stars. 


28.  [As  a result  of  constraint]  upon  the  pole-star  [there  arises 
the  intuitive]  knowledge  of  their  movements. 

Then  by  performing  constraint  upon  the  pole-star  he  would  know 
the  movements  of  the  stars.  By  constraint  upon  heavenly  cars, 
[for  example,  the  chariot  of  the  sun],  he  would  discern  them. 


29.  [As  a result  of  constraint]  upon  the  wheel  of  the  navel 
[there  arises  the  intuitive]  knowledge  of  the  arrangement  of 
the  body. 

By  performing  constraint  upon  the  wheel  ^ of  the  navel  he  would 
discern  the  arrangement  of  the  body.  The  humours  are  three, 
wind  and  bile  and  phlegm.  The  [corporeal]  elements  ^ {dhatu) 
are  seven,  skin  and  blood  and  flesh  and  sinew  and  bone  and 
marrow  and  semen.  Here  {esa)  the  mention  is  such  that  the  pre- 
ceding element  is  in  each  case  exterior  to  that  next  preceding. 


30.  [As  a result  of  constraint]  upon  the  well  of  the  throat 
[there  follows]  the  cessation  of  hunger  and  of  thirst. 

Below  the  tongue  there  is  a cord ; below  that  is  the  throat ; below 
that  the  well.  As  a result  of  concentration  upon  that,  hunger  and 
thirst  do  not  torment. 


* Compare  H.  Walter:  HathayogapradI-  ’ Compare  i.  30,  p.  67*  (Calc.  ed.).  By 
pika,  pp.  xiii-xiv.  adding  prana  and  atman  the  list  is  in- 

creased to  nine. 


261]  Specimens  of  applied  power  [ — iii,  33 

31.  [As  a result  of  constraint]  upon  the  tortoise-tube  [there 
follows]  motionlessness  [of  the  mind-stuflf]. 

Below  the  well  there  is,  within  the  chest,  a tube  in  shape  like 
a tortoise.  By  performing  constraint  upon  this,  the  yogin  gains 
a motionless  state  like  that  of  a serpent  or  of  a guana.^ 

Whenever  the  yogin  desires  to  know  one  thing  or  another,  he  should  perform 
constraint  upon  that.  Thus  constraint  which  leads  to  the  cessation  of  himger 
and  of  thirst,  and  which  leads  to  motionlessness,  is  taught  by  the  words  of  the 
Sotra  and  is  explained  by  the  Comment  with  an  explanation  which  is  a [mere 
matter  of]  reading.  So  it  is  not  explained  [here]. 


32.  [As  a result  of  constraint]  upon  the  radiance  in  the  head 
[there  follows]  the  sight  of  the  Siddhas. 

Within  an  aperture  in  the  skull  there  is  a resplendent  radiance.^ 
As  a result  of  constraint  upon  this  [radiance  there  follows]  the 
sight  of  the  Siddhas  roving  in  the  spaces  between  the  sky  ^ and 
the  earth. 

32.  [As  a result  of  constraint]  upon  the  radiance  in  the  head  [there 
follows]  the  sight  of  the  Siddhas. 

The  words  <in  the  head)  imply  the  tube  {nad^)  called  Summna, — <constraint 
upon)  that,  he  means. 


33.  Or  as  a result  of  vividness  {pratibha)  [the  yogin  discerns] 
all. 

The  so-called  vividness  is  the  deliverer^  [tdraka).  This  is  the 
preliminary  form  of  the  [intuitive]  knowledge  derived  from 
discrimination.  Just  as  the  light  at  dawn  [precedes]  the  sun. 
In  this  other  way  {tena  vd)  the  yogin  knows  all  ® at  the  rise  of  the 
vivid  [intuitive]  knowledge. 

33.  Or  as  a result  of  vividness  {pratibJia)  [the  yogin  discerns]  all. 

Vivid-light  [that  is]  self-cogitation  (uha).  This  develops  into  vividness.  For  in 
the  case  of  one  who  practises  a constraint  which  leads  to  the  Elevation  (prasam- 

^ These  two  animals  exemplify  the  rigidity,  * Compare  Mahanarayana  Up.  xi.  10-12. 
and  not  as  Vijnana  Bhiksu  says,  the  ® Pan.  iv.  2.  32. 
convoluted  state  of  the  mind-stuff.  * See  iii.  54. 

The  word  goilhd  is  mentioned  in  Cowell  ® See  J.  H.  Leuba : Hallucinations  of  Light 
and  Gough’s  translation  of  the  Sarva-  (Revue  Philosophique,  vol.  54,  1902, 

dar^anasamgraha,  p.  238.  p.  447 ).  And  compare  iii.  40. 


iii.  33 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Poivers  or  Vihhvti  [262 

khyana),  there  results,  when  he  attains  perfection  therein,  an  [intuitive]  know- 
ledge due  to  that  self-asserting  which  is  the  preliminary  indication  [linga)  of 
the  dawning  of  the  Elevation.  In  this  way  the  yogin  discerns  all.  And  this 
[intuitive]  knowledge,  since  it  serves  to  bring  the  Elevation  near,  delivers  from 
the  round-of-rebirth  and  so  is  called  the  ‘ deliverer’. 


34.  [As  a result  of  constraint]  upon  the  heart  [there  arises] 
a consciousness  of  the  mind-stuff. 

In  this  citadel  of  Brahma  * is  the  house  [of  the  mind-stuff],  a tiny 
lotus  [of  the  heart] — [there  arises]  a discernment  of  that.  As 
a result  of  constraint  upon  this  [there  arises]  a consciousness  of 
the  mind-stuff. 

34.  [As  a result  of  constraint]  upon  the  heart  [there  arises]  a conscious- 
ness of  the  mind-stufif. 

The  w'ord  ^heart2>  is  explained  in  the  words,  «in  the  citadel  of  Brahma.^ 
Because  it  is  great  [brhat)  the  self  is  Brahma.  His  «citadel»,  [that  is]  retreat. 
For  with  reference  to  this  [citadel]  he  knows  this, — that  it  is  his  property.  The 
cave  is  a den.  That  same  lotus  with  downward  head  is  the  dwelling  of  the  central- 
organ.  He  gives  the  reason  for  this  consciousness  of  the  mind-stuff  by  saying 
«a  discernment  of  that.^  By  constraint  upon  this  he  discerns  the  mind-stuff 
with  its  own  peculiar  fluctuations. 


35.  Experience  is  a presented-idea  which  fails  to  distinguish 
the  sattva  and  the  Self,  which  are  absolutely  uncommingled 
[in  the  presented-idea].  Since  the  sattva  exists  as  object  for 
another,  the  [intuitive]  knowledge  of  the  Self  arises  as  the 
result  of  constraint  upon  that  which  exists  for  its  own  sake. 
The  sattva  of  the  thinking-substance,  with  its  disposition  to 
brightness,  by  mastering  the  rajas  and  tamas  which  are  equally 
dependent  upon  the  sattva,  enters  into  a mutation  as  a result  of 
the  presented-idea  of  the  difference  between  the  sattva  and  the 
Self.  Therefore  the  Self,  of  which  we  can  only  say  that  it  is 
Intellect  {citi),  which  is  other  [than  the  aspects  {guna)'\,  and  which 
is  undefiled  {puddha)  [by  objects],  is  absolutely  contrary  in  quality 
even  to  the  sattva  which  is  mutable.  Experience  is  a presented- 
idea  which  fails  to  distinguish  these  tw'o  which  are  absolutely 


’ Chanel,  Up.  viii.  1.  1. 


263] 


The  Self  distinct  hut  unseparated  [ — iii.  35 

uncommingled.  Because  the  Self  has  objects  shown  to  it.  This 
[same]  presented-idea  of  experience  is  an  object  for  sight,  since 
the  sattva  exists  for  the  sake  of  another.  But  as  a result  of 
constraint  upon  that  presented-idea,  which  is  distinguished  from 
this  [sattval,  which  is  Intellect  and  nothing  more,  and  which  is 
other  [than  the  aspects  [guna)\  and  which  belongs  to  the  Self, — 
[as  a result  of  this,]  that  insight  whose  object  is  the  Self  arises. 
The  Self  is  not  seen  by  that  presented-idea  of  the  Self  whose 
essence  is  the  sattva  of  the  thinking-substance.  It  is  the  Self 
which  sees  the  presented-idea  which  depends  upon  its  own  self. 
For  in  this  sense  it  has^  been  said,  “Wherewith,  pray,  could 
one  discern  the  Discerner  ? ” 

35.  . . . Sattva  . . . [intuitive]  knowledge.  When,  by  reason  of  its  being 
altogether  overwhelmed  by  rajas  and  tamas,  even  the  thinking-substance,  bright 
in  form  and  exceedingly  clear  though  it  is,  can  in  its  mutation  as  a discriminative 
discernment,  be  absolutely  distinguished  from  intelligence,  how  much  more  so 
then  the  rajas  and  tamas,  which  are  inert  {jacja)  by  nature ! With  this  in 
mind  the  author  of  the  Sutras  uses  the  words,  <the  sattva  and  the  Self.> 
Taking  up  this  same  point  the  author  of  the  Comment  also  says  «The  sattva 
of  the  thinking-substance,  with  its  disposition  to  brightness.»  Not  merely  one 
whose  disposition  is  to  brightness,  but  one  which  has  entered  into  a mutation 
in  the  form  of  discriminative  discernment.  Inasmuch  as  it  is  altogether 
undefiled  [by  objects]  and  bright,  it  is  absolutely  similar  to  intelligence 
{cditanya).  So  there  is  a commingling,  as  he  implies  in  the  words  «equal.» 
^Dependent  upon  sattva"^  means  a relation  without  which  it  cannot  exist. 
The  rajas  and  tamas  which  are  equally  dependent  upon  the  sattva  are  so-called 
[in  the  Comment].  Mastered  means  overwhelmed.  He  states  that  there  is 
no  commingling  in  the  words  ^Therefore  . . . even.)^  The  word  ca  is  here  in 
the  sense  of  ‘even  ’.  [Contrary  in  quality]  not  merely  to  the  rajas  and  tamas 
[but  even  to  the  sa^im].  This  is  the  meaning.  The  word  «mutable»  indicates 
the  quality  contrary  to  the  Self  who  is  immutable.  A presented  idea  which 
fails  to  distinguish,  because  the  thinking-substance,  which  is  serene  and  cruel 
and  infatuated,  takes  the  image  of  the  intelligence  {caitanya).  And  so  the 
serene  and  other  forms  are  falsely  attributed  to  the  intelligence,  just  as  the 
trembling  of  the  clear  water  which  reflects  the  moon  is  falsely  attributed  to 
the  moon.  He  gives  the  reason  for  the  experience  in  the  words  ^[Because  the 
Self  has  objects  shown  to  it.»  This  has  been  explained  more  than  once.*  If 
it  be  objected  that  the  sattva  of  the  thinking-substance  might  be  different  from 

Brhad-Aran.  Up.  ii.  4.  14  and  iv.  5.  15.  * For  example,  i.  4,  p.  16 ; ii.  17,  p.  141  ; 

and  also  iv.  22,  p.  306  (Calc.  ed.). 


1 


lii.  35 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vihhuti  [264 

the  Self,  but  that  experience  could  not  be  different  from  the  Self,  he  replies  «This 
[same].^  This  [same]  presented-idea  of  experience  is  a presented-idea  of  a kind  of 
experience  belonging  to  the  sattva.  Hence  as  something  for  the  sake  of  another 
experience  is  an  object-for-sight.  For  the  sattva  is  for  the  sake  of  another  in  that  it 
is  a combination  of  parts.  And  because  experience  is  an  external-aspect  of  this 
[satoa],  it  would  also  be  for  the  sake  of  another.  Furthermore,  that  other  for 
whose  sake  it  is,  would  be  the  experiencer.  His  is  the  experience. — Or  [another 
explanation].  For  experience  {hhoga)  is  passing-through  {anubhava)  pleasure  or 
pain  which  are  felt  to  be  coactive  or  counteractive.  And  this  [experience] 
cannot  be  coactive  or  counteractive  to  itself.  Because  a fluctuation  cannot  be 
opposed  to  itself.  Therefore  experience  must  be  for  the  sake  of  something  that 
is  to  be  made  coactive  or  counteractive.  This  experiencer  is  the  self.  Experience 
is  an  object-for-sight  to  him.  «But . . . that  presented-idea,  which  is  distinguished 
from  this»  which  is  for  the  sake  of  another.  These  words  [from  the  Comment] 
are  explained  by  supplying  the  other  words  in  the  ablative  case  ‘ for  the  sake  of 
another  ’.  An  objector  says,  ‘ This  may  be  true.  But  if  the  insight  has  the 
Self  for  its  object,  then  whew ! Sir ! the  Self  becomes  the  object-for-insight 
by  the  insight ! There  would  surely  be  other  insights,  one  after  the  other,  and 
we  should  fall  into  an  infinite  regress ! ’ In  reply  to  this  he  says  ^The  Self 
is  not ....  by  that  presented-idea  of  the  Self.»  The  connexion-of-ideas  is 
this.  The  Intellect  {citi)  illumines  that  which  is  inert  (jai/«),  and  that  which 
is  inert  does  not  [illumine]  the  intellect.  The  idea  presented  to  the  Self  has 
as  its  essence  that  which  is  not  intelligent.  How  can  this  [presented-idea] 
illumine  a being  whose  essence  is  intelligence?  On  the  other  hand,  how 
can  [the  Self],  whose  essence  is  intelligence  and  whose  brightness  does  not 
depend  upon  another,  be  properly  said  to  illumine  that  which  is  inert  ? When 
he  says  «whose  essence  is  the  sattva  of  the  thinking-substance»  he  describes 
the  inertness  in  so  far  as  there  is  identity  with  the  non-intelligent  form.  [We 
say  that  the  sattva  of  the  thinking-substance]  depends  upon  the  Self  to  the 
extent  that  it  depends  on  the  image  of  the  Self  as  entered  into  the  sattva  of 
the  thinking-substance,  in  the  same  sense  that  a person  depends  upon  [his] 
face  reflected  in  a mirror  [if  he  wish  to  see  himself].  [And  the  sattva  is  said 
to  depend  upon  the  Self.]  But  not  [as  the  objector  said],  because  the  sattva 
of  the  thinking-substance  illumines  the  Self.  It  is  the  sattva  of  the  thinking- 
substance  which  reflects  the  Self  united  with  this  presented-idea,  and  which 
depends  upon  the  Intelligence  (caitanya)  which  has  been  mirrored  {chayapanna) 
in  it  [as  the  intelligence]  of  the  Self.  Thus  it  exists  for  the  sake  of  the  Self. 
On  this  same  point  he  quotes  the  Sacred  Word  by  saying  ^For  in  this  sense 
it  has  been  said»  by  the  Ifvara  «“  the  Discerner.”»  The  meaning  is  that  [He 
is  discerned]  by  no  one. 


[ — iii.  37 


265]  Hyper  aesthetic  sensations 

36.  As  a result  of  this  [constraint  upon  that  which  exists 
for  its  own  sake],  there  arise  vividness  and  the  organ-of- 
[supernal]-hearing  ^ and  the  organ-of-[supernal]-feeling  and 
the  organ-of-[supernal]-sight  and  the  organ-of-[supernal]- 
taste  and  the  organ-of-[supernal]-smell. 

As  a result  of  vividness,  there  arises  an  [intuitive]  knowledge  of 
the  subtile  or  concealed  or  remote,  whether  past  or  future.  As 
a result  of  the  organ-of-[supernal]-hearing,  one  hears  supernal 
sounds  ; as  a result  of  the  organ-of-[supernal]-feeling,  one  has 
access  to  supernal  touch  ; as  a result  of  the  organ-of-[supernal]- 
sight,  one  has  the  consciousness  ^ of  supernal  colour  ; as  a result  of 
the  organ-of-[supernal]-taste,  one  has  a consciousness  of  supernal 
flavour  ; as  a result  of  the  organ-of-[supernal]  smell,^  one  has  an 
[intuitive]  knowledge  ^ of  supernal  fragrance.  These  unceasingly 
arise. 

This  restraint,  moreover,  upon  that  which  exists  for  its  own  sake  continues  until 
the  primary  cause  has  fulfilled  its  peculiar  task  {karya),  the  [intuitive]  knowledge 
of  the  Seif.  He  describes  all  the  supernormal  powers  which  [the  yogin]  receives 
before  that  [intuitive  knowledge  comes].  36.  As  a result  of  this  . . . there 
arise  ...  So  then  it  has  been  asserted  that  the  central-organ  and  the  organ  of 
hearing  and  of  feeling  and  of  sight  and  of  taste  and  of  smell,  which  have  been 
helped  by  the  external-aspects  which  arise  from  yoga,  are  in  each  single  case  in 
direct  causal  relation  with  the  supernal  sounds  and  so  forth  and  with  the  [in- 
tuitive] knowledge  of  vividness  (pratibha).  The  five  organs,  of  hearing  and  so 
on,  which  apperceive  supernal  sounds  and  so  forth  have  technical  names  such  as 
the  organ-of-[supernal]-hearing  and  the  rest.  The  Comment  is  easy. 


37.  In  concentration  these  [supernal  activities]  are  obstacles ; 
in  the  emergent  state  they  are  perfections  (siddhi). 

These,  the  vividness  and  so  forth,  arising  in  the  yogin  whose 
mind-stufi*  is  concentrated,  are  obstacles,  in  that  they  go  counter 
to  the  sight  which  belongs  to  this  [concentrated  mind-stufi*]. 


' This  word  p-avana  is  from  the  causative 
stem.  The  Maniprabha  (p.  64'^^,  Ben. 
ed.)  explains  it  as  being  ‘ the  organs  of 
knowing  supernal  sounds  and  so  on’ 
{divydndm  (-aida  . . . ddlndth  grahakdni). 

* A samvid  is  a perception  with  little  direct 
34  [h.o.s.  it] 


relation  to  the  object. 

® Compare  Hopkins,  Yoga-technique,  JAOS. 

(1901),  vol.  22,  p.  344’*®. 

^ The  word  vijndna  is  loosely  used.  It 
seems  to  indicate  whatever  comes  to 
consciousness. 


iii.  37 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vibhuti  [266 

[But]  arising  [in  the  yogin]  whose  mind-stufF  is  emergent,  they 
are  perfections. 

Occasionally  a man,  after  beginning  constraint  upon  the  self  as  object,  acquires 
those  perfections  which  are  subsidiary  to  this,  and  thinks  because  of  the  power 
[prdbhava)  of  these  [perfections]  that  he  has  effected  his  purpose,  and  so  might 
cease  the  constraint.  So  [the  author]  says,  37.  In  concentration  these 
[supernal  activities]  are  obstacles ; in  the  emergent  state  they  are  perfec- 
tions (skldht).  For  a man  whose  mind-stuff  is  emergent  thinks  highly  of  these 
perfections,  just  as  a man  born  in  misery  considers  even  a small  bit  of  wealth 
a pile  of  wealth.  But  a yogin  whose  mind-stuff  is  concentrated  must  avoid 
these  [perfections]  even  when  brought  near  to  him.  One  who  longs  for  the 
final  goal  of  life,  the  absolute  assuagement  of  the  three-fold  anguish,  how  could 
he  have  any  affection  for  those  perfections  which  go  counter  to  [the  attainment] 
of  that  [goal]  ? This  is  the  meaning  both  of  the  Sutra  and  of  the  Comment. 


38.  As  a result  of  slackening  the  causes  of  bondage  and  as 
a result  of  the  consciousness  of  the  procedure  [of  the  mind- 
stuff  ],  the  mind-stuff  penetrates  into  the  body  of  another. 

By  virtue  of  the  latent-deposit  of  karma  in  the  body,  the  central- 
organ  w'hich  is  changeable  and  unstable  becomes  established.  This 
is  bondage.  By  virtue  of  concentration  there  is  a slackening  of 
this  karma  which  is  the  cause  of  bondage.  And  the  consciousness 
of  the  procedure  [of  the  mind-stuff]  comes  only  from  concentration. 
As  a result  of  the  dwindling  of  the  bondage  of  karma,  and  as 
a result  of  the  consciousness  of  the  procedure  of  his  mind-stuff, 
the  yogin  by  withdrawing  mind-stuff  from  his  own  body  deposits 
it  in  other  bodies.  The  organs  also  fly  after  [ii.  54]  the  mind- 
stuff  thus  deposited,  Just^  as,  for  instance,  when  the  king-bee 
flies  up,  the  bees  fly  up  after  him,  so  the  organs  follow  after  the 
mind-stuff  in  its  penetration  into  the  body  of  another. 

After  thus  stating  that  power,  in  the  form  of  [intuitive]  knowledge  extending 
as  far  as  to  the  sight  of  the  Self,  is  the  result  of  constraint,  he  gives,  as  another 
result  of  constraint,  power  in  the  form  of  action.  38.  . . . The  causes  of  bond- 
age , . . penetration.  When  he  says  «By  virtue  of  concentration»  this  means 
under  1.  the  power  of  the  constraint  whose  object  is  the  causes  of  bondage.  The 
word  ^concentration»  is  used  [instead  of  ‘constraint,’]  because  it  is  pre- 
dominant [in  constraint]. — A procedure  is  that  by  which  something  proceeds  into 

‘ Compare  Prajna  Up.  ii.  4. 


267] 


Externalizing  of  mind-stuff  [ — iii.  39 

another  thing.  It  means  the  tubes  {nadi)  [that  is]  the  paths  for  the  coming  and 
going  of  mind-stuff.  As  a result  2.  of  constraint  upon  this  passage  there  is  a con- 
sciousness of  it.  And  as  a result  of  this  [as  well  as  of  1.  the  constraint  upon 
the  causes  of  bondage],  since  the  causes  of  bondage  are  slackened,  it  [the  mind- 
stuff]  is  not  held  back  by  this  [yogin].  Although  the  mind-stuff  is  not  held  back 
as  it  soars  into  the  upward  path,  it  cannot  without  impediment  pass  forth  from 
his  body  nor  enter  into  the  other’s  body.  Therefore  the  passage  for  this  must 
also  be  known. — The  organs  moreover  follow  the  mind-stuff  and  settle  down  in 
their  respective  places  in  the  other’s  body. 


39.  As  a result  of  subjugating  the  Uddna,  there  is  no  adhesion 
to  water  or  mud  or  thorns  or  similar  objects,  and  [at  death] 
the  upward  flight. 

The  fluctuation  of  the  whole  complex  of  organs  which  is  dis- 
tinguished by  having  the  different  vital-forces  {prana)  is  vitality.^ 
Its  activity  is  flve-fold.  Prana  has  its  course  through  the  mouth 
and  nose  and  its  fluctuation  extends  as  far  as  the  heart.  And 
Samdna,  since  it  distributes  equally,  has  its  fluctuation  from  the 
navel.  Apdna,  since  it  leads  down,  has  its  fluctuation  as  far  as 
the  sole  of  the  foot.  Uddna,  since  it  leads  up,  has  its  fluctuation 
as  far  as  the  head.  Vydna  is  pervading.  Among  these  Prdna  is 
predominant.  As  a result  of  subjugating  the  Uddna  there  is  no 
adhesion  to  water  or  mud  or  thorns  or  similar  objects  ; and  at  the 
time  of  decease  there  is  the  upward  flight.  This  [upward  flight] 
he  attains  by  mastery  [of  the  Uddna). 

39.  Uddna  . . . and.  . . . the  upward  flight.  The  fluctuation  of  the  whole 
complex  of  organs  is  life.  The  words  ^distinguished  by  having  the  different 
vital-forces  {prdnay^  refer  to  that  [fluctuation]  of  which  the  different  vital-forces 
are  the  distinction.  The  organs  have  two  kinds  [of  fluctuations],  an  inner  and 
an  outer.  The  outer  is  distinguished  by  the  external-sense  {dlocana)  of  colour 
and  similar  sensations.  The  inner  is  life.  For  this  is  a special  kind  of  effort 
and  it  leads  to  the  different  activities  of  the  winds  {mdruta)  which  the  body 
comprehends.  This  effort  is  common  to  all  the  organs.  As  they  say  ^ “ The 
fluctuations  common  to  the  [inner]  organs  are  the  five  winds  (vd^u),  vital-airs 
and  so  on.”  Because  they  are  the  distinguishing-characteristic  of  this  [life]. 

* Defined  as  a struggle  for  life  by  Vaca-  15,  p.  217*.  It  is  mentioned  in  the  list 

spatiyTfawam  prarui-dharayui-prayatna-  iii.  18,  p.  230‘  (Calc.  ed.). 

hhedo  ’samvidita^  cittasya  dharmah  iii,  ® S^khya-karika  29. 


iii.  39 — ] Booh  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vibhuti  [268 

The  action  [or]  function  of  this  effort  is  of  five  kinds.  1.  Prana  extends  from 
the  tip  of  the  nose  to  the  heart.  2.  Samana  is  one  which  evenly  distributes  as 
required  in  different  places  the  various  juices  which  are  mutations  of  food  eaten 
and  drunk.  And  its  locality  extends  from  the  heart  and  to  the  navel.  3.  Apana 
is  that  which  leads  to  the  carrying  off  of  urine,  faeces,  foetus,  &c.  And  its 
activity  {vrtti)  is  from  the  navel  and  to  the  sole  of  the  foot.  4.  Udana  is  so-called 
because  it  leads  up  [that  is]  leads  upwards  such  things  as  secretions.  And  its 
activity  is  from  the  tip  of  the  nose  and  to  the  head.  6.  Yyana  is  one  that 
pervades  [the  whole  body]. — Of  these  thus  described  Prana  is  predominant,  since 
the  Sacred  Word*  declares  that  when  that  goes  forth  all  goes  forth,  “Following 
the  Prana  when  it  goes  forth,  all  the  vital-forces  [prana)  go  forth.” — Having  thus 
explained  the  differences  between  the  vital-forces  (prana)  with  respect  to  activity 
and  locality,  he  leads  up  to  the  meaning  of  the  sutra  with  the  words  ^As  a result 
of  subjugating  the  Z7dawa.»  When  constraint  has  been  performed  upon  the 
Udana,  [then]  as  a result  of  its  subjugation,  [the  yogin]  is  not  held  back  by 
water  or  similar  objects.  And  at  the  time  of  decease  his  upward  flight  is  by  the 
path*  which  commences  with  the  flame.  As  a result  of  this  [constraint]  he 
attains  by  mastery  to  this  upward  flight.  These  supernormal  powers  that  result 
from  constraint  upon  the  vital-forces  beginning  with  Prana,  if  there  be  success  in 
it,  should  be  understood  according  to  the  differences  in  the  subjugations  of 
activities  and  of  localities  [in  the  body]. 


40.  As  a result  of  subjugating  the  Samana  [there  arises]  a 
radiance. 

The  yogin  who  has  subjugated  the  Samana  by  causing  a pulsation 
of  the  flames,  becomes  radiant.® 

40.  ...  the  Samana  ...  a radiance.  There  is  pulsation,»  a flaming  forth 
of  the  flame  in  the  body. 


41.  As  a result  of  constraint  upon  the  relation  between  the 


organ-of-hearing,  and  the  air 
supernal  organ-of-hearing.^ 

For  all  organs-of- hearing  the  air  is 
sounds.  In  which  sense  it  has 

* Compare  Brhad  Ar.  Up.  iv.  4.  3. 

* This  is  the  demydna.  See  Brhad  Ar.  Up. 

vi.  1.  3 and  18  and  Chand.  Up.  iv.  15. 

5-6 ; Chand.  Up.  v.  10.  1. 

’ Compare  prdbhd  hhdskarasya  (iii.  13, 
p.  243«,  Calc.  ed.). 

* iii.  51,  p.  267*  (Calc.  ed.). 

‘ Reading  ekap'utitvam  with  six  MSS.  in- 


(akaga),  [there  arises]  the 

the  [physical]  basis,  and  for  all 
been  said  “ All  ® those  whose 

eluding  the  fdradd  MS.  instead  of 
ekadega-grutitvark.  One  is  tempted  to 
surmise  that  there  might  be  another 
reading  tulya-degya  or  tulya-degxya  in- 
stead of  tulyadega,  with  a meaning 
similar  to  Vacaspati’sglossjaiii/a.  This 
is  Panca9ikha’s  twelfth  fragment 
according  to  Garbe. 


269] 


Supernormal  audition 


[ — iii.  41 


processes-of-hearing  [gravana)  are  in  the  same  place  have  the  same 
kind-of-hearing  {elca-grutitvam).”'^  And  this  [fact  that  the  air  is  the 
locus  of  sounds]  is  declared  to  be  the  [first]  characteristic  mark  of 
air.  And  the  second  is  that  it  is  not  covered  ^ [by  anything  more 
extensive].  Thus  because  a thing  which  is  not-limited-in-extent 
{amiorta)  is  evidently  not  covered  [by  anything],  it  is  also 
recognized  that  air  is  [all]  pervasive.  From  the  perception  of 
sounds  it  is  inferred  that  the  organ-of-hearing  exists.  For  in  the 
case  of  a deaf  man  and  of  a man  not  deaf,  the  one  perceives  sound 
and  the  other  not.  Hence  it  is  the  organ-of-hearing  only  which  is 
the  field  of  operation  for  sound. — For  the  yogin  who  has  performed 
constraint  upon  the  relation  between  the  organ-of-hearing  and  the 
air,  the  supernal  ^ ear  begins. 


It  has  already  been  stated  [iii.  36,  p.  246 Calc,  ed.]  that  as  a result  of 
constraint  upon  that  which  exists  for  its  own  sake  [this  would  be  the  muMiyd], 
there  remains  a subsidiary  [perfection],  the  organ-of-[supernal]-hearing  and  other 
[organs].  Now  the  organ-of-[supernal]-hearing  and  other  [organs]  result  from 
the  constraint  which  has  the  organ-of-[supernal]-hearing  and  other  [organs]  as 
its  sole  purpose.  41.  . . . Organ-of-hearing  . . . organ-of-hearing.  He 
saj’^s  that  the  object  of  the  constraint  is  the  relation  between  organ-of-hearing 
and  the  air  in  the  relation  of  the  contained  to  the  container,  in  the  words 
^For  all.^  All  organs-of-hearing,  although  made  of  the  personality-substance, 
have  the  air  which  is  [contained  in]  the  hollow-space  of  the  auditory  canal  as 
its  [physical]  basis.  The  organ-of-hearing  has  its  seat  {ayatana)  there.  For  if  we 
assist  or  injure  this  [auditory  canal],  we  find  that  the  organ-of-hearing  has 
been  assisted  or  injured.  [Air  is]  also  [the  physical  basis]  for  sounds  which  are 
causes  co-operating  with  the  organ-of-hearing.  When  a sound  is  to  be  heard 
as  coming  from  an  earthen  or  other  substance,  the  organ-of-hearing,  which  is 
in  the  hollow  of  the  auditory  canal,  presupposes  that  there  is  a special 
sound  residing  in  the  air^  [nabhas)  which  is  its  own  [that  is,  the  organ’s] 
substance.  [That  this  is  so  is]  clear  {drstam)  [from  analogy].  Thus  when, 
for  instance,  one  wishes  to  have  an  external  sense  [alocana)  of  smell,  which 
is  contained  in  this  case  in  earth,  by  means  of  the  organ-of-smell  which  is 
a co-operating  [non-material]  cause  for  those  things  which  have  smell  and 
[taste]  as  their  [specific]  qualities,  [we  find  similarly  that  the  sense  of  smell 


* The  Yogavarttika,  p.  237“,  also  suggests 
this  reading. 

® The  word  anavaranam  in  the  sense  of 
nuvriyate  anena.  In  the  Varttika  it  is 
said  to  be  ‘ free  space  ’ {avakdga). 


^ Balarama  says  that  the  supernality  con-  * That  is  to  say  the  dkdga. 


sists  in  a kind  of  hyperaesthetic  per- 
ception of  minute  sounds,  &c.,  which 
are  like  subtile  elements  (divyatvam 
tanmdtrddirupasuksmagabdddiyrdhakat- 
vam). 


iii.  41 — ] Booh  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vihhuti  [270 


requires  such  a special  kind  of  smell  in  so  far  as  it  is  contained  in  the  earthen 
thing  which  contains  it].  And  it  has  already  been  said  that  the  organs  of  smell 
and  of  taste  and  of  touch  and  of  sight  and  of  hearing,  although  made  of  the 
personality-substance,  do  have  the  elements  as  their  locus.  For  if  we  assist 
or  injure  the  elements,  we  find  that  we  have  assisted  or  injured  the  organ-of- 
smell  or  some  other  of  the  organs.  This  same  organ-of-hearing,  which  is 
made  of  the  personality-substance,  moreover  resembles  a piece  of  iron  in 
that  it  is  attracted  by  a magnet-like  sound,  in  the  mouth,  produced  by  the 
mouth  of  the  speaker,  and,  by  a succession  of  its  own  functions  {vrtti),  has  the 
external  sense  of  the  word  which  has  come  to  the  mouth  of  the  speaker.  Hence 
there  are  sense-presentations  of  sounds  functioning  at  different  points  of  space. 
[And  this  sense-presentation],  common  to  all  living-beings,  cannot  in  the 
absence  of  inhibition,  be  counted  as  an  invalid-source-of-ideas.  And  in  this 
sense  there  is  an  utterance  by  Panca9ikha,  “All  those  whose-processes-of-hearing 
((;ravana)  are  in  the  same  place  have  the  same  kind-of-hearing.”  Those  persons 
whose  processes-of-hearing  are  in  the  same  place  are  those  persons,  like  Chaitra, 
whose  organs-of-hearing  are  of  that  kind.  The  meaning  is  that  the  processes- 
of-hearing  of  all  are  in  the  air  (aMfa).  The  air,  moreover,  the  locus  of  the 
organs-of-hearing,  because  it  is  produced  from  the  fine-element  {tanmatra), 
whose  [specific]  quality  is  sound,  has  sound  as  its  specific  quality.'  By  which 
sound  as  a co-operating  [non-material]  cause  it  grasps  the  sounds  from  earthen 
and  other  substances.  Therefore  there  is  for  all  one  species  of  hearing  {^ruti) 
with  regard  to  sound.  This  is  the  meaning.  Thus  then  it  has  been  shown 
that  air  is  the  locus  of  the  organ-of-hearing  and  that  it  has  sounds  as  its 
[specific]  quality. — And  this  fact  that  there  is  one  kind  of  hearing  {eka^rutitvam) 
is  the  [first]  characteristic  mark  of  air.  For  this  one  kind  of  hearing  is  that 
condition  which  phenomenalizes  sound.  This  very  thing  which  is  its  substrate 
(afraya)  is  the  thing  expressed  by  the  word  air.  For  in  the  absence  of  such 
a hearing  there  is  no  [individual]  phenomenal  sound  [belonging  to  earthen 
and  other  substances].  Moreover  such  a hearing  cannot  be  a quality  {gum) 
of  the  various  [coarse  substances]  such  as  earth,  because,  if  it  be  such,  these  cannot 
be  both  the  thing-to-be-phenomenalized  and  the  conditions-which-phenomenalize. 
— And  the  [second]  characteristic  mark  of  air  is  that  it  is  not  covered 
[by  anything  more  extensive].  If  there  were  no  air,  the  things  not-limited- 
in-extent  would  be  pressed  together  and  could  not  be  separated  even  by 
needles.  And  so  as  a result  everything  would  be  covered  by  ever3rthing. 
And  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  not  being  covered  [by  anything]  is  merely 
because  things-not-limited-in-extent  are  not  present.  For  this  negation  implies 
a positive  entity  [for  example,  a thing-limited-in-extent].  And  if  this  positive 
entity  do  not  exist,  there  can  be  no  negation  of  it.  Nor  can  it  be  said  that  the 

' Compare  Vai9e3ika-sutra  vii.  1.  22  to-  p.  61, 11. 19-21  (Vizian.  ed.).  See  also 

gether  with  the  words  of  Qridhara,  Tarka-samgraha,  § 14. 


271] 


Levitation 


[ — iii.  42 


Energy  of  Intellect  (cit^ahti)  could  be  the  substrate  for  this*  [free  space  not 
covered  by  anything].  For  being  immutable  it  cannot  have  [spatial]  properties 
that  precisely  determine.  And  again  it  cannot  be  said  that  space  (dif)  and  time 
are  substances  {dravya)  over  and  above  earth  and  the  other  [coarse  elements]. 
Consequently  that  particular  mutation  [which  is  not  covered  by  anything  more 
extensive]  belongs  to  air  only.  Thus  all  is  cleared  up. — When  it  is  proved  that 
the  fact  that  nothing  covers  it  is  a characteristic  mark  of  air, — so  that  wherever 
there  is  anything  that  has  nothing  covering  it,  there  always  air  is, — then  [all-] 
pervasiveness  is  also  proved,  as  he  says  «Thus  because  a thing  which  is  not- 
limited-in-extent.^ — He  gives  the  source-of-the-valid-idea  to  prove  the  real  exist- 
ence of  the  organ-of-hearing  by  saying  «From  the  perception  of  sounds.»  For 
[every]  action  is  to  be  effected  by  an  instrument,  just  as  the  action  of  chopping 
or  the  like  is  to  be  effected  by  the  axe  or  something  similar.  So  in  this  case  also 
the  act  of  perceiving  sound  must  be  accomplished  by  an  instrument.  And  that 
which  is  the  instrument  is  the  organ-of-hearing.  Now  if  it  be  asked  why  may 
not  the  eye  or  some  other  organ  be  the  instrument  of  this  [act],  he  replies  «in 
the  case  of  a deaf  man  and  of  a man  not  deaf.^  This  is  determined  by  positive 
and  negative  arguments.  And  this  is  only  an  elliptical  statement.  For  mutatis 
mutandis  we  must  say  that  as  a result  of  constraint  upon  the  relation  between 
the  organ-of-touch  and  wind  (vdta),  between  organ-of-sight  and  radiance,  between 
the  organ-of-taste  and  water,  and  between  the  organ-of-smell  and  earth,  supernal 
touch  and  other  [supernal  sensations]  would  also  arise. 


42.  Either  as  the  result  of  constraint  upon  the  relation 
between  the  body  and  the  air  {dkd^a),  or  (ca)  as  the  result  of  the 
balanced-state  of  lightness,  such  as  that  of  the  cotton-fibre, 
there  follows  the  passing  through  air. 

Wherever  there  is  a body  there  is  air,  because  it  [air]  gives  space 
to  the  body.  The  relation  [of  the  body]  with  this  [air]  is  that  of 
obtaining  [pervasion].  By  performing  constraint  upon  this  relation 
the  yogin  subjugates  the  relation  with  this  [air].  And  gaining 
the  balanced-state  of  lightness  such  as  that  of  the  cotton-fibre, 
even  to  [that  of]  atoms  [of  cotton-fibre],  he  becomes  light  himself. 
And  by  reason  of  this  lightness  he  walks  with  both  feet  upon 
water.  Next  after  this,  however,  he  walks  upon  nothing  more 
than  a spider’s  thread,  and  then  upon  sunbeams.  Thereafter  he 
courses  through  the  air  at  will. 

* Reading  (with  Poona  text)  tad-agrayd. 


iii.  42 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vihhuti  [272 

42.  . . . body ....  passing  through.  By  performing  constraint  upon  the 
relation  between  the  body  and  the  air,  or  upon  something  light  such  as  a cotton- 
fibre,  [that  is]  by  gaining  the  balanced-state  [that  is]  the  state  of  the  mind  which 
rests  in  the  [thing]  and  in  which  it  is  tinged  [i.  41]  by  it.  He  describes  the 
sequence  of  the  perfections  by  the  words,  ^upon  water. 


43.  An  outwardly  un-adjusted  fluctuation  is  the  Great  Dis- 
carnate ; as  a result  of  this  the  dwindling  of  the  covering  to 
the  brightness. 

The  fluctuation  assumed  by  the  central-organ  outside  the  body  is 
the  fixed-attention  [dharana)  called  Discarnate.  If  it  is  only  an 
outer  ^ fluctuation  of  the  central-organ  which  abides  in  the  body,  it 
is  called  adjusted  (kalpita).  But  if  it  is  an  outer  fluctuation  of  the 
central-organ,  which  is  itself  externalized,  in  that  it  [the  fluctuation] 
disregards  the  body,  it  is  of  course  called  unadjusted.  [The  yogins] 
by  means  of  the  adjusted  one  among  these  two  accomplish  the 
unadjusted  Great  Discarnate,  by  means  of  w^hich  yogins  enter 
the  bodies  of  others.  And  as  a result  of  this  fixed-attention,  the 
covering  of  the  sattva  of  the  thinking-substance,  whose  essence 
is  brightness,  which  has  the  three-fold  fruition  from  the  hindrances 
and  the  karma,  and  whose  root  is  rajas  and  tamas,  dwindles  away. 

He  describes  yet  another  constraint  which  leads  to  the  penetration  of 
another’s  body  and  which  leads  to  the  dwindling  of  the  hindrances  and 
karma  and  fruitions.  43.  An  outwardly  ....  dwindling.  The  discarnate  he 
describes  in  the  words  «The  fluctuation  assumed. » In  order  to  show  the  means 
to  the  Great  Discarnate  state  which  is  unadjusted  he  first  describes  the  discarnate 
in  the  words  <Klf  it  is.)^  The  words  ^onlya  fluctuation»  mean  thinking  only  in 
an  imaginary  way.  He  describes  the  Great  Discarnate  in  the  words  «But  if  it 
is.»  He  shows  that  the  adjusted  and  the  unadjusted  have  the  relation  of  means 
to  end  by  saying  ^among  these  two.»  Is  it  that  one  merely  enters  another’s 
body  as  a result  of  this  ? Not  so,  he  says  in  the  words  «And  as  a result 
of  this.^  «As  a result  of  this  fixed  attention»  means  when  the  Great  Discarnate 
activity  of  the  central-organ  has  been  perfected.  It  has  its  three-fold  fruition, 
from  the  hindrances  and  from  karma,  in  birth  and  length-of-life  and  kind-of- 

1 The  outer  adjustment  would  be  in  part  outwardly  unadjusted  state  there  is 

a voluntary  act.  Compare  the  ex-  a renunciation  of  the  self  and  of  the 

planation  in  the  Maniprabha  me  mano  sense  of  individuality  as  limited  by 

hahir  astv  ita  kaljpanaya.  But  in  the  a body  dehe  'hamhhdvatyagah. 


273] 


Constraint  upon  Jive  kinds  of  being  [ — iii.  44 

experience  [ii.  13].  And  it  is  this  that  has  its  root  in  rajas  and  tamas.  Since 
from  mere  sattva  when  freed  from  rajas  and  tamas  there  arises  discriminative 
discernment  only.  Thus  the  three-fold  fruition  in  so  far  as  it  is  rooted  in  rajas 
and  tamas,  and  because  its  essence  is  in  them,  obscures  the  sattva  of  the 
thinking-substance.  And  as  soon  as  these  have  dwindled  away,  the  mind-stuff 
of  the  yogin  freed  from  its  covering  [by  them]  roves  and  discerns  at  wUl. 


44.  As  a result  of  constraint  upon  the  coarse  (sthula)  and  the 
essential-attribute  {svarajja)  and  the  subtile  [suksma)  and  the 
inherence  {anvaya)  and  the  purposiveness  {arthavattva),  there 
is  a subjugation  of  the  elements. 

In  this  [system]  i.  the  [five  elements]  beginning  with  earth  [which 
in  essence  are  a generic  form  and  a particular]  have  [as  particulars] 
sounds  and  other  perceptible  things  ; [these]  particulars,  together 
with  their  properties  (dharma),  shape  and  the  rest  [which  are  to 
be  described],  are  technically  called  <coarse.>  This  is  the  first 
form  of  the  elements. — ii.  The  second  form  is  its  generic-form. 
For  example,  limitation-in-extent  (murti)  is  the  [generic-form]  of 
earth ; liquidity,  of  water ; heat,  of  fire ; wind  [is]  mobile,  for  air 
goes  everywhere.  This  second  form  is  technically  called  <essential- 
attribute.>  This  generic-form  has  sounds  and  other  [concrete 
perceptible  things]  as  its  particulars.  And  in  this  sense  it  has 
been  ^ said,  “ All  these  [perceptible  things]  that  are  inseparably 
connected  with  one  genus  praedicahile  are  distinguished  only  by 
their  properties.”  In  this  system  a substance  (dravya)  is  an  aggre- 
gate ^ {samudaya)  of  the  generic-form  and  of  the  particular.  For 
a collection  (^samuha)  is  of  two  kinds,  1.  that  in  which  [the  names 
of]  its  different  component  parts  have  disappeared,  as  for  instance, 
a body,  a tree,  a herd,  a forest  ^ ; and  2.  that  collection  in  which 
the  different  component  parts  are  specified  [each]  by  a term,  as  for 
instance  ‘ of  both  kinds,  gods-and-human-beings.’  ^ One  part  of  the 
collection  is  gods  and  the  second  part  is  human  beings.  Only  by  ^ 
means  of  these  two  is  it  termed  a collection.  Furthermore,  either 

* VijnanaBhiksu  says^M/vacarya-samvflfZaw  aha. 

* Compare  Patafijali  Maliabhasya  I.  217^";  I.  289^^®;  I.  377^^®;  III.  3^*®  (Kielhorn). 

* Compare  Tattva  Bindu  (Ben.  ed.),  p.  IP®. 

* Compare  Qatapathabrahmana  ii.  2.  2. 

35  [h.o.s.  n] 


iii.  44 — ] Book  III.  Siipernormal  Poivers  or  Vibhuti  [274 

the  distinction  or  the  identity  may  be  emphasized.  We  may  say 
‘ a grove  of  mango-trees  ’ [or]  ‘ gathering  of  Brahmans  ’ or  we  may 
say  ‘ a mango-grove  ’ [or]  ‘ a Brahman-gathering.’  Again  the 
[collection]  is  two-fold,  1.  that  of  which  the  parts  exist  separately ; 
and  2.  that  of  which  the  parts  do  not  exist  separately.^  A grove 
[or]  a gathering  is  a collection  from  which  the  parts  are  separable. 
A body  or  a tree  or  an  atom  is  a whole  ^ (sarhghdta)  of  which  the 
parts  are  not  separable.  Patanjali  says  that  a substance  is  a 
collection  the  ditferent  component  parts  of  which  do  not  exist 
separately.  Thus  it  has  been  explained  what  the  essential- 
attribute  is. — iii.  Now  what  is  the  subtile  form,  [of  these  elements]  ? 
[The  answer  is]  it  is  subtile-substance,  the  cause  of  the  elements. 
Of  [any]  one  of  these  [elements]  an  atom  is  one  part.  Its  essence 
is  the  generic-form  and  the  particular  and  it  is  an  aggregate 
consisting  of  different  parts  which  cannot  exist  separately. 
Similarly  with  all  the  tanmdtras.  This  is  the  third  [form]. — iv. 
Now  the  fourth  form  of  the  elements.  The  aspects  with  dis- 
positions to  discernment  and  to  activity  and  to  inertia  and 
conforming  to  the  nature  of  [their]  effects  are  described  by  the 
word  inherence. — v.  Now  the  fifth  form  of  these  [elements]  is 
purposiveness.  The  having  of  experience  and  of  release  as  their 
purpose  is  inherent  in  the  aspects  (guna).  And  the  aspects  are 
[inseparably  connected]  with  the  elements  and  the  products  of  the 
elements.  Thus  all  has  a purpose.  By  constraint  upon  these  five 
elements  of  the  present  time  in  their  five  forms,  the  sight  of  the 
essential-attribute  of  this  or  that  form  and  the  subjugation  of  it 
come  about.  [The  yogin]  by  mastering  the  five  essential-attributes 
of  the  elements,  masters  the  elements,  [and]  as  a result  of  their 
subjugation,  the  evolving-causes  of  the  [coarse]  elements  follow  the 
commands  of  his  will  just  as  the  cows  follow  their  own  calves. 

44.  . . . coarse  . . . subjugation ....  [The  compound  is  to  be  analysed  as] 
the  coarse  and  the  essential-attribute  and  the  subtile  and  the  inherence  and 
the  purposiveness.  As  a result  of  constraint  upon  these,  the  coarse  and  the 
essential-attribute  and  the  subtile  and  the  inherence  and  the  purposiveness,  there 

* Compare  NySya-sQtra  ii.  1.  32, 

* Compare  Patanjali  Mahabhasya  I.  30“« ; I.  3P  ; 1.32’;  I.  III.  324'’  (Kielhorn), 


275] 


Concretions  and  universals 


[ — iii.  44 


is  a subjugation  of  them.  i.  He  describes  the  coarse^  by  saying  «In  this 
[system].»  The  sounds  and  touches  and  colours  and  tastes  and  smells,  belonging 
[respectively]  to  the  earthen  and  watery  and  fiery  and  windy  and  airy  [classes  or 
elements],  have  correspondingly  the  particulars,  such  as  the  first  (sacjja)  or  the 
third  notes,  or  heat  or  cold,  or  blue  or  yellow,  or  astringent  or  sweet,  or  fragrant 
or  other  [particular  instances].  For  because  these  are  different  from  each  other 
in  name  and  form  and  use  they  are  the  particulars.  Of  these  particulars  there  are 
five  in  earth,  four  (counting  out  smell)  are  in  water,  three  (counting  out  smell 
and  taste)  are  in  fire,  two  (counting  out  smell  and  taste  and  colour)  are  in  wind 
(nabhasvant),  sound  alone  is  in  the  air.  Particulars  such  as  these,  together  with 
their  properties  [dharma],  form  and  the  rest,  are  technically  called  <coarse>  in 
[this]  system.  1.  And  in  this  [system],  to  begin  with,  the  properties  belonging 
to  the  earthen  [element]  are  “ Shape,  weight,  roughness,  resistance,  and  stability ; 
sustenance  {vrtti),  divisibility,  endurance,  meagreness,  hardness,  and  usefulness 
to  all.”  2.  The  properties  of  water,  “Liquidity,  subtilty,  brilliance,  whiteness, 
sinuosity  {mardava),  weight,  coolness,  protectiveness,  purification,  cohesion  are  the 
qualities  of  water.”  3.  The  fiery  properties,  “ Tending-upwards,  purifier,  burner, 
cooker,  without  weight,  resplendent,  destructive,  yielding  strength, — this  is  fire 
having  characteristics  different  from  the  two  previous  [elements].”  4.  The 
windy  properties,  ‘ ‘ Horizontal  movement,  purification,  felling,  impulsion,  power, 
changeability,  casting  no  shadow,  aridity, — these  are  the  various  properties  of 
wind.”  5.  The  airy  properties,  “Pervasiveness,  interpenetration,  unobstructive- 
ness  are  enumerated  as  three  properties  of  air  distinct  in  character  from  the 
previous  properties.”  These  are  those  properties,  the  shape  and  the  following  ; 
[the  particulars  were  said  to  be]  together  with  these.  And  shape  is  a particular 
instance  of  generic  nature,  such  as  cow-ness.  ii.  He  describes  the  second  form 
[of  the  elements]  by  saying  ^The  second  form  is  its  generic-form.»  Limitation- 
in-extent  means  natural  density.  Liquidity  is  [the  generic-form  of]  water  and 
it  is  the  effective  cause  of  cleanliness  (mrja)  and  plumpness  and  vigour.  Heat 
is  [the  generic-form  of]  fire  {vahni),  since  everywhere  [heat],  whether  it  be 
abdominal  or  solar  or  earthly,  is  inherent  in  fire  (tejas).  All  this  moreover 
is  intended  to  show  the  identity  of  property  and  substance.  Wind  is  motor. 
So  he  says  “By  the  movement  of  grass  and  because  it  makes  the  body  wander, 
motivity  is  inferred  to  be  the  generic-form  of  wind  which  goes  everywhere. 
Going-every where  is  air,  since  it  is  clear  that  we  apperceive  sounds  in  all 
directions.  For  it  has  been  previously  [iii.  41]  explained  that  one  apperceives 
earthen  and  other  sounds  by  means  of  the  sound  which  is  a [specific]  quality 
of  air  the  substance-in-which  the  organ-of-hearing  inheres.  This  is  what  is 


^ Compare  Bhagavata  Pur.  xi.  24.  16. 

* Whatever  is  natural  {sdmsiddhika)  is 
distinct  from  the  thing  itself  (svahhava) 
and  yet  is  not  generated  by  a cause 
outside  the  substance.  For  example, 
liquidity  is  a natural  property  of  water; 


but  the  solidity  of  snow  is  not  natural, 
in  that  it  is  due  to  cause.  On  the  other 
hand  solidity  is  a natural  property  of 
ghee ; whereas  liquidity  is  not,  in  that 
it  is  an  effect  of  something  outside 
the  substance. 


ill.  44 — Book  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vibhuti  [276 

described  by  the  word  essential-attribute.  One  such  generic-form  such  as 
limitation-in-extent  has  the  particular  sounds  and  other  perceptible  things, 
such  as  the  first  note,  such  as  heat,  such  as  whiteness,  such  as  astringency,  such 
as  fragrance,  these  constituting  the  particular  instances  of  the  generic- forms  such 
as  limitation-in-extent.  That  is  to  say,  the  generic-forms,'  such  as  the  limitations- 
in-extent,  such  as  [the  shapes  of]  lemons  or  bread-fruit  or  myrobolans,  are  also 
distinguished  from  each  other  by  diffei’ences  in  taste  and  so  on.  So  that  these 
tastes  and  other  qualities  are  particulars  of  these  [generic-forms],  «And  in  this 
sense  it  has  been  said,  “ All  that  are  inseparably  connected  with  one  genus 
praedicabile  ”»  would  refer  to  each  of  [the  elements]  such  as  earth.  [Each  of 
these]  is  inseparably  connected  with  some  one  genus  praedicabile,  limitation- 
in-extent,  for  example,  or  liquidity.  [These  that  are  thus  inseparably  connected] 
are  distinguished  only  by  their  properties,’*  such  for  example  as  the  first  note. 
Thus  the  generic-form  such  as  limitation-in-extent  has  been  described,  and 
the  particulars  such  as  the  sounds  have  been  described. — And  to  those*  who 
assert  that  substance  {dravya)  is  a substrate  [aqraya)  for  the  generic-form  and  for 
the  particular — [to  them]  he  says,  ^of  the  generic-form. » In  this  system 
substance  is  an  aggregate  [samudaya)  of  the  generic-form  and  of  the  particular. 
Those  who  take  the  point  of  view  that  substance  is  a substrate  of  these  [two] — 
even  they  cannot  deny  that  both  are  experienced  as  an  aggregate.  For  if  this 
experience  be  denied,  the  two  cannot  have  a container-(adMra)-which-underlies 
them.  Therefore  let  us  suppose  that  this  [aggregate]  is  itself  the  substance. 
But  we  do  not  apperceive  any  substance  underlying  them  different  from  both 
and  from  the  aggregate  of  the  two  [which  might  be  supposed  to  contain-them- 
by-underlying  them],  just  as  the  mountain-peak  is  a distinct  thing  and  other 
than  the  stones  or  the  aggregate  of  stones,  and  underlies  them.  Thus  we  say 
that  substance  is  a collection  [and  not  anything  underlying].  From  this  point 
of  view,  to  prevent  the  [error  that  substance  is  any  kind  of  a collection  and] 
to  reach  the  position  that  substance  is  a special  kind  of  collection,  he  describes 
various  kinds  of  collections  in  the  words,  «For  ...  of  two  kinds.^  Since  this 
is  so,  substance  is  not  any  kind  of  a collection.  «Of  two  kinds^  is  a thing 
which  exists  in  two  ways,  a.  One  of  these  kinds  is  given  in  the  words  ^as 
disappeared.»  These  are  so-called  in  whose  case  the  difference  between  the 
parts  has  disappeared.  One  which  has  parts  in  whose  case  the  differences 
have  disappeared  is  of  this  kind.  What  he  means  to  say  is  this.  The  idea 
of  the  collection  raised  by  words  like  body,  tree,  herd,  or  forest  does  not  bring 
into  consciousness  the  difference  between  the  several  parts,  since  the  words  are 
not  used  to  express  this  [difference].  So  the  collective  [sense]  only  is  brought 
to  mind.  There  are  four  cases  given  as  illustrations:  1.  the  case  in  which 
the  parts  can  exist  separately,  2.  the  case  in  which  they  cannot  exist  separately, 
3.  an  animate  thing,  4.  an  inanimate  thing.  That  parts  can  exist  separately  or 

' Reading  sdmanydny  api.  * This  would  be  equivalent  to  the  particular  (vifesa). 

® The  Vaigesikas. 


277] 


Kinds  of  units  [ — ili.  44 

cannot  exist  separately  will  be  stated  later. — b.  The  second  of  the  two  kinds 
is  described  in  the  words,  ^2.  that  collection  in  which  the  different  component 
parts  are  specified  [each]  by  a term,  as  for  instance  ‘ of  both  kinds,  gods-and- 
human-beings.’;^  Now  by  the  expression  <Kgods-and-human-beings»  the  two  parts 
of  the  collection  which  are  expressed  by  the  words  ^of  both  kinds»  have  been 
specified  as  being  separate.  An  objection  is  raised,  ‘the  expression  <Kof  both 
kinds)^  does  not  bring  the  difference  between  the  parts  of  that  [collection] 
into  consciousness.  How  then  can  we  say  that  the  [collection]  in  which  the 
different  component  parts  have  been  described  has  received  [names]  ? ’ The 
reply  is  in  the  words  <S:of  these  two.^  And  it  is  because  of  these  very  parts  that 
the  term  collection  can  be  imposed.  By  the  words  «of  both  kinds;^  which 
describe  a thing  as  having  two  parts,  the  idea  of  the  collection  is  expressed, 
since  a sentence  cannot  but  express  the  object-intended  by  the  sentence. 
This  is  the  point.  Once  more  he  describes  a difference  in  qualities  by  saying 
^Furthermore.^  Both  the  identity  and  the  distinction  are  emphasized.  He 
describes  the  emphasis  laid  upon  the  difference  in  the  words,  «‘a  grove  of 
mango-trees’  [or]  ‘a  gathering  of  Brahmans.’^  Because  the  genitive  case 
is  prescribed  ^ to  express  a distinction,  as  for  instance,  ‘ a cow  belonging  to 
the  Gargas.’  He  describes  the  emphasis  laid  upon  the  identity  in  the  words  ^ 
«‘a  mango-grove’  [or]  ‘a  Brahman-gathering.’»  [The  compound  is  to  be 
analysed  thus,]  the  mango-trees  which  themselves  make  up  the  grove. 
Inasmuch  as  he  wishes  to  emphasize  the  identity  between  the  collection  and 
its  parts,  [the  words]  refer  to  the  same  subject.  This  is  the  meaning.  He  states 
another  kind  of  collection  by  saying  «Again  [the  collection]  is  two-fold.^ 
A collection  of  which  the  parts  exist  separately,  is  one  the  parts  of  which 
have  an  independent  existence,  apart,  with  intervals  between  ; for  when  the 
word  ‘ herd  ’ or  ‘ grove  ’ is  spoken,  the  trees  and  the  cows  which  are  the 
parts  of  these  [collections  are  thought  to]  have  intervals  between  them. 
A tree,  a cow,  or  an  atom  is  a collection  of  which  the  parts  do  not  exist 
separately,  since  neither  the  generic-form  and  the  particular,  which  are  the 
parts  of  these,  have  intervals  between  them,  nor  do  the  dewlap  and  the 
other  [characteristic  parts]  of  the  cow  have  intervals  between  them.  From 
among  these  same  collections  he  selects  that  collection  which  constitutes 
a substance  (dravya),  saying  ^cannot  be  separated.^  Having  thus  inciden- 
tally explained  what  a substance  is,  he  sums  up  the  topic  in  hand  in  the  words 
«Thus  it  has  been  explained  what  the  essential-attribute  is.» — iii.  With  the  intent 
to  state  the  third  form  he  asks  <SNow  He  gives  the  answer  in  the  words 
^from  which  these  [coarse  elements]  are  made.^  ^Of  [any  one  of]  these  [coarse 
elements])^  one  part,  a single  mutation,  is  an  atom.  The  generic-form  is  the 
limitation-in-extent  or  the  like.  The  sounds  and  other  [perceptible  things] 
are  the  particulars.  [The  atom]  has  its  essence  in  these  [two  parts].  A collection 
corresponds  to  such  instances  [of  things]  as  are  in  part  a generic-form,  and  in 
* Panini  ii.  3.  50.  According  to  Pan.  viii.  4.  5 the  n should  be  changed  to  ;t. 


iii.  44 — ] Book  III.  Swpernormal  Powers  or  Vihhuti  [278 

part  a particular,  wherein  these  parts  cannot  separately  exist  and  yet  have  no 
intervals  between  them.  And  just  as  the  atom  is  a subtile  {siilcpna)  form,  so  all 
the  fine  elements  {tanmatra)  are  a subtile  form.  He  brings  this  to  a close  in  the 
words  ^This  is.^ — «iv.  Now  the  fourth  form  of  the  elements.  The  aspects  with 
dispositions  to  disceimment  and  to  activity  and  to  inertia  and  conforming  to  the 
nature  of  [their]  effects»  means  those  whose  disposition  it  is  to  be  inseparably 
connected  with  {anu-gantum),  that  is,  to  conform  to  (anu-pat)  the  nature  of  [their] 
effects.  Hence  they  are  described  by  the  term  inherence  (anv-aya). — ^v.  Now 
the  fifth  form  of  these  [elements]  is  purposiveness. He  elaborates  the  word 
purposiveness  by  saying  «experience.»  An  objector  asks  ‘ Even  if  it  be  granted 
that  the  aspects  have  a purpose,  how  can  you  still  say  that  their  effects  are 
purposive  ? ’ In  reply  to  this  he  says  ^the  aspects.2>  Products  of  the  elements 
are  such  things  as  cows  or  water-jars. — Having  thus  described  the  object  of  the 
constraint,  he  describes  the  constraint  itself  and  its  results  in  the  words  ^upon 
these. » «The  evolving-causes  of  the  [coarse]  elements)^  are  the  elements 
themselves. 

45.  As  a result  of  this,  atomization  {animan)  and  the  other 
[perfections]  come  about ; [there  is]  perfection  of  body ; and 
there  is  no  obstruction  by  the  properties  of  these  [elements]. 

As  to  these  ^ [eight  perfections],  1.  atomization  occurs  in  case  [the 
yogin]  becomes  atomic  ; 2.  levitation  occurs  in  case  [the  yogin] 
becomes  light ; 3.  magnification  (iinahimari)  occurs  in  case  [the 
yogin]  becomes  magnified ; 4.  extension  {prapti)  occurs  in  case 
[the  yogin]  touches  the  moon  with  a mere  finger’s  tip  ; 5.  efficacy, 
the  non-obstruction  of  desire,  occurs  in  case  [the  yogin]  dives 
into  the  earth  underground  [and]  emerges  again,  as  if  in  water  ; 
6.  mastery  (vafitva)  occurs  in  case  [the  yogin]  masters  elements  and 
products  of  elements  and  is  not  mastered  by  others  ; 7.  sovereignty 
occurs  in  case  [the  yogin]  is  sovereign  over  the  production,  ab- 
sorption, and  arrangement  of  these  [elements  and  products] ; 
8.  the  capacity  of  determining  things  according  to  desire  {yatra- 
kdmdvasdyitva)  is  the  capacity  to  will  actual  facts  so  that  the 
elements  which  are  the  evolving-causes  remain  as  he  wills.  And 
although  having  power,  he  does  not  cause  reversal  of  things.  Why 
not  ? Because  at  the  will  of  another  [the  l9vara],  who  determines 
things  according  to  desire,  and  who  from  the  beginning  is  perfected, 
the  elements  have  been  so  willed.  These  are  the  eight  powers. — 
* See  Vacaspati  in  Samkh.  Tat.  Kaum.  on  Ear.  xxiii. 


279] 


[ — iil.  45 


Eight  magic  poivers 

Perfection  of  body  is  described  later.  And  its  external-aspects  are 
not  obstructed.  Earth  with  its  limitation-in-extent  [its  essential- 
attribute]  does  not  restrict  the  action  of  the  body  and  [organs] 
of  the  yogin.  For  he  penetrates  even  the  rock.  The  water,  liquid 
as  it  is,  wets  him  not.  The  fire,  hot  as  it  is,  burns  him  not.  The 
wind,  motor  as  it  is,  budges  him  not.  And  even  in  the  air,  whose 
essence  is  that  nothing  is  covered  [by  it],  his  body  is  covered. 
Nay  more,  not  even  the  Siddhas  may  behold  him. 

When  the  elements  follow  the  commands  of  his  will,  what  perfection  is 
attained  by  the  yogin  ? In  reply  he  says  45.  As  a result  of  this  . . . and  . . . 
no  obstruction.  From  the  mastery  resulting  from  constraint  upon  the  a.  coarse 
[elements],  four  perfections  follow,  as  he  says  «As  to  these. 1.  Atomization 
[that  is]  although  great  he  becomes  small.  2.  Levitation  [that  is]  although  great, 
he  becomes  light  and  stays  in  the  air  like  the  tuft  of  a reed.  3.  Magnification 
[that  is]  although  small  he  becomes  in  dimension  an  elephant  or  a mountain 
or  a town.  4.  Extension  [that  is]  all  things  become  close  at  hand  for  the 
yogin.  For  instance,  even  while  standing  on  the  earth  he  touches  the  moon 
with  the  tip  of  his  finger. — He  describes  the  perfection  resulting  from  the 
subjugation  by  constraint  of  b.  the  essential-attribute  in  the  words  <K5.  efficacy, 
the  non-obstruction  of  desire. » His  own  form  is  not  obstructed  by  the 
limitations-in-extent  and  other  essential-attributes  of  the  elements.  He  dives 
underground  and  emerges  again  as  if  in  water,  c.  He  now  gives  the  perfection 
resulting  from  the  subjugation  by  constraint  of  a subtile  object  by  saying 
^6.  mastery.^  The  elements  are  earth  and  the  other  [coarse  elements].  The 
products-of-the-elements  are  such  things  as  cows  and  water-jars.  He  becomes 
master  of  them,  independent  with  regard  to  them,  and  not  mastered  by  them. 
Since  there  is  a mastery  of  the  atoms  of  earth  and  of  the  other  [coarse  elements], 
and  of  the  subtile  elements  which  are  the  causes  of  these  [elements  and 
products],  there  follows  a mastery  of  the  effects  of  these.  Therefore  those 
particular  elements  or  products  of  elements  when  put  into  a certain  state  remain 
in  that  state,  d.  He  now  gives  the  perfection  which  results  from  subjugation  by 
constraint  upon  inherence  [anvaya)  as  its  object  by  saying  <S7.  sovereignty.^ 
Having  subjugated  the  radical  cause  of  these  elements  and  products-of-elements, 
he  becomes  sovereign  both  over  their  growth  [or]  production,  and  over  their 
decay  [or]  destruction,  and  over  their  arrangement  or  proper  arrangement,  e.  He 
now  describes  the  perfection  which  is  the  result  of  constraint  upon  purposive- 
ness by  saying  ^8.  Fulfilment  of  whatever  is  desired  is  the  volition  which 
becomes  effective.^  Whenever  a yogin  who  has  been  successful  with  regard 
to  the  purposiveness  of  the  aspects  wishes  anything  to  serve  a particular 
purpose,  that  thing  serves  him  for  that  purpose.  Making  others  eat  poison,^ 

^ Cf.  Raghuvanga  viii.  46,  srag  iyam  yacli,  &c. ; the  stanza  is  missing  in  some  ed.’s. 


iii.  45 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vibhnti  [280 

he  wills  that  it  have  the  effect  of  nectar  and  makes  them  live.  An  objector 
says  ‘ This  may  be  so.  But  why  does  he  not  make  an  interchange  of  things 
also,  just  as  he  makes  a reversal  of  powers,  so  that  he  might  make  the  moon 
into  the  sun,  or  make  Kuhu  into  Sinlvali  ? ’ The  reply  is  ^And  although  having 
the  power,  he  does  not.»  For  assuredly  these  whose  desires  are  fulfilled  do 
not  venture  to  transgress  the  order  of  the  Exalted  Highest  l9vara.  But  the 
powers  {gakti)  of  things  are  not  limited  in  their  nature,  in  so  far  as  they 
differ  in  species  and  place  and  time  and  intensity.  So  it  is  proper  that  these 
[powers]  should  follow  the  commands  of  this  [yogin].  These  are  the  eight 
powers  (aigvarya). — With  regard  to  the  words  <and  there  is  no  obstruction 
by  the  properties  of  these  [elements]. > By  the  very  mentioning  that  atomiza- 
tion and  the  other  [perfections]  come  about,  it  is  clear  that  there  is  no 
obstruction  by  the  properties  of  these  [elements].  But  this  is  mentioned 
again  to  make  known  the  fruitions  resulting  from  the  constraints  upon  all 
the  objects  mentioned  in  this  sutra.  And  the  same  holds  good  with  reference 
to  perfections  of  body.  The  rest  is  easj\ 


46.  Beauty  and  grace  and  power  and  the  compactedness  of 
the  thunderbolt,— [this  is]  perfection  of  body. 

The  perfect  body  is  handsome  and  alluring  and  unexcelled  in 
power  and  compact  as  the  thunderbolt. 

He  describes  the  perfection  of  the  body.  46.  Beauty  . . . perfection  .... 
A compactness  as  of  the  thunderbolt.  Of  such  a kind  that  the  arrangement 
of  the  parts  is  firm  and  solid. 


47.  As  a result  of  constraint  upon  the  process-of-knowing 
and  the  essential-attribute  and  the  feeling-of-personality  and 
the  inherence  and  the  purposiveness,  [there  follows]  the 
subjugation  of  the  organs. 

The  object-to-be-known  is  the  sounds  and  other  [perceptible  objects] 
whose  essence  is  both  the  generic-form  and  the  particular.  1.  The 
process-of-knowing  is  a fluctuation  of  the  organs  with  reference  to 
these  [objects].  And  this  [process]  has  not  the  character  (dkara) 
of  being  a process-of-knowing  their  generic-form  only.  How,  if  the 
object  as  a particular  were  not  seen  by  the  organ,  could  it  be 
determined  by  the  central-organ  ? 2.  But  the  essential-attribute  ^ 

* The  self-luminous  nature  of  cognition  is  Siddhanta  Muktavall  (1898),  pp.  131- 

set  forth  with  most  stibtle  discrimina-  134. 

tion  by  Mr.  A.  Venis  in  his  note  on  the 


281] 


Five  subjugations  of  organs  [ — iii.  47 

is  a collection,  inherent  in  the  different  parts  which  cannot  exist 
separately,  [a  collection]  of  the  generic  form  [for  example,  the 
audibility]  and  of  the  particular  [for  example,  the  sounds  and  so 
forth],  [a  collection]  which  belongs  to  the  sattva  of  the  thinking- 
substance  whose  essence  is  brightness.  The  organ  is  [itself  such] 
a substance.  3.  The  third  form  of  these  [organs]  is  the  perso- 
nality-substance with  the  feeling-of-personality  (asmitd)  as  its 
distinguishing-characteristic.  Organs  are  particulars  of  this 
generic-form.  4.  The  fourth  form  is  the  aspects  (guna)  whose 
essence  is  determination^  (vyavasdya)  and  whose  disposition  is 
to  brightness  and  to  activity  and  to  inertia.  Of  which  [aspects] 
the  organs  together  with  the  personality-substance  are  a mutation. 
5.  The  fifth  form  inseparably  connected  with  the  aspects  is  the 
purposiveness  ^ of  the  Self. — Constraint  is  performed  upon  one 
after  another  of  these  five  forms  of  the  organs.  As  a result  of 
the  subjugation  of  the  five  forms  of  accomplishing  the  subjugation 
in  each  several  one  of  them,  there  comes  about  for  the  yogin  the 
subjugation  of  the  organs. 

After  the  yogin  has  subjugated  the  elements  his  means  for  subjugating  the  organs  is 
described.  47.  Process-of-knowing . . . subjugation.  As  a result  of  constraint 
upon  these,  the  process-of-knowing  and  the  essential  attribute  and  the  feeling- 
of-personality  and  the  inherence  and  the  purposiveness.  The  process-of-know- 
ing is  an  act-of-perception  (grhlti).  And  this  [process],  for  its  description, 
requires  the  object-to-be-known.  So  he  describes  the  object-to-be-known  by 
saying  ^whose  essence  is  both  the  generic-form  and  the  particular.^  Having 
described  the  object-to-be-known,  he  describes  the  process-of-knowing  in  the 
words  ^with  reference  to  these. ^ The  fluctuation  is  about  the  same  as 
an  external-sense-process  {alocana),  an  act-of-mutating  into  the  form  of  an 
object.  In  reply  to  those  who  say  that  the  fluctuation  of  an  organ  has  as  its  object 
only  the  generic-form  he  says  «And  this  has  not.^  It  is  a process-of-knowing 
because  [something]  is  known.  And  the  process-of-knowing  has  not’  for 
its  object  the  generic-form  only.  For  the  central-organ,  which  depends  upon 
the  external  organs,  acts  upon  the  external  [and  not  upon  the  generic-form]. 
Otherwise  we  should  have  to  admit  that  there  are,  for  example,  no  blind  or  dumb 
persons.  So  then  if  the  organ  were  not  to  have  a particular  as  its  object,  then 

^ In  accordance  with  Samkhya-karaka  xxiii  * Compare  ii.  23,  p.  158^  (Calc,  ed.) ; also 
it  is  clear  that  this  term  denotes  the  Samkhya-karika  xv  and  Samkhya-sutra 

gunas  in  so  far  as  they  function  as  i.  129. 

thinking-substance  (buddhi).  ® Reading  na  sdmdnyamdtragocaram. 

36  [h.o.s.  n] 


lii.  47 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vibhuti  [282 

that  particular  would  not  be  externally-sensed  by  that  [organ].  How  then  could 
particulars  be  determined  by  the  central-organ?  Therefore  the  perception  of  the 
organs  has  for  its  object  both  the  generic-form  and  the  particular.  This  then  is 
the  process-of-knowing  which  is  the  first  form  of  the  organs.  2.  He  describes  the 
second  form  in  the  words  «But  the  essential-attribute. » For  the  personality- 
substance  out  of  a portion  of  its  own  sattva  generated  the  organs.  Hence  that 
generic-form  of  the  organs  which  belongs  to  all  of  them,  and  those  particular 
features  which  are  limited  to  some  such  object  as  colour, — both  of  these  two  kinds 
also  have  brightness  as  their  essence.  3.  By  saying  «The  third  form  of  these 
[organs]»  he  refers  to  the  personality-substance  as  the  cause  of  the  organs.  So 
wherever  there  are  organs,  there  this  [personality -substance]  must  be.  Thus  since 
it  is  common  to  all  the  organs,  it  is  the  generic-form  of  the  organs.  This  is  the 
meaning.  4.  He  speaks  of  «The  fourth  form^  because  the  aspects  {guna)  have  a 
double  form,  one  whose  essence  is  a determination,  and  another  whose  essence  is 
to  be  the  object  of  the  determination.  Of  these  [two  forms],  with  reference  to  the 
fact  that  its  essence  is  an  object  of  determination  [and]  that  it  is  an  object  of 
knowledge,  the  five  fine  elements  and  the  elements  and  the  products  of  the  ele- 
ments form  themselves ; but  with  reference  to  the  fact  that  its  essence  is  a determi- 
nation and  that  it  has  the  form  of  a process-of-knowing,  the  organs  together  with 
thepersonality-substance  [form  themselves].  This  is  the  meaning.  The  rest  is  easy. 


48.  As  a result  of  this  [there  follows]  speed  [great  as  that]  of 
the  central-organ,  action  of  the  instruments  of  [knowledge] 
disjunct  [from  the  body],  and  the  subjugation  of  the  primary- 
cause. 

Speed  of  the  mind  means  that  the  body  acquires  motion  com- 
parable [to  that]  of  the  mind.  Action  of  the  instruments  ^ of 
knowledge  disjunct  [from  the  body]  is  the  acquisition  by  the 
discarnate  organs  of  the  fluctuation  required  for  the  place  and 
time  and  object  desired.  Subjugation  of  the  primary  cause  is  the 
mastery  over  all  evolving  causes  and  evolved  effects.  These  three 
perfections  are  called  Honey-Faced  {madhupratlka).  And  they 
are  acquired  as  the  result  of  the  subjugation  in  five  forms  of 
instruments  [of  perception]. 

He  describes  the  perfections  which  result  from  the  subjugation,  in  five  kinds, 
of  the  organs.  48.  As  a result  of  this  ....  and  the  subjugation.  The  fact  that 
the  organs  are  instruments  [of  perception]  even  for  the  discarnate  is  described 
as  being  the  action  of  the  instiaiments  [of  perception]  disjunct  [from  the  body]. 

* Compare  ^aiiikara  on  Brahma-sutra  ii.  1.  31. 


283]  Subjugation  of  the  primary  cause  [ — iii.  49 

The  place  is  Kashmir  or  some  other  [place].  The  time  is  the  past  or  some 
other  [time].  The  object  is  subtile  or  other.  As  a result  of  the  subjugation  of 
the  organ  and  of  the  inherence,  [there  follows]  mastery  of  all  evolving-causes 
and  evolved-eflfects,  a subjugation  of  the  primary  cause.  These  perfections  are 
called  Honey-Faced  by  those  persons  who  are  expert  in  the  yoga  system.  An 
objector  says  ‘This  may  be  true.  By  subjugation  of  the  organs,  the  organs 
together  with  their  objects  may  be  mastered.  But  what  is  gained  [by 
subjugation]  of  the  primary  cause  and  the  other  causes  of  these  [organs]  ? ’ In 
reply  to  this  he  says  ^And  they.)^  The  instruments  [of  perception]  are  the 
organs.  The  five  forms  are  [the  five]  processes-of-knowing  [iii.  47].  [The 
result  follows]  from  the  subjugation  of  these.  What  he  means  to  say  is  this : 
These  perfections  are  not  a result  of  a subjugation  of  organs  in  general  but 
of  the  five  forms  [of  the  processes-of-knowing].  And  included  in  these  [five] 
is  the  primary-cause  and  the  rest. 

49.  He  who  has  only  the  full  discernment  into  the  difference 
between  the  sattva  and  the  Self  is  one  who  has  authority 
over  all  states-of-existence  and  is  one  who  knows  all. 

He  who  is  grounded  in  only  the  full  discernment  into  the  difference 
between  the  sattva  and  the  Self,  and  who  is  in  the  higher  con- 
sciousness ^ of  being  master  in  the  higher  clearness,  and  who  has 
the  sattva  of  his  thinking-substance  cleansed  from  the  defilement 
of  rajas  and  tamas  is  one  who  has  authority  over  all  states-of- 
existence.  The  aspects  (guna)  which  are  the  essence  of  all  things, 
which  have  both  the  determinations  and  the  objects-of-determina- 
tions  as  their  essence,  present  themselves  as  being  the  essence  of 
the  object-for-sight  in  its  totality  to  their  Owner,  the  Soul 
(Jcsetrajna).  This  is  the  meaning. — Being  <one  who  knows  alb 
refers  to  the  [intuitive]  knowledge,  produced  by  discrimination 
and  rising  instantaneously  [into  consciousness],  of  the  aspects 
(guna)  which  are  the  essence  of  all,  whether  they  be  [iii.  14] 
quiescent  or  uprisen  or  indeterminable.  This  is  the  meaning.  It 
is  this  perfection  that  is  termed  [i.  36]  the  ‘ undistressed,’  by 
attaining  to  which  the  yogin  who  knows  all,  whose  hindrances  and 
bondages  have  dwindled,  takes  his  recreation  as  having  mastery. 
These  same  constraints,  which  whether  mediately  or  immediately  lead  to  powers 
in  the  form  of  knowledge  and  of  activity,  are  for  the  sake  of  the  discernment 
into  the  difference  between  the  sattva  and  the  Self  by  way  of  the  confidence 
^ See  also  i.  15,  pp.  41®  and  42® ; i.  35,  p.  8H;  i.  40,  p.  84®>® ; ii.  26,  p.  164'^  (Calc.  ed.). 


iii.  49 — ] Booh  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vihhuti  [284 

produced  by  grasping  the  perfections  in  turn  and  binding  them  together. 
The  supernormal  powers  subsidiary  to  this  [discernment]  are  shown  [in  the 
sutra].  49.  Sattva  . . . and.  There  is  clearness  in  so  far  as  the  defilement 
by  rajas  and  tamas  has  been  washed  away.  As  a result  of  this  there  is  the 
higher  consciousness  of  being  master.  It  was  inevitable  that  the  sattva  of  the 
mind-stuff  should  be  overwhelmed  by  the  rajas  and  tamas.  But  when  the 
latter  subside,  it  is  this  [sattvaj]  that  is  to  be  mastered  by  the  yogin  its  master. 
When  it  is  mastered,  the  yogin  who  is  grounded  in  only  the  full  discernment 
of  the  difference  between  the  sattva  and  the  Self,  is  one  who  has  authority  over 
all  states-of-existence.  This  same  he  explains  by  the  words  ^essence  of  all 
things.»  «Both  the  determination  and  the  object-of-determination»  mean  both 
the  inert  [jada)  and  bright  kind.  In  this  way  the  power  of  action  has  been 
described.  He  describes  the  power  of  knowledge  in  the  words  ^one  who 
knows  all.^  With  the  intent  to  create  passionlessness  with  regard  even  to 
this  two-fold  perfection  he  gives  the  technical  name  current  among  yogins 
in  the  words  «that  is  termed  the  ‘ undistressed. One  whose  karmas, 
both  hindrances  [ii.  3]  and  bonds  [i.  24],  have  dwindled  away.  He  is  of 
that  kind.  

50.  As  a result  of  passionlessness  even  with  regard  to  these 
[perfections]  there  follows,  after  the  dwindling  of  the  seeds 
of  the  defects,  Isolation. 

When,  after  the  dwindling  of  hindrances  and  of  karma,  [intuitive 
knowledge]  comes  to  him  thus,  ‘ This  presented-idea  of  discrimina- 
tion is  an  external-aspect  of  the  sattva.  And  sattva  is  to  be 
reckoned  with  those  things  that  are  to  be  escaped.  The  Self 
moreover  is  immutable,  undefiled  {fuddha)  [by  the  aspects],  and 
other  than  the  sattva’ — .when  he  is  thus  unaffected  [by  the 
aspects],  those  seeds  of  the  hindrances  which,  like  burned  ^ seeds  of 
rice,  are  incapable  of  generation,  go  together  with  the  central-organ 
to  their  rest, — and  when,  these  being  resolved  into  the  primary 
cause,  the  Self  does  not  again  have  the  experience  of  the  three 
pains  {tdpa), — then  these  aspects,  in  that  they  are  manifested  in 
the  central-organ  as  being  karma  and  hindrances  and  fruitions, 
have  fulfilled  ^ their  purpose,  and  invert-the-process-of-generation. 
Then  there  is  the  absolute  absence  of  correlation  of  the  Self  with 

* Compare  sukpnJkpa  dagdha-bJja-kalpa  dagdha-klega-bija  ii.  4,  13,  pp.  109®  and 

ii.  2, 10,  11,  pp.  107^  and  120^>'’;  dagdha-  124'  and  iii.  55,  p.  273®  (Calc.  ed.). 

bTjdndm  aprarohaii.4,p.  110*;  dagdha-  ® Compare  conto-adlnX-aro  ii.  10,  p.  120®; 

bijabhdva  ii.  4,  26,  pp.  110',  165®,  and  ii.  24,  p.  162®;  ii.  27,  p.  166®;  iii.  55, 

iii.  50,  p.  264®  and  iv.  28,  p.  312®;  274®. 


285]  The  gods  allure  yogins  [ — iii,  51 

the  aspects,  [which  is]  Isolation.  Then  the  Self  is  nought  else 
than  the  Energy  of  Intellect  {citi)  grounded  in  itself. 

With  the  intent  to  show  that  constraint  upon  the  discriminative  discernment 
is  the  purpose  of  the  Self,  whereas  other  constraints  result  in  what  is  a pseudo- 
purpose of  the  Self,  he  describes  the  result  of  discriminative  discernment  by 
means  of  the  gain  in  the  higher  passionlessness.  50.  As  a result  of  passion- 
lessness even  with  regard  to  these  . . . Isolation.  When  after  the  dwindling 
of  hindrances  and  karmas  the  yogin  has  [intuitive]  knowledge  thus, — of  what 
sort  is  this  [knowledge]  ? In  reply  he  says  «‘  This  presented-idea  of  discrimi- 
nation is  an  external-aspect  of  the  sattva.’'^  The  rest  has  been  explained  in 
various  places  and  is  accordingly  easy. 

51.  In  case  of  invitations  from  those-in-high-places,  these 
should  arouse  no  attachment  or  pride,  for  undesired  con- 
sequences recur. 

Now  there  are  four  kinds  of  yogins,^  1.  Prathama-halpilia,  2. 
Madhubhumika,  3.  Prajhdjyotis,  4.  Atikrdntabhdvanlya.  Of  these 
[four],  1.  The  first  is  the  observant-of-practice  {abhydsin)  for  whom 
light  is  just  beginning.  2.  The  second  has  the  truth-bearing 
insight  [i.  48].  3.  The  third  is  he  who  has  subjugated  the  elements 
and  the  organs,  and  who  has  provided  means  for  keeping  all  that 
has  been  cultivated  [such  as  super-reflective  states]  and  is  yet  to 
be  cultivated  [such  as  the  undistressed  perfection  ; see  i.  36],  and 
who  has  the  means-of-attainment  and  so  forth  for  what  has  been 
done  and  is  yet  to  be  done.  4.  But  the  fourth,  who  has  passed 
beyond  that  which  may  be  cultivated,  has  as  his  sole  aim  the 
resolving  {pratisarga)  of  the  mind-stuff  [into  its  primary  cause]. 
His  is  the  seven-fold  [ii.  27]  insight  advancing  in  stages  to  the 
highest  [concentration]. — The  purity  of  the  sattva  in  that 
Brahman  among  these  [four]  who  has  directly  experienced  the 
[second]  Honeyed  (madhumatl)  Stage  is  observed  by  those-in- 
high-places,  the  gods.  With  their  high-places  they  invite  ^ him. 
‘Sir,  will  you  sit  here ? Will  you  rest  here ? This  pleasure  might 
prove  attractive.  This  maiden  might  prove  attractive.  This 
elixir  checks  old  age  and  death.  This  chariot  passes  through  air. 
Yonder  are  the  Wishing  Trees  ; the  Stream-of-heaven  [manddkini) 
confers  blessedness ; the  sages  are  perfected ; the  nymphs  are 
‘ Compare  SEE.  xxi,  Kern,  Saddhannapundarika,  p.  387.  * Invite,  seek  to  attract. 


iii.  51 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vibhuti  [286 

incomparable  and  not  prudish.  Eyes  and  ears  [will  become] 
supernal ; the  body  like  diamond.  In  consequence  of  your  peculiar 
virtues,  Venerable  Sir,  all  these  things  have  been  won  by  you. 
Have  entrance  to  this  high-place  which  is  unfading  and  ageless 
and  deathless  and  dear  to  the  gods.’  Thus  addressed  let  him 
ponder  upon  the  defects  of  pleasure.  ‘ Baked  upon  the  horrible 
coals  of  the  round-of-rebirths,  and  writhing^  in  the  darkness 
of  birth  and  of  death,  I have  hardly  found  the  lamp  of  yoga 
which  makes  an  end  to  the  obscurations  of  the  hindrances. 
And  of  this  [lamp]  the  lust-born  gusts  of  sensual  things  are 
enemies.  How  then  could  it  be  that  I who  have  seen  its  light 
could  be  led  astray  by  these  things  of  sense,  a mere  mirage,  and 
make  of  myself  fuel  for  that  same  fire  of  the  round-of-rebirths 
as  it  flares  up  again  ? Fare  ye  well ! Sensual  things  [deceitful] 
as  dreams  and  to  be  craved  by  vile  folk ! ’ His  purpose  thus 
determined,  let  him  cultivate  concentration.  Giving  up  attach- 
ment [for  things  of  sense]  let  him  not  even  take  pride  in  thinking 
it  is  he  that  is  thus  urgently  desired  even  by  gods.  Such  a one, 
if  in  his  pride  he  deem  himself  secure,  will  not  feel  as  if  he  were 
one  whom  Death  had  gripped  ^ by  the  hair.  And  so  Heedlessness, 
on  the  lookout  for  his  weak  points  and  failures,  and  always 
carefully  to  be  watched,  will  have  found  an  opening  and  will  arouse 
the  hindrances.  As  a result  of  this  undesired  consequences  recur. 
So  then  he  who  in  this  way  does  not  become  attached  or  take 
pride  will  attain  permanently  the  purpose  which  he  has  cultivated 
within,  and  will  find  himself  face  to  face  with  the  purpose  which 
he  has  yet  to  cultivate. 

Now  obstructions  to  the  yogin  who  has  started  to  acquire  Isolation  are  possible. 
So  he  gives  instruction  as  to  the  cause  which  leads  to  their  dispulsion  [in  the 
sutra].  51.  Those-in-high-places  . . . undesired  consequences  recur. 
Those-in-high-places  are  those  who,  like  the  Great  Indra,  have  high-places 
[in  the  Heaven-world].  The  invitation  is  from  them.  No  attachment  to  it 
or  pride  in  it  should  be  allowed  to  enter  the  mind,  because  <undesired  conse- 
quences recur.>  In  order  to  select  [from  among  the  four  classes]  that 
yogin  only  whom  the  gods  invite  with  offers  of  high-places,  he  mentions  all 
possible  kinds  of  yogins  by  saying  «four  kinds  of  yogins.»  From  among  these 
[four]  he  describes  the  essential-attribute  of  the  Prathama-halpika  by  saying 

* Writhing,  or  wandering. 

’ Compare  the  stanza  ajaramaramt  prdjnah,  &c.,  Hitopadefa,  Introd.,  verse  3. 


287]  Sensual  temptations  [ — iil.  52 

«0f  these  [four],  1,  . . . the  ohservant-of-practice.»  One  for  whom  light  is 
just  beginning,  but  is  not  yet  mastered,  one  whose  [intuitive]  knowledge  has  such 
an  object  as  the  mind-stuff  of  another.  2.  He  describes  the  second  by  saying 
^truth-bearing  insight.)^  In  whose  case  this  has  been  said  [i.  48]  “ In  this 
[concentrated  mind-stuff]  the  insight  is  truth-bearing.”  For  he  is  one  whose  wish 
is  to  subjugate  the  elements  and  the  organs.  3.  He  describes  the  third  class 
by  saying  ^he  who  has  subjugated  the  elements  and  the  organs.^  For  by  him 
the  elements  and  the  rest  and  the  organs  have  been  subjugated  by  constraint  upon 
coarse  elements  and  by  constraint  upon  the  process-of-knowing  and  the  other  [four 
constraints  mentioned  in  iii.  47].  This  same  yogin  is  further  described  in  the 
words  ^all  that.)^  He  is  one  who  has  provided  means  for  keeping  all  that  has 
been  cultivated,  [that  is]  acquired,  such  as  [intuitive]  knowledge  and  so  on  of 
another’s  mind-stuff  and  so  on,  as  a result  of  the  subjugation  of  the  elements 
and  the  organs.  Consequently  he  does  not  lapse  from  them.  One  who  has  un- 
perfected means-of-attainment  for  what  is  yet  to  be  cultivated,  [that  is]  acquired, 
such  as  the  undistressed  [perfection],  extending  as  far  as  to  the  higher  passion- 
lessness. For  human  effort,  only  when  it  operates  upon  the  instrument-of- 
acquisition,  leads  to  the  acquisition  of  the  end.  4.  He  describes  the  fourth 
[kind  of  yogin]  in  the  words  <Kthe  fourth.^  For  this  Exalted  [yogin],  released 
yet  alive  in  the  body,  whose  present  body  is  his  last,  has  as  his  sole  aim  the 
resolving  of  the  mind-stuff  [into  its  primary  cause].  So  from  among  all  these 
yogins  he  determines  that  one  to  whom  the  invitation  is  directed  by  saying 
«among  these  [four],  the  [second]  Honeyed  Stage.)^  As  to  the  one  in  the 
Prathama-Tcalpika  stage,  there  is  not  even  a possibility  of  his  receiving  this  [in- 
vitation] from  the  Great  Indra  and  the  other  [gods].  The  third  also  cannot  be 
invited  by  them,  since  by  mastery  over  the  elements  and  the  organs  he  has 
[already]  obtained  this  [invitation].  And  as  to  the  fourth,  because  he  has  attained 
to  the  higher  passionlessness,  the  possibility  of  an  attachment  is  far-removed. 
Thus  all  that  remains  is  the  second,  the  truth-bearing  insight.  Thus,  by  elimi- 
nation, only  the  second,  the  [yogin]-of-truth-bearing-insight,  [remains]  as  a proper 
recipient  [visaya]  of  this  invitation. — ^iPasses  through  air)^  means  roving  through 
the  air.  ^Unfading^  is  imperishable.  ^Unaging»  is  always  new.  He  describes 
the  defect  due  to  the  arousal  of  pride  in  the  words  ^Such  a one,  if  in  his  pride. » 
One  who  in  his  pride  counts  himself  secure  will  not  feel  the  impermanence  [of 
things]  and  will  not  reflect  upon  this.  The  other  part  is  easy. 

52.  As  a result  of  constraint  upon  moments  and  their 
sequence  [there  arises  the  intuitive]  knowledge  proceeding 
from  discrimination. 

Just  as  the  atom  is  the  minimal  limit  of  matter,^  so  the  moment  is 

* Similarly  the  moment  {samaya)  in  the  an  endless  succession  of  these  moments. 

Jain  system,  equivalent  to  the  ksana  See  Umasvati : Tattvarthadhigama- 

of  the  yoga,  is  a dravya.  And  time  is  sutra,  iv.  15  and  v.  38-39. 


iii.  52 — Book  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vibhuti  [288 

the  minimal  limit  of  time.  Or,  the  time  taken  by  an  atom  in 
motion  in  order  to  leave  one  point  and  reach  the  next  point  is 
a moment.  But  the  continuous  flow  of  these  [moments]  is  a 
sequence.  Moments  and  the  sequences  of  these  [moments]  cannot 
be  combined  into  a [perceptually]  real  {vastu).  Hours-of-eight-and- 
forty-minutes,  days-of-thirty-such-hours  and  so  on  are  combinations 
by  a mental-process  {buddhi).  Thus  time,  being  of  this  nature,  does 
not  correspond  to  anything  [perceptually]  real,  but  is  a structure 
by.  a mental-process  and  follows  as  a result  of  perceptions  or  of 
words.  [Thus]  to  the  ordinary  thinking  of  the  emergent  mind  it 
might  appear  as  if  it  were  [perceptually]  real.  But  the  moment 
does  come  within  the  [real]  objects  ^ and  rests  ^ upon  the  sequence. 
Furthermore  the  sequence  has  its  essence  in  an  uninterrupted 
succession  of  moments.  This  [sequence]  is  called  time  by  experts 
in  time.  So  the  yogins  use  the  term.  For  two  moments  cannot 
occur  simultaneously.  Because  it  is  impossible  that  there  be  a 
sequence  between  two  things  that  occur  simultaneously.  When 
a later  moment  succeeds  an  earlier  without  interruption,  there  is 
a sequence.  Thus  in  the  present  there  is  a single  moment  and 
there  are  no  earlier  or  later  moments.  Therefore  there  is  no 
combination  of  them.  But  those  moments  which  are  past  and  future 
are  to  be  explained  as  inherent  in  the  mutations.  Accordingly  the 
whole  world  passes  through  a mutation  in  any  single  moment.  So 
all  those  external-aspects  of  the  world  are  relative  to  this  present 
moment.  By  constraint  upon  moments  and  their  sequence  both 
are  directly  perceived.  And  as  a result  of  this,  the  [intuitive] 
knowledge  proceeding  from  discrimination  comes  about. 

It  has  been  stated  in  one  place  and  another  that  as  a result  of  constraint  upon 
certain  objects,  knowledge  of  all  follows.  This  [knowledge  of  all]  is  not  a know- 
ledge of  everything  whatsoever  without  remainder.  But  it  only  emphasizes  what 


* A moment  belongs  to  the  real  objects ; 
but  there  is  no  time  outside  the  sequence 
of  moments.  Thus  the  theory  of  time 
IS  midway  between  that  of  the  Bud- 
dhists and  the  Vai9esika  school ; and 
resembles  the  Jain  doctrine  (Umasvati 
V.  39). 


* Vacaspatimi9ra  says  the  opposite. — The 
form  avalanibi  is  wrong  and  popular. 
See  W.  Kirfel,  Beitrage  zur  Gesch.  d. 
Nominalkomposition,  Bonn,  1908, 
pp.  78-79. 


289] 


[ — iii.  52 


Reality  of  the  time- sequence 

kind  of  knowledge  it  is,  just  as  in  the  expression  ‘ Eaten  with  all  the  condi- 
ments.’ For  in  this  [expression]  the  sense  is  that  [the  meal]  was  eaten  with 
as  many  kinds  of  condiments  as  were  [served],  but  not  all  condiments  whatsoever 
without  remainder.  For  all  that,  the  word  ‘ all  ’ has  in  some  cases  the  sense 
of  ‘without  remainder,’  in  the  sentence  for  instance,  ‘The  glutton  has  eaten 
all  the  food  that  was  brought  to  him.’  For  here  it  is  understood  as  meaning 
‘without  remainder.’  So  now  here  he  describes  the  constraint  which  leads 
to  [intuitive]  knowledge  proceeding  from  discrimination  and  characterized  as 
being  a knowledge  of  everything  without  remainder.  62.  Moments  . . . 
[intuitive]  knowledge.  He  describes  the  meaning  of  the  word  <gmoment» 
by  means  of  an  analogy  and  in  the  words  «Just  as.^  When  a clod  of  earth 
is  being  broken  up,  that  bit  of  it  wherein  the  gradations  of  smallness  reach 
their  minimal  limit  of  smallness  is  the  atom.  So  similarly  the  moment  is 
the  minimal  limit  of  time.  In  other  words  it  is  a particle  of  time  which 
has  no  prior  and  subsequent  [within  itself].  This  same  moment  is  illustrated 
in  another  way  by  the  words  ^Or,  the  time  taken.»  The  meaning  is  that 
[the  atom]  would  traverse  the  distance  measured  by  an  atom. — He  now 
describes  the  meaning  of  the  word  ^sequenee^  by  saying  «the  flow  of  these 
[moments].^  The  word  <Sthese»  refers  to  the  moments.  And  the  sequence 
which  is  of  this  kind  is  not  [perceptually]  real ; but  it  is  abstractly  [real]. 
Because,  when  so  combined,  it  cannot  possibly  be  thought  of  as  perceptually 
real  in  the  case  of  things  which  do  not  occur  simultaneously.  This  has 
been  said  in  the  words  «Moments  and  the  sequences  of  these.  Since 
a sequence  consists  of  moments  which  do  not  arise  simultaneously,  and  since 
a combination  of  moments  is  not  [perceptually]  real,  therefore  also  a combina- 
tion of  moments  and  of  their  sequences  is  not  [perceptually]  real.  Ordinary 
persons  who  have  neither  [natural]  excellence  of  the  thinking-substance  nor 
that  resulting  from  disputation,^  whose  emergent  way  of  thinking  is  every 
moment  new,  and  who  deem  such  time  a [perceptual]  reality,  are  in  error. 
So  then,  is  the  moment  [as  contrasted  with  time  perceptually,]  unreal  ? Not 
so,  as  he  says  in  the  words  ^But  the  moment.)^  ^Does  come  within  the 
[perceptually]  real»  means  that  it  is  [perceptually]  real.  It  is  the  basis 
{avalambana)  for  the  sequence.  It  is  the  basis  for  it.  It  is  supported  by 
the  sequence  only  in  terms  of  predicate  relations.  This  is  the  meaning.  He 
gives  the  reason  why  the  sequence  should  be  the  basis  for  the  moment  by 
saying  ^Furthermore  the  sequence.^  He  gives  the  reason  for  the  [perceptual] 
unreality  of  the  sequence  in  the  words  ^For  . . . not.»  The  word  «for  (ca)^ 
expresses  the  idea  of  reason.  To  him  who  might  suppose  that  they  occur 
simultaneously  since  they  belong  to  different  classes  he  says  ^impossible 
between  two  things.)^  Why  is  this  impossible?  To  this  he  replies  ^an 
earlier.)^  He  brings  the  discussion  to  a close  in  the  word  «:Thus.»  So  then, 

^ Where  one  contends  -without  reasons  for  contending.  See  Nyaya-sutra  i.  2.  3 ( = 44). 

37  [h.o.s.  n] 


iii.  52 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Poivers  or  Vibhuti  [290 

are  the  earlier  and  later  moments  merely  hare’s  horns?  Not  so,  as  he  says 
in  the  words  <KBut ....  which.»  The  words  ^inherent  in)^  mean  inseparably 
connected  with  the  generic  form.  He  sums  up  the  discussion  by  saying 
«Accordingly.»  Since  it  is  the  present  only  which  has  the  capacity  to  fulfil 
the  purposes  proper  to  itself. 


The  particular  that  is  the  object  of  this  [intuitive  knowledge 
proceeding  from  discrimination]  is  brought  ^ forward. 

53.  As  a result  of  this  there  arises  the  deeper-knowledge  of 
two  equivalent  things  which  cannot  be  distinctly  qualified 
in  species  or  characteristic-mark  or  point-of-space. 

If  two  equivalent  things  resemble  each  other  in  point-of-space  and 
in  characteristic-mark,  it  is  the  difference  in  species  which  makes 
[us]  distinguish  between  them,  for  instance,  ‘ This  is  a cow  ; that 
is  a mare.’  If  the  place  and  the  species  be  equivalent,  it  is  the 
characteristic -mark  that  makes  [us]  distinguish  between  them,  for 
instance,  ‘This  cow  has  black  eyes;  that  cow  is  lucky.’ ^ Since 
two  myrobolan-fruits  resemble  each  other  in  species  and  in  charac- 
teristic-mark, it  is  the  difference  as  to  point-of-space  that  makes 
[us]  distinguish  between  them,  for  instance,  ‘ This  one  is  in  front ; 
this  [other]  is  behind.’  But  when  the  myrobolan  which  was  in  front 
is  put,  while  the  attention  of  him  who  has  the  intuitive  [knowledge] 
is  elsewhere  occupied,  in  the  place  of  the  one  behind,  then,  if  the 
places  are  equivalent  so  that  one  would  think  ‘ That  is  the  one  in 
front ; that  is  the  one  behind,’  a right  classification  {pravibhdga) 
is  impossible.  Since  the  right  view  of  things  [tattva-jndna)  must 
be  free  from  doubt,  it  was  said  <As  a result  of  this  there  arises  the 
deeper-knowledge,>  as  a result  [that  is]  of  the  [intuitive]  know- 
ledge proceeding  from  discrimination.  How  is  this  ? The  point- 
of-space  coincident  with  the  myrobolan  in  front  is  distinct  from 
the  point-of-space  coincident  with  the  myrobolan  behind.  And 
the  two  myrobolans  are  distinct  in  that  they  pass  through  the 
incidents  peculiar  to  their  own  points-of-space.  But  it  is  this 
passing  through  the  incident  belonging  to  another  point-of-space 

' See  ^amkara  on  ii.  1.  37. 

® The  Rahasyam  says  that  cows  with  white  eyes  are  lucky. 


291] 


[ — iii.  53 


Intuitive  knowledge  of  coincidences 


that  is  the  cause  of  the  distinction  between  the  two.  This  ex- 
ample illustrates  how  the  supreme  yogin  has  the  presented-idea 
{jpratyayd)  of  the  difference  between  two  atoms  as  a result  of  his 
direct  experience  of  the  point-of-space  coincident  with  the  atom 
in  front,  which  atom  is  equivalent  [to  the  other]  in  species  and 
characteristic-mark  and  point-of-space.  The  reason  for  this  is 
that  the  [only]  distinction  is  between  the  coincidents  [with  the 
points-of-space] ; inasmuch  as  it  is  impossible  that  an  atom 
which  is  behind  can  have  the  point-of-space  of  the  one  [in 
front],  the  passing  of  the  atom  behind  through  its  own  point-of- 
space  is  different  [from  the  front  atom’s  passing  through  its  point- 
of-space],  Others  \Vdi^esikas\  however,  describe  [the  same 
matter  thus] ; “ These  particulars  (vigesa),  which  are  ultimates, 
produce  the  idea  of  the  difference.”  Even  in  this  [opinion  of 
theirs]  the  difference  as  to  the  point-of-space  and  as  to  the 
characteristic-mark  and  the  difference  as  to  limitation-in-extent 
and  as  to  the  intervening-space  and  as  to  species  [might  be  a 
sufficient]  cause  of  distinction.  But  it  is  the  difference  as  to  the 
incident  that  is  accessible  to  the  thinking-substance  of  the  yogin 
only.  Therefore  it  has  been  said,^  “ Since  there  is  no  difference 
as  to  limitation-in-extent  or  by  reason  of  intervening-space  or  of 
species  there  is  no  distinction  in  the  [primary]  root  [of  things],” 
So  says  Varshaganya.^ 

Although  the  knowledge  proceeding  from  discrimination  is  to  be  described 
later  as  having  for  its  objects  all  things  without  remainder,  still,  since  this 
knowledge  is  exceedingly  subtile,  the  particular  that  is  the  object  of  it  is  first 
of  all  brought  forward  [in  the  words  of  the  sutra].  53.  Species  . . . deeper- 
knowledge.  To  ordinary  persons  a distinction  in  the  species  [intelligibilis] 
is  the  means-of-knowing  the  difference  between  things.  [But  when]  the  species 
[intelligibilis],  the  common-nature-of-the-cow,  is  equivalent,  [and  when]  the 
place,  in  front  or  elsewhere,  is  equivalent,  the  differentia  [param]  is  the  distinc- 
tion in  the  characteristic-marks  of  the  black-eyed  and  of  the  lucky  [cows]. 


* VijSanabhiksu  interprets  the  passage  as 
referring  to  the  teaching  of  the  Vaife- 
§ikas.  He  asserts  that  there  is  some- 
thing such  as  limitation-in-extent  which 
distinguishes  permanent  substances ; 
but  that  there  is  no  such  entity  as 
a vigesa  the  property  of  the  substances. 


For  there  is  no  differentiating  attribute 
over  and  above  the  differences  in  limi- 
tation or  similar  differences.  The 
context  alone  can  determine  which 
interpretation  is  right. 

^ See  Saihkhya  Tattva  KaumudI  xlvii  for 
another  quotation  from  Varshaganya. 


iii.  53 — ] Booh  III.  Supernormal  Poivers  or  VihJmti  [292 

In  the  case  of  two  myrobolans,  the  common-nature-of-the-myrobolan,  the  species 
[intelligibilis]  is  equivalent ; the  characteristic-mark,  such  as  roundness,  is 
equivalent.  But  the  difference  in  point-of-space  is  the  differentia.  When, 
however,  one  wishes  to  test  the  yogin’s  knowledge,  and,  while  the  yogin 
who  has  the  [intuitive]  knowledge  has  his  attention  occupied  elsewhere,  puts 
the  myrobolan  which  was  in  front  behind,  and  removes  or  hides  the  one  that 
was  behind,  then — inasmuch  as  the  places  are  equivalent  so  that  one  would 
think,  ‘ That  [myrobolan]  is  the  one  in  front,  and  that  is  the  one  behind  ’ — 
a right  classification  is  impossible  for  an  ordinary  person,  [however]  wise, 
who  is  conversant  with  the  three  sources-of-valid-ideas  [only].  Whereas  the 
right-view-of-things  must  be  free  from  doubt.  And  in  the  case  of  the  yogin 
who  has  [intuitive]  knowledge  proceeding  from  discrimination  there  cannot 
be  the  possibility  of  doubt.  So  the  author  of  the  sutra  says  <As  a result  of 
this  there  arises  the  deeper-knowledge.>  [The  Comment]  explains  the  words  <As 
a result  of  this)  by  the  words  ^as  a result  [that  is]  of  the  [intuitive]  knowledge 
proceeding  from  discrimination.!^  A question  is  asked  ‘ How  can  [intuitive] 
knowledge  proceeding  from  constraint  upon  moments  and  upon  their  sequences 
discriminate  one  myrobolan  from  another  having  an  equivalent  species  and 
characteristic-mark  and  point-of-space  ? ’ This  he  asks  by  the  words  ^How 
is  this?!^  The  reply  is  given  in  the  words  ^The  point-of-space  coincident 
with  the  myrobolan  in  front.))  The  point-of-space  which  characterizes  the 
myrobolan  in  front  is  limited  to  one  moment  of  the  myrobolan  in  front.  Or 
we  may  say  that  there  is  an  incessant  mutation  [of  the  point-of-space  as  com- 
pared] with  it  [the  moment].  And  this  is  distinct  from  the  incessant  mutation 
of  the  myrobolan  which  is  behind,  distinct,  that  is,  4!from  the  point-of-space 
coincident  with  the  myrobolan  behind.))  Very  well  then,  let  there  be  a 
distinction  as  to  points-of-space.  How  does  this  bear  upon  the  distinction 
between  the  myrobolans  themselves?  The  answer  is  in  the  words  ^And 
the  myrobolans  are  distinct  in  that  they  pass  through  the  incidents  peculiar 
to  their  own  points-of-space.!)  The  coincidence  with  its  own  point-of-space  is 
that  digit  of  time  belonging  to  the  myrobolan  which,  with  respect  to  its  own 
point-of-space,  is  characterized  by  a kind  of  mutation  in  terms  of  nearness  or 
furtherness.  That  is  its  incident  peculiar  to  its  point-of-space.  Its  ^passing 
through))  is  either  its  getting  [to  a point-of-space]  or  it  is  knowledge.  The  two 
myrobolans  are  different  in  so  far  as  there  is  this  [passing  through].  When  the 
two  myrobolans  had  a moment  of  the  mutation  in  terms  of  nearness  and  further- 
ness, in  so  far  as  the  two  points-of-space  are  in  front  or  behind,  then  [the  yogin] 
performing-constraint  {samyamin)  experiences  the  particularity  of  the  incident 
of  the  mutation  belonging  to  the  two,  in  terms  of  nearness  and  furtherness 
with  reference  to  another  point-of-space.  And  he  admits  that  they  are  quite 
different.  Although  at  present  [one  of  the  myrobolans  has  such]  a mutation 
that  it  is  in  the  point-of-space  of  this  [myrobolan],  [still]  up  to  the  present  it  had 
the  mutation  with  reference  to  a different  point-of-space.  So  it  is  the  moment 


293]  Coincidence  of  the  time  and  the  space  series  [ — iii.  53 

of  the  mutation  of  this  point-of-space  which  distinguishes  it  [from  the  other 
point-of-space].  And  this  moment  it  is  which  is  directly  perceived  by  constraint. 
So  it  was  this  that  was  said  «But  it  is  this  passing  through  the  moments 
belonging  to  another  point-of-space  that  is  the  cause  of  the  distinction  between 
the  two.)^  With  the  help  of  this  example  and  by  dialogues  ‘ between  laymen 
and  experts  and  othei’s  one  comes  to  believe  that  the  distinction  between  even 
such  kinds  of  atoms  is  accessible  to  the  thinking-substance  of  the  yogin,  as  he 
says  <KThis.»  «Others  [Vaifesikas],  however,  describe»  [that  is]  set  forth  [this] 
description  by  saying  <Kwhich.^  For  the  Vai9esikas  say  that  there  are  ultimate 
particulars  functioning  in  permanent  substances.  So  they  say.  To  explain. 
Yogins,  [when  they  consider]  liberated  beings  who  are  equivalent  in  respect  of 
species  and  of  point-of-space  and  of  time  and  who  are  also  free  from  [particular] 
specifications,  have  a [deeper]  knowledge  of  each  person  as  he  really  is  as 
different  from  other  persons.  Therefore,  they  say,  there  is  some  ultimate 
particular.  And  if  so,  this  same  [distinction]  is  one  that  serves  to  distinguish 
permanent  substances  such  as  atoms.  This  he  controverts  in  the  words  «Even 
in  this  opinion  of  theirs.)^  Species  and  point-of-space  and  characteristic-mark 
have  been  illustrated.  Limitation-in-extent  is  an  arrangement-of-parts  (sam- 
sthana).  In  which  case  [of  limitation-of-extent],  after  a thing  whose  arrangement 
of  parts  is  flawless  has  been  removed  and  after  another  thing  whose  combination 
of  parts  is  defective  has  been  put  in  its  place,  while  the  observer  meanwhile  is 
elsewhere  occupied,  then  there  is  a presented  idea  of  the  difference  in  so  far 
as  there  is  a difference  in  the  arrangement  of  parts  of  this  [thing].  Or 
limitation-in-extent  might  be  body.  There  is  a distinction,  between  the 
persons-in-the-rounds-of-rebirths,  whose  souls  {dtman)  are  bound  to  this  or 
that  [body],  and  between  those  whose  souls  are  liberated  [from  the  round-of- 
rebirth],  based  on  the  different  relations  with  the  elements  of  one  kind  or 
another.  So  in  all  cases  the  presented- idea  of  the  difference  is  established  on 
other  grounds  [than  the  existence  of  ultimate  particulars].  [Consequently] 
there  is  no  [need  of  an]  assumption^  of  ultimate  particulars. — Intervening- 
space®  {vyavadlii)  makes  a difference  between  things,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
Lands  * of  Ku9a  and  of  Puskara,  which  are  as  such  two  points-of-space. 
Because  differences  in  species  and  in  point-of-space  and  in  other  respects  are 
accessible  by  the  ordinary  thinking-substance,  therefore  it  was  said  «But  the 
difference  as  to  the  incident  is  accessible  to  the  yogin  only.S>  The  word 
<^.eva^  limits  the  words  ^difference  as  to  the  incident,^  but  not  the  words 
^accessible  to  the  thinking-substance  of  the  yogin. It  follows  then  that  the 
distinction  between  liberated  souls  with  respect  to  their  relations  with  their 


' See  91oka-Varttika,  p.  412  (Chaukambha 
S.  Ser.),  for  samvddapravrtti. 

* The  Vai9esika  doctrine  is  also  rejected  in 
i.  43  in  the  phrases  anu-pracaya-vi^esa- 


atmd'ajid  sa  ca  samsthdna  vi^esah  pp.  89® 
and  90*  (Calc.  ed.). 

® See  also  Vacaspati,  p.  271”. 

* See  iii.  26,  p.  238®  (Calc.  ed.). 


iii.  53 — ] Book  III.  Supernormal  Poivers  or  Vihhuti  [294 

bodies  that  have  been ' is  also  accessible  to  the  yogin.  But  in  the  case  of  one 
who  has  not  got  the  above-mentioned  grounds  for  distinction,  there  is  no 
division  in  the  primary-cause.  So  the  Master  has  thought.  For  this  reason 
it  was  said  [ii.  22]  “ Though  it  has  ceased  [to  be  seen]  in  the  case  of  one  whose 
purpose  is  fulfilled,  it  has  not  ceased  to  be,  since  it  is  common  to  others  beside 
him.”  This  is  expressed  in  the  words  «limitation-in-extent  and  intervening- 
space.»  This  statement  is  to  be  understood  as  partial  and  is  to  be  extended 
to  the  different  causes  of  difference  already  described  [species,  place,  time,  and 
so  on].  The  meaning  is  that  in  the  primary-cause  which  is  the  root  of  the 
world  there  is  no  distinction,  [that  is]  no  difference. 


54.  The  [intuitive]  knowledge  proceeding  from  discrimina- 
tion is  a deliverer,  has  all  things  as  its  object,  and  has  all 
times  for  its  object  and  is  [an  inclusive  whole]  without 
sequence. 

The  word  <deliverer  ^ (tdraka)>  means  that  it  arises  out  of  its  own 
vivid  light  without  further  suggestion.  For  it  has  all  things  for 
its  object.  This  means  that  there  is  nothing  that  is  not  its  object. 
It  has  all  times  for  its  object.  This  means  that  it  has  intuitive 
knowledge  at  all  times  of  one  whole  {sa7'vam),  past  and  future  and 
present,  with  [the  sum  of]  its  states.^  <[An  inclusive  whole] 
without  sequence>  means  that  it  grasps  one  whole,  striking  upon 
[the  thinking-substance]  at  one  moment,  with  all  its  times.  Such 
in  its  complete  form  is  the  [intuitive]  knowledge  proceeding  from 
discrimination.  Of  this  same  the  lamp  of  yoga  is  a part,  beginning 
with  the  Honeyed  * Stage  until  it  reaches  final  perfection. 

Having  thus  shown  a part  of  the  object  of  [intuitive]  knowledge  proceeding 
from  discrimination,  he  gives  the  distinguishing-characteristic  of  the  [intuitive] 
knowledge  itself  which  proceeds  from  discrimination.  54.  Deliverer  . . . 
[intuitive]  knowledge.  He  points  out  [intuitive]  knowledge  proceeding  from 
discrimination  as  the  object  of  the  statement ; the  test  is  the  characteristic- 
mark.  It  is  called  «the  deliverer^  because  it  delivers  from  the  ocean  of  the 
round-of-rebirths.  He  distinguishes  this  from  the  Vividness  which  was  pre- 
viously [iii.  33]  mentioned  by  saying  «has  all  times  for  its  object.^  «With 
[the  sum  of]  its  states)^  means  in  all  its  subordinate  particulars.  Hence  the 
[intuitive]  knowledge  proceeding  from  discrimination  is  complete.  For  there 
is  nothing,  in  any  place  or  in  any  way  or  in  any  time,  which  is  not  in  its 

^ The  force  of  the  suffix  carena  is  explained  ® Defined  by  Umasvati  v.  43  as  a group  of 
in  Pan.  v.  3.  53.  parindma. 

^ See  iii.  33,  p.  243*.  iii.  51,  p.  266*  (Calc.  ed.). 


295]  Isolation  follows  discrimination  [ — iii.  55 

sphere.  Wliy  speak  of  (astam)  of  other  kinds  of  knowledge?  For  even 
[concentration]  conscious  [of  objects]  is  a part  of  this  [completed  intuitive 
knowledge].  So  then  there  is  nothing  more  complete  than  this  as  he  says 
^Of  this  same  the  lamp  of  yoga  is  a part.»  The  lamp  of  yoga  is  [concentration] 
conscious  [of  an  object].  How  does  that  begin  and  how  end  ? The  reply 
is  ^the  Honeyed.)^  The  truth-bearing  insight  [i.  48]  is  itself  the  honey, 
because  it  gives  a flavour,  as  has*  been  said  [Comment  on  i.  47],  “Having  risen 
to  the  undisturbed  calm  of  insight.”  Beginning  with  that  which  has  this,  with 
the  Honeyed  Stage,  until  it  is  finally  perfected,  [until]  insight  seven-fold  in 
advancing  stages  [ii.  29]  has  reached  the  highest.  Hence  [intuitive]  knowledge 
proceeding  from  discrimination  becomes  the  Deliverer,  since  even  a part  of  it, 
the  lamp  of  yoga,  is  a deliverer. 

In  either  case,  whether  one  has  attained  to  [intuitive]  knowledge 
proceeding  from  discrimination  or  has  not  attained  to  [intuitive] 
knowledge  proceeding  from  discrimination, 

55.  When  the  purity  of  the  sattva  and  of  the  Self  are  equal 
[there  is]  Isolation. 

When  the  sattva  of  the  thinking-substance  is  freed  from  the 
defilement  of  the  rajas  and  tamas,  and  when  it  has  no  task  other 
than  with  the  presented-idea  of  the  difference  of  [the  sattva'\  from 
the  Self,  and  when  the  seeds  of  the  hindrances  within  itself  have 
been  burned,  then  the  sattva  enters  into  a state  of  purity  equal  to 
that  of  the  Self  When-this-is-so  (tada),  purity  is  the  cessation  of 
the  experience  which  is  falsely  attributed  to  the  Self.  In  this  state 
[of  purity]  Isolation  follows  for  one-who-has-supremacy  {igvara)  or 
for  one-who-has-not-supremacy,  for  one  who  partakes  of  the  [intui- 
tive] knowledge  proceeding  from  discrimination  or  for  another. 
For  if  there  be  [intuitive]  knowledge  in  the  case  of  one  whose 
hindrances  have  become  burned  seed,  there  is  no  further  need 
of  any  [supernormal  power].  As  being  the  means  of  purifying 
the  sattva,  both  the  supremacy  [aigvarya)  proceeding  from  con- 
centration and  the  [intuitive]  knowledge  have  been  introduced- 
into-the-discussion.  But  strictly  speaking  the  [intuitive]  know- 
ledge represses  not-sight  {adargand).  When  this  is  repressed 
there  are  no  more  hindrances.  Because  there  are  no  more  hin- 
drances there  is  no  fruition  of  karma.  In  this  state  the  aspects, 

* See  above,  p.  98®  (Calc.  ed.). 


iii.  55 — ] Booh  III.  Supernormal  Powers  or  Vihhiiti  [296 

their  task  done,  do  not  again  submit  themselves  as  objects-for- 
sight  to  the  Self.  That  is  the  Selfs  Isolation.  Then  the  Self 
having  its  light  within  itself  becomes  undefiled  and  isolated. 

Of  the  Exposition  of  the  Comment  on  the  Patanjalan  [Treatise], 
the  Book  on  Supernormal  Powers,  the  Third. 

Having  thus  described  the  [various]  constraints  together  with  their  supernormal 
powers,  all  of  which  indirectly  prepare  the  way  for  Isolation,  with  the  intent  to 
show  that  the  [intuitive]  knowledge  of  the  difference  between  the  sattva  and  the 
Self  leads  directly  to  Isolation,  he  here  introduces  the  sutra  by  the  words 
«whether  one  has  attained.»  Whether  [intuitive]  knowledge  proceeding  from 
discrimination  has  been  attained  or  not,  nevertheless  the  insight  into  the  differ- 
ence between  the  sattva  and  the  Self  always  brings  Isolation  to  pass.  This  is  the 
meaning.  55.  When  the  purity  of  the  sattva  and  of  the  Self  are  equal  [there 
is]  Isolation.  [The  last  word]  iti  is  meant  to  indicate  the  end  of  the  sutras 
[of  this  Book]. — 1.  The  words  «one-who-has-supremacy)^  refer  to  one  who  has 
the  powers  of  action  and  of  [intuitive]  knowledge  by  reason  of  the  constraints 
previously  described.  2.  The  words  ^or  for  one-who-has-not-supremacy^  refer  to 
one  who  partakes  of  the  [intuitive]  knowledge  proceeding  from  discrimination 
by  reason  of  the  constraint  described  [ii.  52]  immediately  before.  3.  The  words 
«or  for  another^  refer  to  one  in  whom  this  [intuitive]  knowledge  has  not  risen 
[into  consciousness].  In  these  cases  there  is  no  need  at  all  for  supernormal 
powers.  Therefore  he  says  «For  . . . no.»  And  if  it  should  be  objected  that 
there  is  no  need  of  supernormal  powers  in  connexion  with  Isolation,  and  that 
therefore  instruction  in  them  is  useless,  the  reply  is  «As  being  the  means  of 
purifying  the  sattva.'^  The  instrumental  case  is  used  to  indicate  such  a kind 
of  a mark  [Pan.  ii.  3.  21]. — For  the  attainment  of  Isolation  the  supernormal 
powers  are  not  absolutely  useless,  but  they  are  not  directly  causes.  This  is  the 
meaning.  But  it  is  the  [intuitive]  knowledge  proceeding  from  discrimination 
that  is  the  topic-under-discussion.  And  that  which  is  a cause  indirectly  [the 
powers]  is  only  figuratively  a cause,  not  a principal  cause.  Strictly  speaking, 
however,  insight  alone  is  the  principal  cause ; [and  not  the  discrimination]. 
This  is  the  meaning.  By  the  words  ^[intuitive]  knowledge»  he  means  the 
Elevation. 

In  this  [Book]  the  indirect  aids  and  the  aids  and  the  mutations  have  been 
treated  at  length,  and  the  attainment  of  supernormal  powers,  and  among  these 
[powers]  the  [intuitive]  knowledge  proceeding  from  discrimination. 

Such  is  the  stanza  which  summarizes  the  contents  of  [this]  Book. 

Of  the  Explanation  of  the  Comment  on  Patanjali’s  [Treatise,  which  Explanation 
is  entitled]  the  Clarification  of  the  Entities,  composed  by  the  Venerable  Vaca- 
spatimi9ra,  the  Third  Book,  on  Supernormal  Powers,  is  finished. 


BOOK  FOURTH 


ISOLATION 


BOOK  FOURTH 


ISOLATION 


1.  Perfections  proceed  from  birth  or  from  drugs  or  from 
spells  or  from  self-castigation  or  from  concentration. 

1.  The  power  of  having  another  body  is  the  perfection  by  birth. 

2.  [Perfection]  by  drugs  is  by  an  elixir-of-life  ^ [got]  in  the  mansions 

of  the  demons,  and  by  the  like.  3.  By  spells,  such  as  the  acquisi- 
tion of  [the  power  of]  passing  through  space  and  atomization  [iii. 
45].  4.  [Perfection]  by  self-castigation  is  the  perfection  ^ of  the 

will,  the  faculty  of  taking  on  any  form  at  will  {hamarupin)  [or]  of 
going  anywhere  at  will,  and  so  on.  5.  Perfections  proceeding  from 
concentration  have  been  explained. 

Thus,  in  the  First  and  Second  and  Third  Books,  concentration  and  the  means  of 
this  [concentration]  and  the  supernormal  powers  [pi-oduced]  by  it  have  been 
especially  discussed.  And  other  [matter]  incidental®  or  suggested-by-the-course- 
of-the-discussion  has  been  discussed.  Now  Isolation  as  resulting  from  this  [con- 
centration] is  to  be  expounded.  And  this  Isolation  cannot  be  expounded  unless 
one  have  analysed  the  mind-stuff  which  is  conducive  to  Isolation  ; and  the  world 
beyond  ; and  the  self  which  is  to  be  in  the  world  beyond  and  which  is  over  and 
above  the  sum  of  mental-states  (vijnana)  and  which  is  the  enjoyer,  by  means  of 
the  mind-stuff  which  is  its  instrument,  of  the  sounds  and  other  [things]  whose 
essence  is  pleasure,  [pain,]  and  so  on ; and  the  higher  limit  of  Elevation  {pra- 
samkhyana).  So  all  these  things  are  to  be  expounded  in  this  Book,  as  also  other 
matter  incidental  or  suggested-by-the-course-of-the-discussion.  Of  these,  with  the 
intent  first  to  determine-the-nature-of  mind-stuff  which  is  conducive  to  Isolation, 
in  the  case  of  persons  whose  mind-stuff  is  perfected,  he  states  the  five-fold  per- 
fections by  the  words  [of  the  sutra].  1.  Perfections  proceed,  from  birth  or 
from  drugs  or  from  spells  or  from  self-castigation  or  from  concentration. 
He  explains  [the  sutra]  by  saying  «1.  The  power  of  having  another  body.^ 
When  karma,  conducive  to  the  enjoyment  of  heaven  and  performed  by  one  of 


* Treated  at  length  in  the  Rasayana-tantra, 
the  seventh  of  the  eight  subdivisions 
of  the  Ayur-veda. 

® Equivalent  to  kdmdvasdyitva,  the  eighth 
siddhi,  iii.  45,  p.  259*  (Calc.  ed.). 


® Such  as  the  agglomeration  of  atoms  or 
the  doctrine  of  momentariness.  The 
distinctions  between  the  fluctuations 
would  be  “ suggested  by  the  course  of 
the  discussion.” 


iv.  1 — 


[300 


Booh  IV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya 

the  human  species,  obtains  its  fruition  from  some  cause  or  other,  then  a man, 
from  the  mere  fact  of  being  born  into  a certain  group  of  gods,  passes  into  another 
body,  to  the  perfection  which  has  atomization  and  other  [supernormal  powers]. 
2.  He  describes  the  perfection  which  proceeds  from  drugs.  A human  being 
when  for  some  cause  or  other  he  reaches  the  mansions  of  the  demons  [asura), 
and  when  he  makes  use  of  elixirs-of-life  brought  to  him  by  the  lovely  damsels 
of  the  demons,  attains  to  agelessness  and  to  deathlessness  and  to  other  perfec- 
tions. Or  [this  perfection  may  be  had]  by  the  use  of  an  elixir-of-life  in  this 
very  world.  As  for  instance  the  sage  Mandavya,*  who  dwelt  on  the  Vindhyas 
and  who  made  use  of  potions.  3.  He  describes  the  perfections  by  spells  in  the 
words  «by  spells. » 4.  He  describes  the  perfection  due  to  self-castigation  in 

the  words  «from  self-castigation.^  He  describes  the  perfection  of  the  will  in  the 
words  <SCtaking  on  any  form  at  will.»  Whatever  he  desires,  atomization  for  in- 
stance, precisely  that  he  attains  on  the  spot.  In  case  he  wishes  to  hear  or  think  of 
anything,  that  very  thing  he  hears  and  thinks.  The  words  <5Cand  so  on»  include 
sight  and  the  other  senses.  The  perfections  proceeding  from  concentration  have 
been  described  [iii.  16-19,  21-36,  39-42,  51]  in  the  previous  {adhastana)  Book. 


As  to  these  [perfections],  with  regard  to  those  bodies  and  organs 
which  enter  into  the  mutation  of  another  birth, — 

2.  The  mutation  into  another  birth  is  the  result  of  the  filling- 
in  of  the  evolving-cause. 

When  the  previous  mutation  has  passed  away,  the  rise  of  the 
subsequent  mutation  follows,  since  [this  body  and]  these  [organs] 
interpenetrate  the  new  [arrangement]  of  parts.  And  the  evolving- 
causes  of  the  body  and  organs  give  aid  to  their  own  peculiar 
evolved- effects  by  filling-in  in  dependence  upon  such  instrumental- 
causes  2 as  merit. 


Now  in  the  case  of  those  four  perfections  the  means  for  which  are  the  drugs  and 
the  other  [three]  means,  the  same  body  and  organs  must  enter  into  the  mutation 
of  another  birth.  But  this  mutation  does  not  follow  from  material-causes  in 


general.  For  the  same  quantity  of 
when  he  attains  to  a supernal  or  to  a 

* See  Markandeya  Pur.  xvi.  27  and  Bhaga- 
vata  Pur.  iii.  5.  20.  Compare  MahaBh. 
1.  107-8.  He  keeps  himself  alive  after 
robbers,  who  have  entered  his  hermit- 
age by  mistake,  have  impaled  him.  He 
was  famous  for  curses,  which  were  so 
mighty  as  to  blight  even  Yama.  One 
man  was  cursed  to  die  before  sunrise. 


material-causes  cannot  belong  to  him 
not-supernal  state-of-existence  which  is 

The  wife  of  this  person,  however, 
refused  to  let  the  sun  rise.  Accordingly 
even  Mandavya  Muni  was  obliged  to 
beat  a retreat. 

^ Compare  Vacaspati  on  iii.  18,  p.  230®. 
See  also  i.  44,  p.  94'  and  iv.  10,  p.  283' 
(Calc.  ed.). 


301] 


Action  of  the  final  end  [ — iv.  3 

either  more  or  less  [than  the  present  state].  For  certainly  a material  cause 
which  is  to  bring  forth  something  not  different  is  not  sufficient  to  produce 
an  effect  of  a different  kind  altogether.  And  so  with  a view  to  exclude  the 
possibility  of  any  accidental  [difference  between  cause  and  effect]  he  supplies 
the  following  words,  <SCAs  to  these  [perfections],  with  regard  to  those  bodies  and 
organs  which  enter  into  the  mutation  of  another  birth. » And  then  recites  the 
sutra  2.  The  mutation  into  another  birth  is  the  result  of  the  fllling-in  of 
the  evolving-cause. 

When  the  body  and  organs,  which  have  entered  into  the  mutation  of  a human 
birth,  enter  into  a birth  as  god  or  animal,  the  mutation  is  the  result  of  the 
filling-in  of  the  evolving-cause.  Now  the  evolving-cause  of  the  body  is  earth 
and  other  [coarse]  elements,  and  the  evolving-cause  of  the  organs  is  the 
personality-substance.  The  interpenetration  into  the  parts  of  these  is  the  filling- 
in.  From  this  filling-in  there  results  [this  mutation], — as  he  says  in  the  words 
«When  the  previous  mutation.»  An  objection  might  be  made  to  the  effect  that 
if  this  aid  is  to  follow  from  mere  filling-in,  why  is  it  not  eternally  so?  To 
which  the  reply  would  be  ^such  ...  as  merit.^  So  we  have  explained  ^ how 
the  same  body  can  attain  to  the  different  stages  of  childhood  and  boyhood  and 
young  manhood  and  age  and  so  on,  or  how  a nyagrodha  seed  can  become  a 
nyagrodlia  tree,  or  how  a particle  of  fire  when  placed  on  a pile  of  grass  can 
envelop  the  region  of  the  sky  by  the  flaring  forth  of  thousands  of  flames. 


3.  The  efficient  cause  gives  no  impulse  to  the  evolving- 
causes ; but  [the  mutation]  follows  when  the  barrier  [to  the 
evolving-causes]  is  cut,  as  happens  with  the  peasant. 

For  an  efficient  cause  such  as  merit  gives  no  impulse  to  the 
evolving-causes  {prakrti),  since  a cause  is  not  set  into  activity  by 
an  effect.  In  that  case,  how  is  this  ? [The  answer  is,]  but  in 
that  case  there  is  a cutting  of  the  barrier,  as  happens  with  the 
peasant.  Just  as  a peasant  wishing  to  overflow  ^ one  meadow- 
plot,  whether  it  be  on  the  level  or  below  or  still  lower,  by  filling- 
in  with  water  from  another  meadow-plot,  does  not  remove  the 
waters  with  his  hand,  but  cuts  [the  rim-of-turf  which  is]  the  barrier 
[dvarana)  of  them.  And  after  this  is  cut,  the  water  itself  overflows 
the  other  meadow-plot.  So  similarly  merit  cuts  demerit,  the  barrier 
{dvarana)  of  the  evolving-causes  ; and  after  this  is  cut,  the  evolving- 

* By  stating  that  a mutation,  from  the  removed,  we  have  the  explanation. 

mahat  down,  follows  whenever  parti-  “ See  Sir  Walter  Lawrence : The  Vale  of 
cles  of  the  evolving-cause  enter  or  are  Kashmir,  p.  327. 


rv.  3 — ] 


[302 


Booh  IV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya 

causes  themselves  overflow  each  its  own  appropriate  evolved-eflPect 
{vihdra).  Or  again,  just  as  the  same  peasant,  after  the  same  [rim- 
of-turf]  is  cut,  cannot  force  the  watery  or  earthen  essences  to  inter- 
penetrate the  roots  of  the  different  kinds  of  grain.  In  that  case, 
what  [can  he  do]  ? He  removes  from  among  them  the  pulse  or 
maize  or  red  rice  or  what  not.  And  when  they  are  thus  removed, 
the  essences  interpenetrate  of  themselves  the  roots  of  the  grain. 
Similarly  merit  is  an  efficient  cause  in  the  sense  that  it  follows 
upon  nothing  more  than  the  mere  cessation  of  demerit,  by  reason 
of  the  absolute  opposition  between  purity  and  impurity.  But 
merit  is  not  the  cause  which  sets  the  evolving-causes  into  activity. 
Of  this  Nandifvara  and  others  may  be  cited  as  examples.  And 
conversely  demerit  inhibits  merit ; and  as  a result  of  this  there  is 
a mutation  of  impurity.  And  of  this  Nahusa  ^ [the  king  who  was 
changed  into]  a serpent,  and  others  may  be  cited  as  examples. 

The  statement  was  that  this  filling-in  is  by  the  evolving-causes.  With  regard  to 
this  a doubt  arises.  ‘ Is  the  filling-in  by  the  evolving-causes  natural  or  is  it  due 
to  merit  ? Which  seems  plausible  [to  the  objector]  ? It  seems  plausible  that  even 
when  the  evolving-causes  are  there,  the  filling-in  is  accidental ; and  since  we  are 
traditionally  taught  that  merit  [and  demerit]  are  causes,  [ the  filling-in]  is  due  to 
these  causes.’  To  this  he  replies  [in  the  sutra].  3.  The  efiSeient  cause  gives  no 
impulse  to  the  evolving-causes ; but  [the  mutation]  follows  when  the 
barrier  [to  the  evolving-causes]  is  cut,  as  happens  with  the  peasant. 
True — merit  [and  demerit]  are  efficient  causes.  But  they  are  not  impelling 
causes,  since  even  these  causes  are  the  effects  of  the  evolving-causes.  And  an 
effect  does  not  impel  a cause,  forasmuch  as  this  [effect],  (in  so  far  as  its  coming 
into  existence  is  dependent  upon  this  [cause])  is  dependent  on  a cause,  and 
[forasmuch  as]  the  function  of  impelling  belongs  to  what  is  independent.  For 
surely  when  the  potter  is  not  there,  the  clay  and  the  rod  and  wheel  and  the 
water  and  so  on  are  not  impelled  by  the  jar  which  is  to  be  produced  or  which  has 
been  produced.  But  they  are  impelled  by  a potter  who  is  independent  of  them. 
Nor  again  can  it  even  be  supposed  that  it  is  the  purpose  of  the  Self  that  sets  all 
in  motion.  But  the  l9vara  [sets  all  in  motion]  as  being  the  final-end  of  this 
[purpose  of  the  Self],  For  the  purpose  of  the  Self  is  described  as  setting  all  in 
motion  only  as  being  the  final  end  “ (uddega).  While  this  purpose  of  the  Self  is 

* By  virtue  of  knowledge  and  asceticism  a serpent  (Bbag.  Pur.  vi.  13. 16  ; ix.  17. 

and  the  power  of  3'0ga,  Nahusa  was  1 ; and  ix.  18.  ll.  Compare  in  this 

equal  to  the  task  of  ruling  the  Three  book,  ii.  12,  p.  122®  (Calc.  ed.). 

Heavens.  But  he  became  blinded  by  ^ In  the  sense  of  being  the  object  of  desire, 
pride  and  was  degraded  to  the  state  of  See  Nyaya-Koya  under  Udde^atvam, 


303] 


Mind-stuff  pervades  many  bodies  [ — iv.  5 

yet  to  be,  it  is  right  that  the  unphenomenalized  matter  should  be  the  cause  of 
the  stability  [of  matter].  But  it  does  not  follow  from  this  that  merit  [and 
demerit]  are  not  eflBcient  causes  at  all.  Since  it  is  quite  consistent  that  they, 
like  the  peasant,  should  only  remove  obstructions.  And  in  the  case  of  the 
l9vara  we  must  understand  that  his  functional  activity  is  limited  to  the  removal 
of  obstructions  with  a view  to  securing  a basis  for  merit.  All  this,  stated  by  the 
Comment,  is  clear  upon  a mere  reading. 

But  [if  it  be  asked],  while  the  yogin  creates  many  bodies  for 
himself,  do  these  [bodies]  then  have  a single  central-organ,  or 
have  they  several  central-organs  ? The  answer  is, 

4.  Created  mind-stuffs  may  result  from  the  sense-of-per- 
sonality  ^ and  from  this  alone. 

Assuming  nothing  more  than  the  sense-of-personality  as  the  cause 
of  mind-stuff,  [the  yogin]  makes  created  mind-stuffs.  As  a result 
of  this,  [the  bodies]  have  [separate]  mind-stuffs. 

Having  disposed-of-the-subject  of  perfections  as  taking  place  by  the  filling-in  of 
evolving-causes,  he  now  raises  the  question  as  to  the  oneness  or  the  manyness 
of  the  mind-stuff  resident  in  the  various  bodies  produced  by  the  perfections,  by 
saying  <KBut  [if  it  be  asked],  while.^  ‘If  this  is  so,  there  would  be  many 
central-organs.  And  because  the  intention  varies  according  to  each  mind-stuff 
of  the  [various]  bodies,  there  would  be  no  conformity  to  one  intention  and  also 
there  would  be  no  readjustment  [of  memoiy],  quite  as  in  the  case  of  distinct 
persons.  Therefore  [there  is]  only  one  mind-stuff,  [which,]  inasmuch  as,  like 
a lamp,  it  has  a diffusive  nature,  pervades  even  many  created  bodies.’  To  this 
view  he  replies, — 4.  Created  mind-stuffs  may  result  from  the  sense-of- 
personality  and  from  this  alone.  Each  body  so  long  as  it  lives  is  evidently 
inseparably  connected  with  an  individual  mind-stuff,  such  a body,  for  instance, 
as  that  of  Chaitra  or  of  Maitra.  And  the  same  holds  good  in  the  case  of  bodies 
[created  by  the  yogin].  So  it  is  established  that  each  of  these  [bodies]  has  a 
separate  central-organ  of  its  own.  With  this  in  mind  he  says  <from  the  sense- 
of-personality  and  from  this  alone.> 


5.  While  there  is  a variety  of  actions,  the  mind-stuff  which 
impels  the  many  is  one. 

How  can  many  mind-stuffs  have  their  action  provided  with  a 
purpose  by  a single  mind-stuff  ? [The  answer  is],  the  yogin  makes 
a single  mind-stuff  which  impels  all  the  mind-stuffs.  From  this 
[mind-stuff]  the  variety  of  actions  is  obtained. 

' Compare  Saiiikhya-sutra  vi.  64. 


iv.  5 — ] Book  IV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya  [304 

As  to  the  contention  that,  if  there  be  many  mind-stuffs,  there  cannot  be  con- 
formity to  one  intention  [of  this  yogin  who  has  many  bodies],  nor  can  there  be 
a readjustment  of  memory,  the  reply  is  in  the  next  sutra.  5.  While  there  is 
a variety  of  actions,  the  mind-stuff  which  impels  the  many  is  one.  This 
would  be  a weakness  in  the  argument,  if  one  mind-stuff  which  is  to  guide  the 
central-organ  resident  in  the  various  bodies  were  not  to  be  created.  But  when 
such  a [mind-stuff]  is  created,  there  is  no  weakness  in  the  argument.  And  it 
should  not  be  said  that  [the  yogin]  having  one  [mind-stuff]  needs  no  separate 
central-organ  proper  to  each  body ; or  that  there  is  no  need  of  the  creation  of 
a guide,  because  the  yogin’s  own  mind-stuff  is  the  guide.  Since  what  is  estab- 
lished by  proofs  is  not  rightly-subject  to  command^  or  to  question.  On  this 
point  there  is  a Purana  passage  ® “ By  virtue  of  his  authoritative  power  the 
Ifvara,  though  one,  becomes  many.  Then  being  many  he  becomes  one.  And 
from  him  also  proceed  all  these  variations  of  the  central-organ.  The  Yogl9vara 
makes  the  bodies  one-fold  or  two-fold  or  three-fold  or  manifold  and  again  un- 
makes them.  With  some  he  may  partake  of  objects,  with  others  he  may  practise 
fierce  austerities.  All  these  again  he  may  draw  in,  as  the  sun  draws  in  the 
multitude  of  rays.”  With  this  same  intention  he  says,  «many  mind-stuffs.» 


6.  Of  these  [five  perfections]  that  which  proceeds  from  con- 
templation leaves  no  latent-deposit. 

The  created®  mind-stuff  is  of  five  kinds.  For  the  perfections 
proceed  from  birth  and  from  drugs  and  from  spells  and  from  self- 
castigation and  from  concentration.  Of  these  five  kinds  only  that 
mind-stuff  which  proceeds  from  contemplation  leaves  no  latent- 
deposit.  It  alone  has  no  latent-deposit  which  comes  into  action 
as  a result  of  passion  or  similar  [states].  It  has  accordingly  no 
connexion  with  merit  or  evil,  since  the  yogin’s  hindrances  have 
dwindled  away.  For  the  others,  however,  there  is  a latent-deposit 
of  karma. 

Now  of  these  five  [iv.  1]  perfected  mind-stuffs  which  have  arisen  thus  he  selects 
that  mind-stuff  which  is  conducive  to  release.  6.  Of  these  [five  perfections] 
that  which  proceeds  from  contemplation  leaves  no  latent-deposit.  Latent- 


* Compare  the  use  of  these  words  by  Vacas- 

pati  on  i.  32,  p.  (Calc,  ed.*),  p.  74'^ 
(Calc.  ed.^). 

* With  some  omissions  this  passage  is  found 

in  the  Vayu  Pur.  Ixvi.  143  and  152-3 
[in  the  Calcutta  edition  ii.  5.  139].  See 
also  Kurma  Pur.  i.  4.  54-5.  The  phrase 
tasmac  ca  manaso  bheda  jSynnit  is 


found  in  Vayu  Pur.  vi.  22.  All  this 
illustrates  how  various  the  readings 
of  the  Vayu  are  and  how  much  need 
there  is  of  a critical  edition. 

® Compare  i.  25,  p.  62^ ; iv.  4,  p.278'® ; and 
the  phrase  huddhi-ninnanah  iii.  52, 
p.  268*  (Calc.  ed.). 


305] 


Kai'rria  of  the  yogin  [ — iv.  7 

deposits  are  things  that  lie  latent,  subconscious-impressions  of  karma  and 
subconscious-impressions  of  hindrances.  That  mind-stuff  in  which  these  [sub- 
conscious-impressions] are  not,  is  said  to  have  no  latent-deposit.  In  other 
words  it  is  conducive  to  the  liberation.  Since  it  does  not  act  with  reference 
to  passion  or  similar  [states],  it  is  therefore  not  connected  with  merit  or  evil. 
But  why  is  there  no  activity  generated  by  passion  or  similar  [states]?  The 
reply  is  in  the  words  ^since  the  yogin’s  hindrances  have  dwindled  away.» 
With  the  intent  to  show  that  the  central-organ,  which  is  produced  in  contempla- 
tion, and  in  which  there  is  no  latent-deposit,  is  distinct  from  the  others,  he  says 
that  the  others  have  latent-deposits,  in  the  words  «For  the  others,  however.^ 


For — 

7.  The  yogin’s  karma  is  neither- white-nor-black ; [the  karma] 
of  others  is  of  three  kinds. 

Karma  as  a class  is,  as  every  one  knows,  quadripartite  [catuspdt), 
black  and  white-and-black  and  white  and  neither-white-nor-black. 
Of  these  [four],  1.  the  black  is  found  in  villains.  2.  The  white-and- 
black  is  attainable  by  outer  means-of-attainment.  The  accumula- 
tion of  the  latent-deposit  of  karma  in  this  [division]  is  by  means 
of  injury  or  of  benefit  to  others.  3,  The  white  belongs  to  those 
who  castigate  themselves  and  recite  the  sacred  texts  and  practise 
contemplation.  Because  this  kind  of  karma  is  confined  to  the 
central  organ  alone,  it  does  not  depend  upon  outer  means  and  it 
does  not  grow  as  a result  of  injury  to  others.  4.  The  neither- 
white-nor-black  ^ is  found  in  the  mendicant-saints  (sannydsin), 
whose  hindrances  have  dwindled  away,  and  whose  [actual]  bodies 
are  their  last.  Of  these  four,  the  yogin  alone  has  the  not-white 
karma,  since  he  has  renounced  [sannydsdt)  the  fruition  [even  of 
good],  and  has  not-black,  since  he  will  have  nought  of  it.  But  the 
three  kinds  just  mentioned  are  found  in  other  living  beings. 

On  this  same  point  also  he  introduces  by  the  word  ^For»  a sutra  which  gives 
the  reason.  7.  The  yogin’s  karma  is  neither-white-nor-black ; [the  karma] 
of  others  is  of  three  kinds.  A division  {pada)  is  a topic.  [The  karma  as  a 
class  which  is]  contained  in  four  divisions  is  in-four-divisions  [catuspada). — 
2.  Whatever  karma  is  attainable  by  outer  means-of-attainment  always  contains 
some  injury  to  others.  For  even  in  an  action  in  which  rice-grains  ^ or  some- 

^ See  E.  W.  Hopkins : Great  Epic  of  India  (1901),  p.  180. 

^ Compare  ^astra  DTpika  (Ben.  ed.,  1885),  p.  3,  first  lines. 

39  [h.o.s.  n] 


iv.  7 — ] 


Book  IV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya 


[306 


thing  similar  are  the  means-of-attainment,  one  cannot  say  that  there  is  no 
injury  to  others.  Because  one  might  possibly  kill  an  ant  while  pounding  [the 
grains].  And  after  all,  by  killing  the  seeds,  one  prevents  the  growth  of  stalks  and 
so  forth.  On  the  other  hand  there  is  benefit  in  this  action,  in  that  the  Brahmans 
and  others  receive  their  gifts.  3.  The  white  belongs  to  those  who  castigate  them- 
selves and  recite  sacred  texts  and  practise  contemplation,’  to  those  who  are  not 
mendicant-saints.  He  gives  the  reason  for  the  whiteness  in  the  words  «Because 
this.)»  4.  The  neither-white-nor-black  is  found  in  the  mendicant-saints.  He  refers 
to  the  mendicant-saints  when  he  says  «have  dwindled  away.»  Because  persons 
who  have  renounced  all  karma,  do  not  come  into  activity  with  reference  to  any 
karma  which  can  be  attained  by  outer  means-of-attainment.  And  accordingly 
they  have  no  latent-deposit  of  black  karma.  And  because  they  have  altogether 
offered  up  to  the  Ifvara  the  fruition  of  the  latent-deposit  of  karma,  which  is 
attainable  by  the  following  up  of  yoga,  they  have  no  latent-deposit  of  white 
karma.  For  that  the  fruit  of  which  is  indestructible,  [that  is.  Isolation]  is 
called  white  [karma].  The  meaning  is,  one  who  has  no  fruit  at  all,'’ — how 
can  he  have  that,  the  fruit  of  which  is  indestructible  ? Having  thus  described 
the  four  fold  kinds  of  karma,  he  determines  which  belongs  to  which  by  saying 
«Of  these  four  . . . the  not-w’hite.^ 


8.  As  a result  of  this  there  follows  the  manifestation  of  those 
subconscious-impressions  only  which  correspond  to  the 
fruition  of  their  [karma]. 

<As  a result  of  this>  means  of  the  three  kinds  of  karma.  The 
words  <of  those  only  which  correspond  to  the  fruition  of  their 
[karma]>  means  that  those  subconscious-impressions  which  cor- 
respond to  the  fruition  of  that  karma  which  is  comparate  with 
them,  dwell  upon  the  fmition  of  karma.  The  manifestation  of 
these  only  follows.  For  when  karma  of  the  gods  is  in  fruition 
it  is  not  the  efficient  cause  for  the  manifestation  of  hellish  or  of 
brutish  or  of  human  subconscious-impressions.  It  does,  however, 
make  manifest  those  subconscious-impressions  only  which  corre- 
spond to  it.  And  the  reasoning  is  the  same  with  regard  to 
hellish  or  brutish  or  human  [subconscious-impressions]. 

Having  discussed  in  detail  the  latent-deposit  of  karma,  he  tells  what  the  outcome 
of  the  latent-deposit  of  the  hindrances  will  be.  8.  As  a result  of  this  there 
follows  the  manifestation  of  those  subconscious-impressions  only  which 
correspond  to  the  fruition  of  their  [karma].  [The  subconscious-impressions] 

’ Compare  ii.  1 and  notice  that  dhydna  takes  the  place  of  igvarapranidhana. 

“ If  they  have  no  white  karma,  how  can  they  have  the  fruit  of  white  karma  ? 


307] 


Pre-natal  tendencies 


[ — iv,  9 


correspond  to  a particular  fruition  of  karma,  whether  supernal  or  hellish  birth 
or  length-of-life  or  kind-of-experience,  which  belongs  to  a particular  class,  whether 
it  be  the  class  of  merit  or  the  class  of  demerit.  These  same  [subconscious- 
impressions]  are  described  in  the  words  «subconscious-impressions  which  . • . 
dwell  upon  the  fruition  of  karma.^  They  dwell  ^ upon  [or]  imitate.  For  the 
subconscious-impressions  which  correspond  to  the  fruition  of  supernal  karma  are 
generated  by  supernal  enjoyments.  Therefore  subconscious-impressions  corre- 
spond to  their  own  fruition  and  are  to  be  manifested  by  their  own  karma.  This 
is  the  meaning  of  the  Comment. 


9.  There  is  an  uninterrupted  [causal]  relation  [of  sub-con- 
scious-impressions],  although  remote  in  species  and  point-of- 
space  and  moment-of-time,  by  reason  of  the  correspondence 
between  memory  and  subliminal-impressions. 

Although  a hundred  species  or  a distance  in  points-of-space  or  a 
hundred  mundane  periods  intervene,  if  there  is  a manifestation  of 
the  phenomenal  [form]  by  the  operation  of  the  conditions-which- 
phenomenalize  {vyanjaka)  a given  thing  {sva),  namely,  that  from 
which  the  fruition  [which  results  in  a birth]  as  cat  rises  [into 
consciousness], — and  if  again  just  that  phenomenal  [form]  by  the 
operation  of  the  conditions-which-phenomenalize  that  given  thing 
should  arise  [into  consciousness], — it  would  in  an  instant  be  pheno- 
menalized,  in  association  with  the  subconscious-impressions,  sub- 
liminally  existent,  of  the  fruition,  [which  results  in  the  birth  as] 
cat,  and  which  had  been  experienced  in  former  time.  Why  is 
this  ? Because,  although  those  [subconscious-impressions]  are  re- 
mote, the  karma  [which  produces]  the  same  [result]  becomes  their 
manifester,  [that  is]  efficient-cause;  and  so  there  is  an  uninterrupted 
[causal]  relation.  And  wherefore  is  this  ? The  answer  is  <by  reason 
of  the  correspondence  between  memory  and  subliminal-impressions.> 
Because  subliminal-impressions  are  like  experiences,  and  the  latter 
correspond  with  the  subconscious-impressions  of  karma,  and 
because  memory  is  like  subconscious-impressions,  [therefore] 
memory  arises  from  subliminal-impressions,  [although]  species  and 
points-of-space  and  moments-of-time  intervene,  and  again,  sub- 
liminal-impressions arise  from  memory.  Thus  it  is  that  memory 

* Compare  ii.  7. 


iv.  9 — ] 


Booh  IV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya 


[308 


and  subliminal-impressions  are  phenomenalized  by  virtue  of  the 
fact  that  the  latent-deposit  of  karma  assumes  a fluctuation  [of  mind- 
stuff].  And  consequently  the  uninterrupted-succession  [of  sub- 
conscious-impressions], although  there  be  interventions,  is  proved 
from  the  fact  that  the  relation  of  the  determination  to  the 
determined  is  not  cut  through. 

An  objector  says,  ‘ This  may  be  true.  But  in  the  case  of  a man  who  immediately 
after  his  death  passed  into  an  existence  as  a cat,  one  would  expect  a manifesta- 
tion of  human  subconscious-impressions,  in  that  these  came  immediately  before. 
For  it  cannot  be  that  one  should  not  remember  what  was  experienced  on  the  day 
immediately  preceding,  but  should  remember  what  was  experienced  in  the  days 
before  the  intervention.’  In  reply  to  this  he  says,  9.  There  is  an  uninterrupted- 
[causal]  relation  [of  subconscious-impressions],  although  remote  in  species 
and  point-of-space  and  mom ent-of- time,  by  reason  of  the  correspondence 
between  memory  and  subliminal-impressions.  Although  the  subconscious 
impression  of  the  cat  pass  through  intervening  births  and  so  on,  still  there 
is  an  uninterrupted-succession  of  this  subconscious-impression  with  respect  to 
its  fruit.  For  in  consequence  of  the  karma  the  fruition  of  which  was  [birth  as] 
a cat,  that  particular  subconscious-impression  which  corresponds  to  its  fruition 
would  become  manifest,  and  the  memory  of  that  subconscious-impression  would 
be  produced,  as  he  says  «the  rise  [into  consciousness]  of  the  fruition  [which 
results  in  a birth]  as  cat.»  The  rise  [into  consciousness]  means  that  from  which 
something  rises  into  consciousness,  [thatis]  the  latent-deposit  of  karma.  Thewords, 
«and  if  again  just  that  phenomenal  [form]  by  the  operation  of  the  conditions- 
which-phenomenalize  that  given  thing  should  rise  [into  consciousness]^  would 
mean  that  it  would  be  manifested  [that  is]  itwould  be  brought  near  to  the  beginning 
of  its  fruition.  This  is  the  meaning.  «Subliminally  existent)^  means  activities 
[of  certain  impressions].  «In  association  with^ : it  would  be  phenomenalized 
after  having  seized.  The  meaning  is  that  if  it  is  to  be  phenomenalized,  it  would 
be  phenomenalized  only  after  having  seized  the  subliminal-impressions  which 
correspond  to  its  own  fruition.  Having  explained  that  the  result  is  in  imme- 
diate succession  with  respect  to  the  cause,  he  now  explains  the  same  with 
respect  to  the  effect  [memory]  in  the  words  ^And  wherefore  is  this? . . . memory.» 
There  is  similarity  since  both  [memory  and  impression]  correspond.  This  same 
thing  he  says  by  the  word  «like.»  It  is  objected  ‘If  the  subliminal-impressions 
are  of  the  nature  of  experience,  then  in  that  case,  since  experiences  are  tran- 
sitory, so  also  should  the  subliminal-impressions  be  transitory.  How  can 
they  be  capable  of  producing  an  experience  capable  of  lasting  a long  time  ? ’ 
In  reply  to  this  he  says  <SCAnd  the  latter  correspond  with  the  subconscious- 
impressions  of  karma.»  Just  as  the  invisible- influence  (apurva)  [of  the  sacri- 
fice] is  stable,  although  caused  by  momentary  sacrifice  (karma),  so  a subliminal- 


309] 


[ — iv.  10 


Priority  of  desire 

impression  is  stable,  although  caused  by  momentary  experience.  Similarity 
is  based  upon  some  kind  of  difference.  Otherwise  if  there  were  an  identity  in 
essence,  similarit}'^  would  be  impossible.  The  rest  is  easy. 


10.  Furthermore  these  [subconscious-impressions]  have  no 
beginning  [that  we  can  set  in  time],  since  desire  is  per- 
manent. 

These  subconscious-impressions,  because  of  the  permanence  of 
desire,  have  no  beginning.  This  well-known  desire  [ii.  9]  for  one’s 
self,  ‘ May  I not  cease  to  be  ! May  I be  ! ’ which  is  found  in  every 
one,  is  not  self-caused.  Why  [not]  ? [The  answer  is,]  how  could 
the  fear  of  death,  determined  by  the  recollection  of  hatred  and  of 
pain,  arise  in  an  animal  [jantu)  just  brought  into  life,  in  a condition 
wherein  death  has  never  been  experienced  ? Furthermore  a self- 
caused  thing  does  not  need  an  efficient  cause.  It  is  for  these 
reasons  that  this  mind-stuff,  commingled  with  subconscious- 
impressions  which  have  no  beginning,  by  the  efficient-cause  lays 
hold  of  certain  subconscious-impressions,  and  presents  itself  for  the 
experience  of  the  Self.  Others  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that, 
like  [the  light  of]  a lamp  which  is  contracted  ^ [if  in]  a jar  and 
diffused  [if  in]  a palace,  the  mind-stuff  has  such  a form  [as  corre- 
sponds to]  the  dimension  of  the  body.  And  thus  [they  say]  there 
is  an  intermediate  state  and  there  is  ground  for  the  round-of-re- 
births. — It  is  only  this  all-pervasive  [mind-stuff’s]  fluctuation  which 
contracts  and  expands.  So  the  Master  says.  This  [mind-stuff] 
furthermore  requires  such  efficient-causes  as  right-living.  And  this 
efficient-cause  is  of  two  kinds,  that  which  is  external  and  that  which 
has  to  do  with  self.  The  external  requires  the  body  and  other 
means,  such  as  praises  and  almsgiving  and  salutations.  That  which 
like  belief,  for  instance,  has  to  do  with  self  is  subject  to  the  mind- 
stuff  only.  And  in  this  sense  it  has  been  said  “ As  for  friendliness 
and  such  [exalted  states-of-mind],  they  are  the  diversions  of  con- 
templative [yogins] ; they  are  in  their  essence  unaided  by  outer 
means  ; they  bring  right-living  to  perfection.”  Of  these  two,  [the 
inner  and  the  outer  means],  that  of  the  central-organ  is  the  stronger. 

' Compare  Samkhya  Pravacana  Bhasya  (Garbe),  i.  68  (HOS.  34’*),  v.  69  (132*^),  v.  91  (133’). 


iv,  10 — ] Book  IV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya  [310 

How  is  this  ? [The  answer  is,  that  intuitive]  knowledge  and 
passionlessness  are  unsurpassed  by  any  other  [force].  Who  by 
bodily  action  and  without  the  force  of  mind-stuff  could  empty^  the 
Dandaka  Forest  [of  people],  or  like  Agastya^  drink  up  the  sea? 

An  objector  says,  ‘This  may  be  true.  But  subconscious-impressions  sub- 
liminally-impressed  in  the  previous  or  in  a preceding  birth  might  become 
phenomenalized,  provided  there  be  any  source-of-valid-ideas  [to  prove]  the 
existence  of  a previous  or  a preceding  birth.  But  this  is  just  what  there  is  not. 
And  it  should  not  be  said  that  the  mere  experience  of  joy  or  of  grief  in  an  animal 
just  born  is  the  source-of-the-valid-idea  [to  prove  the  existence  of  the  previous 
birth].  For  this  may  be  explained  by  saying  that  it  is  self-caused  like  the 
contraction  and  expansion  of  the  lotus.’  In  reply  to  this  he  says  10.  Further- 
more these  [subconscious-impressions]  have  no  beginning  [that  we  can 
set  in  time],  since  desire  is  permanent.  The  beginninglessness  of  these  sub- 
conscious-impressions furthermore,  not  their  mere  uninterrupted  [causal]  relation 
is  meant  by  the  word  ^Furthermore.^  This  is  because  desire  is  permanent, 
since  desire  for  one’s  self  never  loses  its  permanent  character,  for  the  reason  that 
subconscious-impressions  have  no  [assignable]  beginning.  And  if  it  be  objected 
that  the  permanent  character  of  desire  is  unproven,  inasmuch  as  it  could  be 
explained  as  being  self-caused,  the  reply  is  ^This  well-known  desire. » 
A heterodox  person  asks  «Why  [not]  ?»  The  answer  is  ^an  animal  just 
brought  into  life)»  and  therefore  in  a condition  wherein  death  has  not  been 
experienced  in  this  birth.  In  other  words,  he  is  one  who  has  not  experienced  the 
condition  which  is  death.  How  can  there  be  in  the  child,  fallen  forward  from  its 
mother’s  lap  and  trembling  in  consequence,  a fear  of  death  due  to  the  memory  of 
pain  associated  with  aversion,  as  is  inferred  from  the  peculiar  quivering  of  the 
child  as  it  clasps  very  tightly  in  its  hand  the  thread  ® marked  with  the  disk  and 
other  auspicious  objects,  which  hang  around  its  mother’s  neck  ? And  if  again  it 
is  urged  that  this  is  self-caused,  the  reply  is  ^Furthermore  not.»  Furthermore 
a self-caused  thing  does  not  need  [that  is]  take  an  efficient  cause  in  order  that  it 
itself  should  come  into  existence.  What  he  means  to  say  is  this.  The  tremor 
that  is  seen  in  the  little  child  is  grounded  in  fear.  Because  it  is  a tremor  of 
a particular  kind  just  like  our  own.  And  the  fear  of  the  child  is  based  on 
the  memory  of  pain  and  aversion  because  it  is  a fear  like  any  one  of  our  own 
fears.  And  so  the  fear  which  is  characterized  by  an  expectancy  of  something 
disagreeable  to  come  does  not  arise  from  the  mere  memory  of  pain.  But  having 
inferred  that  the  thing  of  which  he  is  afraid  is  the  cause  of  something  disagreeable, 

* Ufanas  by  his  curse  burned  the  land  to  Rel.  and  Ethics,  vol.  i,  p.  180'’). 

ashes  and  covered  it  with  a shower  of  ® Compare  Bana : KadambarT,  p.  152'^  (ed. 

dust  (Ramayana  vii.  81.  8-10).  M.  R.  Kale)  and  p.  93’'®  (ed.  Peterson, 

* See  MahaBh.  iii.  105  (Bomb.)  and  Jacobi’s  BSS.). 

article  on  Agastya  (Hastings : Cycl.  of 


311] 


Extent  of  the  mind-stuff  [ — iv.  lo 

[the  child]  now  also  is  afraid  of  something  disagreeable.  So  as  a result  of  the 
memory  of  that  kind  of  pain  accompanied  by  aversion  for  that  kind  of  cause  of 
fear  which  has  been  previously  experienced, — when  that  kind  of  cause  of  fear  is 
now  experienced, — he  [the  child]  inferring  that  it  would  cause  pain  is  afraid  of  it. 
And  the  child  has  not  come  to  the  conclusion  at  any  other  time  in  this  birth 
that  falling  is  the  cause  of  pain.  And  he  has  not  experienced  that  kind  of  pain. 
So  that  the  only  alternative  that  remains  is  an  experience  relating  to  previous 
births.  All  this  can  be  logically  formulated  thus.  The  memory  belonging  to  a 
child  just  born  is  based  on  a previous  experience.  Because  it  is  a memory.  Just 
like  our  own.  Nor  can  it  be  said  that  the  expansion  and  contraction  of  the 
lotus  is  self-caused.  For  what  is  self-caused  cannot  stand  in  need  of  another 
cause.  Because  if  this  were  so,  even  the  heat  of  fire  would  require  another  cause. 
Therefore  what  leads  to  the  expansion  of  the  lotus  is  merely  an  accidental  cause, 
such  as,  for  instance,  contact  with  the  rays  of  the  early  sun.  And  the  cause  of  its 
closing  is  the  subliminal-impression*  which  leads  it  to  i-ecover  its  original 
position.  Similarly  from  laughter  and  other  [physical  acts]  we  must  infer  joy 
[and  grief]  in  some  previous  life  to  be  the  causes  [of  the  acts  of  the  child]. 
So  now  let  the  topic  rest.  He  brings  the  discussion  to  a close  by  saying  ^It  is 
for  these  reasons.^ — By  the  words  «efiicient  cause)^  he  means  that  karma  has 
reached  the  time  for  its  fruition.  ^Laying  hold  of»  means  manifestation.  Inci- 
dentally, with  the  intent  to  do  away  with  the  diversity  of  opinions  concerning 
the  dimensions  of  the  mind-stutf,  he  first  of  all  describes  the  diversity  in  the 
words,  ^a  water-jar  ...  a palace.»  [The  Samkhya  view.]  ‘Since  we  see  works 
performed  only  when  [the  mind-stuff]  functions  within  the  limits  of  the  body,^ 
there  is  no  means-of-proving  that  mind-stuff  exists  outside  the  body.  Nor  is  it  of 
the  dimension  ® of  an  atom.  For  then  it  would  follow  that  at  the  time  of  eating 
and  [handling]  a long  corn-cake,^  the  five-fold  sensation  by  the  organs  simulta- 
neously could  not  be  produced.  And  there  is  no  means-of-proof  for  the  assumption 
of  a sequence  ® [of  sensations  when]  not  actually  in  experience.  Furthermore 
one  atomic  central-organ  cannot  simultaneously  ® come  in  contact  with  organs 
located  in  several  regions  [of  the  body].  The  only  remaining  alternative 
[for  the  Samkhya]  is  that  the  mind-stuff  is  of  the  dimension  of  the  body. 
And  in  the  body  of  an  ant  or  of  an  elephant  [as  the  case  may  be]  it  is  liable 
to  expansion  or  contraction,  like  a lamp  placed  in  a [small]  water-jar  or  in 


* The  word  samsJcdra  is  defined  in  Tarka- 

samgraha,  § 75. 

* The  Saihkhya  school  holds  the  theory  of 

madhyama-paritnana  (Siit.  v.  69). 

* This  is  directed  against  the  argument  in 

Nyaya-sutra  iii.  2.  62. 

This  is  a cake  eaten  at  the  Hindu  New 
Year  and  on  birthdays  and  on  the  feast 
of  Dewali.  In  the  west  it  is  made  of 


corn  and  ghee  or  oil  with  spices  and 
salt  and  is  called  in  Marathi  Tcodabole. 
On  the  plains  it  is  made  of  sugar  and 
wheat  with  almonds,  sugar,  and  bits  of 
coco-nut  in  the  middle  and  is  boiled  in 
ghee.  In  Hindi  it  is  called  karanji. 

® Compare  Nyaya-sutra  iii.  2.  61. 

® See  Nyaya-sutra  iii.  2.  59. 


iv.  10 — ] 


[312 


Booh  TV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya 

a [large]  palace.’  [So  it  is  that]  others  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that 
the  form  [of  the  mind-stuff]  is  the  dimension  of  the  body  itself ; it  is  that  of 
which  the  dimension  [is  the  body].  The  [Saiiikhya]  objector  continues.  ‘ If  this 
[atomic  theory]  were  true  {evam),  how  can  this  [mind-stuff]  come  into  relation 
with  the  womb  [hsetra)  or  the  seed  ? For  surely  without  something-in-which-it- 
resides  (afra^a),  this  [mind-stuff]  cannot  from  the  dead  body  enter  the  blood  and 
seed  resident  in  the  body  of  the  mother  and  the  father.  Since  [this  mind-stuff] 
is  dependent.  For  certainly  when  posts  and  such  things  do  not  move,  their 
shadows  do  not  move  ; nor  when  the  canvas  is  not  moving  does  the  picture 
which  rests  upon  (afrayo)  it  move.  And  further  according  to  this  theory 
the  round-of-rebirth  would  be  impossible.’  Therefore  he  says  ^And  thus  [they 
say]  there  is  an  intermediate  state  and  there  is  ground  for  the  round-of- 
rebirths.»  The  words  «And  thus^  mean  when  [the  mind-stuff]  is  of  the 
dimension  of  the  body,  there  is,  in  order  to  get  into  another  body,  both  the 
leaving  of  the  first  body  and  the  getting  into  the  other  body,  by  means  of 
a correlation,  while  on  the  way  * {antard)  with  a migratory  body.'^  For  of  course 
by  this  [correlation]  he  would  pass®  into  another  body  as  the  Purana  passage* 
also  says,  “ Yama  by  force  drew  forth  a man  the  size  of  a thumb.”  This  is  what 
is  meant  by  saying  that  there  is  an  intermediate  state  and  that  consequently 
there  would  be  ground  for  the  round-of-rebirths.’  Not  tolerating  this  opinion, 
he  gives  his  own  by  saying  «:the  fluctuation. » It  is  only  the  all-pervasive 
mind-stuff’s  fluctuation  which  contracts  and  expands.  So  the  Master,  the  Self- 
born,®  set  forth.  His  point  [in  rejecting  the  other  theory]  is  this.  If  the 
mind-stuff  without  something-in-which-it-resides  cannot  get  into  a body,  how 
does  it  [in  the  first  place]  find  this  something-in-which-it-resides  in  the 
migratory®  body?  And  if  we  imagine  another  body  in  this  case,  that  would 
involve  an  infinite  regress.  Further,  it  is  not  possible  that  this  migratory  body 
be  drawn  forth  from  the  body,  since  it  is  only  when  drawn  forth  that  the 
mind-stuff  can  come  into  correlation  with  [the  migratory  body].  Therefore  let 
there  be  ’’  a subtile  body  from  the  moment  of  creation  and  up  to  the  time  of  the 
great  [mundane]  dissolution.  It  would  be  limited  in  its  function  to  the  six- 
sheathed  body,  which  would  be  the  locus  of  the  mind-stuffs.  For  so  the  mind- 
stuff  could  pass  about  in  one  body  after  another  up  to  the  Truth-world  and 
down  to  Avici.  And  one  could  explain  the  drawing  forth  of  this  subtile 
body  from  the  six-sheathed  body.  For  in  this  case  there  is  [no  difSculty  as 
to  an]  intermediate  state  of  this  [subtile  body],  because  this  [subtile  body] 
is  always  necessarily  there.  Moreover  there  is  no  means-of-proof  for  the 
existence  of  this  [subtile  body]  also,  indeed  it  is  not  within  the  range  of 

' Adverbially,  according  to  Panini  ii.  3.  4.  ® The  Varttika  says  that  the  Svayambhu  is 

® Compare  Qamkara  on  Vedanta-sutraiii.  1.  Patanjali. 

1-6  and  on  iv.  2.  6-11.  ® This  is  of  course  the  suksma-garTra.  Com- 

® See  Sariikhya-sutra  v.  103.  pare  Samkhya-sutra  v.  103. 

* Compare  MBh.  iii.  16763.  So  ^amkara  on  iii.  1.  1. 


313] 


[ — iv.  10 


No  migratory  body 


ocular  [demonstration].  Nor  can  the  round  of  rebirths  be  the  means-of-inference 
for  this  [subtile  body].  For  [this  round-of-rebirths]  can  be  explained  quite  as 
well  by  the  theory  of  the  Master.  While  {fu)  as  for  the  Tradition  (agama),  it  speaks 
of  drawing  out  a man  (puriisa).  And  a man  is  neither  mind-stuff  nor  subtile  body, 
but  the  Energy  of  Intellect  which  unites  not  with  objects.  And  since  a drawing 
out  of  this  [Energy  of  Intellect]  is  impossible,  we  must  understand  [the 
quotation]  as  being  merely  metaphorical.  And  so  [the  explanation  of  the 
metaphor  is]  that  the  meaning  of  the  drawing  out  is  only  the  non-existence 
of  a fluctuation,  belonging  to  both  the  Intellect  and  to  the  mind-stuff,  with 
reference  to  this  [object]  or  that.  As  to  what  has  been  said  in  the  Smrti  or  in 
the  Itihasa  or  in  Puranas  with  regard  to  [the  mind-stuff]  just  after  death  getting 
into  the  body  of  a Preta  and  that  through  the  agency  of  commemorative-feasts 
{sapindlkaranaY  and  so  on  [the  mind-stuff]  is  liberated  from  this  body — 
all  this  we  accede  to.  But  what  we  cannot  tolerate  is  that  mind-stuff  should 
be  migratory.  And  there  is  no  Tradition  to  support  your  theory.  For  the 
messengers  of  Yama  carry  him  bound  with  fetters  only  as  having  a body  [in 
general].  But  it  is  not  said  that  there  is  a migratory  body.  Hence  since 
mind  is  an  effect  of  the  personality-substance ; and  since  the  personality- 
substance  like  the  sphere  of  the  atmosphere  pervades  the  three  worlds,  the 
central-organ  is  also  all-pervasive.’^  An  objector  says,  ‘ If  this  be  so,  the 
fluctuation  of  this  [mind-stuff]  would  also  be  [all-]pervasive,  and  there  would 
be  a universal  omniscience.’  The  reply  to  this  is  ^only  this  ....  fluctuation.^ 
The  objector  replies,  ‘ This  may  be  true.  But  how  has  this  fluctuation,  which 
depends  on  mind-stuff  only,  its  contraction  and  expansion  from  time  to  time  ? ’ 
In  reply  to  this  he  says  ^This  [mind-stuff]  furthermore.»  And  this  mind- 
stuff  for  its  fluctuation  requires  some  such  [efficient-cause]  as  right-living. 
He  classifies  [this  efficient-cause]  by  saying  «And  this  efficient-cause. By 
the  words  ^such  . , . as»  we  are  to  understand  energy  and  wealth  and  the  like. 
By  the  words  «like  belief,  for  instanced  we  are  to  understand  energy  and 
mindfulness  and  such  qualities  [i.  20].  As  to  their  being  internal  [means]  he 
adduces  the  consensus  of  the  Teachers  by  saying  <SAnd  in  this  sense  it  has  been 
said.^  «Diversion^  is  functional  activity.  <KPerfection»  means  whiteness. 
^Of  these  two^  means  among  the  inner  and  the  outer.  <3C[Intuitive]  knowledge 
and  passionlessness^  mean  the  qualities  engendered  by  them.  By  what  quality 
of  outer  means-of-attainment  are  these  [outer  means]  surpassed  [or]  over- 
whelmed ? It  is  the  qualities  resulting  from  [intuitive]  knowledge  and 
passionlessness  which  overcome  it,  in  that  they  remove  it  from  the  condition 


^ See  Vishnu  Pur.  iii.  13.  29. 

* The  Mimahsa  holds  the  atman  is  per- 
manent and  omnipresent  (Qloka-Vart- 
tika  V.  18).  The  Samkhya-sutras  (v. 
69-71)  deny  that  the  central-organ  is 
all-pervasive  ; and  assert  that  it  is  of 
40  [h.o.s.  n] 


a middle  dimension  {madhyama-pari- 
mdna).  The  Vaiyesika  (viii.  1.  2)  and 
the  Nyaya  conceive  the  atman  to  be 
atomic.  The  Yoga  teaches  that  mind- 
stuff  is  all-persuasive  ; its  fluctuations, 
however,  expand  and  contract. 


iv.  10 — ] Booh  IV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya  [314: 

of  seed.  This  is  the  meaning.  On  this  point  he  gives  a well-known  illustration 
n the  words  «the  Dandaka  Forest. 


11.  Since  [subconscious-impressions]  are  associated  with, 
cause  and  motive  and  mental-substrate  (agraya)  and  stimulus, 
if  these  cease  to  be,  then  those  [subconscious-impressions] 
cease  to  be. 

1.  As  to  cause.  From  right-living  results  pleasure;  from  wrong- 
living, pain  ; from  pleasure,  passion  ; from  pain,  aversion  ; and  from 
this,  struggle.  Quivering  in  central-organ  or  in  vocal-organ  or 
in  body  with  this  [struggle],  he  either  helps  or  injures  another. 
From  this  again  result  right-living  and  wrong-living,  pleasure  and 
pain,  passion  and  aversion.  Thus  revolves  ^ the  six-spoked  wheel  ^ 
of  the  round-of-rebirths.  And  as  it  ceaselessly  revolves,  un- 
differentiated-consciousness  (avidyd),  the  root  of  all  the  hindrances, 
is  its  motive-power.  Such  is  cause.  2.  But  motive  is  that  [human 
purpose]  with  reference  to  which  any  condition  {yasya)  such  as 
right-living  becomes  operative  [in  the  present].  For  it  is  not  the 
rise  of  anything  new.  3.  The  central-organ,  however,  while  its 
task  is  yet  unfulfilled,  is  the  mental-substrate  of  subconscious- 
impressions.  For  when  the  task  of  the  central-organ  is  fulfilled, 
the  subconscious-impressions,  now  without  mental-substrate,  are 
not  able  to  persist.  4.  When  a thing  confronted  [with  some 
object]  phenomenalizes  any  subconscious-impression  [in  itself],  then 
[that  object]  is  the  stimulus  of  that  [subconscious-impression]. 
Thus  all  subconscious-impressions  are  associated  with  these  causes 
and  motives  and  mental-substrates  and  stimuli.  If  they  cease 
to  be,  the  subconscious-impressions  cohering  with  them  also 
cease  to  be. 

The  question  is  raised,  if  these  fluctuations  of  mind-stuff  and  the  subconscious- 
impressions  are  without  beginning,  how  can  they  be  destroyed  ? For  surely 
the  Energy  of  Intellect  {citi)  which  is  without  beginning  cannot  be  destroyed. 
In  reply  to  this  he  says,  11.  Since  [subconscious-impressions]  are  asso- 
ciated with  cause  and  motive  and  mental-substrate  {arraya)  and  stimulus, 

^ Compare  i.  5,  p.  20^  (Calc.  ed.).  kam  samsaracalcram.  Professor  Jacobi 

* A six-spoked  wheel  occurs  in  the  Eig-  calls  my  attention  to  the  passage  in 

veda  i.  164^'*,  and  in  the  Divyavadana  Samaraicca  Kaha  p.  338*“. 

p.  180^^  and  28 we  find  pancaganda- 


315]  The  'princi'ples  of  individuation  [ — iv.  12 

if  these  cease  to  be,  then  those  [subconscious-impressions]  cease  to  be. 
Even  a beginningless  thing  evidently  perishes,  for  instance,  the  fact  that  a 
thing  is  yet  to  be  (anagatatva).  [This  is  prag-ahhdva.'\  So  it  is  not  [a  proper] 
middle-term  (sadhana)  because  it  is  too  wide.  As  to  the  Energy  of  Intellect, 
on  the  other  hand,  since  there  is  no  cause  which  could  make  it  perish,  it  does 
not  perish.  But  the  reason  for  this  is  not  that  it  has  no  beginning.  And  it  has 
been  stated  in  the  sutra  that  there  is  a cause  which  brings  about  the  destruction 
of  subconscious-impressions,  although  they  are  from  time  without  beginning. 
Helping  and  injuring  are  partial  expressions  for  the  efficient-cause  of  right-living 
and  wrong-living  and  so  on.  Under  this  expression  the  drinking  of  spirits  and 
similar  acts  are  also  included.  The  motive-power  {netn)  is  that  which  keeps 
[the  wheel]  moving  (ndgikd).  He  gives  the  reason  for  this  in  the  words  «the 
root.)^  Becoming  operative  is  presentness ; but  it  does  not  mean  that  right- 
living as  such  is  made  to  grow.  Of  this  very  point  the  reason  is  given  in  the 
words  «For  it  is  not.»  That  thing  to  which  one  is  confronted  would  be  such 
as  contact  with  a maiden.  So  the  meaning  of  the  sutra  is  that  where  the  more 
extensive  is  not,  there  the  less  extensive  also  is  not. 

Since  there  is  no  production  of  that  which  is  non-existent  nor 
destruction  of  that  which  is  existent,  how  will  subconscious- 
impressions,  by  reason  of  their  existence  as  things,  cease  to  exist  ? 

12.  Past  and  future  as  such  exist;  [therefore  subconscious- 
impressions  do  not  cease  to  be].  For  the  different  time- 
forms  belong  to  the  external-aspects. 

The  future  is  that  the  phenomenalization  of  which  is  yet  to  come. 
The  past  is  that  the  [individual]  phenomenalized  [form]  of  which 
has  been  experienced.  The  present  is  that  which  has  entered  into 
its  functional  activity.  And  this  three-fold  thing  is  the  object  for 
the  [intuitive]  knowledge  [of  the  yogin].  And  if  they  did  not  exist 
as  such,  this  [intuitive]  knowledge,  not  having  any  object,  would  not 
emerge  ^ [in  the  mind-stuff].  Therefore  past  and  future  as  such 
exist.  Moreover  if  the  result  of  the  karma,  either  that  which  is 
conducive  to  experience  or  that  which  is  conducive  to  liberation, 
when  it  is  yet  to  emerge,  were  without-any-describable-existence, 
then  the  actions  of  the  wise,  directed  towards  this  [or]  for  the 
purpose  of  this,  would  have  no  ground.  And  a cause  is  capable  of 
making  an  already  existent  result  present,  but  not  of  producing  ^ 

* With  udapatsgata  (rare : Whitney,  § 941),  p.  201  . For  the  word  upajana  seeii.  19, 

compare  niramdsyata,  above  279^  p.  150'^ ; iv.  2 and  11,  pp.  276®and  288^. 

’ For  the  word  upajanana  compare  iii.  11,  For  the  verb  see  i.  33,  p.  78'  (Calc.  ed.). 


iv.  12 — ] Book  TV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya  [316 

something  [altogether]  new.  The  efficient  cause  when  fully 
established  gives  aid  to  the  particularized  [form]  of  the  effect,  but 
it  does  not  cause  anything  [quite]  new  to  come  into  existence.  A 
substance,  moreover,  consists  of  a number  of  external-aspects. 
And  by  variation  of  this  [substance’s]  time-forms  the  external- 
aspects  are  in  successive  states.  The  past  or  the  future  does  not, 
like  the  present,  exist  as  a material  thing,  in  that  it  has  been 
changed  into  a particularized  phenomenal  form.  How  then  is  it  ? 
The  future  has  its  peculiar  existence  as  a thing  yet  to  be  pheno- 
menalized.  The  past  has  its  peculiar  existence  as  having  an 
[individual]  phenomenalized  [form]  already  experienced.  The 
[individual]  phenomenalized  [form]  of  the  thing  itself  belongs  to 
the  present  time-form  only.  This  cannot  be  for  the  past  and  the 
future  time-forms.  And  while  one  time-form  is  present,  the  two 
[other]  time-forms  are  of  course  inherent  in  the  substance.  Hence 
the  three  time-forms  do  not  come  into  a state-of-existence  after 
having-been-in-a-state-of-non-existence. 

With  the  intent  to  introduce  the  next  sutra  he  raises  a doubt  by  saying 
«there  is  no.»  The  words  «of  that  which  is  non-existent)^  have  been  intro- 
duced either  incidentally  or  by  way  of  illustration.  12.  Past  and  future  as 
such  exist ; [therefore  subconscious-impressions  do  not  cease  to  be].  For 
the  different  time-forms  belong  to  the  external-aspects.  There  is  no 
production  of  things  non-existent,  nor  destruction  of  things  existent.  But 
emergence  and  remergence  {udaya-vyaydu)  are  nothing  but  a mutation  of  the 
different  time-forms  of  external-aspects  which  are  existent.  This  is  the  mean- 
ing of  the  sutra.  «Experienced2>  is  that  by  which  one  gets  to  the  [individual] 
phenomenal  [form].  The  meaning  is  that  at  present  its  [individual]  pheno- 
menal [form]  is  not.  And  so  the  external-aspect  [is]  existent  in  all  three  times,  as 
he  says  «And  if.»  For  wdiat  is  non-existent  does  not  become  an  object  of 
knowledge,  because  it  is  without-any-describable  existence.  For  a mental  act 
is  nothing  but  a shining-forth  of  the  object.  And  it  cannot  occur  where  there 
is  no  object.  Whereas  the  mental-act  of  yogins  has  the  three  worlds  for  its 
object.  The  mental-act  of  such  as  we  are  also  would  not  arise  if  there  were 
no  object.  And  this  is  [quite]  consistent.  Therefore  the  past  and  the  future 
exist  as  connected-inseparably  with  their  generic-forms.  So  the  [intuitive]  know- 
ledge of  one  who  has  experience  of  tliis  kind  is  called  the  cause  of  the  existence 
of  the  object.  Because  the  future  exists  as  something  stateable,  it  also  exists 
as  an  object,  as  he  says  in  the  words  «Moreover  . . . conducive  to  experience. » 
«The  wise»  is  the  clever  man.  And  as  to  any  acts  to  be  performed,  when 


317] 


[ — iv.  13 


Past  and  future  exist 

one  tiling  is  the  cause  of  another,  it  can  bring  its  particular  function  into  play 
only  when  the  effect  is  [already]  existing,  for  instance,  the  chapters  of  the 
Veda  referring  to  the  [cutting  of]  sacrificial-reeds  {kandalava).  For  certainly 
these  cuttings  of  reeds  do  not  bring  into  existence  what  is  not  existing.  But 
they  cause  modifications^  or  they  bring  near  a thing  which  is  existing. 
Similarly  the  potter  and  the  [efficient  causes]  lead  to  the  present  existence 
of  a water-jar  which  already  exists  as  he  says  «an  already  existent. » But  if  the 
past  and  future  are  to  be  supposed  as  being  non-existent  simply  because  they 
are  not  in  the  present,  then,  whew ! Sir ! the  present  also  would  be  non- 
existent, because  it  is  not  in  the  past  and  future.  But  as  to  existence  irrespective 
of  its  relation  to  time-form  or  to  substance,  it  equally  holds  for  all  three,  as  he 
says  substance,  moreover.)^  The  words  ^are  in  successive  states^  mean 
belonging  to  each  state  one  by  one.  The  expression  «as  a material  thing» 
means  in  a substance  which  is  a material  thing.  The  termination  -tas  is  used 
for  all  case-endings.  If  the  past  and  the  future  are,  only  so  far  as  they  are  past 
and  future,  then  at  the  present  they  are  not,  because  at  this  time  they  are  not 
past  or  future,  as  he  says  <SAnd  while  one.^  He  brings  the  discussion  to 
a close  in  the  words  «state-of-existence  after  having-been-in-a-state-of-non- 
existence.» 


13.  These  [external-aspects  with  the  three  time-forms]  are 
phenomenalized  [individuals]  or  subtile  [generic  forms  and] 
their  essence  is  the  aspects  {guna). 

<These>  are  of  course  those  external-aspects  with  the  three  time- 
forms  : those  which  are  [phenomenalized]  are  the  present ; those 
which  are  subtile  are  the  past  and  the  future,  the  six^  non-particulars. 
Since  this  whole  world  is  nothing  more  than  a particular  colloca- 
tion of  aspects  {guno),  it  has  in  the  strict  sense  the  aspects  as  its 
essence.  And  in  this  sense  the  Exposition  ^ of  the  System  has  said, 
“ The  aspects  from  their  utmost  height 
Come  not  within  the  range  of  sight. 

But  all  within  the  range  of  sight 
A phantom  seems  and  empty  quite.” 


* For  the  compound  prdptivikarau  see 

Pan.  ii.  2.  82. 

* ii.  19,  p.  147’  (Calc.  ed.). 

® The  quotation  is  attributed  to  Vdrsaganya 
by  Vacaspatimifra  in  his  Bhamatl  on 
Vedanta-sutra  ii.  1.  2.  3 in  the  follow- 


ing words  ata  eva  yoga^dstram  vyutpd- 
dayitd-dha  sma  Bhagavdn  Vdrsaganyah 
"gundndm  (Nirnayasagara,  first  edition, 
p.  352).  Compare  Vijnana  Bhiksu  in 
his  Vijnanamrta  (Benares  ed.  1901), 

p.  101. 


iv.13— ] Booh  IV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya  [318 

An  objector  says,  ‘This  may  be  true.  But  this  manifold  amplification 
(prapafica)  of  the  varied  forms  of  the  universe  {vi(}va),  having  as  its  essence 
the  kinds  of  mutation  which  are  the  states  of  the  substance  and  its  external- 
aspects,  cannot  properly  come  out  of  one  primary  substance.  For  from  a cause 
which  has  no  diversity,  diversities  of  effect  cannot  come  to  pass.’  In  reply 
to  this  he  says  13.  These  [external-aspects  with  the  three  time-forms] 
are  phenomenalized.  [individuals]  or  subtile  [generic  forms  and]  their 
essence  is  the  aspects  (guna).  These  external-aspects  with  the  three  time- 
forms,  both  the  phenomenalized  and  the  subtile,  have  the  aspects  as  their 
essence.  For  they  have  no  other  cause  than  the  three-fold  aspects.  But  as 
to  their  diversity,  it  follows  from  the  diversity  attending  upon  the  beginningless 
subconscious-impressions  from  hindrances  produced  by  these  [aspects  {guna)~\. 
In  which  sense  it  has  been  said  in  the  Vayu*  Purana,  “Because  the  primary 
cause  has  manifold  forms,  there  is  a marvellous  mutation.”  Of  the  earth  and 
the  other  phenomenalized  [individuals],  and  of  the  eleven  organs,  which  are 
present  forms,  there  are  past  and  future  [forms],  which  are  the  six  non- 
particularized  [forms ; and  these]  arise  according  to  their  capacity. — Making 
now  a distinction  between  the  permanent  and  the  impermanent  forms  of  the 
universe,  he  gives  first  its  permanent  form  in  the  words  ^this  whole  world.» 
«This»  [that  is]  the  visible  [world].  «A  collocation)^  means  a mutation  with 
a particular  arrangement  of  parts.  On  this  point  there  is  a specific  mention 
of  the  Shastitantra  text.  It  is  like  a phantom  {mayd),  but  not  quite  a phantom. 
«Empty  quite»  means  perishable.  For  just  as  a phantom  in  no  time  assumes 
different  shapes,  so  those  evolved-effects  whose  exteimal-aspects  become  visible 
and  invisible,  change  from  moment  to  moment.  Whereas  primary-matter  is 
permanent,  and  thus  not  homogeneous  with  a phantom,  and  is  accordingly  an 
ultimate  reality. 


But  if  all  things  are  aspects  [gund),  how  is  it  that  there  is  a 
single  sound  and  a single  organ  [of  sense]  1 

14.  The  that-ness  of  a thing  is  due  to  a singleness  of  muta- 
tion. 

When  the  aspects  disposed  to  vividness  and  to  activity  and  to 
inertia  have  as  their  essence  processes-of-knowing,  in  so  far  as  they 
are  instruments  [of  perception],  there  is  a single  mutation,  for 
instance,  the  organ-of-hearing.  When  their  essence  is  objects-for- 

’ xlix.  182,  Anandaframa  ed,,  p.  153,  and  * See  Garbe : Mondschein  der  Samkhya 
liii.  20,  Anandaframa  ed.,  p.  175.  See  Wahrheit,  p.  Ill,  note  3 ; and  Garbe’s 

also  Samkhya  Tattva  Kaumudi  xlii  Translation  of  the  Samkhya  Pravacana 

[Garbe’s  translation,  p.  86].  Bhasya,  vi.  3,  p.  147. 


319] 


[ — iv.  14 


Each  thing  a complex  of  relations 


knowledge,  in  so  far  as  they  are  sounds,  there  is  a single  mutation, 
a sound,  an  object  of  sense.  The  sounds  and  other  [perceptible 
objects],  belonging  to  the  general  class  of  limitation-in-extent,^ 
have  a single  mutation,  an  atom  of  earth,  a part  of  a fine-substance 
{tanmdtra).  And  these  [atoms]  have  a single  mutation,  the  earth, 
a cow,  a tree,  a mountain,  for  examples.  By  adding  [to  each  of] 
the  other  [coarse]  elements  [successively]  liquidity  and  heat  and 
motivity  and  the  making  of  a space,  a generic-form,  the  beginning 
of  a single  evolved-effect,  would  be  formed. — They  who  from  the 
following  point  of  view  deny  the  existence  of  a thing  as  such  by 
saying,  ‘ There  is  no  intended-object  dissociated  from  a mental  act, 
but  percepts  are  dissociated  from  intended-objects  and  imagined 
as  in  dreams  and  similar  states,’  and  they  who  say  ‘ a thing  is  only 
a readjustment  of  percepts,  like  the  objects  of  a dream,  and  not 
a thing  in  the  full  sense  of  the  word,’ — these,  when  the  thing  is 
presented  by  its  own  authority  as  it  is  Itathd)  [according  as  it  is 
seen]  to  be  there  {idam),  since  they  throw  overboard  the  thing 
as  such  by  an  abstract  (vikalpa)  thinking  without  force  of  proof, — • 
how  in  the  very  act  of  prattling  it  away  can  their  own  words  be 
worthy  of  belief? 

It  may  be  granted  that  the  three-fold  aspects  (gum)  have  such  a diversity  of 
mutation.  But  whence  comes  a single  mutation,  so  that  one  says  ‘ This  is 
earth  ’ or  ‘ This  is  water  ’ ? By  raising  this  objection,  since  there  is  a con- 
tradiction between  the  three  essences  and  the  singleness,  he  introduces  the 
sutra.  14.  The  that-ness  of  a thing  is  due  to  a singleness  of  mutation. 
We  see  a single  mutation  belonging  to  many,  for  instance,  when  a cow  or 
a horse  or  a buffalo  or  an  elephant  is  huddled  together  in  a brackish  ^ [land], 
each  has  a single  mutation  characterized  by  the  common  nature  of  salt.  And 
[similarly]  a wick  and  oil  and  fire  form  a lamp.  In  the  same  way  the  aspects 
{guna),  though  many,  have  a single  mutation.  As  a result  of  this,  each  of  the 
fine  elements  (tanmatra)  and  of  the  elements  and  of  the  products-of-the-elements 
has  a that-ness,  that  is  a singleness.  [When  their]  essence  is  objects-for- 
knowledge,  in  so  far  as  sattva  is  predominant,  their  essence  is  vividness.  And 


^ Compare  iii.  44,  p.  254^*  (Calc.  ed.). 

“ The  Maniprabha  says  rumdsthale.  And 
the  Patanjala  Rahasyam  says,  ‘ If  cows 
and  other  animals  are  huddled  together 
in  that  brackish  spot  (rumdlavana- 
ihumi),  then  all  of  them  together  will 


have  the  brackish  flavour  attaching  to 
their  bodies.’  Colonel  Jacob  adduces 
evidence  to  show  that  ruma  is  the 
name  of  a particular  salt-lake  or  mine 
(Second  Handful  of  Popular  Maxims, 
2nd  edition,  1909,  p.  69). 


iv,  14 — ] Booh  IV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya  [320 

being  subsidiary-products  of  the  personality-substance  they  have  a single 
mutation  in  the  form  of  instruments  [of  perception],  [for  instance],  the  organ- 
of-hearing.  In  so  far  as  the  tamas  of  these  same  [aspects]  is  predominant, 
inasmuch  as  they  are  insensate  (jada)  and  thus  have  objects-for-knowledge  as 
their  essence,  there  is  a single  mutation  as  being  the  fine  element  sound, 
an  object  of  sense.  By  the  words  «a  sound»  he  indicates  the  fine  element 
sound  ; by  the  words  <Kobject  of  sense»  he  indicates  that  it  is  insensate.  But 
the  fine  element  cannot  possibly  be  the  object  of  the  organ-of-hearing.  The 
rest  is  easy. — He  now  raises  up  a Destructionist  {vdina<;ika),  who  holds  the 
Theory  of  Ideas  {vijmnavadin),  by  saying  «‘  There  is  no  intended-object  dis- 
sociated from  a mental-act.’»  ‘ For  if  there  be  elements  and  products  of 
elements  distinct  from  mental-acts,  then  we  might  suppose  a productive  cause 
of  them  such  as  the  primary  cause.  But  in  the  strict  sense  they  are  not  anything 
different  from  ideas.  How  is  it  then  that  a primary  cause  is  presupposed? 
And  how  is  it  that  processes-of-knowing,  the  organs-of-sense,  which  are  evolved- 
effects  of  the  personality-substance,  are  presupposed  ? To  explain.  Since  an 
insensate  intended-object  cannot  be  vivid  of  itself,  there  is  no  intended-object 
dissociated  from  some  mental-act.  [Association  is]  coexistence  [that  is]  a rela- 
tion. The  absence  of  this  is  dissociation.  The  prefix  vi-  is  used  in  the  sense  of 
absence.  The  meaning  is  that  there  is  nothing  unrelated  to  some  idea  ; [in  other 
words]  something  which  might  properly  be  described  as  non-existing.  On  the 
other  hand  mental-acts  do  exist  dissociated  from  intended-objects.  For  in  so  far 
as  this  mental-act  is  vivid  in  itself,  it  does  not  require  an  insensate  intended- 
object  in  order  to  make  a statement  as  to  its  own  existence.’  So  then  the 
holder  of  the  Theory  of  Ideas  {vijndnavddin)  has  indicated  two  requisites,  1.  the 
fact'  that  it  is  perceived  {vedyatva),  and  2.  the  fact  that  it  is  apperceived 
along  with  something  else  (saJiopalambha).  ‘ These  two  points  can  further 
be  brought  out  in  a syllogism  thus.  Whatever  is  perceived  by  whatever 
process-of-perception,  that  [intended-object]  is  not  distinct  from  that  [process- 
of-perception].  Just  as  the  soul  in  the  case  of  knowledge.  And  the  elements 
and  the  products-of-the-elements  are  perceived.  So  this  apperception  [of 
elements]  is  pervaded  by  the  contrary  proposition,  [that  is,  it  refutes  the 
absence  of  distinction  between  the  process  and  the  object].  So  the  fact-that- 
it-is-perceived,  which  is  less-extensive  as  compared  with  what-is-the-opposite 
of  the  distinction  which-we-wish-to-deny,  [as  soon  as  this  fact]  is  known,  posits 
the  absence-of-distinction,  which  is  more  extensive  with  regard  to  itself  [the 
perception].  And  when  we  see  this,  [the  fact  that  they  are  seen  as  different], 
which  is  just  the  contrary  of  this,  is  denied.  Accordingly,  when  any  thing 
is  invariably  seen  with  another  thing,  then  the  one  is  not  different  from  the 
other,  just  as  the  second  moon  which  is  always  perceived  with  the  [actual] 
moon.  And  it  is  the  case  that  the  object  is  always  invariably  perceived  with 

' Similar  discussion  by  ^amkara  on  ii.  2.  28.  See  also  Sarva-dar9ana-samgraha  (Anand. 
ed.),  pp.  9-10  and  13. 


321]  Criticism  of  Buddhist  idecdism  [ — iv.  14 

the  thought.  Thus  this  perception  contradicts  the  more  extensive  [term] ; the 
invariable  relation  contradicts  the  variable  relation  which  is  more  extensive 
than  the  distinction,  which  we  must  deny.  Kemoving  thus  the  variable  relation, 
it  rejects  the  distinction,  which  is  less  extensive  than  this  [relation].'  Let  this 
be  assumed.  And  if  the  intended-object  is  not  different  from  the  thought, 
then  how  is  it  that  they  seem  to  be  different  ?’  In  reply  to  this  [the  Vijnanavadin] 
says  ‘«imagined.^  As  the  Destructionists * say  “Because  there  is  invariably 
an  apperception  of  [the  object]  blue  and  of  the  percept  of  this  [blue]  at  the 
same  time,  there  is  no  difference  [between  them].  And  the  difference  that 
may  be  seen  between  them  results  from  illusions  of  mental -acts  just  as  a pair 
of  moons  may  be  seen  when  there  is  one  only  without  a second.”  [The 
Vijnanavadin]  makes  clear  the  imaginary  [difference]  in  the  words  ^only  a 
readjustment  of  percepts.’)^  [The  author  of  the  Comment]  refutes  this  by 
saying  <SCthese.^  The  construction  of  the  sentence  is,  how  can  their  own  words 
be  worthy  of  credence? — «Presented»  means  brought  before  them  at  the  time 
of  each  perception.  How  [is  it  presented]?  He  replies  ^as  it  is.)»  In 
the  different  ways  that  [a  thing]  shines  forth  as  being  [the  thing]  that  is 
pointed  to  as  this  and  this,  in  that  very  way  eo  ipso  [svayam)  it  is  presented  ; 
but  not  as  being  reduced  to  an  object  of  a mental-act  [or]  as  being  a figment 
of  the  imagination.  The  words  ^by  its  own  authorityS>  point  out  that  the 
intended-object  acts  as  cause  with  reference  to  the  mental-act,  because  the 
intended-object  has  given  rise  to  the  mental-act  by  virtue  of  its  own  power 
as  an  object-for-knowledge.  It  is  on  account  of  this  that  the  mental-act  is  the 
perceiver  of  the  intended-object.  Now  how  could  a thing,  which  is  of  such 
a kind,  [be  thrown  away]  by  reason  of  an  [empty]  abstract  thinking  having 
no  force  of  proving?  For  since  an  [empty]  conception  is  no  means-of-proof, 
therefore  what  is  based  upon  it  and  what  is  in  essence  that  [empty  abstraction] 
is  no  means-of-proof.  In  this  way  throwing  overboard  the  thing  as  such,  [that 
is]  setting  it  afloat. — An  occasional  reading  is  ‘holding  it  under.’  In  this  case 
too  the  meaning  is  the  same.  Prattling  away  this  object  in  this  way,  [how] 
can  their  own  words  be  worthy  of  belief  ? This  is  what  is  intended.  The  two 
middle  terms  given,  the  invariable  apperception  at  one  time  and  the  fact  of 
being  perceived,  are  non-conclusive.  Because  the  negative  statement  is  open  to 
doubt.  To  explain.  The  coarseness  and  externality  appear  [in  consciousness] 
in  the  case  of  elements  and  products  of  elements  which  [as  you  say]  have  the 
form  of  thought  [only],  but  these  two  [qualities]  are  not  possible  in  the  case 
of  thought  [only].  To  explain.  Coarseness  means  pervading  several  points-of- 
space.  Externality  means  related  to  separated  points-of-space.  And  it  is  im- 
possible that  a single  mental-act  should  peiwade  several  points-of-space  and  also 

' If  there  is  llteda,  there  is  a-niyatasahopa-  ® Quoted  Sarva  Darf.  Samg.  p.  16  (Ananda9. 
lambka;  hut  there  is  none  of  this  ed.)  and  de  la  Valle'e  Poussin’s  note  in 

latter  ; therefore  there  is  no  bkeda.  Le  Bouddhisme  (Museon,  1902),  p.  34. 

41  [h.o.s.  n] 


iv.  14 — ] 


Booh  TV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya 


[322 


[occupy]  separated  points- of-space.  For  it  is  impossible  to  have  in  a single  thing 
the  confusion  of  contrary  qualities  such  as  occupying  this  point-of-space  and  not 
occupying  this  point-of-space.  Else  if  this  were  possible,  one  would  have  to 
admit  that  all  three  worlds  are  a single  thing.  If  it  be  said  that  for  this  very 
reason  we  should  admit  that  there  is  a difference  in  the  mental-acts  [as  to 
coarseness  and  externality,  in  that  there  are  as  many  thoughts  as  there  are  forms 
of  the  thing],  then  the  reply  would  be.  Then ! Sir ! in  the  case  of  the  ideas 
which  can  grasp  even  the  extremely  subtile  objects  [finer  than  coarseness  and 
externality],  and  which  take  no  notice  of  each  other’s  behaviour,  and  which  are 
awake  only  to  that  [one  atomic  object]  which  comes  within  their  range — how 
could  there  be  the  appearance  of  coarseness  ? And  you  cannot  talk  [of  what 
is  perceived  by  the  later-distinct-impression  {vikalpa)  in  language]  which  refers 
to  the  later-distinct-impression.  Because  there  is  no  confusion  of  [the  content  of 
this  impression  with  anything  else],  and  [on  the  other  hand]  there  is  a clear 
appearance  [of  coarseness].  Nor  can  it  be  said  that  coarseness  is  externally 
sensed  (alocitam)  [by  the  first-indistinct-impression],  and  so  the  clearness  of  the 
knowledge  (savikalpa)  which  follows  this,  and  which  is  conditioned  by  this 
[avikalpa]  could  be  explained.  Further  this  later-distinct-impression  is  not,  like 
the  first-indistinct-impression,  limited  to  its  form  (akara)  and  to  nothing  else. 
For  since  this  [later-indistinct-impression]  is  not  itself  a coarse  [thing],  it 
cannot  make  the  coarse  [manifest]  as  its  object.  Therefore  if  an  idea  is  to 
be  outer,  since,  as  we  have  shown  it,  it  cannot  be  coarse  or  outer,  then  these 
coarse  and  outer  [impressions]  may  be  counted,  if  you  will,  as  altogether  false. 
And  you  cannot  say  that  such  a false  impression  is  just  the  same  as  a mental- 
act.  For  then  you  would  have  to  admit  that  the  mental-act  is  as  empty  as 
this  [false  impi-ession]. — So  to  resume  the  argument  {tatha  ca).  In  so  far 
as  the  fact  of  being  perceived  is  not  less  extensive  than  the  absence  of  difference 
between  [the  idea  and  the  object],  how  can  the  fact  of  its  being  perceived 
refute  the  fact  of  the  difference? — And  as  to  being  invariably  together.  Just 
as  in  the  case  of  the  mental-act  and  of  the  coarseness,  the  one  existent  and 
the  other  non-existent,  so  likewise  in  the  case  of  two  existing  things  [the  being 
perceived  invariably  together]  may  be  explained  on  the  ground  of  the  nature 
of  things  or  on  the  ground  of  some  kind  of  an  obstruction  [in  the  thinking 
apparatus].  Accordingly  those  two  fallacious  middle  terms  [put  forth  by  the 
opponent],  because  they  are  non  conclusive,  only  give  rise  to  an  [empty] 
abstraction  {vikalpa),  if  there  be  no  external  [thing].  And  the  authority  of 
a perception  is  not  to  be  gainsaid  by  a mere  [empty]  abstraction.  So  the  point 
was  well  taken  when  he  said  «by  an  abstract  {vikalpa)  thinking  without 
force  of  proof.2>  By  this  [discussion  we  must  understand  that  also  the 
view  which  attempts  to  prove  that  objects]  are  ideas,  urged  as  a ground  that 
ideas  have  no  external-basis,  as  illustrated  by  the  ideas  of  a dream,  is  also 
overthrown.  And  the  alternatives  {vikalpa)  regarding  the  object-of-the-illation 
have  been  offered-in-rebuttal  by  stating  that  the  relation  is  that  between  whole 


323]  Criticism  of  Buddhist  idealism  [ — iv,  15 

and  [part].  For  details  the  Nyaya  Kanika'  is  to  be  consulted.  So  there  is 
no  need  of  details  here. 

Why  is  this  incorrect  ? 

15.  Because,  while  the  [physical]  thing  remains  the  same,  the 
mind-stuffs  are  different,  [therefore  the  two  are  upon]  dis- 
tinct levels-of-existence. 

A single  [physical]  thing  is  the  common  [physical]  basis  for  many 
mind-stuffs.  It  is  not,  of  course,  figured  forth  by  a single  mind- 
stuff,  nor  yet  is  it  figured  forth  by  many  mind-stuffs.  It  is 
rather  grounded  in  itself.  Why  is  this  ? Because,  while  the 
[physical]  thing  remains  the  same,  the  mind-stuffs  are  different. 
When  the  mind-stuff  is  in  relation  with  right-conduct,  the  mind- 
stuff  has  thoughts  of  pleasure,  the  [physical]  thing  remaining  the 
same.  When  in  relation  with  wrong-living,  from  the  same 
[physical  thing]  it  has  thoughts  of  pain.  When  in  relation  with 
undifferentiated-consciousness,  from  the  same  [physical  thing]  it  has 
thoughts  of  infatuation.  When  in  relation  wnth  complete  insight, 
from  the  same  thing  it  has  thoughts  of  detachment.^  If  this  is  so, 
by  whose  mind-stuff  would  this  thing  be  formed  ? Nor  would  it  be 
sound  to  say  that  one  person’s  mind-stuff  is  affected  when  brought 
into  relation  with  an  object  formed  by  the  mind-stuff  of  another 
person.  Consequently  the  [physical]  thing  and  the  thought  distinct 
because  of  dissimilarity,  in  that  the  thing  is  the  object-for-know- 
ledge  and  the  thought  is  the  process-of-knowing,  [are  upon]  distinct 
levels-of-existence.  There  is  not  even  a trace  ^ of  a blending  of  the 
two.  But  from  the  point-of-view  of  the  Samkhya,  since  a thing  has 
three  aspects  {guna)  and  since  the  changes  of  the  aspects  ^ are 
unstable,  it  comes  into  relation  with  the  mind-stuffs  [of  men], 
dependent  [for  its  existence  in  this  case  or  the  other]  upon  such 
determinants  as  right-living  [or  wrong  living  or  undifferentiated 
consciousness  or  complete  insight],  it  becomes  the  cause,  in  one  form 

* Reference  is  made  to  this  work  by  Vacas-  the  Bhamati  on  Vedanta-sutra  ii.  2. 

patimi9ra  at  i.  32,  p.  75'  (Calc,  ed.),  25  (Nirnaya-sagara  ed.),  p.  462. 

and  also  in  the  Tattva  Bindu  (Benares,  ® Compare  ii.  28. 

1892),  p.  23’^ — The  Niralambanavdda  ® Compare  Pan.  i.  2.  15. 

is  discussed  in  the  ^astra-dipika,  p.  32  ; * Compare  ii.  15,  p.  135";  iii.  9 and  13, 

in  the  Nyaya  karika,  p.  261  ; and  in  pp.  199'  and  204'  (Calc.  ed.). 


iv.  15 — ] Book  IV.  Isolation  or  Kaivalya  [324 

or  another,  of  presented-ideas,  as  they  rise  [into  consciousness], 
corresponding  [in  quality]  to  the  [determining]  efficient-cause. 

So  having  in  this  manner,  independently  of  the  sutra,  given  the  reason  for 
setting  up  [the  physical  thing]  as  something  over  and  above  the  mental-act,  the 
author  of  the  Comment  introduces  the  reason  as  given  in  the  sutra  itself  by  the 
words  ^Why  is  this  15.  Because,  while  the  [physical]  thing  remains  the 
same,  the  mind-stuffs  are  different,  [therefore  the  two  are  upon]  distinct 
levels-of-existence.  Whatever  units  are  in  the  manifold  these  differ  absolutely 
from  the  manifold.  For  instance,  a single  thought  in  Chaitra  or  in  Maitra  is 
distinct  from  the  presented-ideas  in  Devadatta  and  in  Vishnumitra,  which  are 
dissimilar.  And  since  the  intended-object  is  not  different,  even  when  the  thoughts 
about  it  are  manifold,  it  is  other  than  the  mental-acts.  And  further  the  iden- 
tity of  the  intended-object,  although  the  thoughts  of  those  who  know  it  validly 
are  different,  is  determined  by  the  connexion  of  one  [thought]  with  another  [in 
memory].  For  in  the  case  of  a single  woman  who  is  presented-to-the-minds  of 
several  persons,  enamoured  or  ill-disposed  or  infatuated  or  detached,  we  see  a 
reciprocal  connexion  so  that  one  thinks  ‘ She  who  is  seen  by  you  is  seen  by  me 
also.’  Consequently  while  the  [physical]  thing  remains  the  same,  because  the 
mind-stuffs  are  different,  because  there  is  a difference  of  thoughts,  [therefore] 
the  two,  the  intended-object  and  the  thought,  [are  upon]  distinct  levels-of-exist- 
ence [that  is]  [distinct]  means  of  distinguishing  the  essential  attributes.  In 
the  lover,  a thought  of  pleasure  with  reference  to  the  woman  loved  ; in  rival 
mistresses,  a thought  of  pain  ; but  in  Chaitra  who  has  not  obtained  her,  a thought 
of  infatuation,  a depression.  ‘This  may  be  so,’  the  objector  says,  ‘ but  that 
intended-object  with  the  distinguishing  characteristic  of  being  loved  is  figured 
forth  by  a mind-stuff  of  one  person.  And  this  same  [intended-object]  affects 
the  mind-stuff  of  the  others  also.  So  [this  mind-stuff]  might  be  supposed  to  be 
common.’  In  reply  to  this  he  says  ^nor  would  it  be  . . . another.»  For  if  that 
were  so,  when  one  person  has  the  thought  of  blue,  all  would  have  the  thought 
of  blue.  A further  objection  would  be  this  ‘ Even  according  to  the  view  which 
maintains  the  distinct  existence  of  objects  {artliavada),  how  can  one  and  the 
same  object  be  the  cause  of  mental-acts  differing  according  to  the  difference 
in  pleasure  and  the  other  [experieirces]  ? For  from  a cause  which  is  not  differ- 
ent in  its  distinguishing  characteristics  there  should  be  no  difference  in  effects.’ 
In  reply  to  this  he  says  «from  the  point-of-view  of  the  Sariikhya.)^  It  is  quite 
consistent  to  say  that  the  same  external  thing  which  is  a mutation  of  the  three 
aspects  {guna)  has  three  forms.  The  objector  says  ‘ Even  if  it  be  so,  then  all 
without  distinction  would  have  a mental-act  of  pleasure  and  of  pain  and  of 
infatuation.’  In  reply  to  this  he  says  «dependent  [for  its  existence]  upon  such 
determinants  as  right-living.»  The  sattva  accompanied  by  the  rajas  and  deter- 
mined by  right-living  produces  the  sensation  of  happiness.  But  this  same  sattva 
when  determined  by  knowledge  (vidya),  after  the  rajas  has  been  removed,  gives 
rise  to  a sensation  of  detachment.  And  right-living  and  the  other  [experiences] 


325]  One  real  object  common  to  all  Selves  [ — iv.  16 

are  not  all  in  all  persons.  Some  of  it  is  in  some  pemons.  So  this  arrangement 
[of  pleasures  and  of  pains]  is  quite  consistent. 

There  are  some  who  say  that  a thing  is  coextensive  with  its 
thought,  in  so  far  as  like  pleasure  and  the  other  [experiences] 
it  is  experienced.  In  this  way  when  they  thus  reject  the  quality 
of  being  common  [to  several  mind-stuffs],  they  deny  the  existence 
of  the  thing  in  both  its  earlier  and  its  later  moments. 

16.  And  a thing  is  not  dependent  upon  a single  mind-stuff, 
[for  then  in  certain  cases]  it  could  not  be  proved  [by  that 
mind-stuff],  [and]  then  what  would  it  be  ? 

If  a thing  were  dependent  ^ upon  a single  mind-stuff,  then  if  the 
mind-stuff'  be  distracted  or  restricted,  it  itself  would  be  un- 
touched by  that  mind-stuff.  And  not  coming  within  the  range 
of  that  [mind-stuff],  and  not  being  proved  [by  that  mind-stuff], 
and  unperceived  in  its  nature  by  any  one,  would  it  then  be  at  all?^ 
And  how  could  it  be  produced  again  in  relation  to  the  mind-stuff? 
It  would  not  possess  those  parts  of  it  which  are  not  apparent.  So 
that  if  one  says  the  back  does  not  exist,  neither  could  the  belly  be 
known.  Consequently  an  intended-object  is  independent  [of  mind- 
stuff]  and  common  to  all  the  Selves.  And  again  independent 
mind-stuff's  function  differently  for  each  Self.  As  a result  of 
a relation  between  these  two  [the  intended-object  and  the  mind- 
stuff']  there  follows  an  apperception,  an  experience  of  the  Self 
On  this  point  there  are  some  disputatious  persons  who  say  that  the  object  is 
coexistential  with  the  idea.  Because  it  is  the  object  of  experience,  like  pleasure. 
What  he  means  to  say  is  this.  The  intended-object  might  be  admitted  to  be 
distinct  from  knowledge,  still  since  it  is  insensate  {jarja),  it  cannot  be  perceived 
in  the  absence  of  knowledge,  but  must  be  illumined  by  the  knowledge. 
Accordingly  [the  object]  is  only  at  the  time  of  the  idea,  and  not  at  other  times. 
Since  there  is  no  evidence  that  it  exists  at  other  times.  This  the  author  of  the 
Comment  confutes  independently  of  the  sutra  in  the  words  ^In  this  way  when 
they.»  For  a [physical]  thing  (vastu)  is  experienced  by  ordinary  observers®  as 
common  to  all  mind-stuffs  and  as  persisting^  in  the  succession  of  various 
moments  and  as  consisting  of  a mutation.  Now  if  the  thing  is  coexistential 
with  the  mental-act,  then  it  would  be  of  this  sort  [that  its  appearance  and 

' As  the  Vijnanavada  maintains.  ® This  would  be  the  point  of  view  of  the 

* Compare  de  la  Vallee  Poussin : La  Nega-  Sarvastivadin. 

tion  de  I’Ame  (Journal  Asiatique,  9®  * Compare  Nyaya-sutra  i.  1.  40. 

serie,  tome  xx,  1902,  pp.  248  and  254). 


iv.  16—] 


[326 


Booh  IV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya 

disappearance  would  be  coexistential  with  the  appearance  and  disappearance  of 
the  idea].  If  so,  how  can  one  act  up  to  {anurodha)  this  objective-factor  {idaman^a) 
so  that  one  shall  not  at  the  same  time  deny  it  ? This  is  the  meaning.  Or  we 
may  suppose  that  there  is  not  a denial  of  this  objective-factor.  Let  the  intended- 
object  be  coexistential  with  the  knowledge.  To  this  also  the  reply  is  in  the 
sntra.  16.  And  a thing  is  not  dependent  upon  a single  mind-stuff,  [for 
then  in  certain  cases]  it  could  not  be  proved  [by  that  mind-stuff],  [and]  then 
what  would  it  be  ? For  the  same  mind-stuff  which  perceives  a water-jar,  when 
distracted  by  another  substance  such  as  a piece  of  cloth,  does  not  remain  upon 
the  water-jar;  or  when  the  mind-stuff  which  has  discrimination  as  its  object, 
attains  at  that  very  time  to  restriction  ; — at  these  times,  since  there  is  no  know- 
ledge of  the  water-jar  or  of  the  discrimination,  the  water-jar  and  the  discrimina- 
tion, being  dependent  for  their  existence  upon  one  particular  knowledge  only, 
would  surely  cease  when  this  [knowledge]  ceases.  This  he  says  in  the  words 
^dependent  upon  a single  mind-stuff.»  The  words  <Khow  could  it  be»  mean  that 
it  could  not  be.  How  does  it  happen  that  the  mind-stuff  is  in  relation  to  this 
thing  whether  it  be  a water-jar  or  discrimination?  For  the  effects  invariably 
are  where  the  cause  is,  and  invariably  are  not  where  the  cause  is  not.  Without 
regard  to  their  own  peculiar  cause  they  cannot  be  produced  by  another  cause. 
And  if  they  are  supposed  to  be  causeless,  then  one  would  have  to  deny  [such]  an 
inconsistency  as  the  accidental  existence  of  them  [the  effects].  And  there  is  no 
ground  for  saying  that  whatever  causes  the  knowledge  of  the  thing  also  causes 
the  thing.  For  then  it  would  follow  that  the  taste  and  the  sensific  power  and 
the  digestion  and  so  on  would  be  the  same  whether  one  makes  use  of  an  actual 
sweetmeat  or  of  a sweetmeat  * of  hope.  Therefore  the  point  is  well  taken  when 
he  says  «And  how  could  it  be  produced  again  in  relation  to  the  mind-stuff  ?» 
Furthermore  the  front  part  of  anything  is  implied  by  the  middle  and  hind  part. 
But  if  the  existence  [of  the  thing]  were  to  depend  upon  the  knowledge,  then 
the  upper  and  middle  parts  would  not  exist,  since  this  [idea  of  them]  is  not  in 
experience.  And  accordingly  since  the  pervader  [the  upper  and  middle  parts] 
are  not,  the  lower  part,  which  is  pervaded,  would  also  not  be.  And  thus  if  the 
whole  object  be  absent,  how  could  it  be  urged  that  the  intended-object  is  coexis- 
tential with  the  knowledge,  as  he  says  <Klt  would  not  possess  those  parts.)^  The 
words  «are  not  apparent^  mean  are  not  perceived.  He  brings  the  discussion 
to  a close  by  saying  ^Consequently.»  The  rest  is  easy. 


* This  is  an  allusion  to  the  stanza  in  Qrihar- 
aa’s  Khandanakhandakhadya 
‘‘  Afamodakatrpta  ye,  ye  coparjitamo- 
dakah 1 

Rasavxt'yavipdkddi  tulyam  tesam  pra- 
sajyate.” 

(Lazarus  and  Co’s  edition,  Medical  Hall 
Press,  Benares,  p.  37;  Chaukhamba 


Sanskrit  Series,  fascicle  I,  p.  66.)  This 
stanza  is  given  as  a quotation  in^rlhar- 
sa’s  work  also.  There  is  another  book 
of  the  same  title  on  astronomy.  See 
also  de  la  Vallee  Poussin,  Le  Boud- 
dhisme  (Museon,  1902),  p.  35,  and 
Hoernle’s  translation  of  the  Su9ruta, 

p.  12. 


327]  Objects  noiv  known  now  not  known  [ — iv.  17 

17.  A thing  is  known  or  not  known  by  virtue  of  its  affecting 
[or  not  affecting]  the  mind-stuff. 

Objects-of-sense  like  magnets,  bind  to  themselves  the  mind-stuff, 
as  if  it  had  qualities  of  iron,  and  affect  it.  The  object  whereby 
the  mind-stuff  is  affected  is  known.  But  [the  Self],  who  is  other 
than  this,  is  not  known.  The  mind-stuff  enters  into  mutations 
because  the  nature  of  the  thing  is  now  known  ^ and  now  not 
known. 

This  might ^ be  conceded.  ‘But,’  as  the  objector  says,  ‘if  the  object  is  to  be 
independent,  in  that  it  is  insensate,  it  can  never  throw  out  light,  or  if  it  does 
throw  out  light,  then  its  insensate  character  would  vanish.  And  so  {iti)  it 
would  cease  also  to  be.  For  surely  a thing  cannot  exist  after  casting  off  its 
own  nature.  Moreover  it  cannot  be  urged  that  throwing  out  light  is  a pro- 
perty of  the  intended-object  which  is  really  insensate  by  nature,  and  that  this 
[property]  is  put  into  it  by  the  organs.  For  if  throwing  out  light  were  to  be 
a property  of  the  intended-object,  it  would  be,  like  blueness,  common  to  all 
persons.  Thus  if  a single  person  knows  the  meaning  of  the  [philosophical] 
systems,  then  all  would  be  scholars  and  there  would  be  no  incompetent  persons. 
Nor  is  it  correct  to  say  that  a present  external-aspect  should  exist  in  the  past 
or  in  the  future.  Therefore  that  an  intended-object  exists  independently  as  an 
object  of  apperception  is  nothing  but  a wish.’  In  reply  to  this  he  recites  the 
sutra  17.  A thing  is  known  or  not  known  by  virtue  of  its  affecting  [or 
not  affecting]  the  mind-stuff. 

Although  the  intended-object  is  by  nature  insensate,  still  by  the  channel  of  the 
organs  it  affects  the  mind-stuff.  The  Energy  of  Intellect  [citi-(^akti),  whose 
reflection  enters  into  the  mirror  of  the  mind-stuff  which  is  in  such  a state  [of 
being  affected]  as  has  been  just  described,  enlivening  (cetayamana)  the  mind-stuff 
which  is  affected  by  the  intended-object,  experiences  the  intended-object.  But 
it  does  not  impart  to  the  object  anything  like  visibility.  Neither  [is  the 
Energy  of  Intellect]  out  of  relation  with  the  mind-stuff.  For  we  have  said 
that  its  reflection  unites  with  the  mind.  And  although  both  the  mind-stuff, 
because  it  is  omnipresent,  and  the  organ  which  is  made  of  the  personality- sub- 
stance, are  not  in  relation  ® with  the  object-of-sense,  still  that  mind-stuff  which 
has  its  fluctuation  in  any  particular  body  is  in  relation  with  objects-of-sense. 
Thus  it  is  that  objects  are  said  to  be  like  a magnet.  Since  the  mind-stuff  is 
like  the  iron  in  its  properties,  the  objects,  having  by  the  channel  of  the  organs 
brought  it  into  relation,  affect  it.  And  hence  mind-stuff  is  capable  of  muta- 
tions, as  he  says  «Of  the  thing.» 


^ ii.  20,  p.  152^  (Calc.). 
® Reading  visaye  ndsti. 


* The  purpose  of  this  sutra  is  to  demolish  idealism. 


iv.  18 — ] Booh  IV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya  [328 

But  as  for  [the  Self]  for  whom  this  same  mind-stulf  is  an  object- 
of-sense — 

18.  Unintermittently  the  Master  of  that  [mind-stuff]  knows 
the  fluctuations  of  mind-stuff  [and  thus]  the  Self  undergoes- 
no-mutations. 

If,  like  the  mind-stuff,  the  Master  also,  that  is,  the  Self,  should  un- 
dergo mutation,  then  fluctuations  of  mind-stuff  which  are  its  objects 
would  be,  like  objects-of-sense,  the  sounds  and  other  [perceptible 
things],  sometimes  known  and  sometimes  not  known.  The  fact, 
however,  that  the  central  organ  is  unintermittently  known  by  its 
Master,  the  Self,  leads  us  to  infer  that  [the  Self]  is  an  entity  that 
undergoes-no-mutations. 

Thus  then  he  has  established  the  existence  of  the  intended-object  as  distinct  from 
mind-stuffs.  Now  with  the  intent  of  showing  that  the  Self  is  distinct  from 
these  [mind-stuifs]  whose  nature  is  to  enter  into  mutation,  he  asserts  its  [the 
Self's]  immutability,  the  quality  which  differentiates  it  from  these  [mind-stuffs]. 
This  he  does  by  supplying  some  words  and  by  reciting  the  sutra.  <KBut  as  for 
[the  Self]  for  whom  this  same  mind-stuff  is  an  object-of-sense.^  19.  TJnin- 
termittently  the  Master  of  that  [mind-stuff]  knows  the  fluctuations  of 
mind- stuff  [and  thus]  the  Self  undergoes-no-mutations.  The  mind-stuff, 
whether  it  be  restless  or  infatuated  or  distracted  or  in  a state  of  focusedness, 
is  always  up  to  the  time  of  restriction,  experienced  by  the  Self  as  in  mutation. 
Why  is  this  so  ? Because  the  Self  does  not  undergo  mutation.  If  he  entered 
into  mutations,  then  the  Self  also,  like  the  mind-stuffs,  would  sometimes  know 
objects-of-sense  and  sometimes  not.  Whereas  objects-of-sense  are  only  known 
[and  never  unknown]  to  him.  Therefore  he  does  not  undergo  mutation.  And 
as  a result  he  is  something  distinct  from  things  that  are  in  mutation.  The 
same  he  says  in  the  words  «If  like  the  mind-stuff.^  It  is  the  central-organ, 
when  in  fluctuation,  that  he  unintermittently  knows.  Of  this  he  is  the  Master 
[and]  Owner,  in  other  words,  the  Experiencer.  Of  this  Master,  the  Self,  [the 
above  fact]  leads  us  to  infer  the  immutability.  To  explain : The  point  is  that 
this  Self  which  does  not  enter  into  mutation  is  distinct  from  the  mind-stuff 
which  enters  into  mutation. 


Should  the  doubt  arise  wliether  the  mind-stuff  like  fire  illumines 
itself  and  at  the  same  time  illumines  objects — 

19.  It  does  not  illumine  itself,  since  it  is  an  object-for-sight. 
Just  as  the  organs-of-sense  and  the  sounds  and  other  perceptible 
[things]  do  not  illumine  themselves,  since  they  are  objects  for  sight. 


329] 


[ — iv.  19 


Things  distinct  from  thoughts 

so  the  central -organ  is  also  to  be  represented.  And  accordingly,  fire  as 
an  example  could  not  apply  to  it.  For  fire  does  not  throw  light  upon 
its  own  self  which  [before  was  something]  without  light.  And  here 
light  is  thrown  [only]  when  there  is  a relation  of  the  light-giver 
with  something  [which  is  yet]  to  be  lighted.  Furthermore  such  a 
relation  [of  a thing]  does  not  occur  with  the  thing  itself.  Besides, 
the  meaning  of  the  words  <the  mind-stuff  illumines  itself)  is  that 
it  is  not  an  object-for-knowledge  for  any  one.  Just  as  the  words 
‘ Air  is  grounded  in  itself’  mean  that  it  is  not  grounded  in 
something  else.  For  the  reason  that  creatures  are  conscious-by- 
reflection of  the  processes  of  their  own  thinking-substances,  when 
they  say  ‘ I am  angry,  I am  afraid,  I feel  a passion  for  that  person, 
I am  angry  with  that  person,’  there  is  purposive  action.  This  is 
impossible  unless  there  be  a knowledge  of  one’s  own  thinking- 
substance. 

With  the  words  ^Should  the  doubt  arise)^  he  sets  up  a Destructionist  (vainagika) 
as  an  opponent,  who  argues  as  follows  ; ‘ All  this  may  be  so,  provided  mind-stuff 
be  the  object  of  the  Self.  But  this  it  is  not.  On  the  contrary,  this  [mind- 
stuff]  throws  light  upon  itself  [and]  illumines  the  objects  [and]  originates 
in-dependence-upon  previous  mind-stuff.  How  then  can  the  Self  always  have  the 
objects  perceived  ? And  still  more  how  can  it  be  distinct  from  the  mind-stuff 
which  enters-into-mutation  ? ’ 19.  It  does  not  illumine  itself,  since  it  is  an 
object-for-sight.  It  might  be  so  [self-illumining],  providing  mind-stuff  had 
consciousness  of  itself.  This,  however,  it  does  not  have.  It  is,  like  the  colour 
blue,  [an  object]  capable  of  being  included  in  experience  in  so  far  as  it  undergoes 
mutation.  And  whatever  is  capable  of  being  included  in  experience  cannot  throw 
light  upon  itself.  For  it  cannot  be  a fluctuation  with  regard  to  itself  [and  not 
to  mind-stuff].  Since  the  same  thing  cannot  he  the  act,  the  object  of  the  act, 
and  [one  of]  the  relations  * of  the  act.  For  the  act  of  cooking  is  not  cooked ; 
nor  is  the  act  of  chopping  chopped.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Self  does  not 
undergo  mutation  and  is  not  an  object  of  experience.  Therefore  with  reference 
to  him  self-enlightenment  is  not  inexplicable.  For  his  self-enlightenment  is 
nothing  but  an  enlightenment  ® which  is  not  dependent  on  any  other  ; and  it  is 
not  his  being  an  object  of  experience.  Therefore  because  it  is  an  object-for- 
sight,  the  mind-stuff  which  is  the  object  of  the  seeing  does  not  illumine  in 
itself.  The  objects  of  the  fluctuations  of  that  mind-stuff  only  which  has  the 
reflections  of  the  light  of  the  self  {atman)  throw  light.  This  is  the  point.  An 
objector  says,  ‘But  don’t  you  see  that  Are  is  an  object-for-sight  and  yet  has 

^ These  relations  are  those  expressed  by  the  cases  other  than  the  nominative  and 
possessive. 

“ Reading  praA:afa<a  hy  asya  . . . nanuhhavakarmata. 

42  [h.0,8.  it] 


iv,  19 — ] 


Book  IV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya 


[330 


enlightenment  in  itself.  It  is  not  with  a fire  as  it  is  with  water-jars  and  so  on, 
which  may  he  made  manifest  by  [the  light  of  a]  fire  ; for  a fire  is  not  [made 
manifest]  by  another  fire.’  In  reply  to  this  he  says  «And  so,  fire  as  an  ex- 
ample.»  Why  ? «For  fire  does  not.»  The  meaning  is  that  fire  does  not 
require  any  other  fire  to  throw  light  upon  it,  but  has  light  thrown  upon  it  by 
a mental-act.  So  it  does  not  throw  light  upon  itself.  Thus  [fire]  is  not  an 
exception-to-general-principle  [stated  in  the  sutra].  This  is  the  meaning.  The 
word  «here^  in  the  expression  «And  here  light  is  thrown:^  distinguishes  [fire] 
from  the  light  which  is  the  nature  of  the  Self,  in  other  words,  the  light  which 
is  of  an  active  kind.  What  he  means  to  say  is  this : Wherever  there  is  an 
action,  it  is  in  all  cases  seen  to  exist  as  related  to  ah  agent  and  to  an  instru- 
ment-of-action  and  to  an  object.  Just  as  we  see  the  act  of  cooking  as  related 
to  Chaitra  and  to  the  fire  and  to  the  rice.  Similarly  throwing-light  is  an 
action.  And  this  [action]  too  must  be  in  the  same  [threefold]  relation.  Now 
a relation  must  be  based  upon  a difference.  It  is  impossible  where  there  is  no 
difference.  This  is  the  meaning.  When  it  is  said  «Besides,  the  meaning  of 
the  words  <the  mind-stuff  illumines  itself>  is  that  it  is  not  an  object-for-know- 
ledge  for  any  one,»  the  objector  grants,  ‘ This  may  he  so.  But  let  it  not  be  said 
that  the  mind-stuff  is  an  object-for-knowledge.  For  when  the  process-of-know- 
ing,  which  is  neither  the  cause  nor  the  pervader  [of  the  mind-stuff]  is  repressed, 
it  does  not  follow  that  the  mind-stuff  must  be  repressed.’  To  this  he  replies, 
«of  their  own  thinking-substance.^  The  «thinking  substance»  means  the  mind- 
stuff.'  «Movements)^  mean  functional-activities.  «Beings^  mean  living  beings. 
The  different  fluctuations  of  mind-stuff,  anger  or  greed  for  instance,  are,  together 
with  their  basis  the  mind-stuff  and  with  their  objects,  experienced  by  each  in- 
dividual ; and  refute  that  statement  that  the  mind-stuff  is  not  an  object-for-know- 
ledge. He  makes  clear  this  same  perception  of  the  movements  of  one’s  own 
thinking-substance  by  the  words  <Kl  am  angry.^ 

20.  And  there  cannot  be  a cognition  of  both  [thinking- 
substance  and  thing]  at  the  same  time. 

And  it  is  impossible  in  a single  moment  to  cognize  one’s  own 
form  and  another’s  as  well.  It  is  a supposition  ^ of  the  Momen- 
tarists  that  whatever  exists  is  both  action  and  the  means-related- 
to-an-action. 

20.  And.  there  cannot  be  a cognition  of  both  [thinking-substance  and 
thing]  at  the  same  time.  He  who  says  that  mind-stuff  illumines  itself  and 
illumines  objects-of-sense  cannot  at  least  say  that  mind-stuff  cognizes  itself  by 
the  same  functional-activity  as  that  by  which  it  cognizes  objects.  For  a 

' That  the  buddhi  is  equivalent  to  citta  ; to  manas  these  are  indications  of  a 

that  in  1.  2,  p.  6'^  it  is  equivalent  to  wide  divergence  from  the  Samkhya. 

antahkaranam  ; and  that  at  the  end  of  * Compare  ^amkara  on  ii.  2.  20. 
iv.  19  Vacaspati  uses  it  as  equivalent 


331]  Criticism  of  Momentarists  [ — iv.  21 

functional-activity  which  has  not  a different  distinguishing-characteristic  is  not 
adequate  to  producing  a difference  in  effect.  Therefore  a difference  in  functional- 
activity  has  to  be  presupposed.  In  the  opinion  of  the  Destructionists  there  is  no 
functional-activity  over  and  above  the  various  originations.  And  from  the 
same  act  of  origination  which  is  without  different  distinguishing-character- 
istics, there  cannot  possibly  come  effects  which  have  distinguishing-character- 
istics. For  then  this  difference  would  be  quite  accidental.  Neither  [as  in  the 
last  alternative]  can  it  be  urged  that  one  and  the  same  thing  can  have  two 
originations.  Therefore  at  one  moment  of  time  (samaya)  the  mind-stuff  cannot 
determine  the  objects  and  also  its  own  kind  of  thought  ; [it  cannot  illumine 
itself].  The  Comment  states  this  in  the  words  «And  it  is  impossible  in  a single 
moment.;^  And  in  this  sense  it  has  been  said ' by  the  Destructionists,  “ What- 
ever is  the  being  of  a thing  that  is  itself  the  action  and  the  means-related-to- 
action.”  Therefore  this  fact  that  mind-stuff  is  an  object-for-sight,  which  is 
eternal,  takes  from  it  its  character  of  illumining  itself  and  points  to  a seer,  and 
to  the  fact  that  the  seer  does-not-enter-into-mutations. 

If  there  be  the  opinion  that  a mind-stuff  naturally  ^ restricted  is 
[yet]  known  by  another  mind-stuff  immediately  contiguous  to  it, 
[the  answer  is,] 

21.  If  [one  mind-stuflf]  were  the  object-for-sight  for  another, 
there  would  be  an  infinite  regress  from  one  thinking- 
substance  to  another  thinking-substance,  as  well  as  confusion 
of  memory. 

If  one  mind-stuff  were  perceived  by  another  mind-stuff,  by  whom 
would  the  thinking-substance  of  the  thinking-substance  be  per- 
ceived? Because  this  would  be  perceived  by  still  another,  and 
that  by  yet  one  more,  there  would  be  an  infinite  regress.  And 
there  would  be  a <confusion  of  memory.>  As  many  memories  would 
obtain  as  there  would  be,  on  the  part  of  the  thinking-substances, 
experiences.  And  as  a result  of  the  confusion  of  these  [memories] 
there  would  be  no  limit  to  the  memory  of  one  [thinking-substance]. 
Thus  everything  is  put  into  disorder  by  the  Destructionists’ 
prattling  away  of  the  Self  who  is  conscious  by  reflecting  the 
thinking-substance.  But  those  who  assume  that  the  experiencer 
as  such  [experiences]  anywhere  soever  do  not  conform  to  the  rules 
[of  logic].  There  are  some  who  assume  an  existence  as  such,  and 
that  it  is  this  existence  which  casts  off  those  five  divisions-of- 
existence  {skandha)  of  theirs  and  puts  others  together  again.  But 

’ Compare  Vacaspatimigra’s  Bhamatl  on  ii.  2.  4.  20.  (Nir.  Sag.  ed.,  p.  456,  last  line.) 

' Compare  ii.  9. 


iv.  21 — ] 


Booh  IV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya 


[332 


these  are  afraid  of  this  very  [existence].  Thus  in  the  very  act  of 
saying,  ‘ That  I may  feel  the  passionlessness  of  the  Great  Disgust 
for  the  divisions-of-existence  and  that  they  may  arise  no  more  and 
altogether  cease,  I will  lead  the  student’s  life  ^ in  the  presence  of 
my  spiritual  guide,’  they  deny  after  all  the  existence  of  the 
existence.  But  the  systems  with  the  Sarnkhya  and  Yoga  at  their 
head  denote ^ by  the  word  ‘self’  the  Self,  the  Owner,  the 
experiencer  of  the  mind-stuff. 

Again  he  sets  up  a Destructionist  as  opponent  with  the  words  there  be  the 
opinion.^  ‘It  may  be  granted  that  because  [mind-stuff  is]  an  object-for-sight 
it  is  not  conscious  of  itself.  But  this  does  not  necessitate  the  existence  of  a self 
{atman).  For  any  later  moment  of  mind-stuff  belonging  to  the  same  continuous- 
series  {santana)  can  perceive  the  moment  of  the  mind-stuff  which  gave  it  birth 
and  which  became  naturally  restricted.’  This  is  the  meaning.  [This  latter 
moment  of  mind-stuff  is  called]  immediately  contiguous  (samanantara)  because 
it  is  alike  (sama)  in  point  of  knowledge,  and  immediate  (anantara)  in  point  of 
not  being  separated.  21.  If  [one  mind-stuff]  were  the  object-for-sight  for 
another,  there  would  be  an  infinite  regress  from  one  thinking-substance 
to  another  thinking-substance,  as  well  as  confusion  of  memory.  The 
word  ^thinking-substance^  means  mind-stuff.  When  the  succeeding  thinking- 
substance  is  not  itself  known,  it  is  not  able  to  know  the  previous  thinking- 
substance.  And  a previous  thinking-substance  as  long  as  it  is  unrelated  with 
the  thinking-substance  cannot  be  supposed  to  be  perceived.  For  certainly  a man 
who  does  not  know  what  a staff  is  cannot  know  what  it  means  to  speak  of 
a man  with  a staff.  Therefore  there  would  be  an  infinite  regress.  The  [divisions 
of  existence  are  the  five]  groups®  (sTcandha),  consciousness  and  sensations  and 
perceptions  and  forms  and  predispositions.  When  he  says  ^But  the  systems 
■with  the  Sarnkhya  and  Yoga  at  their  head»  he  means  to  say  that  the  Sarnkhya 
and  Yoga  are  at  the  head  of  such  systems  as  the  Vai9esika.  The  rest  is  easy. 


How  [is  this]  ? 

22.  The  Intellect  {citi)  which  unites  not  [with  objects]  is 
conscious  of  its  own  thinking-substance  when  [the  mind- 
stuff]  takes  the  form  of  that  [thinking-substance  by 
reflecting  it]. 

“ For,  the  Energy  of  the  experiencer,^  which  is  immutahle  and 


* Similar  discussion  in  Caraka-Samhita, 
fifth  adhyaya. 

® The  word  sva  as  applied  to  the  mind-stuff 
implies  a contrast  to  the  owner  (srd- 
min).  The  reference  is  to  the  begin- 
ning of  the  Comment  on  iv.  19. 

’ The  order  varies  from  the  Buddhist  order. 


See  H.  C.  Warren’s  Buddhism  in 
Translations,  Appendix,  p.  487. 

‘ This  is  Paiicafikha’s  ninth  fragment 
(according  to  Garbe),  quoted  a second 
time  (see  ii.  20),  and  misprinted  both 
times  (jpratisanikratem) . 


333] 


[ — iv.  22 


The  Self  does  not  unite  with  objects 

which  unites  not  with  objects,  seeming  to  unite  with  something 
mutable  [the  thinking-substance],  takes  the  form  of  the  fluctuations 
which  that  [thinking-substance]  undergoes.  And  [this  Energy] 
being  identified  with  a fluctuation  of  the  thinking-substance  in  so 
far  as  it  is  nothing  but  an  imitation  of  a fluctuation  of  the  thinking- 
substance  that  has  come  under  the  influence  of  the  intelligence 
{cditanya),  it  is  termed  a fluctuation  of  the  thinking-substance.” 
And  in  this  sense  it  has  been  said  “That  hiding-place  in  which  the 
everlasting  Brahman  lies  concealed  is  not  an  under-world  nor 
mountain-chasm  nor  the  darkness  nor  caverns  of  the  sea,  but  is  the 
working  of  the  mind  when  not  distinguished  [from  Himself].  So 
the  sages  tell.” 

The  objector  says,  ‘ This  might  he  conceded.  But  if  mind-stuff  does  not  illu- 
mine itself  and  is  not  knowable  by  another  mind-stuff,  how  then  will  even  the 
self  {dtman)  experience  the  mind-stuff?  For  surely  the  Self,  even  if  it  have 
light  in  itself,  cannot  have  any  activity,  and  in  the  absence  of  any  activity  he 
cannot  be  an  agent.  And  while  the  self  is  unrelated  with  the  mind-stuff,  the 
object-of-the-action,  it  cannot  be  the  experiencer  of  this  [mind-stuff].  For  this 
would  prove  too  much.’  With  this  in  view  he  asks  ^How  [is  this]  The 
reply  is  given  in  the  sutra.  22.  The  Intellect  {citi)  which  unites  not  [with 
objects]  is  conscious  of  its  own  thinking-substance  when  [the  mind-stuff] 
takes  the  form  [by  reflecting  it].  What  was  said  before  [i.  4]  of  that 
[thinking-substance]  “ At  other  times  it  takes  the  same  form  as  the  fluctuations 
[of  mind-stuff]”  is  based  on  this.  The  Intellect’s  consciousness  of  its  own 
thinking-substance  takes  place  when  the  thinking-substance,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
a receptacle  for  the  reflection  of  the  Intellect,  passes  into  the  form  of  that 
[Intellect],  [that  is],  passes  into  a resemblance  (rupata)  of  the  Intellect  (citi). 
For  just  as  even  without  activity  of  the  moon  the  clear  water,  into  which  the 
reflection  of  the  moon  has  passed  over,  makes  the  moon  seem  to  be  quivering, 
although  the  moon  itself  is  not  quivering,  so  similarly,  even  in  the  absence  of 
any  operation  of  the  Intellect,  the  mind-stuff  with  which  the  reflection  of  the 
Intellect  has  become  united,  makes  by  its  own  activity  the  Energy  of  Intellect 
seem  to  have  activity,  makes  it  seem  to  have  attachment  even  when  it  is 
without  attachment.  The  transforming  of  itself  into  an  object  of  experience 
makes  this  [Energy  of  Intellect]  an  experiencer.  This  is  the  meaning  of  the 
sutra.  This  is  also  the  meaning  of  the  Comment.  And  since  it  has  been 
explained  more  than  once  in  various  places,  it  is  not  explained  here. — To  show 
that  the  fluctuation  of  thought  (jndm)  is  not  distinguished  from  the  fluctuation 
of  the  thinking-substance,  he  quotes  the  Sacred  Word  [dgama),  saying  ^And 
in  this  sense  it  has  been  said  “.  . . not  an  under-world.”^  Just  the  mental 
activity  of  the  eternal  9^va,  [that  is]  Brahman,  whose  nature  is  undefiled. 


iv.  22 — ] Booh  IV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya  [334 

■which  changes  into  an  image  of  Intellect,  [and  which,]  inasmuch  as  it  changes 
into  an  image  of  Intellect,  is  not  distinguished  from  Intellect  even,  [the  sages] 
explain  as  a “hiding-place ” {guhdm).  In  that  same  hiding-place  is  that  hidden 
Brahman ; but  when  that  hiding-place  is  done  away  with  (apanaye),  [then] 
Brahman,  self-illumined,  unobscured,  unobstructed,  flashes  forth  for  the  Exalted 
[yogin]  who  has  reached  his  last  bodily  existence. 


And  for  this  reason  we  reach  this  result ; 

23.  Mind-stuff  affected  by  the  Seer  and  by  the  object-for- 
sight  [leads  to  the  perception  of]  all  intended-objects. 

For  the  central-organ  is  affected  by  the  object-for-meditation,  and 
is  itself  on  account  of  its  objectivity  connected  by  one  of  its 
own  fluctuations  with  the  subject,  with  the  Self  also.  Thus  the 
same  mind-stuff  is  affected  by  the  Seer  and  by  the  object-for-sight 
and  is  seemingly  both  object  and  subject.  Assuming  a form  both 
intelligent  and  unintelligent,  appearing  (although  really  an  object) 
as  that  which  is  not  object,  while  unintelligent  it  appears  to  be 
intelligent,  [and]  like  a crystal,  is  described  as  [perceiving]  all 
intended-objects.  Accordingly  there  are  some,  deceived  by  this 
resemblance  to  mind-stuff,  who  say  that  [mind-stulF]  itself  is 
intelligent.  There  are  others  who  say  that  this  whole  universe 
is  nothing  more  than  mind-stuff,  and  that  this  world  of  things, 
cows  and  watei'-jars  and  other  things,  together  with  their  causes, 
does  not  exist.  They  are  to  be  pitied.  Why  so  ? Because  their 
mind-stuff,  shining  forth  [in  consciousness]  in  all  kinds  of  forms 
is  the  source  of  error. — Consequently  in  concentrated  insight  the 
object-for-the-insight  when  once  reflected  is  other  than  [the  mind- 
stuff]  because  this  [Self]  is  that  upon  which  [the  insight]  rests. 
If  this  object  were  the  mind-stuff  and  nothing  more  than  that, 
how  could  the  insight  by  itself  ascertain  its  form  as  being  insight  ? 
Accordingly  when  in  the  insight  an  object  is  reflected  it  is  the 
Self  who  determines  [the  object].  Thus,  by  dividing  mind-stuff 
as  such  into  knower  and  process-of-knowing  and  object-for-know- 
ledge,  they  classify  it  according  to  its  kinds  [i.  41]  as  a triad  also. 
These  are  men  of  complete  insight.  By  them  the  Self  has  been 
reached. 

i; 

So  then  since  mind-stuff  is  an  object-for-sight  and  enters-into-mutation,  the  Self 
who  has  the  property  of  immutability  has  been  proved  to  be  over  and  above  the 


335]  The  mind-stuff  not  itself  intelligent  [ — iv.  23 

mind-stuff.  Now  he  makes  even  ordinary  perception  a means  of  validating  this 
[transcendence  of  the  Self]  in  the  words  «And  for  this  reason  we  reach  this 
result.^  He  means  to  say  [we]  necessarily  [reach]  this  [result].  23.  Mind- 
stuflf  affected  by  the  Seer  and  by  the  object-for-sight  [leads  to  the  percep- 
tion of  ] all  intended-objects.  For  just  as  when  affected  by  blue  or  other 
[colour],  the  mind-stuff  makes  a blue  or  other  object  stand  before  us  by  direct 
perception,  so  the  mind-stuff  affected  by  the  Seer,  in  that  it  has  changed  into  an 
image  of  the  Seer,  makes  the  Seer  also  stand  before  us,  by  direct  perception. 
For  knowledge  has  two‘  kinds  of  forms  ‘I  am  aware  of — the  blue.’  So 
although  the  knower  also,  like  the  object  known,  can  be  established  by  direct 
perception,  still  special  pains  were  not  taken  to  give  a distinct  proof  of  it. 
Just  as  the  statement  ‘ the  image  of  the  moon  is  in  the  water  ’ does  not  mean 
that  the  image  cannot  be  directly  perceived.  And  further  if  you  say  that 
this  [image]  which  has  entered  the  water  does-not-validate  {apramana)  this 
[moon],  you  have  no  right  to  say  that  the  [actual]  form  also  of  the  moon  is-not- 
validated.  Consequently  the  fluctuation  of  the  mind-stuff,  in  so  far  as  the 
mind-stuff  reflects  the  [Intelligence],  has  Intelligence  as  an  object.  Still  we  are 
able  to  say  that  [the  fluctuation  of  the  mind-stuff  ] does  not  contain  Intelligence 
as  an  object.  This  is  what  is  meant  by  saying  that  mind-stuff  [leads  to  the 
perception]  of  all  objects.  This  same  is  expressed  by  the  words  <KFor  the  central- 
organ.»  The  central-organ  is  affected  not  only  by  the  [external]  object-for- 
meditation,  by  assuming  the  form  of  the  intended-object,  but  as  he  says  «itself 
. . . also.»  The  word  «also^  comes  in  the  wrong  place  and  should  be  after 
^the  Self.^  The  fluctuation  of  the  Self  is  [this]  change  so  that  it  is  reflected 
in  this  [mind-stuff].  And  this  identity  of  the  mind-stuff  with  the  reflection 
of  the  Intelligence  must  have  been  assumed  by  the  Destructionists  {vainagika). 
How  otherwise  could  these  have  attributed  Intelligence  to  mind-stuff — as  he  says 
^Accordingly)^?  The  word  ^some»  refers  to  those  Destructionists  who  hold 
the  theory  that  there  are  external  things.  The  word  <Kothers»  refers  to  those 
who  hold  the  theory  that  there  are  mental-acts  (vijnana)  and  nothing  more. 
An  objector  says  ‘ If  the  mind-stuff  only  is  experienced  as  having  the  form'  of 
the  Seer  and  the  form  of  the  object-for-sight,  then  surely  the  Seer  and  the 
object-for-sight  must  be  not  different  from  the  mind-stuff,  as  they  say,  “ For 
although  the  soul  [atman)  is  not  different  from  the  thinking-substance,  [still] 
by  wrong-headed  persons  it  is  characterized  as  if  it  were  possessing-a-difference 
[brought  about  by]  the  recognition  {samvitti)  of  the  object-for-knowledge  and  the 
knower  {grahakay’  So  then  how  is  it  that  these  Destructionists  deserve  our 
pity?’  In  reply  to  this  he  says  ^in  concentrated  insight.^  Because  in  accord- 
ance with  the  arguments  already  stated  they  should  be  led  to  assume  that  the 
Self  is  something  different  from  the  mind-stuff.  And  by  instruction  in  yoga  with 

^ The  Bikaner  MS.  and  other  texts  read  (Calc.  ed.).  The  double  form  would 

tryakdra.  This  would  refer  to  grahUr,  apparently  be  the  visaya  and  visayin. 

grahana,  and  grdhya.  Possibly  the  re-  The  cittam  is  the  common  medium, 

ference  would  be  to  iii.  18,  p.  23P' 


iv.  23 — ] 


Book  IV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya 


[336 


its  eight  aids  which  would  introduce  them  to  concentrated  insight  the  object 
of  which  is  the  self  they  should  be  awakened.  To  explain  : In  the  concentrated 
insight  the  object-for-the-insight,  the  self,  is  other  [than  the  mind-stuff]  when 
[the  self]  is  reflected.  Why  so  ? Because  the  self  becomes  that  upon  which  that 
[mind-stuff]  rests.  And  if,  although  instructed  by  this  argument,  the  opponent 
perversely  should  say,  ‘ Why  should  not  that  upon  which  it  rests  be  the  mind- 
stuff  itself,’  he  replies  <Slf  this  object.^  If  this  object,  which  is  the  self  (dtman), 
be  merely  the  mind-stuff  and  not  something  over  and  above  this  [mind-stuff], 
then  how  could  the  insight  by  itself  ascertain  its  form  as  being  insight  ? For 
there  cannot  be  a fluctuation  of  a thing  with  reference  to  itself.  He  brings  the 
discussion  to  a close  by  saying  «Accordingly.»  One  shows  them  pity  by  giving 
them  the  proper  instruction,  as  he  says  ^Thus.»  ^According  to  its  kinds/> 
means  according  to  its  nature. 


And  for  what  reason  is  this  ? 

24.  This  [mind-stuff],  although  diversified  by  countless  sub- 
conscious-impressions, exists  for  the  sake  of  another,  because 
its  nature  is  to  produce  [things  as]  combinations. 

Although  diversified  by  absolutely  countless  subconscious-impres- 
sions, this  same  mind-stuff  exists  for  the  sake  of  another,  for  the 
sake  of  the  experience  and  the  release  of  another ; not  for  its  own 
sake.  Because  like  a house ^ its  nature  is  to  work  as  a combination. 
The  mind-stuff  must  act  as  a combiner  [for  the  Self]  and  not  for  its 
own  sake.  Pleasurable  mind-stuff  is  not  for  the  pleasure  [of  the 
mind-stuff].  The  mind-stuff  of  thought  is  not  for  the  thought  [of 
the  mind-stuff].  But  both  of  these  two  kinds  exist  for  the  sake 
of  another.  And  that  very  Self  which  has  its  purpose  in  the  two 
purposes  of  experience  and  liberation  is  this  <other>,  not  any  other 
in  general.  Any  indefinite  other  as  such  which  the  Destructionists 
set  forth  in  general  terms,  would  all  still  exist  for  the  sake  of  some 
other,  since  [after  all]  they  [too]  act  [only]  to  produce  things  to 
be  combined.  But  that  particular  other  which  is  the  Self  does 
not  act  as  a combination. 

He  introduces  another  reason  for  the  existence  of  the  self  {dtman)  over  and  above 
the  mind-stuff  by  asking,  «And  for  what  reason  is  this  ?»24.  This  [mind-stuff], 
although  diversified  by  countless  subconscious-impressions,  exists  for  the 
sake  of  another,  because  its  nature  is  to  produce  [things  as]  combinations. 


* See  Saihkhya-kiir.  xvii. 


337] 


Mind- stuff  exists  for  the  Self 


[ — iv.  25 


Although  countless  subconscious-impressions  of  karma  and  subconscious-impres- 
sionsof  hindrances  remain  attached  to  {adhi(}erate)ihe  mind-stuff  only,  but  not  to  the 
Self, — and  although,  accordingly,  the  fruitions  which  depend  upon  subconscious- 
impressions,  in  so  far  as  they  are  contained  in  the  mind-stuff,  would  lead  one  to 
suppose  that  mind-stuff  is  the  experiencer, — and  although,  because  all  objects-of- 
eiperience  are  for  the  experiencer,  everything  would  be  supposed  to  be  for  the 
mind-stuff, — still  the  mind-stuff  diversified  as  it  is  by  countless  subconscious- 
impressions  must  be  supposed  to  exist  for  the  sake  of  another.  Why  ? Because 
it  acts  as  a combination.  This  is  the  meaning  of  the  sutra.  He  explains  [the 
sutra]  by  saying  ^this  sarne.^  An  objector  asks,  ‘ This  may  be  true.  But 
what  contradiction  is  there  in  supposing  that  the  mind-stuff  acts  in  combination 
and  yet  stiU  for  its  own  sake  ? ’ If  some  one  were  to  urge  this,  he  replies  ^since 
it  acts  in  combination.^  The  words  ^Pleasurable  mind-stuff»  are  a partial 
expression  for  experience  [in  general].  Painful  mind-stuff  also  is  to  be  under- 
stood as  expressed  by  these  [words].  And  when  he  says  ^thought:^  he  means 
release.  What  he  means  to  say  is  this.  Pleasure  and  pain  may  be  in  essence 
both  counteractive  and  coactive  with  reference  to  the  mind-stuff,  but  cannot  be 
so  with  reference  to  themselves.  For  there  cannot  be  a fluctuation  with  refer- 
ence to  itself.  Neither  is  there  any  other  thing  acting  as  a combination  and  itself 
giving  rise,  directly  or  indirectly,  to  pain  and  pleasure,  for  which  the  pain  and 
the  pleasure  can  be  counteractive  or  coactive.  Therefore  he  who  is  in  no  wise 
concerned  either  directly  or  indirectly  with  pleasure  or  pain,  can  be  brought 
into  a state  of  counteraction  to  them  or  of  coactivity  with  them  ; and  that  one 
is  the  permanently  detached  Self.  Similarly  that  thought  {jnana)  which  leads 
to  liberation,  in  so  far  as  it  also  depends  upon  objects-of-knowledge,  and  because 
a fluctuation  cannot  exist  with  reference  to  itself,  is  not  for  thought  itself.  And 
it  cannot  be  that  release  would  arise  when  this  thought  has  reference  to  another. 
For  this  would  make  release  impossible  in  the  case  of  the  discarnate  and  of  those 
whose  [bodies]  are  resolved  into  primary  matter.  Therefore  [intuitive]  thought 
also  is  for  the  sake  of  the  Self  only  ; and  it  is  not  for  its  own  sake  ; neither  for 
any  other  whatsoever.  And  if  it  were  for  the  sake  of  any  other  who  acted  as 
a combination,  the  result  would  be  an  infinite  regress.  So  it  is  settled  that 
thought  is  for  another  who  does  not  act  as  a combination. 

25.  For  him  who  sees  the  distinction,  the  pondering  upon 
his  own  states-of-being  ceases. 

Because  a blade  of  grass  sprouts  during  the  rains  we  infer  the  ex- 
istence of  seed.  Just  so  in  the  case  of  him  who  betrays  thrills  of  joy 
and  falling  tears  in  hearing  of  the  way  of  release,  we  may  likewise 
infer  that  there  is  in  him  [good]  karma  rooted  in  the  knowledge  of 
the  difference  [between  the  sattva  and  the  Self],  conducive  to  libera- 
tion, and  brought  to  completion  [in  the  past].  In  him,  the  pondering 

43  [h.o.s.  it] 


iv,  25 — ] 


Book  TV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya 


[338 


upon  his  own  states-of-being  which  is  natural*  to  him  comes  into 
activity. — When  there  is  none  of  this  {yasya)  [good  karma],  this 
has  been  said  “ For  [those]  who,  after  having  renounced  their  own 
nature  [of  pondering  upon  themselves],  there  is  by  reason  of  lack  [of 
good  karma],  a liking  {ruci)  for  the  opposing  view  and  no  liking  for 
the  ascertainment  of  truth — , [for  them  there  is  no  sight  of  the 
distinction  and  no  cessation  of  the  pondering].” — Now-as-to-this- 
point  (tatra),  the  pondering  upon  his  own  states-of-being  [ii.  39]  is 
in  this  fashion,  ‘ Who  was  I ? How  was  1 1 What  is  this  [birth]  ? 
How  is  this  [birth]  ? What  shall  we  become  ? or  how  shall  we 
become  ? ’ But  this  pondering  ceases  for  one  who  sees  the  distinc- 
tion [between  the  sattva  and  the  Self].  For  what  reason  is  this  ? 
Since  it  is  this  mind-stuffy  which  undergoes  this  diversified  muta- 
tion. But  when  there  is  no  longer  undifferentiated-consciousness 
(avidya),  the  Self  is  purified  and  untouched  by  the  conditions  of 
the  mind-stuff.  For  this  reason  this  skilful  person  ceases  pondering 
upon  his  own  states-of-being. 

Having  thus  enunciated  the  doctrine  about  the  Self,  as  based  upon  reasonings, 
which  is  the  primary  source  of  Isolation,  he  discriminates  the  man  who  is  com- 
petent for  this  teaching  from  the  other  man  who  is  not  competent.  26.  For 
him  who  sees  the  distinction,  the  pondering  upon  his  own  states-of-being 
ceases.  For  one  who  ponders  upon  the  existence  of  the  Self, — for  him,  after 
his  instruction  in  the  eight  aids  to  yoga,  if  he  follow  [the  instruction]  up  [and] 
practise  yoga,  as  a result  of  that  [following  and  practice  and]  after  he  sees  the 
difference  between  the  Self  and  the  sattva  of  the  mind-stuff,  there  comes  a cessa- 
tion of  pondering  upon  the  being  of  the  self.  For  one  who  does  not  ponder  at 
all  upon  the  existence  of  the  self,  the  heretic, — for  him,  incompetent  [to  receive] 
the  instruction,  and  failing  to  make  out  the  existence  of  the  self  in  this  or  the 
other  world,  [there  is]  no  instruction,  no  seeing  of  the  distinction,  no  cessation 
of  pondering  upon  the  existence  of  the  self.  Such  is  the  meaning  of  the  sQtra. 
An  objector  asks  ‘ How  may  we  conclude  that  there  is  in  the  mind-stuff  a ponder- 
ing upon  the  states  of  the  self?  ’ In  reply  to  this  he  says  ^in  the  rains  . . . just 
so.»  It  is  inferred  that  there  has  been  performed  in  a previous  existence  a 
karma  which  was  the  following  up  of  the  eight  aids  to  yoga,  or  of  a part  of  them, 
which  is  the  seed  of  the  sight  of  the  thing-as-it-is  {tattva)  and  which  is  conducive 
to  release.  In  such  a person,  unavoidably,  the  pondering  upon  the  states  of  the 
self  naturally  goes  on,  even  when  there  is  no  practice  ^ [in  concentration]  upon 
the  thing.  He  shows  who  these  persons  are  who,  according  to  the  statements  of 

* Compare  the  expressions  at  iv.  10,  p.  283“>''.  ^ Reading  cittasydivaisa. 

* Compare  the  Bhasya  on  iii.  51,  p.  265*  (Calc.  ed.). 


339] 


[ — iv.  27 


The  Self  becomes  isolated 

the  traditionalists,  are  not  competent,  by  saying  «When  there  is  none  of  this 
{yasya)  [good  karma],  this.^  The  opposing  view  is  that  there  is  no  fruition  of 
karma  because  there  is  no  one  in  any  other  world,  since  no  other  world  exists. 
There  are  those  who  have  a liking  for  this  [doctrine]  and  no  liking  for  the  demon- 
strated truth  of  the  five-and-twenty  entities.  The  pondering  upon  one’s  own  states- 
of-being  has  already  [ii.  39]  been  explained.  He  refers  to  the  man  who  sees  the 
distinction  by  saying  ^since  it  is  this  mind-stuff.)^  For  him  who  is  skilful  in 
the  sight  of  the  distinction,  pondering  upon  his  own  states-of- being  ceases. 

26.  Then  the  mind-stuff  is  borne  down  to  discrimination, 
onward  towards  Isolation. 

That  mind-stuff  of  his  which  formerly  was  borne  onward  towards 
objects-of-sense,  down  to  non-thinking,  becomes  changed  for  him. 
It  is  borne  onward  towards  Isolation,  down  to  the  thinking  which 
comes  from  discrimination.^ 

Now  to  the  question  ‘ What  kind  of  mind-stuff  has  the  man  who  sees  the  distinc- 
tion?’ he  replies:  20.  Then  the  mind-stuff  is  borne  down  to  discrimination, 
onward  towards  Isolation.  [This  is]  explained  by  merely  reading. 


27.  In  the  intervals  of  this  [mind-stuff]  there  are  other 
presented-ideas  [coming]  from  subliminal-impressions. 

The  mind-stuff  which  is  [borne]  down  towards  discrimination  of 
the  presented-idea  and  the  flow  of  which  is  towards  nothing  but 
discernment  of  the  difference  between  the  sattva  and  the  Self, 
has  in  its  intervals  other  presented-ideas,  either  ‘It  is  I ’ or  ‘It 
is  mine’  or  ‘I  think’  or  ‘I  do  not  think.’  From  what  source? 
From  the  dwindling  seeds,  from  previous  subliminal-impressions. 

An  objector  says  ‘ This  may  be  so.  But  if  the  sight  of  the  distinction  has  as  its 
final  goal  {nistha)  the  discrimination,  then  the  mind-stuff  w'ould  at  no  time  be 
emergent.  Whereas  we  see  that  [the  mind-stuff]  of  one  who  goes  the  rounds  for 
alms  is  emergent.’  To  which  the  reply  is  this.  27.  In  the  intervals  of  this 
[mind-stuff]  there  are  other  presented-ideas  [coming]  from  subliminal- 
impressions.  A presented-idea  is  that  by  which  a thing  is  presented  [to  the 
Self].  It  is  the  sattva  of  the  mind -stuff.  From  this  \_sattvai\  the  Intelligence  is 
discriminated.  By  this  it  is  [borne]  down  to  [discrimination].  By  the  words 
‘ I think  ’ liberation  is  plainly  indicated  as  distinct  [from  infatuation].  By  the 
words  ‘ I do  not  think  ’ infatuation  is  [plainly  shown].  By  the  words  ‘ It  is  I ’ 
or  the  words  ‘It  is  mine’,  the  sense-of-personality  {dhamlcdra)  and  the  sense- 
of-property  {mamaMra),  which  are  the  sources  of  infatuation,  are  indicated. — 

^ Compare  i.  12. 


iv,  27 — ] 


Book  IV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya 


[340 


The  compound  {Jcsiyamandbljd)  is  to  be  analysed  [as  meaning]  seeds  which  are 
dwindling.  The  words  «from  previous  subliminal-impressions^  means  from 
subliminal-impressions  of  emergence. 


28.  The  escape  from  these  [subliminal-impressions]  is  de- 
scribed as  being  like  [the  escape  from]  the  hindrances.^ 

The  hindi’ances  when  in  the  condition  of  burned  seed  are  unfit  ^ 
for  generation.  J ust  so  a previous  subliminal-impression,  when  in 
the  condition  of  seed  burned  by  the  fire  of  [intuitive]  thinking, 
does  not  generate  presented-ideas.  But  because  the  subliminal- 
impressions  of  [intuitive]  knowledge  are  dormant  ® until  the  task 
of  the  mind-stulF  is  completed,  they  are  not  considered  here. 

‘ This  might  be  granted,’  the  objector  says ; ‘ but  even  if  there  be  discriminative 
thinking,  supposing  the  subliminal-impressions  of  emergence  generate  other 
presented-ideas, — what  means  is  there  then  for  escaping  them  to  the  end  that 
they  in  turn  shall  not  generate  other  presented-ideas  ? ’ In  reply  to  this  he  says 
28.  The  escape  from  these  [subliminal-impressions]  is  described  as  being 
like  [the  escape  from]  the  hindrances.  In  the  case  of  one  whose  discrimi- 
native thinking  is  not  thoroughly  mature,  the  subliminal-impressions  of  emer- 
gence not  having  dwindled  away  generate  other  presented-ideas.  Whereas  in 
the  case  of  one  in  whom  discriminative  thinking  is  mature,  the  subliminal- 
impressions  have  dwindled  and  are  not  capable  of  generating  other  presented- 
ideas,  just  as  the  hindrances,  although  arising  in  the  intervals  of  the  discrimi- 
nation, do  not  generate  other  subliminal-impressions.  Why  is  this  so  ? Because 
in  that  case  these  hindrances  are  in  the  condition  of  seeds  burned  by  the  fire  of 
discriminative  thinking.  Similarly  also  the  subliminal-impressions  of  emergence. 

• — Now  these  subliminal-impressions  of  emergence  must  be  restricted  by  the 
subliminal-impressions  of  discriminative  thinking,  and  the  subliminal-impres- 
sions of  discrimination  by  the  subliminal-impressions  of  restriction.  But  as  for  the 
subliminal-impressions  of  restriction,  we  have  shown  that  they  are  outwardly 
objectless.  The  means  of  restriction  must  in  all  cases  be  considered,  [but  not  the 
subliminal-impressions  * of  intuitive  knowledge],  as  he  says  «of  intuitive  know- 
ledge.»  He  refers  to  the  subliminal-impressions  of  the  higher  passionlessness. 


29.  For  one  who  is  not  usurious  even  in  respect  of  Elevation, 
there  follows  in  every  case,  as  a result  of  discriminative 
discernment,  the  concentration  [called]  Rain-cloud  of  [know- 
able]  things. 

This  Brahman  even  in  respect  of  Elevation,  is  not  usurious,  [that 

1 See  ii.  10-12.  = See  ii.  7. 

* Compare  ii.  4 and  13.  * Because  these  cease  of  themselves. 


341] 


[— iv.  30 


Supreme  detachment  of  the  Self 

is  to  say]  is  not  looking  for  anything  [as  a reward]  even  from  that 
{tato  fi) ; [and]  if,  even  in  respect  of  that,  he  be  passionless,  in  every 
case  nothing-less-than-the  discriminative  discernment  becomes  his. 
In  this  way,  when,  because  the  seeds  of  the  subliminal-impressions 
have  perished,  there  do  not  spring  up  for  him  any  more  presented- 
ideas, — then  the  concentration  called  Rain-cloud  ^ of  [knowable] 
things  becomes  his. 

So  the  author  of  the  sutras,  after  describing  the  Elevation  {p'asamldiyana)  as 
the  means  for  the  restriction  of  emergence,  gives  the  means  for  the  restriction 
of  the  Elevation  itself.  29.  For  one  who  is  not  usurious  even  in  respect  of 
Elevation,  there  follows  in  every  case,  as  a result  of  discriminative  discern- 
ment, the  concentration  [called]  Rain-cloud  of  [knowable]  things.  [This 
Brahman]  looks  for  nothing,  for  example,  dominion  over  all  things.  ^Even  from 
that)^  means  even  from  Elevation.  [When]  on  the  contrary,  he  is  hindered  even 
in  respect  of  that,  and  is  disaffected  towards  it,  because  he  sees  the  defects  of 
mutability,  in  every  case  nothing  less  than  discriminative  discernment  becomes  his. 
This  same  he  explains  in  the  words  ^even  in  respect  of  that.»  Whenever 
presented-ideas  of  emergence  may  arise,  then  this  Brahman  has  not  attained  to 
discriminative  discernment  at  all  times.  After  he  has  no  other  presented-ideas, 
he  has  at  all  times  attained  to  discriminative  discernment.  Then  the  con- 
centration called  the  Eain-cloud  of  [knowable]  things  becomes  his.  What  he 
means  to  say  is  this  : When  he  becomes  disaffected  towards  Elevation  and  longs 
for  its  restriction,  he  should  devote  himself  to  the  concentration  [called]  the 
Eain-cloud  of  [knowable]  things.  And  by  thus  devoting  himself  to  the  Eain- 
cloud  of  [knowable]  things  he  attains  to  discriminative  discernment  at  all 
times.  And  thus  he  is  capable  of  making  it  restricted. 

30.  Then  follows  the  cessation  of  the  hindrances  and  of  karma. 

After  the  attainment  of  this  [Rain-cloud  of  knowable  things], 
unditferentiated-consciousness  {avidya)  and  the  other  hindrances 
are  extirpated  root  and  [branch].  And  the  latent-deposits  of 
karma,  good  and  bad,  are  destroyed  with  their  roots.  Upon  the 
cessation  of  the  hindrances  and  of  karma,  the  wise  man,  even 
while  yet  alive,  is  released.  Why  is  this  ? Because  misconception 
is  the  cause  of  the  world  {bhavasya).  For  surely  no  one  has  ever  seen 
the  birth  of  any  one  whose  misconceptions  have  dwindled  away. 
And  he  tells  what  the  purpose  of  this  is.  30.  Then  follows  the  cessation  of 
the  hindrances  and  of  karma.  But  why  does  he  become  liberated  even  while 
living?  The  answer  is  in  the  word  «Because.»  For  verily  the  latent-deposit 
' See  i.  2,  p.  IF,  and  iv.  32,  p.  315®  (Calc.  ed.). 


iv.  30 — ] 


Book  IV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya 


[342 


of  karma  kindled  by  subconscious-impressions  of  hindrances  and  of  karma  is  the 
source  of  birth  and  of  other  [fruitions].  And  when  there  is  no  source,  there 
can  be  nothing  following  from  the  source,  as  on  this  point  the  Exalted  Aksapada ' 
says  “Because  we  see  that  persons  free  from  passion  have  no  birth.” 


31.  Then,  because  of  the  endlessness  of  knowledge  from 
which  all  obscuring  defilements  have  passed  away,  what 
is  yet  to  be  known  amounts  to  little. 

The  knowledge  which  is  freed  from  all  obscurations  by  hindrances 
and  by  karma  becomes  endless.  The  sattva  of  the  obscured  know- 
ledge overwhelmed  by  the  tamas  which  obscures  it,  and  kept  in 
motion  here  and  there  only  by  the  rajas,  is  set  free  [from  the 
tamas^  and  becomes  fit  for  the  process-of-knowing.  In  this  case 
when  it  has  become  rid  of  defilement  by  any  of  the  defilements  of 
the  covering,  it  becomes  endless.  In  consequence  of  the  endless- 
ness of  knowledge  what  is  yet  to  be  known  amounts  to  little,  to  no 
more  than  a firefly  in  the  sky.  On  which  point  this  has  been  said  ^ 
“ A blind  man  pierced  a jewel  ; one  without  fingers  strung  it  on  a 
cord  ; one  without  a neck  put  it  on;  a dumb  man  paid  honour  to  it.” 
Now  what  kind  of  mind-stuff  is  there,  when  thus  there  is  the  Kain-cloud  of 
[knowable]  things  ? The  reply  is  this.  31.  Then,  because  of  the  endlessness 
of  knowledge  from  which  all  obscuring  defilements  have  passed,  away,  what 
is  yet  to  be  known  amounts  to  little.  The  obscurations  are  those  things  by 
which  the  sattva  of  the  mind-stuff  is  obscured.  The  defilements  are  the  hindrances 
and  the  karma.  The  compound  is  to  be  analysed  into  <all>  and  <obscuring- 
defilements.>  All  these  obscuring  defilements  have  passed  away  from  the  sattva 
of  the  mind-stuff.  Knowledge  is  that  by  which  we  know — this  is  the  derivation. 
Because  of  the  endlessness,  by  reason  of  its  immeasurability,  what  is  yet  to  be 
known  amounts  to  very  little.  For  just  as  in  the  autumn  when  the  rays  of  the 
moon  are  freed  from  a dense  veil  [of  cloud],  and  when  they  are  brilliant  in 
all  directions,  the  light  is  so  endless  that  water-jars  and  other  things  which 
are  to  be  lightened  up  [amount  to  very]  little, — similarly  owing  to  the 
endlessness  of  light  from  the  sattva  of  the  mind-stuff  from  which  all  rajas  and 
tamas  have  passed  away,  the  things  to  be  lightened  up  [amount  to]  little.  This 
same  he  says  in  the  words  «from  all.»  He  makes  this  clear  from  the  negative 
side  by  the  words,  ^overwhelmed  by  the  tamas  which  obscures  it.)^  Kept  in 
motion  by  the  rajas,  whose  disposition  is  to  activity,  and  hence  set  free,  [because] 
the  tamas  is  removed  from  the  spot.  This  is  the  meaning.  Hence  because  by  its 
‘ Njaya-sutras  iii.  1.  25.  * Taitt.  Aranyaka  i.  11*. 


[ — iv.  33 


343]  Subsidence  of  aspects 

light  it  rains  [that  is]  pours  down  all  kinds  of  knowable  things,  it  is  called  the 
Kain-cloud  of  [knowable]  things.  The  objector  says  ‘We  may  admit  the  existence 
of  this  Kain-cloud  of  [knowable]  things,  the  concentration,  which  is  the  cause  of 
the  subsidence  of  the  hindrances  with  their  subconscious-impressions  and  of  the 
latent-deposit  of  karma.  But  even  when  this  [concentration]  exists,  why  should 
a creature  not  be  a reborn  ? ’ In  reply  to  this  he  says  «On  which  point  this  has 
been  said.»  If  an  effect  is  to  take  place  even  when  the  cause  is  totally  uprooted, 
then  whew!  Sir!  piercing  of  jewels  by  blind  men  and  similar  performances 
would  take  place  before  our  eyes.  And  so  this  proverb  popular  with  reference 
to  any  inexplicable  thing  would  be  explicable.  A blind  man  pierced  a jewel.  He 
strung  it,  that  is,  put  it  on  a thread.  He  put  it  on,  that  is,  fastened  it  on.  He 
paid  honour  to  it,  that  is,  spoke  in  praise  of  it. 

32.  When  as  a result  of  this  the  aspects  {puna)  have  fulfilled 
their  purpose,  they  attain  to  the  limit  of  the  sequence  of 
mutations. 

As  a result  of  the  rise  [into  consciousness]  of  the  Rain-cloud  of 
[knowable]  things,  when  the  aspects  have  fulfilled  their  purpose, 
they  end  the  sequence  of  their  mutations.  For  [the  aspects] 
having  completed  their  experience  and  their  liberation,  and  having 
attained  the  limit  of  their  sequence,  are  incapable  of  lingering 
even  for  a moment. 

The  objector  says  ‘ The  last  limit  of  the  Rain-cloud  of  [knowable]  things, 
the  undisturbed  calm  of  thought,  the  higher  passionlessness,  may  remove 
to  their  very  roots  the  subliminal-impressions  of  emergent  concentration,  the 
latent-deposits  of  hindrances  and  of  karma.  Still  since  the  aspects  of  them- 
selves are  disposed  to  form  evolved-effects,  why  do  they  not,  even  in  case  of  such 
a Self,  produce  a body  and  organs  and  the  rest  ? ’ The  reply  is  this.  32.  When 
as  a result  of  this  the  aspects  {guna)  have  fulfilled,  their  purpose,  they  attain 
to  the  limit  of  the  sequence  of  mutations.  The  disposition  of  the  aspects  is 
such  that  when  they  have  fulfilled  their  purpose  with  reference  to  any  [Self] 
they  do  not  continue  active  with  reference  to  that  [Self].  This  is  the  point. 

What  now  is  this  so-called  sequence  'i 

33.  The  positive  correlate  to  the  moment,  recognized  as  such 
at  the  final  limit  of  the  mutation,  is  a sequence. 

A sequence  has  as  its  essence  a continuous  series  of  moments  and 
is  cognized  as  such  at  the  final  limit  [or]  termination  of  the 
mutation.  For  when  a new  garment  has  come  to  the  end  [of  its 
newness],  there  is  no  oldness,  unless  [the  oldness]  has  passed  through 


iv.  33 — ] Book  IV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya  [344 

the  moments  of  the  sequence.  In  permanent  things  also  it  is  evident 
that  there  is  a sequence.  There  are  moreover  two  kinds  of  perma- 
nences, the  absolutely  unchanging  permanence  and  the  permanence 
in  mutation.  Of  these  two  the  Selfs  permanence  is  the  absolutely 
unchanging,  and  the  aspects’  permanence  is  in  mutation.  A thing 
is  permanent  when  its  essence  is  not  destroyed  while  it  is  passing 
through  mutations.  Both  of  these  two  kinds  have  a [certain] 
permanence,  because  the  essential  nature  of  them  is  not  destroyed. 
Of  these  two  : with  regard  to  the  external-aspects  of  the  aspects 
(guna),  the  thinking-substance  and  the  others  for  example,  the 
sequence,  having  reached  its  end,  is  recognizable  at  the  final  limit 
of  the  mutation ; with  regard  to  permanent  substances  [that  is] 
the  aspects  (guna),  the  end  has  not  been  reached  ; with  regard  to 
the  absolutely  unchanging  permanent,  the  liberated  Selves  grounded 
in  themselves  and  in  nothing  else,  the  being  in  themselves  is 
experienced,  to  be  sure,  as  a sequence,  yet  it  has  not  reached  its 
end  [and  is  not  recognizable  at  the  final  limit].  [The  sequence  is] 
abstracted  from  the  act  of  existence  and  is  based  upon  words 
[only], — Now  has  this  round-of- rebirths  as  it  exists  in  the  aspects 
[guna),  either  in  [actual]  motion  or  in  [potential]  equilibrium,  a 
final  consummation  of  the  sequence  or  not  ? This  is  incapable  of 
answer.  How  then?  A question  capable  of  answer  is  this,  ‘Will 
every  one  who  is  born  die  ? ’ ‘ Yes,  sir.’  There  is  [however]  a 

question  capable  of  alternative  answers,  ‘ Will  every  one  after 
he  has  died  he  born  again  ? ’ The  skilful  man  upon  whom  dis- 
cernment has  dawned  ^ and  whose  craving  has  dwindled  will 
not  be  born  again  ; but  any  other  will  be  born  again.  Likewise 
in  case  this  question  should  be  raised  ‘ Will  the  human  race  be 
more  fortunate  or  not  ? ’ A partial  answer  to  this  question  is 
this  ‘ It  will  be  more  fortunate  in  comparison  with  animals  ; it 
will  not  be  more  fortunate  in  comparison  with  gods  and  sages.’ 
On  the  other  hand  a question  incapable  of  answer  is  this  ‘ Will 
this  round-of-rebirths  have  an  end  or  will  it  be  endless  ? ’ [But] 
in  case  there  be  a limitation  [of  the  question]  in  either  one  of 
two  ways,  so  that  there  be  a consummation  of  the  series  of  the 
^ Compare  i.  16,  p.  45' ; ii.  27,  p.  165®  (Calc.  ed.). 


[ — iv.  33 


345]  Final  condition  of  the  seHcd  order 

round-of-rebirth  for  the  good  man,  but  not  for  any  other,  then 
there  is  no  defect  [in  the  question].  Consequently  the  only  [way] 
is  that  this  question  be  analysed. 

Meanwhile  he  asks  what  a sequence  of  mutations  is  by  saying  «What  now  is 
this  ?)»  33.  The  positive  correlate  to  the  moment,  recognized  as  such 

at  the  final  limit  of  the  mutation,  is  a sequence.  The  sequence  of  the  muta- 
tion is  that  which  has  the  moment  as  its  positive  correlate  ; it  is  that  to  which 
the  moments  are  related.  It  is  that  in  which  the  accumulation  of  moments 
inheres.  This  is  the  meaning.  And  a sequence  can  never  be  explained 
unless  there  be  that  which  the  sequence  contains.  Neither  can  there  be 
a sequence  of  only  a single  moment.  Therefore  the  remaining  alternative 
is  that  in  which  the  accumulation  of  moments  inheres.  As  he  says  in  the 
words,  «a  continuous  series  of  moments.^  He  gives  the  source-of-the-valid- 
idea  for  the  sequence  of  the  mutation  by  saying  «of  the  mutation.^  The 
final  limit  or  termination  of  the  mutation  is  the  observed  fact  that  even  a new 
garment,  although  kept  with  care,  after  a time  looks  old.  So  then  there  is 
a sequence  of  the  mutation.  And  before  this  point  is  reached  the  successive 
stages  of  oldness,  the  slightest,  veiy  slight,  slight,  noticeable,  more  noticeable, 
most  noticeable,  are  inferred  [already  to  exist].  This  same  he  sets  forth  by 
a negative  argument  in  the  words  «For  when.»  The  words  <Kunless  . . . has 
passed  through^  refers  to  [an  oldness]  in  which  a [particular]  moment  in  the 
sequence  has  not  been  reached.  The  objector  says  ‘ Such  a sequence  is  impos- 
sible in  the  case  of  primary  matter  since  that  is  permanent.’  In  reply  to  this 
he  says  ^In  permanent  things  also.»  By  the  use  of  the  plural  he  asserts  that 
the  sequence  is  to  be  found  among  all  permanent  things.  As  to  this  he  shows 
first  what  the  different  kinds  of  permanent  things  are,  and  then  explains  how 
the  sequence  is  found  among  permanent  things  in  the  words  ^two  kinds.  ^ The 
objector  says  ‘ The  absolutely  unchanging,  because  it  does  not  swerve  from  its 
own  nature,  may  be  conceded  to  be  permanent.  But  how  can  that  which  is 
in  mutation,  which  unceasingly  swerves  from  its  own  nature,  be  permanent  ? ’ 
In  reply  to  this  he  says  «When.»  External-aspects  and  time-variations  and 
intensities,  of  these  it  is  the  nature  to  rise  and  fall.  But  for  a substance  there  is 
no  dislodging  it  from  its  essential  nature.  And  to  the  question  whether  all  the 
sequences  are  cognizable  at  the  final  limit  of  mutation,  he  says  No.  «Of  these 
two : with  regard  to  the  external-aspects  of  the  aspects  {gum),  the  thinking- 
substance  and  the  others  for  example. » Since  it  has  reached  the  end  because 
of  the  destruction  of  the  properties,  [therefore  the  sequence  is  cognizable  at  the 
end  of  the  mutation].  In  the  case  of  the  primary  cause,  however,  the  sequence 
of  mutations  does  not  reach  an  end. — The  objector  says  ‘Since  the  original 
substance  undergoes  mutation  in  the  form  of  external  aspects,  it  may  have 
a sequence  of  mutation.  But  how  can  the  Self  who  does  not  enter  into 
mutation  have  a sequence  of  mutation  ? ’ In  reply  he  says  ^with  regard  to 
44  [h.o.s.  it] 


iv.  33 — ] Booh  TV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya  [346 

the  absolutely  unchanging  permanent.^  Persons  who  are  in  bondage,  because 
they  assume  that  they  are  not  over  and  above  mind-stuff,  have  the  mutations 
of  this  [mind-stuff]  attributed  to  them.  And  in  the  case  of  the  liberated 
a mutation  based  upon  the  [mere]  act  of  existence  and  having  no  material 
existence  is  wrongly  predicated.  Since  it  is  a word  only,  [if  we  say  that  the 
liberated  exist,]  which  comes  first,  the  predicate-relation  which  follows  is  based 
on  the  act  of  existence  [only  and  on  nothing  more],  when  he  says  «from  the  act 
of  existence.)^  As  to  the  aspects  {guna)  it  has  been  said  that  their  sequence 
of  mutation  reaches  no  end. — Not  enduring  this  some  one  asks  ^Now?»  The 
words  «in  equilibrium»  mean  in  the  condition  of  a great  mundane  dissolution  ; 
«in  motion»  means  at  the  time  of  creation.  What  he  means  to  say  is  this : 
‘ If  owing  to  endlessness,  there  is  no  end  of  the  mutations  of  the  round-of- 
existence,  why,  then ! Sir ! how  at  the  time  of  a great  mundane  dissolution 
could  it  suddenly,  for  all  selves,  cease  ? And  how  at  the  time  of  the  beginning 
of  a creation,  could  the  round-of-existence  suddenly  be  produced?  Accordingly 
in  a sequence  of  liberations  of  the  selves,  one  by  one,  because  all  of  them  would 
be  set  free,  in  a sequence  of  rounds-of-rebirths  all  [of  these  rounds-of-rebirths] 
would  be  destroyed,  [that  is]  would  reach  a final  consummation  of  the  mutations 
of  the  primary  cause.  And  if  this  be  so,  the  primary  cause  itself  would  prove 
to  be  impermanent.  Inasmuch  also  as  you  are  not  willing  [to  admit]  that 
quite  a new  principle  should  come  forth,  you  cannot  say  that  [the  mutations]  are 
endless.  For  if  that  be  so,  beginninglessness  would  be  contradicted  and  one 
would  be  involved  in  a breaking  of  all  the  statements  of  the  books  {r^astra).' 
This  is  the  point.  He  gives  the  reply  in  the  words  «This  is  incapable  of 
answer.»  This  contention  does  not  deserve  a reply.  In  order  to  show  that 
it  is  absolutely  incapable  of  answer,  he  shows  that  there  is  a question  absolutely 
capable  of  answer  by  saying  ^CA  question  . . . is.)^  The  question  is  Will  every 
one  who  is  born  die  ? He  gives  the  answer  by  saying  «‘  Yes,  sir.’»  In  other 
words,  ‘ Assuredly,  sir.’  Having  asked  a question  which  admits  of  only  one 
answer,  he  asks  a question  which  admits  of  alternative  answers  in  the  words 
«‘ Will  every  one  ? ’»  He  shows  how  it  is  that  this  admits  of  several  answers 
in  the  words  «alternative  answers.»  He  gives  another  question  which  also 
admits  of  alternative  answers  and  which  makes  the  meaning  clear  in  the  words 
^Likewise . . . the  human  race.^  But  this  is  incapable  of  an  absolute  answer. 
For  it  is  not  possible  to  say  absolutely  and  in  general  whether  the  round- 
of-rebirth  of  fortunate  and  unfox’tunate  persons  has  an  end  or  not.  Just 
as  we  cannot  ascertain  absolutely  the  blissfulness  or  the  lack  of  blissfulness 
in  the  case  of  all  living  beings.  [This  cannot  be  asserted]  with  the  same 
absolute  certainty  as  the  certainty  that  all  who  are  born  will  die.  But  the 
question  is  capable  of  answer  in  alternative  ways  as  he  says  «for  the  fortunate 
being.  ^ What  he  intends  is  this.  The  inference  is  that  when  there  is  a series 
of  liberations,  all  would  be  liberated  and  the  round-of-rebirths  would  be  cut 
short.  Now  this  [inference]  is  based  on  the  liberation  established  by  the  Sacred 


347]  Self-sufficiency  of  Isolation  [ — iv.  34 

Tradition  (agama).  So  how  can  the  fact  of  the  validity  of  the  Saci-ed  Tradition 
that  establishes  the  Liberation  which  we  assume,  invalidate  the  same  Sacred 
Tradition  with  reference  to  the  permanence  of  the  evolved-effects  of  the  primary 
cause?  Therefore  this  inference,  the  object  of  which  runs  counter  to  the 
Sacred  Tradition  is  not  the  source-of-a-valid-idea.  For  it  is  taught  in  the 
Sacred  Word  and  the  Tradition  and  the  Legends  and  the  Puranas  that 
the  succession  of  creations  and  resolutions  (pratisarga)  is  without  beginning 
and  without  end.  And  so  fii’st  of  all  in  the  case  of  all  the  selves  {dtman)  a 
simultaneous  destruction  of  the  round -of-rebirths  is  not  possible.  For  even 
learned  men  are  not  gi’ounded  in  discriminative  discernment,  although  it  is 
to  be  acquu’ed  by  the  toils  of  study  in  a succession  of  many  births.  How  much 
less,  then,  all  living  creatures  in  general,  both  animate  and  inanimate  and  so  on 
on,  suddenly  at  one  time ! For  if  causes  are  not  simultaneous,  effects  should 
not  be  simultaneous.  But  discriminative  discernment  occurs  in  a sequence, 
and  when  numberless  beings  are  liberated  in  a sequence,  there  is  no  destruction 
of  the  round-of-rebirth.  For  living  beings  are  endless  [in  number],  because  they 
are  countless.  Thus  all  is  cleared  up. 


Isolation  is  said  to  follow  after  the  sequence  of  the  task  of  the 
aspects  {guna)  has  been  completed.  The  nature  of  this  is  defined. 

34.  Isolation  is  the  inverse  generation  of  the  aspects,  no 
longer  provided  with  a purpose  by  the  Self,  or  it  is  the 
Energy  of  Intellect  grounded  in  itself. 

When  the  aspects  {guna),  whose  essence  is  causes  and  effects,  are 
inversely  generated, — now  that  experience  and  liberation  have 
been  accomplished  [for  the  Self]  and  now  that  a purpose  is  no 
longer  provided  by  the  Self, — this  is  Isolation.  The  Self’s  Energy 
of  Thought  becomes  isolated,  since  it  is  grounded  in  itself  and  is 
not  again  related  to  the  sattva  of  the  thinking-substance.  Its 
continuance  thus  for  evermore  is  Isolation. 

In  the  Patanjalan  authoritative  book  on  yoga,  the  Exposition  of 
the  Samkhya,  the  Book  on  Isolation,  the  Fourth. 

The  subordinate  connexions  of  the  sutra,  whose  purpose  is  to  determine  the 
nature  of  Isolation,  [with  other  topics]  he  gives  in  the  words  ^task  of  the 
aspects. » 34.  Isolation  is  the  inverse  generation  of  the  aspects,  no  longer 
provided  with  a purpose  by  the  Self,  or  it  is  the  Energy  of  Intellect 
grounded  in  itself.  In  so  far  as  their  work  is  done,  the  aspects,  no  longer 
provided  with  a purpose  by  the  Self,  are  inversely  generated.  They  are  resolved 
into  theii’  cause  which  is  the  primary-cause  {pradhdna).  Of  the  aspects,  whose 


iv.  34] 


Book  TV.  Isolation  or  Kdivalya 


[348 


essence  is  causes  and  effects,  the  subliminal-impressions  of  the  restriction  of 
emergent  concentration  are  resolved  into  the  central-organ ; and  the  central- 
organ  into  the  personality-substance ; and  the  personality-substance  into 
resoluble  [primary  matter] ; and  resoluble  [primary  matter]  into  unresoluble 
[primary  matter].  This  resolution  {pratisarga)  of  the  aspects  {gu)ia),  whose 
essence  is  causes  and  effects,  is  Isolation,  the  release  of  some  Self  from  the 
primary  cause. — Or  release  is  the  Self  grounded  in  itself,  as  he  says  ^grounded 
in  itself.»  For  the  Energy  of  Thought  even  in  a great  mundane  dissolution 
is  grounded  in  itself.  But  that  is  not  release.  So  he  says  «again.»  The 
word  Hi  in  the  sutra  signifies  the  completion  of  the  [authoritative]  work. 


In  this  Book  he  has  described  first  the  mind-stuff  fit  for  release,  then  the  per- 
fections of  the  other  world,  and  of  the  external  objects  and  of  the  knower  {jna), 
the  Cloud  of  [knowable]  things,  concentration  and  the  two  kinds  of  release,  and 
incidentally  other  things.  There  has  also  been  a description  of  the  source  of 
anguishes,  and  anguishes  [themselves]  have  been  recounted.  Here  also  the  two 
kinds  of  yoga  with  the  eight  aids  to  yoga  have  been  set  forth.  The  path  of 
release,  the  distinction  between  the  aspects  and  the  Self,  has  also  been  made 
more  clear.  Isolation  has  been  discriminated  and  the  Intellect  {citi)  has  been 
made  free  from  the  anguishes. 


In  the  Explanation  of  the  Comment  on  Patanjali’s  [Yoga-treatise],  [which 
Explanation  is  entitled]  Clarification  of  the  Entities  (Tattva-vaigaradi),  and 
which  was  composed  by  the  Venerable  Vacaspatimi9ra,  the  Book  on  Isolation, 
the  Fourth,  is  finished. 


APPENDIXES 


APPENDIX  1 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  OF  WORKS  REFERRED  TO  IN  THIS  VOLUME 

1834-39.  Mahabharata.  4 vols.  and  index,  Calcutta. 

1837.  Tumour,  George.  The  Mahawanso  in  Roman  characters,  with  the 
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1856.  Hall,  Pitz-Edward.  Sankhya-Pravacana-Bhashya  with  the  editor’s 
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1859.  93'tapatha  Brahmana.  Edited  by  Albrecht  Weber,  Berlin. 

1861.  9^n(^ya.  Aphorisms  with  the  commentary  by  Swapneswara,  edited  by 
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1864.  Cowell,  E.  B.  The  Kusumanjali,  Calcutta. 

1869.  Rig-Veda-Pratigakhya.  Edited  with  a German  translation  by  Max 
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1874.  Aryabhata.  Aryabhatlya,  edited  with  commentary  by  H.  Kern,  Leyden. 

1875.  Jacobi,  Hermann,  Ueber  tejas,  vayu,  aka^a,  speciell  in  der  Vaifesika- 

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Keshava  Shastri,  Medical  Hall  Press,  Benares. 

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Sagara  Press,  Bombay. 

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E.  B.  Cowell  and  E.  A.  Neil,  Cambridge  University  Press. 

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1891.  Kalidasa.  Abhijhana-fakuntala,  edited  by  Godabole  and  Parab,  Third 

revised  edition,  Nirnaya-Sagara  Press,  Bombay. 

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45  [h.o.s.  n] 


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355]  Bibliography  of  Works  referred  to  in  this  Volume 

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Appendix  1 [356 

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1904.  Ra,m£tnuja.  Vedanta-Sutras  with  the  Commentary,  translated  by  George 
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1904.  Brahmasutra-Shankarabhasyam.  With  the  commentaries  Ratnaprabha, 

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1905.  Kurma-Purana.  Published  at  the  Shrl-Venkateshwar  Steam  Press, 

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1905.  Subhasitaratna-bhandagaram.  Selected  and  arranged  by  K.  P.  Parab, 
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1905.  Vayu-Purana.  Ananda^rama  Sanskrit  Series  No.  49,  Poona. 

1905.  Bhagavata-Purana.  Edited  by  Vasudeva9arman,  Nirnaya-Sagara  Press, 
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1905.  Naradiya-Mahapurana.  Shrl-Venkateshwar  Press,  Bombay. 

1905.  Magha.  Sisupalavadha,  edited  by  Durg&prasad  and  Sivadatta,  Fourth 

edition,  Nirnaya-Sagara  Press,  Bombay. 

1906.  Kielhorn,  Franz.  E^ngraphic  Notes.  Nachrichten  von  der  Koniglichen 

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1906.  Apodeva.  Mimahsa-nyaya-praka9a,  reprinted  from  the  Pandit,  Benares. 

1906.  Garuda-Purana.  With  tika,  Shrl-Venkateshwar  Steam  Press,  Bombay. 

1906.  Madhavacarya.  Sarva-Dar9ana-Sangraha  with  the  Prasthanabheda, 
edited  by  H.  N.  Apte,  Ananda9rama  Sanskrit  Series  No.  51,  Poona. 
1906.  Caland,  W.,  and  Henry,  V.  L’Agnistoma,  2 vols.,  Paris. 

1906.  Jacobi,  Hermann.  Eine  Jaina-Dogmatik,  Umasvati’s  Tattvarthadhigama- 
sutra  iibersetzt  und  erlautert  (Sonderabdruck  aus  Band  LX  der  Zeitschrift 
der  Deutschen  Morgenlandischen  Gesellschaft),  Leipzig. 

1906.  Linga-Purana.  With  tika,  published  by  Khemraj  Shrikrishnadas  at  the 

Shrl-Venkateshwar  Steam  Press,  Bomba5% 

1907.  Udayana.  Atma-Tattva-Viveka,  edited  by  Vindhj^esvaraprasada-dvivedin, 

Bibliotheca  Indica,  new  series.  No.  1165,  Calcutta. 

1907.  Udyotakara.  Nyaya-varttika  together  with  Vacaspatimi9ra’s  Nyayasucl- 
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1907.  iQvarakrsna.  Sarhkhya-karika,  with  the  Sariikhya-Tattva-Kaumudl  and 
a tippana  by  Balaramodasina,  published  by  Jyestharamamukunda, 
Bombay. 

1907.  Jacob,  George  A.  A [first]  Handful  of  Popular  Maxims,  Second  edition, 
Nirnaya-Sagara  Press,  Bombay. 


357]  Bibliography  of  Works  referred  to  in  this  Volume 

1907.  Chakravarti,  Nilmani.  Chronology  of  India,  Journal  of  the  Asiatic 
Society  of  Bengal,  vol.  iii,  Calcutta. 

1907.  Mandanamigra.  Vidhiviveka  together  with  the  NyEyakanika  by  Vacas- 
patimi^ra,  reprinted  from  the  Pandit,  Benares. 

1907.  Kaye,  G.  R.  Notes  on  Indian  Mathematics,  J ournal  of  the  Asiatic  Society 
of  Bengal,  vol.  iii.  No.  7,  p.  474,  Calcutta. 

1907.  Asanga.  Mahayana-Sutralamkara,  Expose  de  la  Doctrine  du  Grand 

Vehicule,  par  Sylvain  Levi,  tome  i,  Texte,  Champion,  Paris. 

1908.  Mahavamsa.  Edited  by  Wilhelm  Geiger,  Pali  Text  Society,  London. 

1908.  Pathak,  K.  B.  Bhamaha’s  Attacks  on  the  Buddhist  Grammarian  Jinen- 

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vol.  xxiii.  No.  63,  p.  18. 

1908.  Deussen,  Paul.  Allgemeine  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  Erster  Band, 
Dritte  Abtheilung,  Die  Nachvedische  Philosophie,  pp.  507-578,  Leipzig. 
1908.  Kalidasa.  Kumarasambhava  with  the  Commentary  of  Mallinatha  (1-8) 
and  of  Sitaram  (8-17),  edited  by  Vasudev  Lakshman  Shastri  Pansikar, 
Fifth  edition,  Nirnaya-Sagara  Press,  Bombay. 

1908.  Kirfel,  Willibald.  Beitrage  zur  Geschichte  der  Nominalkomposition  in 
den  Upanishads  und  im  Epos,  Bonn. 

1908.  Wogihara,  Unrai.  Asanga’s  Bodhisattvabhumi,  Ein  dogmatischer  Text 

der  Nordbuddhisten,  Kreysing,  Leipzig. 

1909.  Jacob,  George  A.  A Second  Handful  of  Popular  Maxims,  Second  edition, 

Nirnaya-Sagara  Press,  Bombay. 

1909.  Kane,  P.  V.  Bhamaha,  the  Nyasa  and  Magha,  Journal  of  the  Bombay 

Branch  of  the  Royal  Asiatic  Society,  vol.  xxiii.  No.  64,  p.  91. 

1910.  Jacobi,  Hermann.  Agastya,  Encyclopaedia  of  Religion  and  Ethics, 

edited  by  James  Hastings,  vol.  i,  p.  181. 

1910.  Jacobi,  Hermann.  Abhasvaras,  Encyclopaedia  of  Religion  and  Ethics, 
vol.  i,  p.  202. 

1910.  Jacobi,  Hermann.  Atomic  Theory  (Indian),  Encyclopaedia  of  Religion 
and  Ethics,  vol.  ii,  p.  199\ 

1910.  Jacobi,  Hermann.  Abode  of  the  Blest,  Encyclopaedia  of  Religion  and 
Ethics,  vol.  ii,  p.  698. 

1910.  Jacobi,  Hermann.  The  Date  of  the  Philosophical  Sutras  of  the  Brah- 
mans, Journal  of  the  American  Oriental  Society,  thirty-first  volume. 
Part  I,  pp.  1-29. 

1910.  Hopkins,  E.  W.  Mythological  Aspects  of  Trees  and  Mountains  in  the 
Great  Epic,  J ournal  of  the  American  Oriental  Society,  thirtieth  volume. 
Part  IV,  p.  347. 

1910.  Kaye,  G.  R.  The  Sources  of  Hindu  Mathematics,  Journal  of  the  Royal 
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1910.  Andersen,  Dines.  A Pali  Reader,  Part  I,  Second  edition  ; Part  II,  Firet 
edition  (1907),  Copenhagen. 


A'p'pendix  1 [358 

1910.  Six  Buddhist  NySya  Tracts,  edited  by  Mahamahopadhyaya  Haraprasad 

Shastrl,  Bibliotheca  Indica  (New  Series),  No.  1226,  Calcutta. 

1911.  Dharmakirti.  Nyayabindu  and  Nyayabindutika,  edited  by  Th.  I.  Stcher- 

batskoi,  Bibliotheca  Buddhica,  vol.  vii.  [This  book  is  in  the  press  ; but 
the  proofs  have  been  in  my  hands.] 

1911.  Jacobi,  Hermann.  Zur  Friihgeschichte  der  indischen  Philosophic, 
Sitzungsbericht  der  koniglich  Preussischen  Akademie  der  Wissen- 
schaften,  22  Juli,  Berlin. 

1911.  Asahga.  Mahayana-Sutralamkara,  Expose  de  la  Docti’ine  du  Grand 
Vehicule  selon  le  Systeme  Yogacara,  edite  et  traduit  par  Sylvain  Levi, 
tome  ii,  Paris. 

1911.  Jacobi,  Hermann.  Kultur-,  Sprach-  und  Literarhistorisches  aus  dem 
Kautillya,  Sitzungsbericht  der  koniglich  Preussischen  Akademie  der 
Wissenschaften,  Phil. -hist.  Klasse,  2 November,  Berlin. 

1911.  Shastri,  Haraprasad.  Notes  on  the  newly-found  Manuscript  Catuhsataka 
by  Aryadeva,  from  the  Journal  and  Proceedings,  Asiatic  Society  of 
Bengal  (New  Series),  vol.  vii.  No.  7,  p.  431. 

1911.  Peri,  Noel.  A Propos  de  la  Date  de  Vasubandhu,  Bulletin  de  I’^cole 

Fran9aise  d’Extreme-Orient,  tome  xi,  p.  339,  Hanoi. 

1912.  Shiiwo,  Benkyo.  Doctor  Takukusu  and  Monsieur  Peri  on  the  date  of 

Vasubandhu,  Tetsugaku  Zasshi,  vol.  xxvii,  November-December, 
Tokyo. 


APPENDIX  2 


INDEX  OF  QUOTATIONS  IN  THE  COMMENT 


Following  the  order  in  which  they  are  cited  in  the  text  of  the  Bhasya  or 
Comment,  and  with  indication  of  their  sources. 

Synopsis  of  the  sources,  with  indication  of  Abbreviations  used. 


Anadhikarina  Agaminah. 
Agama. 

Amnaya. 

Chand.  Up.  = Chandogya  Upanisad. 
Taitt.  Ar.  = Taittirlya  Aranyaka. 
Panca9ikha. 

Brh.  = Brhadaranyaka  Upanisad. 

MBh.  = Mahabharata. 


Vatsyayana  Bhasya. 
VaP.  = Vayu  Purana. 

Varsaganya. 

VP.  = Visnu  Purana. 

Vaiyasikl  Gatha. 
Qravana. 

Qruti. 

Saihgraha  Karika. 


The  numbers  on  the  left  refer  to  the  page  and  line  of  the  Calcutta  edition  of 
1890  reprinted  in  1908  in  Benares  without  change  of  pagination,  but  with  slight 
differences  in  the  lines.  Quotations  which  are  not  verbally  accurate  are  marked 
with  an  asterisk.  An  interrogation-point,  placed  after  the  sign  of  equality, 
means  that  the  source  of  the  quotation  concerned  has  not  been  discovered. 


16^  = Pancagikha  2. 

62^  = Panca9ikha  1. 

65‘  = VP.  vi.  7.  33  f ; vi.  7.  36-37 ; 
Brhan  Naradlya  P.  xlvi. 
12-14. 

83'  = Panca9ikha  4. 

98«  = MBh  xii.  17.  20  ; 151.  11  ; 

compare  Dhammapada  28. 
99"  = Qravana. 

113‘  = Vaiyasikl  Gatha. 

114"'  = Panca9ikha  5. 

116"  = Panca9ikha  6. 

128^  = Amnaya. 

129'  = Panca9ikha  3. 

132'  = Saihgraha9loka  ? 

133'  = ? 

136'  = Panca9ikha  11. 


140''  = Panca9ikha  7. 

145'  = Pahca9ikha8. 

153"  = Panca9ikha  9. 

156®  = Agama. 

159'  = Panca9ikha  ? 

159"  = Qruti. 

168"  = Samgrahakarika  ? 

172"  = ? 

176’  = ? 

179'  = Vatsyayana  Bhasya. 

183'  = Va  P.  xciii.  101 ; VP.  iv.  10- 
12  ; LP.  Ixvii.  23. 

190®  — Agama. 

198'  = ? 

199®  = Panca9ikha  ? See  pp.  136', 
217'®. 

204'  = Panca9ikha  ? 


[3(50 


Appendix  2 


207''  = Panca9ikha  11. 

213^  = ? 

217-  = Samgrahakarika. 

236®  = Samgraha9loka. 

243®  = Chand.  Up.  viii.  1.  1. 
245^  = Brh.  ii.  4.  14  ; iv.  5.  15. 
249’  = Pauca9ikha  12. 

255’  — Pui-vacarya. 


272’  = Varsaganya. 

287'  = Purvacarya. 

291®  = Varsaganya. 

306’  = Panca9ikha  9. 

306''  = Agama. 

311’  = Anadhikarina  Agaminah. 
315’  = Taittirlya  Aranyaka,  i.  1 1®. 


APPENDIX  3 


INDEX  OF  QUOTATIONS  IN  THE  COMMENT,  GROUPED 
ACCORDING  TO  THEIR  SOURCES 

The  explanations  prefixed  to  Appendix  2 apply  to  this  Appendix  also. 


Anadhikarina  Agaminah. 

= 31U. ' 

Agama. 

= 156^ 

= 190^ 

= 3061 
Amnaya. 

= 128^ 

Taittirlya  Aranyaka. 

i.  11.  5 = 

Chandogya  Upanisad. 

viii.  1.  1 = 243^ 
Purvacarya. 

= 289*. 

Brhadaranyaka  Upanisad. 

ii.  4.  14  and  = 245^ 
iv.  5.  15. 

Mahabharata. 

xii.  530  = 98®. 
Vatsyayana  Bhasya. 

= 179*. 


Vayu  Parana, 
xcix.  101  = 183*. 

Varsaganya. 

= 272*. 

= 291®. 

Visnu  Parana, 
vi.  7.  30  f.  and  = 65^ 
vi.  7.  36-37. 

Vaiyasiki  Gatha. 

= 113*. 

^ravana. 

= 99\ 

grati. 

= 159®. 

Saihgraha-karika. 

= 132  . 

= 168®. 

= 217^ 

= 236®. 


46  [h.o.s.  i?] 


APPENDIX  4 


INDEX  OF  QUOTATIONS  IN  THE  TATTVA-VAigARADi 

Following  the  order  in  which  they  are  cited  in  the  text  of  Vacaspatimifra’s 
Vyakhya,  entitled  Tattva-Vaifaradi,  and  with  indication  of  their  sources. 
Synopsis  of  the  sources,  with  indication  of  the  Abbreviations  used. 


Katyayana. 

Tand.  = Tandya  Mahabrahmana. 

Nyaya-Kanika. 

NS.  = Nyaya-Sutra. 

Pat.  MBhas.  = Patanjali  Mahabhasya. 

Pan.  = Panini. 

Purana. 

Brh.  = BrhadaranyakaUpanisad. 

Brahma  Tattva  Samiksa. 
Bhag.  = Bhagavad-Gita. 

Manu. 

Mand.  = Mandukya  Upanisad. 
Moksa  Dharma. 


Yogiyaj.  = Yogiyajiiavalkya  Smrti. 

VaP.  = Vayu  Purana. 

VP.  = Visnu  Purana. 

Vainafika. 

Vaiyakarana. 

giksa. 

gnhar.  = (^rlhansa  Khandana- 
khandakliadya. 

gvet.  = gvetafvatara  Upanisad. 

Saiiigraha  gioka. 

Sariikh.  Kar.  = Sarhkhya  Karika. 
Smrti. 


The  numbers  on  the  left  refer  to  the  page  and  to  the  line  of  Vacaspati’s  text 
in  the  Calcutta  edition.  The  pages  in  the  Benares  reprint  agree  with  those 
of  the  Calcutta  edition ; the  lines  vary  a little.  Quotations  which  are  not 
verbally  accurate  are  marked  with  an  asterisk.  An  interrogation-point  placed 
after  the  sign  of  equality,  means  that  the  source  of  the  quotation  concerned  has 


not  been  discovered. 

= Tand.  xix.  2.  1. 

3*=  = Brh.’ iv.  4.23. 

4®  = Yogiyaj. 

20^^  = Pan.  V.  2.  42. 

20’  = Pan.  ii.  2.  29. 

27’  = *Pat.  MBhas.  i.  2.  45. 
27*  = ? 

2T  = Manu  ii.  7. 

31'^  = Samkh.  Kar.  xlviii. 


33”=  Mand.  5 and  11. 

44'“  = Samkh.  Kar.  xlv. 

50*  = VaP.? 

5P  = VaP.? 

75^  = Nyayakanika? 

75“  = Brahma-Tattva-Samiksa  ? 
102“  = ? 

104”  = Saihgraha  Qloka. 

106'  = VP.  vi.  7.  33. 


363] 

Index  of  Quotations  in  the  Tattva-Vdigdrcull 

106” 

— 

Snu’ti  ? 

II 

i-H 

VP.  vi.  7.  43. 

1061S 

= 

Bhag.  ii.  47. 

192*  = 

VP.  vi.  7.  44. 

112< 

= 

Samgraha  ^loka. 

194*2  = 

VP.  vi  7.  45. 

126« 

= 

Pan.  ii.  1.  49. 

195**  = 

VP.  vi.  7.  89. 

129^ 

= 

•? 

196*  = 

VP.  vi.  7.  90. 

132‘« 

= 

? 

196®  = 

VP.  vi.  7.  92. 

132” 

= 

Manu  iii.  68. 

1976  ^ 

VP.  vi.  7.  86-88. 

133® 

= 

Bhag.  xviii.  38. 

210*  = 

MBh.  xii.  318.  102. 

134* 

= 

VP.  iv.  10.  9. 

218®  = 

^iksa  13. 

137» 

= 

? 

225*  = 

Vaiyakarana. 

142* 

= 

^vet.  iv.  5. 

227*  = 

Katyayana. 

143* 

= 

Pan.  i.  4.  22. 

240**  = 

VaP.  ci  85. 

156® 

= 

^vet.  iv.  5. 

248*  = 

Samkh.  Kar.  xxix. 

159*2 

= 

Manu  iv.  37. 

248*2  = 

Brh.  iv.  4.  3. 

162** 

= 

VaP.  Ixix.  2. 

254*  = 

? 

1762 

= 

VP.  vi.  7.  36-37. 

279®  = 

VaP.  Ixvi.  143. 

180* 

= 

Pan.  ii.  4.  9. 

285**  = 

Puiana  ? 

1832 

= 

VP.  iv.  10.  12. 

2942  = 

9 

186*2 

= 

VP.  vi.  7.  39. 

299®  = 

Qilhar. 

190* 

= 

Pan.  iii.  4.  68. 

304*  = 

Vaina9ika  ? 

190** 

z= 

Manu  vi.  72. 

3082  ^ 

? 

190” 

= 

VP.  vi.  7.  40-41. 

314*  = 

NS.  iii.  1.  25. 

APPENDIX  5 


INDEX  OF  QUOTATIONS  IN  THE  TATTVA-VAigARADI 
GROUPED  ACCORDING  TO  THEIR  SOURCES 


The  explanations  prefixed  to  Appendix  4 apply  to  this  Appendix  also 


Katyayana. 

= 227^ 

Tandya  Mahabrahmana. 

xiv.  2.  1 = 3'. 
Nyayakanika. 

? = 

Nyaya-Sutra. 

iii.  1.  25  = 31P. 
Panini. 

i.  4.  22  = 143». 

ii.  1.  49  = 126«. 

ii.  2.  29  = 20’. 

*ii.  4.  9 = 180'. 

iii.  4.  68  = 190'. 

V.  2.  42  = 20^ 

Patanjali  Mahabhasya. 

*1.  2.  45  = 27’.’ 
Parana. 

? = 285". 

Brhadaranyaka  Upanisad. 

iv.  4.  3 = 248'“. 

iv.  4.  23  = 3“. 

Brahma  Tattva  Samiksa. 

? = 75“. 

Bhagavad  Gita, 
ii.  47  = 106'“. 
xviii.  38  = 133“. 

Manu. 

ii.  7 = 27“. 

iii.  68  = 132'“, 


iv.  37  = 159'“. 
vi.  72  = 190". 
Mahabharata. 

xii.  318.  102  = 210’. 
Mandukya  Upanisad. 

Sand  11  = 33". 

Yogi  Yajnavalkya  SmrtL 
? = 4®. 

Vayu  Purana. 

? = 50®. 

? = 51'. 

Ixix.  2 = 162". 

Ixvi.  143  = 279®. 
ci.  85  = 240". 

Visnu  Purana. 
iv.  10.  9 ’=  134'. 
iv.  10.  12  = 183“. 
vi.  7.  33  = 106'. 
vi.  7.  36-37  = 176®. 
vi.  7.  39  = 186'“. 
vi.  7.  40-41  = 190'*. 
vi.  7.  43  = 191". 
vi.  7.  45  = 194‘". 
vi.  7.  77-85  = 194'“. 
vi.  7.  89  = 195". 
vi.  7.  90  = 196'. 
vi.  7.  92  = 196®. 
vi.  7.  86-88  = 197®. 
Vainafika. 

? = 294“. 

? = 304'. 


365]  Index  of  Quotations  in  the  Tattva-  Vaigdrada 


Vaiyakarana. 

? = 225’. 

^iksa. 

13  = 218*. 

Qrlharsa  Khandanakhandakhiidya. 
= 299*. 

^veta9vatara  Upanisad. 
iv.  5 = 142\ 
iv.  5 = 156*. 


Sarhgraha  Qloka. 
104’*. 

112*. 

Sariikhya  Karika. 
xxix  = 248*. 
xlv  = 44’“. 
xlviii  = 31*. 

Smrti. 

? = 106”. 


APPENDIX  6 

QUOTATIONS  IN  THE  TATTVA-VAigARADi  NOT  YET  TRACED 

TO  THEIR  SOURCES 


Gdityam  vandet  svargakdmak  = 27*. 

Nirupadravabhutarthasvahhavasya  = 102’. 
Kamato  ’Mmato  vupi  yat  karomi  = 106”. 
Na  Jiinsydt  sarvd  hhutani  [Vedic]  = 129*. 
Sdbhildsa^  ca  samkalpa/i  = 132’*. 

Pradipasyevanirvanaih  vimoksak  = 137®. 
Akdro  gauravam  rduksyam  — 254’. 

Sahopdlambhaniyamad  abhedah  = 294*. 
Bhutir  yesam  kriyd  sdiva  kdrakam  = 304*. 
Ahhinno  ’pi  hi  huddhydtmd  = 308*. 


APPENDIX  7 


INDEX  OF  WORDS  IN  THE  SUTRAS 


An  alphabetic  index  of  the  Sutras  themselves  is  given  in  the  edition  of  the 
Bombay  Sanskrit  Series,  and  in  that  of  the  Anandaframa  Series  of  Poona. — This 
index  is  designed  to  include  all  the  words  of  the  text  of  the  Sutras,  and  no 
others.  The  text  is  that  of  the  Calcutta  edition  of  Samvat  1947  (Baptist  Mission 
Press,  A.D.  1891) ; and  accordingly 2?anca,  for  example,  is  included.  The  numbers 
refer  to  pada  and  sutra. 

The  Sutras  contain  almost  no  finite  verb-forms  [asti,  syat,  kfiyate,  jaymte),  and 
I have  therefore  put  the  participles,  not  under  the  verbal  roots,  but  in  their 
proper  alphabetic  place  : so  atlta,  apeta,  udita,  vita  under  a-,  u-,  v-,  not  under  root  i ; 
similarly  abliijdta,  dsanna,  utpanna,  uhta  (not  under  vac),  u-labdha  (under  al-) ; and 
so  the  other  negatives  beginning  with  an-  or  a-.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
pronominal  forms  are  assembled  in  the  usual  way : tat,  tasya,  tdh,  sa,  under  tad ; 
asya,  esdm,  under  idam ; etena  under  etad. 


akarana,  sanga-smaya^akaranam  iii. 

51.  * 

akalpita,  bahir-akalpita  iii.  43. 
akusida,  prasariikhyane  ’pi  akusidasya 
iv.  29. 

akrsna,  afukla^akrsnam  iv.  7. 
akrama,  akramaiu  ceti  iii.  54. 
aklista,  khsta^aklistah  i.  5. 
anga,  yoga^anga  ii.  28  ; astav  angani 
ii.  29  ; angamejayatva  i.  31 ; sva^an- 
ga  ii.  40. 

ajnata,  vastu  jnata,_^ajnatam  iv.  17. 
ajnana,  duhkha^jnana  ii.  34. 
anjanata,  tad-anjanata  i.  41. 
animan,  anima^adi  iii.  45. 
atadrupa,  atadi-upa-pratistham  i.  8. 
atita,  atlta^anagata-jnanam  iii.  16 ; 
atlta^anagatanam  svarupato  ’sty 
adhvabhedat  iv.  12. 
atyanta,  atyanta^asarhkirnayoh  iii.  35. 


atha,  atha  yoga^anu^asanam  i.  1. 
adrsta,  drsta^adrsta  ii.  12. 
adhigama,  pratyak-cetana^adhigamah 

i.  29. 

adhimatra,  mrdu-madhya^adhimatra 

ii.  34. 

adhimatratva,  mrdu-madhya^adhima- 
tratvat  i.  22. 

adhisthatrtvam,  sarva-bhava^adhi- 
sthatrtvam  iii.  49. 

adhyatman,  adhyatma-prasadah  i.  47. 
adhyasa,  itara^adhyasat  iii.  17. 
adhvan,  adhva-bhedat  iv.  12. 

Ananta,  Ananta-samapattibhyam  ii.  47. 
ananta,  ananta-phala  ii.  34. 
anabhighata,  dvandva^anabhighatah 

ii.  48  ; tad-dharma^anabhighataf  ca 

iii.  45. 

auavacchinna,  samaya^anavacchin- 
nah  ii.  31. 


367] 


Index  of  Wordfi  in  the  Sutras 


anavaccheda,  anyata^anavacehedat 

iii.  53  ; kalena^anavacchedat  i.  26. 
anavadliarana,  ubhaya^anavadhara- 

namiv.  20. 
anavasthitatva,  i.  30. 
anastam,  nastam  apy  anastam  ii.  22. 
anagata,  dulikham  anagatam  ii.  16  ; 
anagatam  jnanam  iii.  16 ; anagatam 
svarupatah  iv.  12. 
anatman,  duhkha^anatmasu  ii.  5. 
anaditva,  tasam  anaditvam  ca  iv.  10. 
anagaya,  dhyana-jam  anagayam  iv.  6. 
anitya,  anitya^aguci-duhkha  ii.  5. 
anista,  anista-prasangat  iii.  51. 
anukara,  svarupa^anukara  ii.  54. 
anugama,  rupa^anugamat  i.  17. 
anuguna,  vipaka^anugunanam  iv.  8. 
anuttama,  santosad  anuttama-sukha- 
labhah  ii.  42. 

anupagya,  pratyaya^anupagyah  ii.  20. 
anupatin,  gabda-jnana^anupatl  i.  9 ; 

dharma-anupatl  iii.  14. 
anubhuta,  anubhuta-visaya  i.  11. 
anumana,  pratyaksa^anumana  i.  7 ; 

gruta^anumana  i.  49. 
anumodita,  krta-karita^anumodita, 

ii.  34. 

anugayin,  sukha^anugayl  ii.  7 ; 

duhkha^anugayi  ii.  8. 
anugasana,  yoga^anugasana  i.  1. 
anusthana,  yoga^anga^anusthanat  ii. 

28." 

aneka,  cittam  ekam  anekesam  iv.  5. 
anta,  paramamahattva^antah  i.  40. 
antara,  jaty-antara  iv.  2 ; citta^antara 

iv.  21  ; pratyaya^antarani  iv.  27. 
antaranga,  trayam  antarangam  iii.  7. 
antaraya,  te  antarayah  i.  30 ; anta- 

rayabhavagca  i.  29. 
antardhanam,  iii.  21. 
anya,  samskara-geso  ’nyah  i.  18  ; anya- 
visaya  i.  49  ; anya-samskara  i.  50  ; 
tad-anya-sadbaranatvat  ii.  22. 


anyata,  anyata-khyati  iii.  49 ; 

anyata^anavacchedat  iii.  53. 
anyatva,  krama^anyatva  iii.  15 ; 

parinama^anyatve  iii.  15. 
anvaya,  suksma^anvaya  iii.  44  ; 
asmita^anvaya  iii.  47 ; citta^anvaya 

iii.  9. 

aparanta,  aparanta-jnanam  iii.  22  ; 

parinama^aparanta-nirgrahya,  iv.  33. 
aparamrsta,  agayair  aparamrstah  i. 
24. 

aparigraba,brahmacarya^aparigrabah 
ii.  30 ; aparigraha-sthairye  ii.  39. 
aparinamitva,  purusasya_aparinami- 
tvat  iv.  18. 

apavarga,  bhoga^apavarga  ii.  18. 
api,  tato  ’pi  i.  22  ; purvesam  api  i.  26  ; 
adhigamo  ’pi  i.  29  ; tasya^api  i.  51  ; 
viduso  ’pi  ii.  9 ; guddho  ’pi  ii.  20  ; 
nastam  api  ii.  22 ; tad  api  iii.  8 ; 
vairagyad  api  iii.  50  ; vyavahitanam 
api  iv.  9 ; cittam  api  parartham  iv. 
24  ; prasamkbyane  ’pi  iv.  29. 
apunya,  i.  33  ; ii.  14. 
apeksitva,  tad-uparaga^apeksitvat  iv. 
17. 

apeta,  avarana-mala^apetasya  iv.  31. 
apratisamkrama,  citer  apratisamki-a- 
mayah  iv.  22. 

apratisanga,  buddher  ajjratisangah  iv. 

21. 

apramanaka,  iv.  16. 

aprayojaka,  nimittam  aprayojakam 

iv.  3. 

abbava,  abhava-pratyaya  i.  10 ; 
antaiaya^abhava  i.  29  ; tad-abbavat 
samyogabhava  ii.  25  ; esam  abhave 
tadabhavah  iv.  11. 

abhighata,  an-abbighata  ii.  48,  iii.  45. 
abhijata,  abbijatasya  maneh  i.  41. 
abbinivega,  raga-dvesa^abbinivega 
ii.  3 ; svarasavabi  viduso  ’pi  tatha 
rudbo  ’bbinivegah  ii.  9. 


Appendix  7 


[368 


abhibhava,  abhibhavaprudurbhavau 

iii.  9. 

abhimata,  yathabhimatam  i.  38. 
abhivyakti,  abhivyaktir  vasananam 

iv.  8. 

abbyantara,  ii.  50,  51. 
abhyasa,  tatra  sthitau  yatno  ’bhya- 
sah  i.  13 ; abhyasa-vairagyabhyam 
i.  12 ; ekatattva^abhyasa,  i.  32  ; 
virama-pratyaya^abhyasa  i.  18. 
arista,  aristebhyo  va  iii.  22. 
artha,  fabda^artha-jnana  i.  42 ; 
fabda^artha-pratyaya  iii.  1 7 ; cittarii 
sai’va^artharii  iv.  23 ; sva^artha  iii. 
35  ; cittam  api  para^artham  iv.  24  ; 
purusa^artha  iv.  34  ; tad-artha  eva 
dr^yasya^atma  ii.  21  ; artha-matra 
i.  43  and  iii.  3 ; krta^artha  ii.  22 
and  iv.  32 ; tad-artha-bhavanam  i.  28; 
bhavana^artha,  ii.  2 ; tanukarana^ 
artha  ii.  2 ; apavarga^artham  ii.  18 ; 
tat-pratisedha^arthara  i.  32. 
arthata,  sarva^arthata  iii.  11. 
arthatva,  vi9esa^arthatva  i.  49  ; 

para^arthatva,  iii.  35. 
arthavattva,  anvaya^arthavattva  iii. 

44  ; arthavattva-samyamat  iii.  47. 
alabdha,  alabdha-bhumikatva  i.  30. 
alihga,  lihgamatra^alihgani  ii.  19 ; 

alihga-paryavasanam  i.  45. 
alp  a,  jheyam  alpam  iv.  31. 
avadharana,  an-avadharanam,  iv.  20. 
avastha,  dharma-laksana^avastha  iii. 
13. 

avasthana,  drastuh  svarupe  ’vastha- 
nam  i.  3. 

avidya,  avidya^asmita-  ii.  3 ; anitya^ 
afuci-duhkha^anatmasu  nitya-fuci- 
sukha^atma-khyatir  avidya  ii.  5 ; 
avidya  ksetiam  uttaresam  ii.  4 ; 
tasya  hetur  avidya  ii.  24. 
aviplava,  viveka-khyatir  aviplava  ii. 
215. 


avirati,  alasya^avirati,  i.  30. 
avigesa,  1.  unparticularised,  vigesa^ 
avigesa  ii.  19.  3.  failing  to  distin- 

guish, pratyaya^avigeso  bhogah  iii. 
35. 

avisayibhutatva,  iii.  20. 
avyapadegya,  ganta^^udita^avyapa- 
degya  iii.  14. 

agukla,  agukla^akrsna  iv.  7. 
aguei,  anitya-aguci  ii.  5. 
aguddhi,  aguddhi-ksayat  ii.  43. 
astau,  astav  ahgani  ii.  29. 
asamkirna,  atyanta^asamklmayoh 

iii.  35. 

asamkhyeya,  asamkhyeya-vasanabhih 

iv.  24. 

asahga,  kantaka^adisu  asahga  iii.  39. 
asampramosa,  anubhuta-visaya^a- 
saihpramosah  i.  11. 

asamprayoga,  caksuh  prakaga^a- 
saiiipi’ayoge  iii.  2 ; visaya^asampra- 
yoge  ii.  54. 

asamsarga,  parair  asamsargah  ii.  40. 
asti,  svarupato  ’sty  adhvabhedat  iv. 

12  ; tada  kirn  syat  iv.  16. 
asteya,  satya^asteya  ii.  30 ; asteya- 
pratisthayam  ii.  37. 
asmita,  avidya^asmita-  ii.  3 ; drg- 
dargana  - gaktyor  • ekatmata^iva^as- 
mita  ii.  6 ; vitarka-vicara^ananda^ 
asmita  i.  17  ; asmita^anvaya^artha- 
vattva  iii.  47  ; nirmana-cittany  asmi- 
tamatrat  iv.  4. 
asya,  asya  vaglkarah  i.  40. 
ahihsa,  ahihsa-satya-  ii.  30 ; ahihsa- 
pratisthayfim  ii.  35. 


a,  a vivekakhyateh  ii.  28. 
akaga,  grotra^akagayoh  saihbandha 
iii.  41  ; kaya^akagayoh  sambandha 
. . . akaga-gamanam  iii.  42. 
aksepin,  visaya^aksepl  ii.  51. 
agama,  anumana^agamah  i.  7. 


369] 


Index  of  TT’^07t/.s  in  the  Sf/traft 


atmaka,  indriya^atmaka  ii.  18. 
atmata,  eka^atmata^eva  ii.  6. 
atman,  1.  the  soul,  atma-dar^ana,  ii. 
41 ; atma-khyati  ii.  5 ; atma-bhava- 
bhavana  iv.  25  ; J2.  the  essence, 
drgyasya^atma  ii.  21  ; guna^atma 
nah  iv.  13. 

adarga,  vedana-adarca-  iii.  36. 
adi,  anima^adi  iii.  45  ; bala^adlni  iii. 
24 ; maitrl^adisu  iii.  23  ; kantaka^ 
adisu  iii.  39. 

anantarya,  vyavahitanam  apy  anan- 
taryam  iv.  9. 

anantya,  jnanasya^anantyat  iv.  31. 
ananda,  vitarka-vicara^ananda  i.  17. 
anuQravika,  drsta^anu^ravika  i.  15. 
apatti,  tad-akara._,apatti  iv.  22. 
apura,  prakrti^apurat  iv.  2. 
abhasa,  sva^abhasam  iv.  19. 
ayus,  jaty-ayur-bhogah  ii.  13. 
alambana,  jnana^alambana  i.  38 ; 
abhava-pratyaya^alambana  i.  10 ; 
hetu-phala^a9raya._^alambanaih  iv. 
11. 

alasya,  pramada^alasya-  i.  30. 
aloka,  prajna-aloka  iii.  5 ; pravrtty- 
aloka-nyasat  iii.  25. 
avarana,  avarana-mala  iv.  31  ; pra- 
ka9a^avarana  ii.  52 ; praka9a^ava- 
rana-ksaya  iii.  43. 
aveqa,  para-9arlra^ave9ah  iii.  38. 
agaya,  vipaka^a9ayaih  i.  24  ; karma^ 
a9ayaih  ii.  12. 
agis,  agiso  nityatvat  iv.  10. 
agraya,  hetu-pbala.^a9raya  iv.  11. 
agrayatva,  kriya-phala^agrayatvam  ii. 
36. 

asana,  asana-pranayama  ii.  29  ; sthira- 
sukham  asanam  ii.  46. 
asanna,  tlvrasamveganam  asannah  i.21. 
asevita,  satkara^asevitah  i.  14. 
asvada,  adarga^asvada-vSrtta  iii.  36. 


itara,  itaretara^adhyasat  iii.  17  ; tri- 
vidham  itaresam  iv.  7 ; prajna-pur- 
vaka  itaresam  i.  20. 
itaratra,  vrtti-sarupyam  itaratra  i.  4. 
itij  ii.  34,  iii.  54,  55,  iv.  34. 
idam,  asya  vagikarah  i.  40  ; hanam 
esam  iv.  28  ; esam  abbave  iv.  11. 
indriya,  kaya^indriya  ii.  43  ; bhuta^ 
indriya  ii.  18,  iii.  13 ; indriya-jaya 
ii.  41  ; iii.  47  ; vagyata^indriyanam 
ii.  55  ; indriyanam  pratyahara  ii.  54. 
iva,  svarupagunyam  iva  i.  43,  iii.  3 ; 
anukara  iva  ii.  54  ; abhijatasya^iva 
i.  41. 

ista,  ista-devata  ii.  44. 

igvara,  klega-karma-vipaka^agayaih 
aparamrstah  purusa-vigesa  igvarah 

i.  24  ; Igvara-pranidhana  i.  23,  ii.  1, 

ii.  32,  ii.  45. 

ukta,  klegavad  uktam  iv.  28. 
utkranti,  asanga  utki-antig  ca  iii.  39. 
uttara,  avidya  ksetram  uttaresSm  ii.  4. 
utpanna,  visayavatl  va  pravrttir  ut- 
panna  i.  35. 

udaya,  ksaya^udayau  iii.  11. 
udana,  udana-jayat  iii.  39. 
udara,  prasupta-tanu-vicchinna^uda- 
ranam  ii.  4. 

udita,  ganta^udita  iii.  12  and  14. 
upanimantrana,  sthany-upaniman- 
trane  iii.  51. 

uparakta,  uparaktam  cittam  iv.  23. 
uparaga,  tad^uparaga^apeksitvat  iv. 
17. 

■upalabdhi,  svarupa^upalabdbi  ii.  23. 
upasarga,  samadhav  upasargah  iii. 
37. 

upastbana,  saiTa-ratna^upasthanam 
ii.  37. 

upaya,  bana^upayah  ii.  26. 
upeksa,  maitn-kariina-mudita^upek- 
sanam  i.  33. 


47 


H.O.S.  17] 


Appendix  7 


ubhaya,  ubhaya^anavadharanam  iv. 

20. 

rtambhara,  rtaiiibhara  tatra  prajna 

i.  48. 

eka,  prayojakaiii  cittam  ekam  iv.  5 ; 
eka-citta-tantram  iv.  16 ; eka^atmata 

ii.  6 ; eka-rupatvat  iv.  9 ; eka-tattva^ 
abhyasah  i.  32  ; eka-samaye  iv.  20. 

ekatanata,  pratyaya^ekatanata  iii.  2. 
ekatra,  trayam  ekatra  samyamah  iii.  4. 
ekatva,  parinama^ekatvat  iv.  14. 
ekagrata,  cittasya^ekagrata  iii.  12 ; 

sarvarthata^ekagrata  iii.  11. 
ekagrya,  saunianasya^ekagrya^indri- 
ya-jaya  ii.  41. 

etad,  etayaiva  savicara  i.  44  ; etena 
bhutendriyesu  iii.  13. 
eva,  i.  44,  i.  46,  ii.  6,  ii.  15,  ii.  21, 

iii.  3,  iv.  8. 


osadhi,  janma^osadhi-mantra  iv.  1. 


ka,  tada  kiiii  syat  iv.  16. 
kantaka,  jala-panka-kantaka  iii.  39. 
kantha,  kantha-kupe  iii.  30. 
kathamta,  janma-kathaiiita-saiiibodha 

ii.  39. 

karana,  saksat-karanat  iii.  18. 
karuna,  maitrl-karuna-mudita^upeksa 

i.  3*3. 

karman,  kle9a-karma-vipaka  i.  24  ; 
kle9a-karma-nivrttih  iv.  30  ; karma^ 
fi9aya  ii.  12 ; nirupakramarii  ca 
karma  iii.  22 ; karma^a9ukla^ 
akrsnam  iv.  7. 

kalpita,  bahir-akalpita  iii.  43. 
kaya,  kaya^indriya-siddhih  ii.  43 ; 
kaya-rupa-saiiiyamat  iii.  21  ; kaya- 
vyuha-jiianam  iii.  29  ; kaya-sariipat 

iii.  46,  46 ; kaya^aka9ayoh  sarii- 
bandha  iii.  42. 


[370 

karana,  bandha-karana-9aithilyat  iii. 
38.' 

karita,  krta-karita^anumodita  ii.  34. 
karitva,  iv.  24. 

kala,  de9a-kala  ii.  31,  ii.  50,  iv.  9 ; 
dirgha-kala-nairantarya  i.  14 ; ka- 
lena^anavacchedat  i.  26. 
kim,  tada  kim  syat  iv.  16. 
kupa,  kantha-kupe  iii.  30. 
ktirma,  kurma-nadyam  iii.  31. 
krta,  krta^artha  ii.  22,  iv.  32. 
kaivalya,  saiiiyogabhavo  hanaiii  tad- 
dr9eh  kaivalyam  ii.  25  ; sattva- 
purusayoh  9uddhi-samye  kaivalyam 
iii.  55 ; dosa-blja-ksaye  kaivalyam 
iii.  50 ; gunanam  pratiprasavah  kfii- 
valyam  iv.  34  ; kaivalya-pragbharam 
cittam  iv.  26. 

krama,  ksana-pratiyogi  parinama^apa- 
ranta-nirgrahyah  kramah  iv.  33 ; 
parinama-krama  iv.  32 ; ksana-tat- 
kramayoh  iii.  52  ; krama^anyatvam 

iii.  1-5. 

kriya,  kriya-yogah  ii.  1 ; kriya-phala 
ii.  36 ; praka9a-kriya  ii.  18. 
krodha,  lobha-krodha-moha  ii.  34. 
klista,  vrttayah  pancatayyah  klis- 
ta^aklistah  i.  5. 

klega,  panca  kle9ah  ii.  3 ; kle9a-mula- 
karma9aya  iii.  12 ; kle9a-karma- 
vipaka  i.  24 ; kle9a-karma-nivrttib 

iv.  30 ; kle9a-tanakarana  ii.  2 ; 
lianam  esarii  kle9a-vad  uktam  iv.  28. 

ksana,  ksana-pratiyogi  . . . kramah 

iv.  33 ; ksana-tat-kramayoh  samya- 
mat  iii.  52 ; nirodha-ksana  iii.  9. 
ksaya,  ksaya-udayau  iii.  11  ; praka- 
9a^avarana-ksaya  iii.  43 ; dosa-blja- 
k.saya  iii.  50  ; a9uddhi-ksaya  ii.  28, 
4^ 

ksi,  tatah  ksiyate  praka9a^avaranam 
ii.  52;  ksina-vrtteh  i.  41. 
ksudh,  ksut-pipasa  iii.  30. 


371] 


Index  of  Word^f  in  the  Sutras 


ksetra,  avidya  ksetram  ii.  4. 
ksetrika,  varana-bhedas  tu  tatah  ksetri- 
ka-vat  iv.  3. 

kkyati,  purusa-kliyater  guna-vaitrsn- 
yam  i.  16 ; atma-khyati  ii.  15 ; 
viveka-khyati  ii.  26,  ii.  28,  iv.  29  ; 
anyata-khyati  iii.  49. 

gati,  gati-vicebedah  ii.  49  ; dhruve  tad- 
gati-jnanam  iii.  28. 
gamana,  akafa-gamanam  iii.  42. 
guna,  guna-vrtti  ii.  15  ; guna-vaitrsn- 
yam  i.  16 ; guna-parvani  ii.  19  ; te 
vyakta-suksma  guna^atmanah  iv. 
13;  gunanam  pratiprasavah  iv.  34; 
samaptir  gunanam  iv.  32. 
guru,  purvesam  api  guruh  i.  26. 
grahana,  grahana-grahyesu  tatstha-tad- 
anjanata  samapattih  i.  41  ; grahana- 
svarupa^asmita-  iii.  47. 
grahitr,  grahitr-grahana-grahyesu  i.  41. 
grahya,  grahitr-grahana-grahyesu  i.  41 ; 
tad-grahya-fakti-stambhe  iii.  21. 

ca,  abhavaf  ca  i.  29  ; nirvicara  ca  i.  44  ; 
visayatvaih  ca  i.  45  ; artha5  ca  ii.  2 ; 
virodhac  ca  ii.  15 ; yogyatvani  ca 
ii.  41 ; dharanasu  ca  ii.  53  ; na  ca  tad 
salambanam  iii.  20 ; nirupakramaiii 
ca  iii.  22  ; samvedanac  ca  iii.  38  ; ut- 
krantif  ca  iii.  39  ; samapattef  ca  iii. 
42  ; anabhighata?  ca  iii.  45  ; pradha- 
na-jaya9  ca  iii.  48  ; sarva-jnatrtvaih 
ca  iii.  49  ; akramaiii  ca^iti  iii.  54  ; 
anaditvarii  ca  iv.  10  ; na  ca  ekacitta- 
tantram  iv.  16  ; ekasamaye  ca  iv.  20  ; 
samkara^  caiv.  21. 
cakra,  nabhi-cakre  iii.  29. 
caksus,  caksuh-prakafa  iii.  21. 
caturtha,  visaya^aksepl  caturthah  ii. 
51.  ' ’ 

candra,  candre  tara-vyuha-jhanam  iii. 
27. 


citi,  citer  apratisamkramayah  iv.  22 ; 
svarupa-pratistha  va  citifaktih  iv.  34. 

citta,  yogaf  citta-vrtti-nirodhah  i.  2 ; 
citta-vrttayah  iv.  18 ; cittam  api 
parartham  iv.  23 ; dega-bandha^ 
cittasya  iii.  1 ; uparaktam  cittam 
iv.  23  ; uparaga^apeksitvac  cittasya 
iv.  17  ; visayaih  va  cittam  i.  37  ; eka- 
citta-tantram  iv.  16 ; vastu-samye 
citta-bhedat  iv.  15  ; asaihprayoga 
cittasya  ii.  54 ; citta-viksepa  i.  30 ; 
citta-prasadanam  i.  33  ; cittasya^eka- 
grata  iii.  12 ; nirodha-ksana-citta^an- 
vayo  nirodhaparinamah  iii.  9 ; 
pravrttibhede  prayojakaiii  cittam 
ekam  anekesam  iv.  5 ; citta^antara- 
di'fye  iv.  21 ; para-citta-jhanam  iii. 
19  ; citta-sariivit  iii.  34 ; cittasya 
para-9arlra^ave9ah  iii.  38  ; nirmana- 
cittani  iv.  4 ; ksaya.^udayau  cittasya 
iii.  11. 

eetana,  pratyak-cetana  i.  29. 


chidra,  tac-chidresu  pratyaya^antarani 
iv.  27. 

ja,  taj-jah  sarhskarah  i.  50  ; viveka-jarii 
jnanam  iii.  52,  iii.  54  ; samadhi-jah 
siddhayah  iv.  1 ; dhyana-jam  ana9a- 
yam  iv.  6. 

jan,  vartta  jayante  iii.  36. 

janma,  janma-kathaiiita-sahibodha  ii. 

39  ; adrsta-janma  ii.  12  ; janma^osa- 
dhi-mantra  iv.  1. 

japa,taj-japas  tad-artha-bhavanam  i.  28. 
jaya,  taj-jayat  prajha^alokah  iii.  5 ; 
udana-jayat  iii.  39  ; samana-jayat  iii. 

40  ; indriya-jaya  ii.  41,  iii.  47  ; bhuta- 
jayah  iii.  44  ; pradhana-jaya  iii.  48. 

jala,  jala-pahka-kantaka  iii.  39. 
javitva,  mano-javitvam  iii.  48. 
jati,  piirva-jati  iii.  18 ; jaty-antara- 
parinama  iv.  2 ; jati-de9a-kala-samaya 


[372 


Appendix  7 


ii.  31  ; jaty-ayur-bhogah  ii.  13  ; jati- 
laksana-de^air  anyata  iii.  52  ; jati- 
de?a-kala-vyavahita  iv.  9. 

jugupsa,  sva^anga-jugupsa  ii.  40. 
jna,  niratifayaih  sarvajnabljam  i.  25. 
jnata,  sada  jnata?  citta-vrttayah  iv.  18  ; 

vastu-jnata^ajnatam  iv.  17. 
jnatrtva,  sarva-juatrtvam  iii.  49. 
jfiana,  mithyajnanam  i.  8 ; 9abda- 
jnana^anupatl  i.  9 ; svapna-nidra- 
jnana^alambanam  va  i.  38 ; ^ab- 
da^artha-jnana  i.  42 ; anagata-jnanam 

iii.  16  ; sarva-bhuta-ruta-jnanara  iii. 
17  ; purva-jati-jnanam  iii.  18  ; para- 
citta-jnanam  iii.  19 ; aparanta-jnanam 
iii.  22 ; viprakrsta-jnanam  iii.  25 ; 
bbuvana-jnanam  iii.  26  ; triravyuha- 
jnanam  iii.  27  ; tad-gati-jiianam  iii. 
28 ; kaya-vyuha-jnanam  iii.  35  ; 
viveka-jarii  jnanam  iii.  52,  iii.  54  ; 
mala^apetasj^a  jnanasya  iv.  31  ; 
jnana-diptir  a viveka-khyateh  ii.  28. 

jneya,  jneyam  alpam  iv.  31. 
jyotismant,  vi9oka  va  jyotismatl  i.  36. 
jyotis,  murdha-jyotisi  iii.  32. 
jvalana,  samana-jayaj  jvalanam  iii.  40. 

tad,  1.  tan-niiodah  i.  12  ; tat  paraiii  i. 
16 ; tad-artha  i.  28 ; taj-japa  i.  28 ; tat- 
pratisedha^artham  i.  32  ; tat-stha  i. 
41  ; tad-anjana  i.  41  ; taj-jah  i.  50 ; 
tad-vrttayah  ii.  11 ; tad-vipaka  ii.  13  ; 
tad-artha  ii.  21 ; tad-anya-sadharana 

ii.  22 ; tad-dr9eh  ii.  25  ; tad-abhavat 

ii.  25  ; tat-sanuidhau  ii.  35  ; tad  eva 

iii.  3 ; taj-jayat  iii.  5 ; tad  api  iii.  8 ; 
tatpravibhaga  iii.  17 ; tat  salambanam 

iii.  20  ; tadgrahya  iii.  21 ; tat-samya- 
mat  iii.  22 ; tad-gati  iii.  28 ; tad- 
dharma  iii.  45  ; tad-vairagyat  iii.  50  ; 
tat-kramayoh  iii.  52 ; tad-vipaka  iv.  8 ; 
tad-abhavah  iv.  1 1 ; tad  apramanakam 

iv.  16  ; tad-uparaga  iv.  17 ; tat-pra- 


blioh  iv.  18  ; na  tat  svabhasam  iv.  19 ; 
tad-akara^apattau  iv.  22  ; tad  asarh- 
khyeya-  iv.  24 ; tac-chidresu  iv.  27. 

2.  tasya  hetuh  ii.  24  ; tasya  vacakah 

i.  27  ; tasya^avisayl  iii.  20  ; tasya 
bhumisu  iii.  6 ; tasya  pra9anta-  iii.  10 ; 
tasya  saptadha  ii.  27 ; tasya^api 
nirodhe  i.  51. 

3.  tasmin  sati  ii.  49. 

4.  tayor  vibhaktah  panthah  iv.  15. 

5.  te  antarayah  i.30;  te  pratiprasava- 
heyah  ii.  10  ; te  hladaparitapaphalah 

ii.  14  ; te  samadhav  upasai’gah  iii. 
37  ; te  vyakta-suksmah  iv.  13. 

6.  ta  eva  sabljah  samadhih  i.  46. 

7.  tasam  anaditvam  iv.  10. 

8.  From  the  stem  sa,  sa  tu  dlrgha- 
kala-  i.  14. 

tada,  tada  drastuh  i.  3 ; tada  viveka- 
nimnam  iv.  26  ; tada  sarva^avarana 
iv.  31  ; tada  kirii  syat  iv.  16. 
tanu,  prasupta-tanu-vicchinna^udara- 
nam  ii.  4. 

tantra,  eka-citta-tantram  iv.  16. 
tapas,  mantra-tapah-samadhi  iv.  1 ; 
taiDah-svadhyaya-  l9varapraiiidhanani 
ii.  1 ; saiiitosa-tapah-svadhyaya  ii.  32  ; 
a9uddhi-ksayat  tapasah  ii.  43. 
tapa,  parinama-tapa  ii.  15. 
taraka,  tarakarii  sarva-visayam  iii.  54. 
tara,  tai’a-vyohaiii.  27. 
tivra,  tlvra-sariiveganam  i.  21. 
tatas,  tato  ’pi  i.  22  ; tatah  pratyak- 
cetana  i.  29  ; tato  dvandva^anabhi- 
ghatah  ii.  48 ; tatah  kslyate  ii.  52  ; 
tatah  parama  va9yata  ii.  55 ; tatah 
punah  9antoditau  iii.  12  ; tatah  pra- 
tibha  iii.  36  ; tatah  praka9a  iii.  43  ; 
tato  ’nimadi  iii.  45  ; tato  manojavi- 
tvam  iii.  48  ; tatah  pratipattih  iii.  53  ; 
tatah  ksetrikavat  iv.  3. 
tattva,  parinamaikatvad  vastu-tattvam 

iv.  14  ; eka-tattva^abhyasah  i.  32. 


Index  of  Words  in  the  Sutras 


373] 

tatra,  tatra  sthitau  i.  13  ; tafcra  nirati- 
fayam  i.  25 ; tatra  9abda^artha- 
jnana-vikalpaih  i.  42  ; rtaiiibhara 
tatra  prajna  i.  48 ; tatra  pratyaya^eka- 
tanata  iii.  2 ; tatra  dhyana-jam  ana- 
9ayam  iv.  6. 
tatha,  tatha  rudho  i.  9. 
tu,  sa  tu  dirghakala  i.  14  ; varana- 
bhedas  tu  iv.  3. 

tulya,  tulyayos  tatahpratipattih  iii.  53 ; 

tulya-pratyayau  iii.  12. 
tula,  laghu-tnla  iii.  42. 
tyaga,  vaira-tyagah  ii.  35. 
traya,  trayam  ekatra  iii.  4 ; parinama- 
traya  iii.  16;  trayam  antarangam  iii. 
7. 

trividha,  trividham  itaresam  iv.  7. 

darQana,  atma-dar9ana  ii.  41  ; drg- 
dai’9ana  ii.  6 ; siddha-dar9ana  iii.  32  ; 
vi9esa-dar9ana  iv.  25 ; bhranti-dar- 
9ana  i.  30. 

divya,  divyam  9i’otram  iii.  41. 
dipti,  jnana-dipti  ii.  28. 
dirgha,  dlrgha-suksma  ii.  50 ; dirgha- 
kala i.  14. 

duhkha,  heyaiii  duhkham  ii.  16 ; duh- 
kham  eva  sai'vam  ii.  15  ; duhkha^a- 
jnana^ananta-phalah  ii.  34 ; a9uci- 
duhkha^anatmasu  ii.  5 ; sukha-duh- 
kha-punya^apunya-visayanam  i.  33 ; 
duhkha^anu9ayl  dvesah  ii.  8 ; duli- 
kha-daurmanasya  i.  31  ; saiiiskara- 
duhkhaih  ii.  15. 
drk,  drg-dai’9ana  ii.  6. 
drdha,  drdha-bhumih  i.  14. 
drgi,  tad  dr9eh  kaivalyam  ii.  25  ; di^i- 
matraii.  20. 

drgya,  drastr-dr9ya  ii.  17,  iv.  23  ; tad- 
artha  eva  dr9yasya^atma  ii.  21  ; 
apavarga._^artharii  dr9yam  ii.  18 ; 
citta^antara-dr9ye  iv.  21. 
drgyatva,  abhasaiii  dr9yatvat  iv.  19. 


drsta,  drsta^adrsta  ii.  12  ; drsta^anu- 
9ravika  i.  15. 
devata,  ista-devata  ii.  44. 
dega,  dega-bandhag  cittasya  iii.  1 ; dega- 
kala-saiiikliyabhih  ii.  50 ; jati-laksana- 
degaih  iii.  53  ; jati-dega-kala-vyavahi- 
tfinam  iv.  9 ; jati-dega-kala-samaya 
ii.  31. 

dosa,  dosa-blja-ksaye  iii.  50. 
daurmanasya,  i.  31. 
drastr,  drastr-drgyayoh  ii.  17,  iv.  23  ; 
drasta  drgimatrah  ii.  20 ; tada  dra- 
stuh  svarupe  ’vasthanam  i.  3. 
dvandva,  dvandva^anabhighatah  ii. 
48. 

dvesa,  raga-dvesa^abhinivega  ii.  3 ; 
dulikha^anugayl  dvesah  ii.  8. 

dharma,  1.  external  aspect,  dhar- 
ma^anupatl  dharmi  iii.  14 ; dharma- 
laksana^avastha  iii.  13 ; kaya-sampat 
tad-dharma^anabhighatag  ca  iii.  45  ; 
adhva-bhedad  dharmanam  iv.  12. 

2.  fnowahle^  thing,  dharma-meghah 
samadhih  iv.  29. 

dharmin,  dharma^anupatl  dharmi  iii. 
14. 

dharana,  dega-bandhag  cittasya  dhar- 
ana  iii.  1 ; dharana-dhyana-samadhi 
ii.  29  ; dharanasu  ca  yogyata  mana- 
sah  ii.  53. 

dhyana,  tatra  pratyaya^ekatanata 
dhyanam  iii.  2 ; -dhyana-samadhayo 
ii.  29  ; dhyana-heyas  tad-vrttayah 
ii.  11  ; yatha^abhimata-dhyanad  va 
i.  38  ; dhyanajam  anagayam  iv.  6. 
dhruva,  dhruve  tad-gati  iii.  28. 

na,  na  ca  tat  salambanam  iii.  20  ; na 
ca^eka-citta-tantram  ii.  16 ; na  tat 
svabhasam  iv.  19. 
nasta,  nastam  apy  anastam  ii.  22. 
nadi,  kurma-nadyam  iii.  31. 
nabhi,  nabhi-cakre  iii.  29. 


[374 


Appendix  7 


nitya,  nitya-?uci-sukha^atnia-khyati 

ii.  5, 

nityatva,  a^iso  nityatvat  iv.  10. 
nidra,  abhava-pratyaya^alambana  vrt- 
tir  nidra  i.  10  ; nidra-smrtayah  i.  6 ; 
svapna-nidra-jnana^alambanami.o8. 
nibandhanin,  sthiti-nibandhani  i.  35. 
nimitta,  nimittam  aprayojakam  iv.  3. 
nimna,  viveka-nimnam  iv.  26. 
niyama,  yama-niyama-  ii.  29  ; 9auca- 
saihtosa  - tapah  - svad  by  aya  -l9varapra- 
nidhanani  niyamah  ii.  32. 
nirati^aya,  nirati9ayarii  sarvajnabljani 
i.  25. 

nirupakrama,  sopakramaiii  nirupakra- 
mam  ca  karma  iii.  22. 
nirodha,  yoga9citta-vrtti-nirodhah  i.  2 ; 
abhyasa-vairagyabhyarh  tan^niro- 
dhah  i.  12  ; tasya^api  nirodlie  sarva- 
nirodhan  nirbljah  samadhih  i.  51  ; 
vyutthana-nirodha-saiiiskarayorabhi- 
bhava-pradurbhavau  nirodha-ksana- 
citta^anvayo  nirodhaparinamah  iii.  9. 
nirgrahya,  aparanta-nirgrahyah  kra- 
mah  iv.  33. 

nirbija,  sarva-nirodhan  nirbljah  sama- 
dhih i.  51 ; tad  api  bahirangam  nir- 
bljasya  iii.  8. 

nirbhasa,  artha-matra-nirbhasam  i.  43, 

iii.  3. 

nirmana,  nirmana-cittani  iv.  4. 
nirvicara,  savicara  nirvicara  ca  stiksma- 
visaya  i.  44  ; nirvicara-vai9aradye 
’dhyatmaprasadah  i.  47. 
nirvitarka,  smrti-pari9uddhau  svarupa- 
9unya^iva^arthamatra-ni  rbhasa  nir- 
vitarka i.  43. 

nivrtti,  pipasa-nivrtti  iii.  30 ; kle9a- 
karma-nivrttih  iv.  30 ; atma-bhava- 
bhavana-nivrttih  iv.  25. 
nairantarya,  dlrghakala-nairantarya- 
i.  14. 

uyasa,  aloka-nyasat  iii.  25. 


pahka,  jala-pahka-kantaka  iii.  39. 
panca,  pahca  kle9ah  ii.  3. 
pancataya,  vrttayah  pancatayyah  i.  5. 
panthan,  vibhaktah  panthah  iv.  15. 
para,  1.  other,  cittam  api  para^artham 

iv.  24  ; bhogah  para^arthatvat  iii. 
35  ; para-9arlra^ave9ah  iii.  38  ; para- 
citta-jhanam  iii.  19  ; parair  asamsar- 
gah  ii.  40 ; 

2.  higher,  tat  paraiii  [vairagyam]  i.  16. 
parama,paramava9yata  ii.  55 ; parama- 
mahattva^anta  i.  40. 
paramanu,  paramanu-paramamahattva 
i.  40. 

parinama,  dharma-laksana^avastha- 
parinama  iii.  13 ; parinama-traya 

iii.  16 ; parinama-krama  iv.  32  ; 
krama^anyatvaiii  parinama^any- 
atve  hetuh  iii.  15  ; parinama^apa- 
ranta  iv.  33  ; parinama-tapa-samska- 
raih  ii.  15 ; jaty-antara-parinama 

iv.  2 ; parinama^ekatvad  vastu- 
tattvam  iv.  14  ; cittasya^ekagrata- 
parinamah  iii.  12  ; nirodha-parinama 
iii.  9;  samadhi-parinama  iii.  11. 

paritapa,  hlada-paritapa  ii.  14. 
paridrsta,  samkhyabhih  paridrsta  ii. 
50. 

pariguddhi,  smrti-pari9uddhi  i.  43. 
paryavasana,  alihga-paiyavasanam  i. 
45. 

parvan,  guna-parvani  ii.  19. 
pipasa,  ksut-pipasa  iii.  30. 
punya,  punya^apunya  i.  33,  ii.  14. 
punar,  tatah  punah  9antoditau  iii.  12  ; 

punar  anistaprasahgat  iii.  51. 
purusa,  sattva-purusayor  atyanta- 
samklrnayoh  iii.  35 ; tat-prabhoh 
purusasya  iv.  18  ; sattva-purusa^an- 
yata-khyatimatra  iii.  49  ; purusa- 
khyater  guna-vaitrsnyam  i.  16 ; 
sva^artha-samyamat  pu rusa-j nanam 
iii.  35  ; purusa^artha-9unyam  iv.  34; 


375] 


Index  of  Wordi^  in  the  Siltras 


sattva-purusayoh  guddhi-samye  kai- 
valyam  iii.  55  ; purusa-vi9esa  I9varah 

i.  24. 

purva,  abhyasa-purvah  i.  18  ; antaran- 
garh  purvebhyah  iii.  7 ; purva-jati 
iii.  18 ; purvesam  api  guruh  i. 
26. 

purvaka,  prajna-purvaka  i.  20  ; moha- 
purvakah  ii.  34. 

prakaga,  praka9a-kriya-sthiti  ii.  18 ; 
caksuh-praka9a  iii.  21;  praka9a^ava- 
rana-ksaya  ii.  52,  iii.  43. 
prakrti,  prakrty-apurat  iv.  2 ; prakrtl- 
nam  varana-bhedas  iv.  3. 
Prakrtilaya,  bhavapratyayo  Videha- 
Px’akrtilayanam  i.  19. 
pracara,  pracara-saiiivedanac  ca  iii.  38. 
praecbardana,  i.  34. 
prajSa,  samadhi-prajna  i.  20  ; pranta- 
bhumih  prajna  ii.  27  ; prajna^alokah 

iii.  5 ; rtambhara  tatra  prajna  i.  48  ; 
9ruta^anumana-prajnabhyam  i.  49. 

pranava,  vacakah  pranavah  i.  27. 
pranidhana,  l9vara-pranidhana  i.  23, 

ii.  1,  ii.  32,  ii.  45. 

prati,  krta.^artbam  prati  ii.  22. 
pratipaksa,  pratipaksa-bhavanam  ii. 
33,  34. 

pratipatti,  anavacchedat  tulyayos  ta- 
tah  pratipattih  iii.  53. 
pratiprasava,  gunauam  pratiprasavali 

iv.  34  ; pratiprasavaheyah  ii.  10. 
pratibandhin,  anya-saiiiskara-prati- 

bandhl  i.  50. 

pratiyogin,  ksana-pratiyogi  iv.  33. 
pratisedha,  tat-pratisedha._,artham  i. 

32.’ 

pratistha,  a-tadrupa-pratistham  i.  8 ; 
ahihsa-pr°  ii.  35 ; satya-pr°  ii.  36 ; 
asteya-pr°  ii.  37 ; brahma-carya-pr° 
ii.  38 ; kaivalyam  svaiupa-pratistha 
va  citi9aktih  iv.  34. 
pratyak,  pratyak-cetana  i.  29. 


pratyaksa,  pratyaksa._^anumana  i.  7. 
p raty  ay  a,  9abda^ai  tha-pratyayanam 

iii.  17  ; pratyaya^avi9esa  iii.  35  ; 
bhava-pratyaya  i.  19 ; 9uddho  ’pi 
pratyaya^anupa9yah  ii.  20 ; pratya- 
ya^antarani  samskarebhyah  iv.  27  ; 
pratyayasya  para-citta-jiianam  iii. 
19  ; 9antoditau  tulyapx’atyayau  cit- 
tasya  iii.  12  ; virama-pratyaya  i.  18  ; 
abhava-pratyaya  i.  10 ; pratyaya^ 
ekatanata  iii.  2. 

pratyahara,  pratyahara-dharana  ii. 
29 ; svavisaya^asamprayoge  cittasya 
svartlpa^anukara  iva.^indriyanaiii 
pratyaharah  ii.  54. 
pradhana,  pradhana-jaya9  ca  iii.  48. 
pramana,  pramana-viparyaya-  i.  6 ; 
pratyaksa^anumana^agamah  pra- 
manani  i.  7. 

pramada,  sarii9aya-i3ramada^alasya- 
i.  30. 

prayatna,  prayatna-9aithilya  ii.  47. 
pray oj  aka,  prayojakam  cittam  ekam 

iv.  5. 

pravibhaga,  tat-pravibhaga-sariiyamat 
iii.  17. 

pravrtti,  visayavatl  pravrttih  iv.  5 ; 
pravrtty-aloka-nyasat  iii.  25;  pra- 
vrtti-bhede  prayojakarii  cittam  ekam 
anekesam  iv.  5. 

praganta,  pra9anta-vahita  iii.  10. 
pragvasa,  9vasa-pra9vasa  i.  31,  ii. 
49. 

prasamkhyana,  prasaiiikhyane  ’pi 
' akusidasya  iv.  29. 
prasanga,  anista-prasangat  iii.  51. 
prasada,  adhyatma-prasada  i.  47. 
prasupta,  prasupta-tanu-vicchinna^ 
udaranam  ii.  4. 

pragbbara,  kaivalya-pragbharam  iv. 

21. 

prana,  pracchardana-vidharanabhyaiii 
pranasya  i.  34. 


Appendix  7 


pranayama,  pranayama-pratyuhara-  ii. 
29. 

pratibha,  pratibhad  va  sarvam  iii.  33  ; 

pratibha-fravana-  iii.  36. 
pradus,  pradur-bhavah  iii.  3.  45. 
pranta,  pranta-bhumih  prajna  ii.  27. 

phala,  dubkha^ajnana^ananta-phalah 

ii.  34  ; hlada-paritapa-phalah  ii.  14  ; 
kriya-phala^afrayatvam  ii.  36;  hetii- 
phala^afraya^alambanaih  iv.  11. 

bandha,  de^a-bandha?  cittasya  iii.  1 ; 

bandha-karana-9aithilyat  iii.  38. 
bala,  rripa-lavanya-bala-vajrasaiiihana- 
natvani  iii.  46  ; maitrl-adisu  balani 

iii.  23  ; balesu  hasti-bala^adlni  iii. 
24. 

bahir-akalpita,  bahirakalpita  vrttih 

iii.  43. 

bahiranga,bahirangaiii  nirbijasyaiii.  8. 
badhana,  vitarka-badhane  pratipaksa- 
bhavanam  ii.  33. 

bahya,  bahya^abhyantai’a  ii.  50,  51. 
bija,  dosa-blja-ksaye  iii.  50 ; sarvajiia- 
bljam  i.  25. 

buddbi,  buddhibuddher  atiprasangali 

iv.  21  ; sva-buddhi-saiiivedanam  iv. 
22. 

brahmaearya,  asteya-brahmacarya-  ii. 
30  ; brahmacarya-pratisthayam  vlr- 
ya-labhah  ii.  38. 

bhava,  bhava-pratyaya  i.  19. 
bhava,  atma-bhava-bhavana  iv.  25 ; 
sarva-bhava^adhisthatrtvam  iii.  49 ; 
vikarana-bhavah  iii.  48 ; pradur- 
bhavah  iii.  45. 

bhavana,  pratipaksa-bhavanam  ii.  33- 
34  ; tad-artha-bhavanam  i.  28. 
bhavana,  bhavanata9  citta-prasadanam 

i.  33  ; atma-bhava-bhavana  iv.  25  ; 
samadhi-bhavana^arthah  ii.  2. 
bhuvana,  bhuvana-jfianam  iii.  26. 


[87(5 

bhuta,  1.  element,  bhuta^indriya  ii. 
18,  iii,  13  ; bhuta-jayah  iii.  44, 

2.  crea^wre,  sarva-bhuta-ruta  iii.  17. 

3.  participle  in  avisayibhutatvat  iii, 

20. 

bhumi,  drdha-bhumih  i.  14  ; pranta- 
bhumih  ii.  27  ; tasya  bhumisu  vini- 
yogah  iii.  6 ; alabdhabhumikatva 

i.  30. 

bheda,  adhva-bliedat  iv.  12  ; pravrtti- 
bhede  iv.  5 ; citta-bhedat  iv,  15  ; 
prakrtinaiii  varana-bhedah  iv.  3. 
bhoga,  jaty-ayur-bhogah  ii.  13  ; bho- 
ga^apavarga  ii.  18  ; pratyaya^avi- 
9eso  bhogah  iii.  35. 

bhauma,  sarva-l)hauma  mahavratam 

ii.  31. 

bhranti,  bhranti-dar9ana  i.  30. 

mani,  abhijatasya^iva  maneh  i.  41. 
madhya,  mrdu-madhya^adhimatra 

i.  22,  ii.  34. 

manas,  mano-javitvam  iii.  48 ; mana- 
sah  sthiti  i.  35  ; yogyata  manasah  ii. 

53! 

mantra,  osadhi-mantra-tapah  iv,  1. 
mala,  avarana-mala  iv.  31. 
mahant,  maha-videha  iii.  43 ; maha- 
vratam ii.  31. 

matra,  artha-matra  i.  43,  iii.  3 ; dr9i- 
matra  ii.  20  ; anyata-khyati-matra 

iii.  49  ; asmita-matra  iv.  4 ; lihga- 
matra  ii.  19. 

mithya,  mithya-jfianam  i.  8. 
mudita,  maitrl-karuna-mudita^upek- 
sanam  i.  33. 

murdhan,  murdha-jyotisi  iii.  32. 
mula,  kle9amiilah  karma9aya  ii.  12  ; 

sati  miile  tad-vipakah  ii.  13. 
mrdu,  mrdu-madhya^adhimatra  i.  22, 

ii.  34.  ’ 

megha,  dharma-meghah  samadhih  iv. 
29. 


377] 


Index  of  Words  in  the  Sutras 


maitri,  maitrl-karuna-mudita^upek- 
sanam  i.  33 ; maitrl^adisu  balani 
iii.  23. 

moha,  lobha-krodha-mohah  ii.  34. 

yatna,  tatra  sthitau  yatno  ’bhyasah 

i.  13. 

yatha,  yatha^abhiniata-dhyanad  va  i. 
39. 

yama,  yama-niyama-  ii.  29  ; ahitisa- 
satya^asteya  - brahmacarya^apari- 
graha  yamah  ii.  30. 
yoga,  yoga^anufasanam  i.  1 ; yoga9 
citta-vrtti-nirodhah  i.  2 ; kriya- 
yogah  ii.  1 ; yoga^anga^anustha- 
nat  ii.  28. 

yogin,  a^ukla^akrsnam  yoginas  iv.  7. 
yogyata,  yogyata  manasah  ii.  53. 
yogyatva,  atma-dar^ana-yogyatvani  ca 

ii.  41. 

ratna,  sarva-ratna^upasthanam  ii.  37. 
rasa,  sva-rasa-vahl  ii.  9. 
raga,  sukha^anu9ayl  ragah  ii.  7 ; raga- 
dvesa^abhinive9ah  panca  kle9ah  ii. 
3 ; vlta-raga-visayam  i.  37. 
rupa,  kaya-rupa-samyamat  iii.  21  ; 
rupa-lavanya-bala  iii.  46  ; sva-rupa- 
pratistha  iv.  34  ; sva-rupa-9unyam 
iva  iii.  3 ; sva-rupa^anukara  iva  ii. 
54 ; sva-rupa^upalabdhi-samyogah 
ii.  23 ; a-tadrupa-pratistham  i.  8 ; 
yitarka-vicara._^ananda^asiriita  - rupa 
i.  17. 

rupatva,  eka-rupatvat  iv.  9. 


laksana,  dharma-laksana^avastha  iii. 
13  ; jati-laksana-de9aih  iii.  53. 


laghu,  lagbu-tula  iii.  42. 
labba,  virya-labha  ii.  38 ; sukha-labhah 
ii.  42. 

lavanya,  rupa-lavanya-bala  iii.  46. 

48  [h.o.s.  it] 


linga,  linga-matram  ii.  19. 
lobha,  lobha-krodha-mohah  ii.  34. 


vajra,  vajra-samhananatva  iii.  46. 
vat,  ksetrika-vat  iv.  3 ; kle9a-vat  iv. 
28. 

varana,  prakrtinam  varana-bhedah  iv. 

3.  ' 

vagikara,  paramamahattva^anto  ’sya 
va9lkarah  i.  40 ; va9lkara-samjna  i. 
15. 

vastu,  vastu  jnata^ajnatam  iv.  17  ; 
vastu-9unyo  vikalpah  i.  9 ; vastu- 
samye  cittabhedat  iv.  15 ; parinama^ 
ekatvad  vastu-tattvam  iv.  14 ; eka- 
citta-tantraiii  vastu  iv.  16. 
va,  l9vara-pranidhanad  va  i.  23  ; vidha- 
ranabhyam  va  i.  34 ; visayavatl  va 
i.  35  ; vi9oka  va  i.  36 ; visayam  va 
i.  37  ; alambanam  va  i.  38  ; dhyanad 
va  i.  39  ; aristebhyo  va  iii.  33  ; pra- 
tibhad  va  iii.  33 ; sva-rupa-pratistha 
va  iv.  34. 

vaeaka,  tasya  vacakah  pranavah  i.  27. 
vartta,  -asvada-vartta  iii.  36. 
vasana,  abhivyaktir  vasananam  iv.  8 ; 

asamkhyeya-vasanabhi9  iv.  24. 
vahita,  pra9anta-vahita  iii.  10. 
vahin,  sva-rasa-vahl  ii.  9. 
vikarana,  vikarana-bhavah  iii.  48. 
vikalpa,  pramana-viparyaya-vikalpa- 
nidra-smrtayah  i.  6 ; 9abda-jnana^ 
anupatl  vastu-9unyo  vikalpah  i.  9 ; 
9abda_artha-jhana-vikalpaih  sam- 
klrna  savitarka  samapattih  i.  42. 
viksepa,  citta-viksepa  i.  30  ; viksepa- 
sahabhuvah  i.  31. 

vieara,  vitarka-vicara^ananda^asmita 
i.  17. 

vicehinna,  prasupta-tanu-vicchinna  ii. 

4. 

viccheda,  gati-viccheda  ii.  49. 


[378 


Appendix  7 


vitarka,  1.  deliberation  [upon  cqarse  ob- 
jects], vitarka-vicara^ananda-  i.  17. 
2.  perverse  consideration,  vitarka 
hihsadayah  krta-kari ta^anumod itah 
ii.  34  ; vitarka-badhane  pratipaksa- 
bhavanam  ii.  33. 
vitrsna,  visaya-vitrsnasya  i.  15. 
Videha,  Videha-Prakrtilayanam  i.  19  ; 
bahir-akalpita  vrttir  mahavideha  iii. 
43. 

vidvans,  viduso  ’pi  ii.  9. 
vidharana,  pracchardana-vidharana- 
bhyaih  i.  34. 

viniyoga,  bhumisu  viniyogah  iii.  6. 
vinivrtti,  bliavana-vinivrttih  iv.  25. 
viparyaya,  pramana-viparyaya - vikal- 
pa-  i.  6 ; viparyayo  mithyajnanam 
atadrupapratistham  i.  8. 
vipaka,  kle9a  - karma  - vipaka^apa- 
ramrstah  i.  24  ; sati  mule  tad-vijiako 
jaty-ajmr-bhogah  ii.  13  ; vipaka^ 
anugunanam  . . . vasananam  iv.  8. 
viprakrsta,  viprakrsta-jnanam  iii. 
25. 

vibhakta,  vibhaktah  panthah  iv.  15. 
virama,  virama  - pratyaya.^abhyasa- 
purvah  i.  18. 

virodha,  guna-vrtti-virodhac  ca  ii.  15. 
viveka,  viveka-nimnam  kaivalya-prag- 
bharam  cittam  iv.  26  ; viveka-khyati 

ii.  26,  ii.  28,  iv.  29  ; viveka-jam 
.inanam  iii.  54  ; viveka-jam  dhyanam 

iii.  52. 

vivekin,  dubkham  eva  sarvarii  vive- 
kinali  ii.  15. 

vigesa,  1.  the  particular,  purusa-vigesa 

1.  24 ; vigesa^arthatvat  i.  49 ; vi- 
gesa^avigesa  ii.  19. 

2.  the  distinction,  tato  ’pi  vigesah  i. 
22;  vigesa-darginah  iv.  25. 

vigoka,  vigoka  va  jyotismatl  i.  36. 
visaya,  anubhuta-visaya  i.  11  ; visaya- 
vitrsnasya  i.  15  ; sva-visaya^asam- 


prayoge  cittasya  ii.  54  ; tarakam 
sarva  - visayam  sarvatha-visayam 
akramaih  ceti  vivekajam  jnanam  iii. 
54  ; prajnabhyam  anya-visaya  i.  49  ; 
savicara  nirvicara  ca  suksma-visaya 
i.  44 ; apunya-visayanam  i.  33 ; 
bahya^abhyantara-visaya  ii.  51  ; 
vltaraga-visayam  i.  37. 
visayatva,  suksma-visayatvam  ca^ 
alinga-paryavasanam  i.  45. 
visayavant,  visayavatl  va  pravrttih  i. 
35. 

vita,  vltaraga-visayam  i.  37. 
virya,  graddha-vlrya-smrti-samadhi- 
prajna  i.  20 ; brahmacarya-pratistha- 
yam  virya-labhah  ii.  38. 
vrtti,  yogag  citta-vrtti-nirodhah  i.  2 ; 
vrttayah  pancatay  yah  klista^aklistah 
i.  5 [the  list  forms  the  next  sutra] ; 
vrttir  nidra  i.  10  ; sada  jhatag  citta- 
vrttayas  tat-prabhoh  purusasya._^apa- 
rinamitvat  iv.  18 ; vrtti-sarupyam 
i.  4 ; guna-vrtti-virodhac  ca  ii.  15  ; 
bahya^abhyantara-stambha-vrttih  ii. 
50  ; dhyana-heyas  tad-vrttayah  ii.  11; 
ksina-vrtteh  i.  41 ; bahir-akalpita 
vrttih  iii.  43. 

vedana,  vedana^adarga^asvBda-  iii.  36. 
vedaniya,  janma-vedanlyah  ii.  12. 
vaitrsnya,  guna-vaitrsnyam  i.  16. 
vaira,  vaira-tyagah  ii.  35. 
vairagya,  drsta^^anugravika-visaya- 
vitrsnasya  vagikarasamjna  vairagyam 
i.  15  ; abhyasa-vairagyabhyam  i.  12  ; 
tad-vairagyad  api  dosa-blja-ksaye 
kaivalyam  iii.  50. 

vaigaradya,  nirvicara-vaigaradye  i.  47. 
vyakta,  vyakta-suksmah  iv.  13. 
vyapadegya,  a-vyapadegya  iii.  14. 
vyavahita,  kala-vyavahita  iv.  9 ; suks- 
ma-vyavahita  iii.  25. 
vyakhyata,  parinama  vyakhyatah  iii. 
13  ; suksma-visaya  vyakhyata  i.  44. 


Index  of  Words  in  the  Sutras 


379] 

vyadhi,  vyadhi-styana  i.  30. 
vyutthana,  vyutthana-nirodha  iii.  9 ; 

vyutthane  siddhayah  iii.  37. 
vyuha,  tara-vyuha  iii.  27  ; kaya-vyuha 

iii.  29. 

vrata,  maha-vratam  ii.  31. 

gakti,  svarupa-pratistha  va  citifaktih 

iv.  34 ; sva-svami-9aktyoh  ii.  23 ; 
tad-grahya-9akti  iii.  21 ; drg-darfana- 
9akti  ii.  6. 

Qabda,  9abda^artha-jnana  i.  42 ; 9ab- 
da^artha-pratyayanam  iii.  17;  9abda- 
jnana^anupatl  i.  9. 
garira,  para-9arlra^ave9ah  iii.  38. 
ganta,  ganta^udita  iii.  12  and  14. 
gila,  prakaga-kriya-sthiti-gllam  ii.  18. 
guci,  nitya-guci-sukha^atma-khyati  ii.  5. 
guddha,  drasta  drgimatrah  guddho  ’pi 

ii.  20. 

guddhi,  guddhi-ksaye  ii.  28 ; sattva- 
guddhi  ii.  41 ; guddhi-samye  kaival- 
yam  iii.  35. 

gunya,  svarupa-gunya^iva  i.  43,  iii.  3 ; 
vastu-gunyai.9 ; purusa^artha-gunya 
iv.  34. 

gesa,  samskara-gesa  i.  18. 
gaithilya,  bandha-karana-caithilyat  iii. 

38  ; prayatna-gaithilya  ii.  47. 
gauca,  gauca-samtosa-  ii.  32 ; gaucat 
sva^anga-jugupsa  ii.  40. 
graddha,  graddha-vlrya-smrti-samadhi- 
prajna  i.  20. 

gravana,  pratibha-gravana-vedana-  iii. 

36.  ’ 

gruta,  gruta^anumana  i.  49. 
grotra,  grotra^akagayoh  iii.  41 ; divyaiii 
grotram  iii.  41. 

gvasa,  gvasa-pragvasa  i.  31,  ii.  49. 

sa,  sa  tu  dirghakala-  i.  14. 
samyama,  trayam  ekatra  samyamah 

iii.  4 ; parinama-traya-samyamat  iii. 
16  ; tat-pravibhaga-samyamat  iii.  17 ; | 


kaya-rupa-saihyamat  iii.  21  ; karma 
tat-saihyamat  iii.  22  ; surye  sarh- 
yamat  iii.  26  ; sva^artha-samyamat 
iii.  35  ; saihbandha-samyamat  iii.  41, 
iii.  42  ; arthavattva-sariiyamat  iii.  44, 

iii.  47 ; ksana-tat-kramayoh  saih- 
yamat  iii.  52. 

samyoga,  sarhyogo  heya-hetuh  ii.  17 ; 
upalabdhi-hetu-samyogah  ii.  23  ; 
sarhyoga^abhava  ii.  25 ; ista-devata- 
samprayoga  ii.  44. 
samvid,  citta-sarhvit  iii.  34. 
samvega,  tlvra-saihveganam  i.  21. 
samvedana,  pracara-samvedanac  ca  iii. 

38  ; sva-buddhi-samvedanam  iv.  22. 
samgaya,  styana-samgaya-pramada  i. 
30. 

samskara,  parinama-tapa-samskara- 
duhkhaih  ii.  15  ; pratyaya^antarani 
samskarebhyah  iv.  27  ; taj-jah  sarii- 
skaro  ’nyasarhskara-pratibandhl  i. 
50  ; smrti-sarfaskarayor  ekarupatvat 

iv.  9 ; nirodha-samskarayor  abhi- 
bhava-praduibhavau  iii.  9 ; pragaiita- 
vahita  samskarat  iii.  10  ; samskara- 
gesa  i.  18  ; sarnskara-saksat  iii.  18. 

samhatyakaritva,  parartham  samhat- 
yakaritvat  iv.  24. 

samhananatva,  vaj  ra-saiiihananatvani 
iii.  46. 

samkara,  adhyasat  sarhkarah  iii.  17 ; 

srhrti-samkarag  ca  iv.  21. 
saihkirna,  vikalpaih  sarhklrna  i.  42 ; 

atyanta^a-samkirna  iii.  35. 
samkhya,  dega-kala-samkhyabhih  ii. 
50. 

sanga,  sanga-smaya^akaranam  iii.  51  ; 
a-sanga  iii.  39. 

samgrhitatva,  hetu-phala-agraya-alam- 
banaih  saiiigrhltatvat  iv.  11. 
samjna,  vagikara-samjna  vairagyam 

i.  15. 

sati,  tasmin  sati  ii.  49 ; sati  mule  ii.  13. 


Appendix  7 


satkara,  nairantarya-satkara^asevita 

i.  14. 

sattva,  sattva-^uddhi  ii.  41  ; sattva- 
purusayoh  fuddhi-samye  kaivalyam 
iii.  55  ; sattva-purusa-anyata-khyati- 
matra  iii.  49 ; sattva-purusayor 
atyanta-samkirnayoh  iii.  35. 
satya,  ahinsa-satya  ii.  30 ; satya-prati- 
sthayam  ii.  36. 

sada,  sada  jnata^  citta-vrttayah  iv.  18. 
sant,  sati : see  sati. 

samtosa,  fauca-saihtosa-tapah-  ii.  32 ; 
sarhtosad  anuttamah  sukhalabhah 

ii.  42.’ 

saihnidhi,  tt-samnidhau  vaira-tyagah 

ii.  35, 

saptadha,  tasyasaptadha  prantabhumih 
prajna  ii.  27. 

sabija,  sabljah  samadhih  i.  46, 
samaya,  jati-defa-kala-samaya  ii.  31 ; 
eka-samaye  ca^ubhaya^anavadhar- 
anam  iv.  20. 

samadhi,  tad  eva^arthamatranir- 
bhasamsvarupafunyam  iva  samadhih 

iii.  3 ; sabljah  samadhih  i.  46 ; nir- 
bljah  samadhih  i.  51  ; dharana- 
dhyana-samadhayah  ii,  29  ; ^raddha- 
vlrya-smrti-samadhi-prajna  i.  20 ; 
samadhi-siddhi  ii.  45,  iv,  1 ; samadhi- 
parinama  iii.  11  ; samadhi-bhava- 
na^arthah  ii.  2 ; te  samadhav  upa- 
sargahiii.  37  ; dharma-meghah  sama- 
dhih iv.  29. 

samana,  samana-jayat  iii,  40. 
samapatti,  tatstha-tadahjanata  sama- 
pattih  i.  41 ; laghu-tula-samapatteh 
iii.  42  ; savitarka  samapattih,  i.  42  ; 
Ananta-samapattibhyam  ii,  47. 
samapti,  parinama-krama-samaptih  iv. 
32. 

sampad,  kaya-sampat  iii.  45, 46. 
samprajuata,  vitarka  . . . samprajha- 
tah  i.  17. 


[380 

sambandba,  sambandha-samyamat  iii. 

41,  42. 

sambodha,  janma-kathamta-sambodha 

ii.  39. 

sarva,  sarva-jha  i.  25  ; sarva-jhatrtvam 

iii.  49  ; sarva-visayam  iii.  54  ; cittam 
sarva^rtham  iv.  13  ; sarva^rthata 

iii.  11 ; sarva-bhava  iii.  49  ; duhkham 
eva  sarvam  ii.  15  ; sarva^avarana- 
mala  iv.  31 ; sarva-nirodhat  i.  51  ; 
pratibhad  va  sarvam  iii.  33  ; sarva- 
ratna^upasthanam  ii.  37 ; sarva- 
bhuta-ruta  iii.  17. 

sarvatha,  sarva-visayam  sarvatha 
visayam  akramam  iii.  54  ; sarvatha 
viveka-khyateh  iv.  29, 
savicara,  savicara  . . . suksmavisaya 
i.  44. 

savitarka,  savitarka  samapattih  i.  42. 
sahabbu,  viksepa-sahabhuvah  i.  31. 
saksat,  samskara-s°  iii.  18. 
sadharanatva,  tad-anya-sadh°  ii.  22. 
samya,  9uddhi-samye  kaivalyam  iii,  55; 

vastu-samye  iv,  15. 
sarupya,  vrtti-sarupyam  i.  4. 
sarvabhauma,  sarvabhauma  mahavra- 
tam  ii.  31, 

salambana,  tat  salambanam  iii.  20. 
siddba,  siddha-dar9anam  iii.  32. 
siddbi,  kaya— indriya-siddhih  ii.  43  ; 
vyutthane  siddhih  iii.  37 ; samadhi- 
siddhih  ii.  45 ; samadhi-jah  siddhayah 

iv.  1. 

sukba,  sukha— anufayl  ragah  ii.  7 ; 
nitya-9uci-sukha-atma-khyatih  ii.  5 ; 
sthira-sukham  asanam  ii.  46 ; sukha- 
duhkha-punya-apunya-visayanam  i. 
33 ; anuttamah  sukha-labhah  ii. 

42. 

suksma,  vyakta-suksma  gunatmanah 
iv.  13 ; suksma-vyavahita-  iii.  25 ; 
dirgha-suksmah  ii.  50 ; pratiprasava- 
heyah  suksmah  ii.  10 ; suksmavisaya 


Index  of  Words  in  the  Sutras 


381] 

i.  44 ; suksma-visayatvarii  ca  i.  45  ; 
svarupa-suksma-anvaya-  iii.  44. 
surya,  surye  samyamat  iii.  26. 
sopakrama,  sopakramam  nirupakra- 
marh  ca  karma  iii.  22. 
saumanasya,  9uddhi-sau°-ekagrya  ii. 
41. 

stambha,  9akti-stambhe  iii.  21 ; abhy- 
antara-st°-vrttih  ii.  50. 
styana,  vyadhi-st°-sarii9aya-  i.  30. 
stba,  tat-stha-tadanjanata  i.  41. 
sthanin,  sth°-upanimantrane  iii.  51. 
sthiti,  praka^a-kriya-sthiti  ii.  18 ; tatra 
sthitau  yatno  ’bhyasah  i.  13 ; man- 
asah  sthiti-nibandbani  i.  35. 
sthira,  sth°-sukham  asanam  ii.  46. 
sthula,  sth°-svarupa-suksma-  iii.  44. 
stbairya,  aparigraha-sthairye  ii.  39  ; 

kurma-nadyam  sthairyam  iii.  31. 
smaya,  sanga-sm°-akaranam  iii.  51. 
smrti,  anubhuta-visaya^asampramo- 
sah  smrtih  i.  11 ; -vikalpa-nidra- 
smrtayah  i.  6 ; ^raddha-vlrya-smrti- 
samadhi-prajna  i.  20  ; smrti-samska- 
rayor  ekarupatvat  iv.  9 ; smrti-pari- 
9uddhau  i.  43 ; smrti-saihkara?  ca 
iv.  21. 

syat,  tada  kiiri  syat  iv.  16. 
sva,  sva-svami-^aktyah  ii.  23  ; sva^an- 
ga  ii.  40 ; tapah-svadhyaya^ifvara- 
pranidhanani  ii.  32  ; svadhyayad  ista- 
devata  ii.  44 ; sva^artha-sarhyamat 
iii.  35 ; sva-buddhi-samvedanam  iv. 


22 ; na  tat  sva^abhasani  dr^yatvat 
iv.  19  ; sva-rasa-vahl  ii.  9 ; sva-rupa, 
see  by  itself]  sva-visaya^asariipra- 
yoge  ii.  54. 

svapna,  sv°-nidra-jnana^alambanam 

i.  38. 

svarupa,  sthula-svarupa-suksma-  iii. 
44 ; svarupa^upalabdhi-hetuh  saiii- 
yogah  ii.  23 ; svarupa-pratistha  va  iv. 
34 ; citta-svarupa^anukara  iva  ii.  54 ; 
svarupa-9tinya^iva  i.  43  ; svarupa- 
9unyam  iva  iii.  3 ; tada  svarupa^ava- 
sthanam  i.  3 ; svarupato  ’sty  adhva- 
bhedat  iv.  12  ; grahana-svarupa^as- 
mita  iii.  47. 

svamin,  sva-svami-9aktyoh  ii.  23. 

haua,  samyoga^abhavo  hanam  ii.  25  ; 
viveka-khyatir  aviplava  hana^upa- 
yah  ii.  26  ; hanam  esam  kle9avat 
iv.  28. 

hinsa,  vitarka  hinsa^adayah  ii.  34. 

hrdaya,  hrdaye  citta-sarixvit  iii.  34. 

hetu,  hetu-phala^a9raya  iv.  11  ; ki’a- 
ma^anyatvam  parinama^anyatve 
hetuh  iii.  15 ; upalabdhi-hetu-sam- 
yogah  ii.  23  ; tasya  hetur  avidya 

ii.  24 ; samyogo  heya-hetuh  ii.  17. 

hetutva,  apunya-hetutvat  ii.  14. 

hey  a,  samyogo  heya-hetuh  ii.  17  ; pra- 
tiprasava-heyah  ii.  10 ; dhyana-heyah 
ii.  11  ; heyarh  duhkham  ii.  16. 

hlada,  hlada-paritapa-phalah  ii.  14. 


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384 


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Date  Due 


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